Rel: July 10, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
CL-2025-1084
Jared Don Thrasher
v.
Tabitha Nicole Thrasher
Appeal from Marshall Circuit Court
(DR-25-900146)
FRIDY, Judge.
Jared Don Thrasher ("the husband") appeals from a judgment
entered by the Marshall Circuit Court ("the trial court") divorcing him
from Tabitha Nicole Thrasher ("the wife"). We affirm the trial court's
CL-2025-1084
judgment in part and reverse it in part, and we remand the case to the
trial court with instructions.
Procedural History
On June 5, 2025, the wife filed a complaint in the trial court seeking
a divorce from the husband. She requested, among other things, an
award of sole legal and sole physical custody of the parties' child ("the
child"), who was born in May 2014; an award of child support; an
equitable division of the parties' real and personal property and an
apportionment of the parties' debts; an award of alimony; and an award
of attorney's fees. She also requested pendente lite relief, including
interim alimony and an order directing the husband to prevent the
foreclosure of the parties' marital residence. On June 5, 2025, the trial
court entered an initial pendente lite order directing, among other things,
that the parties refrain from disposing of any assets or property and that
they continue to pay the marital debts and expenses in the same manner
as they had before the commencement of the action. On June 18, 2025,
the husband filed an answer to the wife's complaint and a counterclaim
for a divorce in which he requested, among other things, an award of joint
legal and physical custody of the child, an award of child support, an
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equitable division of the parties' personal property and debts, and an
award of attorney's fees. The wife filed a reply to the husband's
counterclaim.
On July 3, 2025, the trial court entered a pendente lite order in
which it indicated that both parties had been present for a hearing on
that date. Among other things, the trial court awarded the wife the "care,
custody, and control" of the child, subject to the husband's visitation "for
no fewer than four (4) hours per week," directed the husband to "inform
the [wife] in writing no fewer than 72 hours prior to his intent to exercise
visitation," directed the husband to pay child support to the wife in the
amount of $847 per month, granted the wife possession of the marital
residence, directed the husband to immediately satisfy any debt
arrearage currently owing on the marital residence to avoid foreclosure,
and directed the husband to pay to the wife temporary spousal support
in the amount of $1,900 per month beginning on August 1, 2025.
On October 23, 2025, the trial court conducted a trial. On October
28, 2025, the trial court entered a judgment divorcing the parties. The
divorce judgment awarded the "care, custody and control" of the child to
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the wife1 and awarded the husband visitation with the child on the first
and third weekends of each month, in addition to visitation with the child
on Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day from 2:00 p.m. until 5:00 p.m.
The judgment also directed, among other things, that the husband
"inform the [wife] in writing no fewer than 72 hours prior to his intent to
exercise visitation." The divorce judgment further ordered the husband
to pay to the wife child support in the amount of $726 per month; ordered
both parties to be responsible for one-half of the child's uninsured
medical, optical, pharmaceutical, and dental expenses; and ordered that
the wife shall claim the child as a dependent for tax purposes. The divorce
judgment also awarded each party their personal effects, jewelry, and
clothing and directed that "[a]ny real estate, monies, chattels, or other
property … shall be the sole and exclusive property of the person
currently having possession of (or in the case of titled property, title to)
such property," with any debts or encumbrances against said property to
be borne by the party in possession or holding title thereto.
Regarding alimony, the divorce judgment provided:
1We interpret the divorce judgment as having awarded sole legal
and sole physical custody of the child to the wife. See Ala. Code 1975, §
30-3-151 (defining the various forms of custody).
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"1. As alimony-in-gross, the [husband] shall pay the sum
of Twenty Five Thousand and No/Dollars ($25,000.00) to the
[wife]. [The husband] shall pay $150.00 per month until the
entire sum is paid in full. This amount represents the value
of the [wife's] equity in the former residence of the parties due
to non-payment of [the husband]. This amount is a property
settlement and is not modifiable.
"2. As periodic alimony, the [husband] shall pay to the
[wife] the sum of One Thousand and NO/Dollars ($1,000.00)
per month. All such payments shall be made directly to the
[wife]. The first such payment of periodic alimony shall be due
on or before the 1st day of November, 2025. This periodic
alimony shall terminate upon the expiration of sixty (60)
months or as otherwise prescribed by law.
"Subsequent payments shall be made on or before the
first day of each month thereafter."
