Rel: July 10, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
CL-2026-0201
Trulieve Cannabis Corp., Trulieve Holdings, Inc., and Trulieve
AL, Inc.
v.
Alabama Medical Cannabis Commission et al.
Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-26-900441)
PER CURIAM.
This appeal arises from a judgment of the Montgomery Circuit
Court ("the circuit court") that dismissed a complaint seeking judicial
review of an administrative order. At issue in the complaint was whether
a certain administrative order could lead to the exposure of trade secrets
CL-2026-0201
and other proprietary information at a later administrative hearing. The
circuit court determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
review the administrative order and dismissed the complaint. We
disagree, reverse the judgment, and remand this case to the circuit court
for further consideration.
This case is the latest in a series of lawsuits (and appellate
proceedings) related to the Darren Wesley "Alto" Hall Compassion Act
("the Act"), Ala. Code 1975, § 20-2A-1 et seq., which legalized "medical"
marijuana for personal use in the State of Alabama. The Act created the
Alabama Medical Cannabis Commission ("the commission") to oversee
the implementation of the Act and, specifically, as the Act relates to this
case, to issue licenses related to the growing and distribution of medical
cannabis. See §§ 20-2A-20 and 20-2A-22, Ala. Code, 1975. The licenses at
issue in this case are "integrated facility medical cannabis licenses"
("integrated-facility licenses"). Integrated-facility licenses authorize a
company to cultivate, process, and distribute medical cannabis. The Act
authorizes the commission to issue five integrated-facility licenses. See §
20-2A-67, Ala. Code 1975. Trulieve Cannabis Corp., Trulieve Holdings,
2
CL-2026-0201
Inc., and Trulieve AL, Inc. (collectively referred to as "Trulieve") have
applied for one of those licenses.
To assist it in selecting recipients for integrated-facility licenses,
the commission initiated a competitive, investigative-hearing process.
The investigative-hearing process will allow the various applicants to
participate in an adversarial hearing conducted by an administrative-law
judge ("ALJ") under the procedures contained in the Alabama
Administrative Procedure Act ("the AAPA"), § 41-22-1 et seq., Ala. Code
1975. The ALJ would then make a recommendation to the commission
for a final decision on which applicants would receive an integratedfacility license.
To prepare for the impending presentation of likely complex
evidence, the ALJ issued various scheduling orders and other prehearing
directives to applicants for the integrated-facility licenses. The
commission and its members describe the process as follows:
"During months of structured case management, the
ALJ entered numerous orders, including a protective order
dated November 20, 2025, drafted by Trulieve and negotiated
among the parties. [The] ALJ also issued scheduling orders
dated December 4, 2025, January 15, 2026, and January 29,
2026. These orders established deadlines and procedures for
the production of documents, identification of confidentiality
3
CL-2026-0201
claims, and preparation for anticipated contested case
hearings that were to begin March 23, 2026.
"Specifically relevant to these proceedings, the
November 20 Protective Order permitted the parties to
designate portions of their documents and information as
'Confidential -- Subject to a Protective Order' ('Confidential')
or 'Confidential -- Attorney Eyes Only -- Subject to a
Protective Order' ('AEO'). The protective order cautions that
the AEO 'designation must be made in good faith and not for
the purpose of gaining a tactical advantage…. [and] shall be
made only where disclosure to a business representative
would create a clearly defined and serious risk of competitive
harm.' A party could challenge another party's confidentiality
designation 'at any point in these proceedings … by filing a
motion with the [ALJ].' The protective order also allocated the
burden of proof as to the designation of documents and
information: 'The Designating Entity bears the burden of
establishing that the information is entitled to [Confidential]
or [AEO] treatment.' "
Brief of the commission and its members, p. 7 (citations omitted).
Pursuant to the November 20, 2025, order ("the protective order"),
Trulieve, along with other applicants, submitted a version of its original
application for an integrated-facility license with portions of the
information redacted and designated as "Confidential -- Attorney Eyes
Only" ("AEO"). The intended effect of those redactions would be to
prevent another applicant's outside counsel from sharing the
4
CL-2026-0201
designated/protected information with his or her client, i.e., an employee
of another applicant.1 Trulieve describes its designations as follows:
"Trulieve … complied with this process, making just 17
AEO designations in its 1400-page-long application. Trulieve
… reserved AEO designations for information considered to
be trade secret information in the medical-cannabis industry.
