Rel: July 10, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
CL-2025-1069
William Desmond, Jr.
v.
Meliaha Desmond
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(DR-18-900535.03)
FRIDY, Judge.
William Desmond, Jr. ("the father"), appeals from a judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial court") resolving competing petitions
for a rule nisi and for modification of child custody and child support that
he and Meliaha Desmond ("the mother") had filed in the trial court. For
CL-2025-1069
the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the trial court's judgment as to
the issues of child custody and contempt, and we reverse that portion of
the judgment concerning the child-support award.
Background
The parties married in May 2014, and one child ("the child") was
born of the marriage in December 2016. On July 26, 2018, the trial court
entered a judgment divorcing the parties; that judgment incorporated a
settlement agreement the parties had previously executed. The divorce
judgment awarded the parties joint legal custody of the child; awarded
the mother sole physical custody of the child; and awarded the father
visitation on the first, third, and fifth weekends of each month, overnight
visitation on the second and fourth Wednesdays of each month,
designated holiday visitation, and summer visitation. It further required
the father to pay child support of $800 per month through February 2019
and $1,100 per month thereafter, to pay all expenses associated with the
child's extracurricular and athletic activities, and to share certain
childcare expenses with the mother, while requiring the mother to
maintain health-insurance coverage for the child.
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Three years later, on July 27, 2021, the trial court entered a
modification judgment ("the 2021 modification judgment"), again
incorporating an agreement of the parties. That judgment expanded the
father's visitation to the first, third, and fifth weekends of each month
from 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 8:00 a.m. on Tuesday and on the second
and fourth weeks of each month from 6:00 p.m. on Monday until 8:00 a.m.
on Tuesday, with the child to be returned to "daycare or school at the end
of [the father's] custodial time or to the [m]other, whichever is
applicable." That judgment further provided that, beginning in 2022,
from June 1 through July 31, the parties were to rotate custody weekly.
The trial court also modified the holiday schedule, awarded the father
custodial time on the child's birthday, and awarded him additional
Thanksgiving visitation. That judgment increased the father's childsupport obligation to $1,387.50 per month.
On April 16, 2024, the father filed a verified petition for a rule nisi
and a petition for modification of the 2021 modification judgment,
alleging that the mother had interfered with his relationship with the
child by blocking communications, by failing to notify him of the child's
school and extracurricular activities, and by otherwise excluding him
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from significant aspects of the child's life. He also alleged that he feared
for the child's safety because of the mother's purportedly "erratic
behavior" and requested sole legal and sole physical custody of the child,
an award of appropriate visitation for the mother, a modification of child
support, and an order requiring each party to be individually responsible
for the child's after-school and summer-care expenses incurred during
that party's custodial periods. The father's petitions began a flurry of
petitions and counterpetitions between the parties, with each alleging
that the other had engaged in some form of wrongful conduct involving
custody and visitation.
At a hearing on September 11, 2024, the parties reached an
agreement, pursuant to which the father was given authority to pick up
the child from school or after-school care on his custodial days and was
to be listed on school and after-school records, designated as an
emergency contact, and provided complete access to the child's
educational and attendance records, including through the school's
electronic systems. On October 11, 2024, the trial court entered a
pendente lite order incorporating the agreement. The day before the trial
court entered the pendente lite order, however, the mother filed an
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emergency motion for pendente lite relief relating to counseling, the
child's welfare, and the father's visitation rights pending a final hearing.
The parties then resumed their pattern of filing numerous motions and
responses against each other related to the custody of the child. Those
motions remained pending until the trial, which the trial court held over
three days in March and May 2025.
At the trial, the mother testified that the child was in the second
grade at a school in Blount County and that the parties resided
approximately sixteen minutes apart within the same school district. She
said that, before beginning elementary school, the child had attended
daycare. The mother testified that she had remained in the same
residence since the entry of the 2021 modification judgment and that no
significant changes had occurred in her residence or living arrangements
since that time. She testified that her fiancé ("the fiancé") had resided
with her since October 2018 and continued to reside with her at the time
of trial. She testified that she and the fiancé had a child ("the half
sibling"), who was born in June 2019. The child and the half sibling
shared a bedroom, and the house had a dedicated playroom for them.
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The father's wife ("the stepmother") testified that she married the
father in August 2019 and had been involved in the child's life since he
was approximately one or two years old. She testified that she had two
children of her own, had been divorced from her previous husband since
2017, and exercised joint custody of her children pursuant to a weekon/week-off custodial schedule. The father testified that he had resided
in the same house since approximately 2018 or 2019, that the child had
his own bedroom there, and that the child kept clothing and other
personal belongings at the residence.