The trial court found the husband in contempt for his failure to pay child
support and alimony as directed in the pendente lite order and ordered,
among other things, that the husband could purge himself of the
contempt by paying to the wife $5,391 within 180 days of the date of the
entry of the divorce judgment. The trial court ordered the husband to pay
attorney's fees to the wife in the amount of $7,000 and denied all
remaining requested relief.
The husband filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the trial
court's judgment. The trial court held a hearing on that motion, after
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which it denied the motion. The husband filed a timely notice of appeal
to this court.
Issues
The husband raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial
court's division of property and awards of alimony are equitable; (2)
whether the trial court erred in its award of attorney's fees to the wife;
and (3) whether the limitations placed on the husband's visitation with
the child are reasonable and in the child's best interests.
Analysis
The husband contends on appeal that the trial court's awards of
alimony in gross and periodic alimony are due to be reversed. Regarding
the trial court's award of "periodic alimony," the husband argues, among
other things, that the trial court failed to make the express findings
required by § 30-2-57, Ala. Code 1975, regarding the basis for the award
and the specific type of alimony awarded. Section 30-2-57 provides, in
pertinent part:
"(a) Upon granting a divorce or legal separation, the
court shall award either rehabilitative or periodic alimony as
provided in subsection (b), if the court expressly finds all of
the following:
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"(1) A party lacks a separate estate or his or
her separate estate is insufficient to enable the
party to acquire the ability to preserve, to the
extent possible, the economic status quo of the
parties as it existed during the marriage.
"(2) The other party has the ability to supply
those means without undue economic hardship.
"(3) The circumstances of the case make it
equitable.
"(b) If a party has met the requirements of subsection
(a), the court shall award alimony in the following priority:
"(1) Unless the court expressly finds that
rehabilitative alimony is not feasible, the court
shall award rehabilitative alimony to the party for
a limited duration, not to exceed five years, absent
extraordinary circumstances, of an amount to
enable the party to acquire the ability to preserve,
to the extent possible, the economic status quo of
the parties as it existed during the marriage.
"(2) In cases in which the court expressly
finds that rehabilitation is not feasible, a goodfaith attempt at rehabilitation fails, or good-faith
rehabilitation only enables the party to partially
acquire the ability to preserve, to the extent
possible, the economic status quo of the parties as
it existed during the marriage, the court shall
award the party periodic installments of alimony
for a duration and an amount to allow the party to
preserve, to the extent possible, the economic
status quo of the parties as it existed during the
marriage as provided in subsection (g)."
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The remainder of § 30-2-57 outlines factors to be considered in making
the necessary findings and provides additional guidance in determining
an alimony award.
The husband cites Merrick v. Merrick, 352 So. 3d 770, 775 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2021), in which this court stated: "The legislature has clearly
required that an alimony award be either rehabilitative alimony or
periodic alimony and that, to award either type of alimony, the trial court
must make certain express findings after considering the various factors
described in § 30-2-57(d)-(f)." In Perry v. Perry, [Ms. CL-2025-0409, Jan.
16, 2026] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2026), this court reversed a
judgment awarding periodic alimony based on the absence of the express
findings required by § 30-2-57(a). In the present case, the wife requested
an award of "interim alimony, rehabilitative alimony, alimony in gross,
and/or periodic alimony." The trial court's judgment awarded the wife
"periodic alimony" but did not make the express findings required by §
30-2-57(a) or expressly find that rehabilitative alimony is not feasible
under the circumstances presented, as required by § 30-2-57(b);
accordingly, the periodic-alimony award is due to be reversed. See Perry,
supra. Because "the periodic-alimony award is intertwined with the
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division of the marital property and the attorney-fee award, those aspects
of the judgment are likewise subject to reversal and reconsideration by
the trial court on remand." Cason v. Cason, 378 So. 3d 552, 554 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2022).
The husband also challenges that portion of the divorce judgment
addressing his visitation with the child. First, the husband argues that
limiting his visitation with the child to the first and third weekends of
the month, along with a few hours on Thanksgiving and Christmas,
barring other holiday or summer visitation, amounts to a limitation on
his visitation with the child that is unsupported by the evidence.
Additionally, the husband argues that the requirement that he inform
the wife of his intent to exercise his visitation rights in writing seventytwo hours in advance is "ambiguous" and does not state that the wife
must accommodate the visitation following that notice.