Its AEO designations included, among other things, its
business plan, standard operating procedures, policies and
procedures manual, manufacturing processes, and
engineering layouts. Trulieve … also served all counsel with
a privilege log, explaining the basis and nature of all
confidentiality designations."
Trulieve's brief, p. 12.
Other applicants submitted redacted versions of their applications
as well, while some applicants submitted applications with very limited
redactions. It is largely uncontested that Trulieve submitted the most
extensive redactions using the AEO designation.
Paragraph 13 of the protective order provides guidance on how
disagreements over an applicant's redactions were to be resolved:
"13. Challenge to Confidential Designation. In the event
that any party who has appeared disagrees at any point in
these proceedings with any designation made under this
1The protective order allows for a slightly less stringent designation
referred to in the order as "Confidential." This designation would
generally prevent disclosure to third parties not connected to the
investigative hearing and prohibits the use of the designated information
outside the proceedings.
5
CL-2026-0201
Protective Order, the parties who have appeared shall first
try to resolve such dispute in good faith on an informal basis.
If the dispute cannot be resolved, the party objecting to the
designation may seek appropriate relief by filing a motion
with the Administrative Law Judge. The Designating Entity
bears the burden of establishing that the information is
entitled to Confidential or Confidential-Attorney-Eyes-Only
treatment."
On February 18, 2026, one of the other applicants for an integratedfacility license, Alabama Always, LLC ("Alabama Always"), filed a motion
with the ALJ objecting to Trulieve's AEO designations. The motion
included an affidavit from an expert in the medical-marijuana industry
that stated that "several applicants labeled a significant amount of
information in their applications [as AEO] … that does not constitute a
trade secret or other confidential or proprietary business information in
the cannabis industry." Insa Alabama, LLC ("Insa"), filed a similar
motion detailing the AEO designations by Trulieve that it believed were
not justified.2
Trulieve filed a lengthy response justifying the use of the AEO
designations in its application. The response included an affidavit from
the "Chief Legal Officer and Corporate Secretary for Trulieve Cannabis
2Another applicant, Jemmstone, Alabama, LLC, filed a motion
objecting "to any AEO designation of any materials by any party."
6
CL-2026-0201
Corp.," as well as affidavits from two experts in the medical-cannabis
industry. Among other things, Trulieve argued that its designations
protect trade secrets of "significant economic value" from being seen and
exploited by other applicants who are also Trulieve's competitors in the
medical-cannabis industry. Trulieve also continuously reminded the ALJ
in its response that the AEO designation did not restrict outside counsel
and outside experts of the other applicants from viewing the complete,
unredacted integrated-facility application. The AEO designation's
primary effect was to restrict employees of the other applicants from
seeing Trulieve's unredacted, original application.
On March 10, 2026, the ALJ issued an order ruling on the motions
filed by Alabama Always, Insa, and Jemmstone. Extended portions of the
order are set out below:
"I have spent the better part of the past two weeks,
including the intervening weekends, going through the
accumulated resubmissions of original applications, as now
updated and 'shaded' to designate specific assertions of the
two confidentiality categories allowable under the Protective
Order, as last amended. Of particular interest to me at this
stage are assertions of the 'Confidential-Attorney Eyes Only'
level of confidentiality. I find that five of the fifteen applicants
have advanced that protection for only personal identifiers
such as Social Security numbers and bank account numbers.
The other ten applicants have asserted that heightened level
of protection for a variety of other types of information, in
7
CL-2026-0201
many instances so pervasively and expansively as to conflict
with, and frustrate, the policies and mandates for disclosure,
transparency, and right of probing cross-examination
contained in the combined provisions of the Alabama
Administrative Procedure Act, the Alabama Medical Use of
Cannabis Act ('AMUCA'), and the Alabama Medical
Commission Administrative Code.