The mother described the fiancé as "absolutely" a father figure to
the child, testified that the child spent a lot of time with him, and stated
that the fiancé contributed financially to the household. The fiancé
testified that he had been involved in the child's life since the child was
approximately one year old. He testified that he was engaged to the
mother, although they had not yet set a wedding date. He testified that
he gave the mother access to his personal funds to support and maintain
the mother, the half sibling, and the child.
The fiancé testified that, on a daily basis, he served as a role model
for the child by getting up each morning, going to work, and
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demonstrating consistency. He said that he and the child regularly
played together. He testified that he and the child would "aggravate" one
another and that those interactions reflected how they got along,
explaining that both were generally in "great mood[s]" during those
interactions.
The fiancé testified that he and the mother had experienced
disagreements during their relationship and had separated on one
occasion. He testified, however, that those disagreements had not been
frequent occurrences and had not occurred on a weekly basis. The fiancé
also testified that he had two children of his own, including a sixteenyear-old son with whom he did not exercise custodial time. According to
the fiancé, during what he described as a hard time in his life, he had
decided to "pull away" from that relationship.
The father testified that he did not consider the fiancé to be a
stepparent because the fiancé and the mother were not married, and, in
his view, the fiancé's relationship with the child lacked permanence
because the fiancé could leave the relationship at any time. He testified
that the issue he had with the fiancé was that, if the fiancé was going to
be a stepfather to the child, then he should marry the mother and be a
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stepfather. He further said that, if the fiancé was going to help raise the
child, then he should raise him properly. The father further testified that
the child needed a father figure in his life and that, in his view, the child
did not have one in the mother's household.
The stepmother testified that, in her opinion, the fiancé was not a
father figure to the child "because [he was] not even a father to his own
two kids," and she further stated that, in her opinion, the fiancé was not
a father figure to the half sibling because he did not "show up to things."
She testified that the fiancé was often absent at many of the child's
activities and that her opinion regarding his role as a stepfather was
based on "what he shows up to for" the child.
The mother testified that she had observed the fiancé raise his voice
to the child; however, she said, she had never heard him raise his voice
in a manner that caused her concern for the child's well-being, and she
had never asked him to lower his voice when speaking to the child. The
fiancé testified that he had spanked the child in the past, but he believed
that it had occurred only once, could not recall when it occurred, and
denied having ever used a belt. He testified that he had raised his voice
to the child on "numerous" occasions to get the child's attention,
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particularly when the child was engaging in conduct that could result in
harm to himself or others. He further testified that he had used profanity
when speaking to the child to get his attention, giving as an example,
"damn it, son, I told you." The fiancé also testified that, if the father
objected to spanking the child, he would agree not to spank the child in
the future.
The father testified that he did not have a problem with the fiancé's
disciplining the child and that he expected another responsible adult to
correct the child's behavior if neither parent was present. He explained
that his view regarding spanking depended on the circumstances and the
reason that the child needed to be spanked. The father testified, however,
that his main concern was that, if the fiancé was going to discipline the
child, he needed to be "the entire part of stepdad" and not merely "pay
bills and whoop him."
The stepmother testified that the primary behavioral issues she
had observed with the child involved the child's having "an attitude" or a
"smart mouth." She testified that she participated in disciplining the
child and had administered corporal punishment in the past, although
she could not recall the last occasion on which she had done so. When
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asked whether she had ever cursed at the child, she testified, "I'm sure I
have, yes," but stated that she could not recall a specific occasion and that
it was not her "nature" to curse at a child or to do so out of frustration.
The father testified that he had observed "bickering and arguing"
between the stepmother and the child and that he supported the
stepmother's "putting her foot down" because he did not want the child
being disrespectful to an adult.
The mother testified that the child was very smart, remained on
track academically, had no learning disabilities, and had not experienced
significant behavioral problems at school. The father likewise testified
that the child had great grades, was doing well in school, and had not
developed any learning disabilities, physical-health conditions, or
mental-health diagnoses since the entry of the 2021 modification
judgment. He further testified that the current custodial schedule was
not affecting the child's school performance, and he confirmed that the
mother supported the child's extracurricular activities "to an extent."
The mother testified that, during the pendency of the action, she
had enrolled the child in counseling because he had been short-tempered
and combative after returning to her home following extended weekends
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with the father. She testified that the father told her that the child did
not need therapy. According to the mother, the child had shown
significant improvement since beginning counseling and had learned
ways to manage his anger and talk about his feelings.