In his October 31, 2025, motion to alter, amend, or vacate the
divorce judgment, the husband asserted that the divorce judgment
"imposes a modified version of the Marshall County Unified Family Court
Standard Custody and Visitation Order," and he requested that the trial
court reconsider and amend that portion of the divorce judgment to
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CL-2025-1084
"award the standard visitation pursuant to Marshall County Family
Court Standard Custody and Visitation Order, as such arrangement
would serve the best interest of the … child and promote a consistent and
meaningful parent-child relationship." The husband stated that his
request for a modification was intended "to establish a fair and balanced
schedule." The husband did not challenge the seventy-two-hour-notice
requirement in his postjudgment motion. See Chapman v. Chapman,
[Ms. CL-2023-0485, Mar. 28, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App.
2025) ("When a trial court does not make specific findings of fact
regarding the reasons it imposed a restriction on custody or visitation,
the noncustodial parent must file a postjudgment motion to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence."). Although the trial court set the husband's
postjudgment motion for a hearing, a transcript of that hearing does not
appear in the record on appeal. Thus, we have no indication regarding
whether the husband raised an argument regarding the seventy-twohour-notice requirement before the trial court at any time. "[An appellate
court] cannot consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal;
rather, [the appellate court's] review is restricted to the evidence and
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arguments considered by the trial court." Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612
So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala. 1992).
The husband asserts that the wife had interpreted the seventy-twohour-notice requirement in the pendente lite order to mean that the
husband could visit the child only at the times that she selected. He
points to his trial testimony in which he stated that, when he had
attempted to visit the child following the entry of the pendente lite order,
the wife had denied him visitation on the day that he requested and had
informed him that he "could only have [the child] for whatever the times
was [sic] that she picked"; the husband asserts that the trial court's
reinstatement of the seventy-two-hour-notice requirement in the divorce
judgment reinforces the belief that the husband's visitation "is
completely at the whim of [the wife]." The husband's brief, p. 32.
We note first that, unlike in the divorce judgment, which awarded
the husband visitation on the first and third weekends of each month,
the July 3, 2025, pendente lite order awarded the husband "visitation for
no fewer than four (4) hours per week" and directed him to inform the
wife in writing no fewer than seventy-two hours before his intent to
exercise visitation. Moreover, we note that the husband did not testify at
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the trial that he had provided the wife with the required seventy-twohour notice for his requested visitation time or that the inclusion of that
requirement in the pendente lite order had created any ambiguity that
had resulted in the wife's refusal to allow him to exercise visitation. Thus,
we cannot conclude that the husband's testimony at the trial preserved
any challenge to the seventy-two-hour-notice requirement for this court's
review, and we decline to consider the same. See Andrews, supra.
Because the husband challenged the trial court's award of a more
limited visitation schedule in lieu of standard visitation in his
postjudgment motion, we consider his arguments on appeal as to that
issue. In Pratt v. Pratt, 56 So. 3d 638, 641 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), this court
stated, in pertinent part:
" 'The trial court has broad discretion in determining the
visitation rights of a noncustodial parent, and its decision in
this regard will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.'
Carr v. Broyles, 652 So. 2d 299, 303 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994). In
exercising its discretion over visitation matters, ' "[t]he trial
court is entrusted to balance the rights of the parents with the
child's best interests to fashion a visitation award that is
tailored to the specific facts and circumstances of the
individual case." ' Ratliff v. Ratliff, 5 So. 3d 570, 586 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2008) (quoting Nauditt v. Haddock, 882 So. 2d 364, 367
(Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (plurality opinion)). A noncustodial
parent generally enjoys 'reasonable rights of visitation' with
his or her children. Naylor v. Oden, 415 So. 2d 1118, 1120
(Ala. Civ. App. 1982). However, those rights may be restricted
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in order to protect children from conduct, conditions, or
circumstances surrounding their noncustodial parent that
endanger the children's health, safety, or well-being. See Ex
parte Thompson, 51 So. 3d 265, 272 (Ala. 2010) ('A trial court
in establishing visitation privileges for a noncustodial parent
must consider the best interests and welfare of the minor
child and, where appropriate, as in this case, set conditions on
visitation that protect the child.'). In fashioning the
appropriate restrictions, out of respect for the public policy
encouraging interaction between noncustodial parents and
their children, see Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-150 (addressing
joint custody), and § 30-3-160 (addressing Alabama ParentChild Relationship Protection Act), the trial court may not use
an overbroad restriction that does more than necessary to
protect the children. See Smith v. Smith, 887 So. 2d 257 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2003), and Smith v. Smith, 599 So. 2d 1182, 1187
(Ala. Civ. App. 1991)."