".…
"Protection is often claimed in litigation for information
that does not qualify as a trade secret, referring to it as,
alternatively, proprietary information or confidential
information. These broad, generic categories are not welldefined in scope but, like trade secrets, are not absolute and
must yield when the ends of justice warrant.
".…
"As the preamble to the November 20, 2025, Protective
Order stated, its impetus was that documents and
information were being sought, produced and exhibited by
and among parties that related to various types of personal or
especially sensitive information and the parties desired to
'protect such documents and information from public
disclosure or improper use.' That purpose has been well
served during the stages of this process up to now. But the
many instances of invocation in the 'shaded' materials of
Attorneys Eyes Only protection -- which the Protective Order
expressly reserves only for those situations 'where disclosure
to a business representative would create a clearly defined
and serious risk of competitive harm' -- for information not
qualifying as such, undercuts the feasibility and practicability
of its continued application. Additionally, the need, indeed the
right, of each applicant fully to vet and analyze the relevant
credentials, qualifications, and expertise of each other
applicant, both in advance of and during the hearing, is
evident. The competitive injury any particular disclosure
might cause a disclosing applicant is tempered by the fact that
8
CL-2026-0201
at this stage there are no true competitors -- none of the
applicants will be able to engage in the business of operating
an Integrated Facility until the Cannabis Commission
ultimately issues the maximum of five licenses statutorily
allotted for that category of operation. Once this hearing
process has been completed, and I have reviewed the hearing
record and issued my recommendations to the Commission,
and it has completed its process of review and ultimate
issuance of up to five Integrated Facility licenses, then, and
only then, will there be business competitors. Each licensee
may operate a maximum of five dispensing sites, each located
in a different county. Thus, a total of not more than 25
dispensing sites will be in place within Alabama's 63 counties
and, probably, all in different counties. Thus, each operational
licensee will have only four true competitors, and the
proximity of dispensing sites to patient populations will
probably be the principal competitive 'draw.'
"Taking everything into consideration in the exercise of
a balancing process, I find that it would work an injustice to
allow various applicants to advocate their superiority as
deserving licensees while shielding pertinent information
from all but those allowed access under the Attorney Eyes
Only category, and also be in a position to attack the
suitability of other applicants who applied that category
sparingly.
"Therefore, I rule as follows:
"1. It is not practical to issue an applicant-byapplicant, aspect-by-aspect analysis of the propriety of every
asserted application of Attorney Eyes Only protection. A
broader, category-based treatment must be employed.
"2. The confidentiality category of Attorney Eyes Only
is henceforth reserved exclusively for and applicable only to:
"a. Social Security Numbers and Tax
Identification Numbers
9
CL-2026-0201
"b The home addresses of all natural
persons other than those whose addresses are
called for by Ala. Code [1975,] § 20-2A-55(a)(2)[,]
and also are required to satisfy the residency
requirements of § 20-2A-55(a)(l0)
"c. Personal telephone numbers of natural
persons
"d. Dates of birth
"e. Income tax returns and financial
statements of natural persons
"f. Banking records of natural persons
"g. Medical records.
"To the extent any of that information might be
pertinent and relevant to the application process, it can be
adequately reviewed by those persons authorized to access
Attorney-Eyes Only information.
"3. All other claims, classifications, and categories of
Attorney Eyes Only confidentiality are hereby denied and
they are automatically converted and relegated to the
separate category under the Protective Order of 'ConfidentialSubject to a Protective Order.' To the extent that Attorney
Eyes Only protection has been sought for records concerning
'security plans,' pursuant to the exemptions for such records
from the Open Records Act, codified as § 36-12-40, [Ala. Code
1975,] the protection indirectly provided by that exemption is
only from the 'right of every citizen to inspect and take a copy
of any public writing of this state,' as otherwise provided by
the Act. The protection afforded under the Protective Order
for information designated as 'Confidential-Subject to a
Protective Order' adequately safeguards such security plans.
10
CL-2026-0201
"4. Provided, however, this Order and the resulting
conversion of Attorney Eyes Only designations to the lessrestrictive category of 'Confidential-Subject to a Protective
Order' shall not take effect until noon on Monday, March 16,
2026, in order that any party wishing to attempt to obtain a
stay of this Order may have time to secure such a stay. In
other words, I recognize the adage that you 'can't unring the
bell' once access to information has been provided. Only if a
binding 'stay' order has issued from a court of competent
jurisdiction will this Order not take effect at noon on March
16, 2026."