The husband argues on appeal that the trial court's more restricted
visitation schedule is unsupported by the evidence presented. He asserts
that the record contains no allegations that he had endangered the child;
that the wife did not request restrictions on his visitation with the child;
and that, although his work schedule had previously interfered with his
ability to visit the child, he had obtained employment that allowed him
to visit the child more often. We note that, at the October 23, 2025, trial,
the trial court took notice of the testimony and other evidence that had
been presented at the pendente lite hearing, without objection by the
husband. A transcript of that hearing does not appear in the record on
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appeal. At the October 23, 2025, trial, however, the wife described the
husband and child's relationship as "estranged." The husband
acknowledged that he had attempted to set up only two visits with the
child since the pendente lite order was entered on July 3, 2025, and that
he had exercised only one of those visits. The husband also acknowledged
that he was able to send messages to the child on an old cellular telephone
that the child had access to, but he acknowledged that he had not sent a
message to the child in the month of October before the trial. The
husband denied having the child's new cellular-telephone number. The
wife testified, however, that the child had given the husband his new
cellular-telephone number but that the husband had not telephoned the
child in September or October before the October 23, 2025, trial.
The husband's son from a previous relationship testified that he
had worked a long-haul trucking job with the husband from January
2025 until the beginning of May 2025. The husband testified that he had
continued working for the company where he had worked with his son
until September 2025 but that he was going to begin a new job at a
different trucking company on the Monday after the October 23, 2025,
trial. He stated that he would work Monday through Friday of each week
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and that he could have every weekend off or every other weekend off. He
affirmed that part of his motivation for having changed jobs was so that
he could see the child more often. On cross-examination, the husband
testified that, at his new job, he would be driving "from Mobile, Alabama,
all the way up through Chicago up the I-65 corridor." The husband denied
that he would "be doing long hauls" and stated that his "plan with this
job is starting out with them just running these short hauls," after which
he would be "doing a daily job" that would allow him to "be home daily."
Upon questioning by the trial court, the husband clarified that he would
be required to drive to Chicago and back "for a year to get [his] time in
with" his new employer and that, after that, he would "swap over to their
daily job where [he'll] be home daily."
"When a trial court hears ore tenus testimony, this court will
presume on appeal that the trial court's findings on disputed facts are
correct, and we will not reverse its judgment based on those findings
unless the judgment is palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust."
Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 386 So. 3d 42, 51 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). The
evidence presented indicates that, for a year following the trial, the
husband will be driving from Mobile to Chicago and back on "short hauls"
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at his new job and that he will have every other weekend off.
Additionally, the trial court could have concluded from the evidence
presented at the trial that the father's relationship with the child was
tenuous based, in part, on the husband's lack of effort to pursue
communication and visitation with the child. Even without the benefit of
the testimony and other evidence presented at the pendente lite hearing,
we conclude that the evidence presented at the trial supports the trial
court's visitation award, which is appropriately tailored to the particular
circumstances of the present case. See Pratt, supra. The visitation
schedule takes into consideration the husband's work schedule that
permits him to be at home every other weekend and the existing
relationship between the husband and the child, and it encourages
visitation between the husband and the child while protecting the child's
best interests. Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the trial court's
judgment.
Conclusion
The trial court's judgment is reversed insofar as it awarded the wife
periodic alimony, and we remand the case to the trial court for it to enter
a new judgment that complies with § 30-2-57. In light of our reversal on
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the issue of periodic alimony, we pretermit consideration of the husband's
arguments on appeal as they relate to the equity of the property division,
the award of alimony in gross, and the award of attorney's fees to the wife
because "[t]he issues of property division and alimony are interrelated,
and they must be considered together on appeal." Turnbo v. Turnbo, 938
So. 2d 425, 430 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006). The trial court is directed to
reconsider those issues in conjunction with any alimony determination it
makes on remand. The trial court's judgment is affirmed in all other
respects.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Bowden, JJ., concur.
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