On March 12, 2026, Trulieve filed a complaint in the circuit court
requesting protection from the ALJ's March 10 order. Count I of the
complaint sought a "Judicial Review" of the ALJ's March 10 order
pursuant to § 41-22-20, Ala. Code 1975, which allows a circuit court to
review preliminary agency rulings in certain limited circumstances.
Count II sought a "Declaratory Judgment and Injunction" pursuant to
Rule 57, Ala. R. Civ. P., and § 6-6-222, Ala. Code 1975. Finally, Count III
asked the circuit court to issue a "Common Law Writ of Mandamus." Also
on March 12, 2026, Trulieve asked the circuit court to stay the execution
of the March 10 order. The circuit court set a hearing on Trulieve's
request for a stay on March 16, 2026.
The parties appeared before the circuit court on March 16 as
ordered and made extensive arguments to the circuit court on Trulieve's
11
CL-2026-0201
request for a stay, as well as addressing other aspects of the case.3 Later
that day, the circuit court entered its judgment allowing certain parties
(other applicants for licenses) to intervene,4 denied Trulieve's motion for
a stay, and determined as part of the judgment that "it [was] without
subject-matter jurisdiction." The circuit court also alternatively ruled
that, "with respect to Counts II and III of the Complaint, Alabama
Always' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings would be due to granted
as to the argument that all other applicants for licenses would be
necessary parties to the case under Rule 19[, Ala. R. Civ. P.]." The circuit
court concluded its judgment by ordering that the case be dismissed.
Trulieve filed its notice of appeal the same day.5
3The hearing was set to argue Trulieve's motion for a stay of the
execution of the March 10 order. However, the arguments were farranging and devolved into argument regarding the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the circuit court.
4The intervenors below were Alabama Always, Insa, Wagon Trail
Med-Serv, LLC, and Jemmstone Alabama, LLC.
5In its notice of appeal, Trulieve named as appellees the
commission; the members of the commission -- Rex Vaughn, Sam
Blakemore, Dwight Gamble, Dr. Angela Martin, Dr. Eric Jensen, Loree
Skelton, James Harwell, Dr. Mac Barnes, Dr. Jimmie Harvey, Dion
Robinson, Dr. William Saliski, Hon. Charles Price, and Taylor Hatchett;
the ALJ -- Hon. Bernard Harwood; and the intervenors below (see note 4,
supra).
12
CL-2026-0201
Along with its notice of appeal, Trulieve also filed an "Emergency
Motion to Stay" with this court. That motion was granted and then later
clarified to reflect that the stay applied only to Trulieve. The commission
and its members and Insa filed motions to dissolve the stay, which were
denied.6 This court also entered an order on March 18, 2026, ordering
expedited briefing on the merits of Trulieve's appeal.
Because it is fundamental to the outcome of this appeal, we first
review the circuit court's determination that it did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over Trulieve's interlocutory request for immediate
judicial review. In reviewing that decision, we are guided by the principle
that a trial court's "subject-matter jurisdiction [is] subject to de novo
review." DuBose v. Weaver, 68 So. 3d 814, 821 (Ala. 2011). See Alabama
Med. Cannabis Comm'n v. Alabama Always, LLC, [CL-2024-0588, Mar.
7, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2025). Furthermore, "no
presumption of correctness" attaches to the circuit court's "dismissal" on
that basis. Hudson v. Ivey, 383 So. 3d 636, 639 (Ala. 2023).
Trulieve argues that it has a right of appeal to the circuit court
based on § 41-22-20(a), which provides:
6Alabama Always joined Insa's motion to dissolve the stay.
13
CL-2026-0201
"(a) A person who has exhausted all administrative
remedies available within the agency, other than rehearing,
and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is
entitled to judicial review under [the AAPA]. A preliminary,
procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling is
immediately reviewable if review of the final agency decision
would not provide an adequate remedy."
(Emphasis added.)7
The record in this case is clear that Trulieve is seeking review of a
preliminary ruling -- the ALJ's March 10 order modifying the protections
for trade secrets and other proprietary information -- issued before the
investigative hearing. The plain language of § 41-22-20(a) allows judicial
review of an agency action "if review of the final agency decision would
not provide an adequate remedy." Trulieve argues that waiting until the
commission's final decision would not protect it from the release of what
has been described as valuable information related to its internal
operations. Trulieve further describes its position as follows:
"The jurisdictional plague that has wiped out most of the
medical-cannabis lawsuits has not infected Trulieve's appeal.
Trulieve brought an interlocutory administrative appeal -- not
a declaratory judgment action -- that presents irreparable
7Insa is the only other applicant that filed a brief in response to
Trulieve's appellant's brief. Insa did not address the circuit court's
judgment dismissing the case on subject-matter-jurisdiction grounds in
its brief. Another applicant, Alabama Always, joined Insa's brief. The
commission and its members did file a brief in which they argued in
support of the circuit judge's decision on subject-matter jurisdiction.
14
CL-2026-0201
harm unrelated to the Commission's final licensure decision.
This put Trulieve's action squarely within the governing
statutory language and the medical-cannabis precedents
finding circuit-court jurisdiction. Although the Commission
fears that a finding of jurisdiction here will lead to a run on
the courthouse, that fear is unfounded. As this Court has
continually held, any procedural complaint that can be
remedied by getting a license or a final appeal will not give
rise to an interlocutory appellate right. Trade secrets are
fundamentally different in that respect, thus opening the door
to appeal in this limited circumstance."
Trulieve's brief, p. 40.
Thus, the threshold question of subject-matter jurisdiction hinges
on whether a later judicial review of the commission's final decision on
integrated-facility-license awards would provide the opportunity for an
adequate remedy for the improper release of alleged trade secrets. We
agree with Trulieve that it would not and that the circuit court has
subject-matter jurisdiction to review the March 10 order. In reaching that
decision, we briefly examine the unique nature of trade secrets and the
protection afforded such information during litigation.
We first note that it is the public policy of this state that
information qualifying as a "trade secret" is protected from disclosure
under the law. See § 8-27-3, Ala. Code 1975 ("A person who discloses or
uses the trade secret of another, without a privilege to do so, is liable to
15
CL-2026-0201
the other for misappropriation of the trade secret .…"); § 13A-8-10.4(c),
Ala. Code 1975 ("Theft of trade secrets or trademarks is a Class C
felony."); Rule 507, Ala. R. Evid. ("A person has a privilege … to refuse to
disclose and to prevent other persons from disclosing a trade secret
owned by the person, if the allowance of the privilege will not tend to
conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice."); and Rule 26(c)(7), Ala. R.
Civ. P. (authorizing the court to enter a protective order "that a trade
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial
information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way").
Those legal protections symbolize the significance of trade secrets
and the lengths the law extends to protect them. Conversely, those same
protections implicitly recognize that the imprudent and unnecessary
release of trade secrets to competitors is a harm to be avoided.8 On this
8
"The issue of trade secret disclosure in litigation
requires a balancing of two competing interests: (1) trade
secrets are an important property interest worthy of
protection, and (2) all facts necessary for the fair adjudication
of a lawsuit must be disclosed. These interests are best
accommodated by requiring disclosure only if it is necessary
for a fair adjudication of the requesting party's claims or
defenses. An in camera review may be required to make these
determinations."
16
CL-2026-0201
principle there seems to be little disagreement. The finer point to be
addressed here is the timing of judicial review of a trial judge's, or in this
case the ALJ's, decision to order the release of trade secrets before a final
judgment or decision. The Alabama Supreme Court described the
problem as follows:
"The danger of entrusting [the plaintiff] with the
[defendant's] trade secrets is that doing so could harm [the
defendant] and there may be no sanction sufficient to protect
[the defendant] in the event [the plaintiff] fails to abide by the
terms of the protective order; there also may be no system of
monitoring what [the plaintiff] or his current employer, a
business in competition with [the defendant], do with the
information they would be able to glean from this expansive
discovery. The Ohio Court of Appeals noted: 'If a trial court
orders the discovery of trade secrets and such are disclosed,
the party resisting discovery will have no adequate remedy on
appeal. The proverbial bell cannot be unrung and an appeal
after final judgment on the merits will not rectify the damage.'
Gibson-Myers & Assocs. v. Pearce, (No. 19358, Oct. 27,
1999)(Ohio Ct. App. 1999)(unpublished)."
Ex parte Miltope Corp., 823 So. 2d 640, 644-45 (Ala. 2001) (footnote
omitted; emphasis added).
In Ex parte Michelin North America, Inc., 161 So. 3d 164 (Ala.
2014), the Alabama Supreme Court addressed whether a trial court's
2 Louis Altman & Malla Pollack, Callmann on Unfair Competition,
Trademarks & Monopolies, § 14:35 (4th ed. 2022) (footnotes omitted).
17
CL-2026-0201
order allowing a plaintiff to conduct an onsite inspection of the
defendant's tire plant unfairly and unnecessarily exposed the defendant's
trade secrets. The supreme court first recognized that the defendant had
met its "initial burden of showing that the information sought to be
shielded from disclosure constitutes a trade secret the disclosure of which
would result in injury to [the defendant]." Id. at 172. The supreme court
further concluded that the plaintiff failed to "establish[] that the
information she seeks by way of an inspection of the [defendant's] facility
is necessary and relevant to this litigation" and found that the trial court
exceeded its discretion in ordering the onsite inspection. Id. at 176.
In addition to the holding referenced above, there are two
procedural aspects of Michelin that are relevant to the analysis in this
case. First, the defendant in Michelin sought relief by way of a petition
for the writ of mandamus during the litigation. That is, the supreme
court accepted the defendant's petition for assistance in protecting its
trade secrets during the ongoing litigation in the court below. The
defendant was not left with addressing the injury on appeal after a final
judgment. Id. at 167. Also, the standard of review for a mandamus
petition, which was cited by the supreme court in Michelin, includes the
18
CL-2026-0201
principle that the party seeking mandamus relief must show that it
" ' " 'does not have an adequate remedy by ordinary appeal.' " ' " Id. at 170
(citations omitted; emphasis added). Thus, the ruling in Michelin and its
procedural posture clearly support Trulieve's position that its complaint
for judicial review fits squarely within the language of § 41-22-20(a)
allowing for "immediate review" of an interlocutory agency decision.
This court had the opportunity to review the scope of a licensee's
right to immediate review under § 41-22-20(a) in Southeast Cannabis Co.
v. Alabama Medical Cannabis Commission, [Ms. CL-2024-0300, Dec. 20,
2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024). In Southeast, the
appellants were three businesses that had initially been awarded
medical-cannabis-distribution and/or integrated-facility licenses.
However, for reasons unimportant to this case, the commission had
rescinded the licenses and had awarded them to other entities. Id. at ___.
The disappointed applicants ("the applicants") filed complaints in circuit
court before the commission's final decision, seeking relief, in part,
pursuant to § 41-22-20(a), which allows immediate review of an agency
decision. Id. at ___. This court found that the applicants "could be
irreparably harmed by a delay in judicial review." Id. at ___. In reaching
19
CL-2026-0201
that conclusion, this court made the following observation: "The remedy
of judicial review following a final decision would be inadequate if there
is 'some suggestion that the administrative ruling, if incorrect, could not
be remedied so as to cause irreparable harm.' " Id. at ___ (citation
omitted).
The commission and its members argue in their appellate brief that
the exception allowing for "immediate review" of an interlocutory agency
decision is a "narrow one." Brief of the commission and its members, p.
17. They further argue that "[a]llowing immediate appellate review of
limited procedural matters within the context of the contested-case
proceedings would invite similar challenges to routine evidentiary and
case-management decisions." Id. at 18.
We agree that the exception is a narrow one. And we are certainly
mindful of the litigation that has developed around the medical-cannabislicensing process. However, the plain language of § 41-22-20(a) clearly
contemplates situations in which an interlocutory order of an agency
impacts a party's rights in such a way that the order is eligible for judicial
review before a final agency decision. The constellation of trade-secret
protections found in Alabama law are a clear indication of how important
20
CL-2026-0201
the privilege from releasing this information is to be considered. Trulieve
has presented sufficient evidence showing that the information it is being
required to disclose could potentially be trade secrets and that release of
the information could potentially be harmful to its ability to compete.
Therefore, we hold that the March 10 order falls within the scope of § 41-22-20(a)'s right to immediate judicial review. That being the case, the
circuit court erred in concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
Count I of Trulieve's complaint.9
Trulieve asks this court on appeal to vacate "the March 10 order as
to Trulieve only" and to order the ALJ to "reject the challenges to
Trulieve's trade-secret-privilege claims." Trulieve's brief, p. 9. In the
alternative, Trulieve asks this court to remand this case for the "ALJ to
9As previously indicated, the circuit court alternatively ruled that
"Alabama Always' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings would be due
to [be] granted as to the argument that all other applicants for licenses
would be necessary parties to the case under Rule 19[, Ala. Rule Civ. P.]."
However, that ruling only extended to Counts II and III. Trulieve did not
appeal that ruling, and, thus, the circuit court's decision on those counts
is not before this court. See Trulieve's reply brief, p. 29 ("The Circuit
Court did not rule that Trulieve failed to join necessary parties to its
administrative appeal claim, which is what Trulieve asks this Court to
reverse.").
21
CL-2026-0201
apply the established law of trade secrets to the challenges to Trulieve's
trade-secret claims." Id. We decline to grant the relief requested.
A petition for judicial review of an agency decision should be filed
in the relevant circuit court:
"A petition shall be filed either in the Circuit Court of
Montgomery County or in the circuit court of the county in
which the agency maintains its headquarters, or unless
otherwise specifically provided by statute, in the circuit court
of the county where a party other than an intervenor, resides
or if a party, other than an intervenor, is a corporation,
domestic or foreign, having a registered office or business
office in this state, then in the county of the registered office
or principal place of business within this state."
§ 41-22-20(b).
Because the circuit court determined that it did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction, it did not exercise any further review of the
allegations in Trulieve's complaint under the AAPA. Pursuant to the
procedural provisions of the AAPA, the circuit court has the authority to
hold hearings, hear arguments, and render an appropriate remedy.10
That is decidedly the function of a trial court and not an appellate court.
This case was in the circuit court for less than a week, and the litigation
10"The court may reverse or modify the decision or grant other
appropriate relief from the agency action, equitable or legal .…" § 41-22-20(k), Ala. Code 1975.
22
CL-2026-0201
consisted of a few basic pleadings and one hearing. Accordingly, having
determined that the circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction, we
return the case to the circuit court for additional judicial review under
the AAPA. See generally Alabama Dep't of Env't Mgmt. v. Friends of
Hurricane Creek, 71 So. 3d 673 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (vacating the
judgment and remanding the case to the circuit court for further
proceedings under the AAPA); Covin v. Alabama Bd. of Exam'rs in
Counseling, 712 So. 2d 1103, 1107 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) ("We conclude
that the trial court erred in holding that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to consider Covin's complaint …. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment of dismissal and remand the cause for further proceedings
[under the AAPA] ….").
" 'In determining a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, this
Court asks " 'only whether the trial court had the constitutional and
statutory authority' to hear the case." ' " Ex parte Alabama Medicaid
Agency, 338 So. 3d 183, 190 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021) (citations omitted).
Trulieve has demonstrated that it is the subject of "[a] preliminary,
procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling" and that "review of
the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy." § 41-23
CL-2026-0201
22-20(a). Therefore, the circuit court had the authority to hear its
complaint. That being the case, we order the circuit court to set aside its
March 16, 2026, judgment insofar as it determined that it lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction in this case, and we remand this cause to the circuit
court for additional proceedings pursuant to the AAPA. Finally, we direct
the circuit court to enter an order staying the ALJ's March 10 order, as
applied to Trulieve, until such time as the circuit court has addressed
Trulieve's request for judicial review of that order.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
All the judges concur.
24