The mother testified that the child had previously participated in
football and was participating in baseball at the time of trial. The father
testified that he served as the child's baseball coach and saw the child at
practices and games. He testified, however, that he did not consider
coaching baseball to be parental time or "extra time" with the child
because it was not "one-on-one" time and he had other responsibilities
while coaching.
The stepmother testified that she served as the baseball team's
"team mom" and attended the child's practices and games. The mother
likewise testified that she attended the child's practices and games and
had attended all but one of the child's practices during both the previous
season and the current season. The father testified that he attended the
child's extracurricular activities during both parties' custodial periods
and attempted to attend school events, including field trips, regardless of
which parent had custody at the time. The father further testified that,
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before commencing the present action, he would pick up the child from
school and take him to practice. He further testified that the fiancé had
become more involved in the child's activities during the litigation by
attending baseball games and similar events, but, he said, before the
pending modification action was commenced, he had never seen the
fiancé at the child's activities.
The mother testified that, from the entry of the 2021 modification
judgment until the commencement of the present action, there were
periods during which she and the father had communicated and
coparented effectively. She testified, however, that the father's conduct
would vary and that, at times, he would "push" and "harass" her via text
messages; she said that he had called her derogatory names on telephone
calls, including "bitch" and "stupid bitch," sometimes in the child's
presence.
The mother acknowledged that she had blocked the father's
telephone number on two occasions, including around June 2019 and for
twenty-one days in April 2024. She testified, however, that she had
blocked only the father's direct communication with her, not
communication between the father and the child. According to the
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mother, although the child did not have a telephone in April 2024, he had
remained able to communicate with the father through her work
telephone, and she said that he was able to call the father anytime he
needed to. She further testified that she had blocked the father from
texting her but had not blocked him from communicating by e-mail.
The mother testified that, when the child was in the father's care,
the father provided the child with a second cellular telephone and that
she had the telephone number for that telephone and was able to call and
text it. She further testified that, before the commencement of the
current modification action, she believed that her telephone number had
been blocked on that telephone because her calls went straight to
voicemail on multiple occasions and that she later "unblocked" her
telephone number at a baseball practice.
The father testified that, when the parties disagreed or became
upset with one another, he would either "get[] [his telephone number]
blocked" or the mother would refuse to allow him any additional custodial
time beyond that provided in the court order. He further testified that,
when the parties were getting along, the mother would "throw a bone
here and there" by allowing him an extra day, an extra hour, or other
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additional time with the child. The father testified that, although the
2021 modification judgment provided for a 6:00 p.m. exchange time, that
provision had not been enforced since the entry of that judgment until
the pending action had been commenced. He testified that, after he had
commenced the pending action, the mother had begun enforcing the 6:00
p.m. exchange time.
The father testified that the issues between him and the mother
had "gotten worse" and were "pretty bad." He further testified that, from
2018 through the time of trial, the parties had experienced periods of
positive communication, including "good months" and "good weeks,"
followed by conflicts that caused their relationship to deteriorate again.
According to the father, the parties would have a couple of good months,
then something would happen, one of them would become upset, and
"everything [would blow] back up," resulting in blocked telephone
communication, periods of three or four months without speaking, and
later attempts to get back on track.
The mother testified that she did not want to eliminate the father's
Monday custodial periods because she knew that the child needed to see
the father, but she believed that that schedule made the week "choppy"
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because the Monday custodial period occurred at the beginning of the
school week. She testified that "every other weekend would make things
a little easier for everyone," including the child. The mother confirmed
that the father was a good father, that the child needed his father, and
that she was not asking the trial court to reduce the father's custodial
time. She testified, however, that the child needed structure.
The stepmother testified that, in her opinion, the child had a more
structured routine during the summer under the week-on/week-off
custodial schedule and that she noticed a difference in his demeanor,
particularly regarding his attitude, between the academic year and the
summer. The father likewise testified that a week-on/week-off schedule
would benefit the child by eliminating what he described as a "choppy
schedule" and reducing the amount of back-and-forth between
households. He testified that such a schedule would allow him to spend
more time with the child, while still providing the mother with equal
time, and he acknowledged that both his parenting and the mother's
parenting were important to the child.
Regarding child support, the parties stipulated that annual income
of $65,000 would be imputed to the mother for purposes of calculating
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child support. The mother testified that she remained at home with the
children, but she acknowledged that she was capable of working and did
not object to recalculation of child support using imputed income.
The father testified that he owned and operated a business known
as 1229 Construction and that that business served as his primary source
of income. He acknowledged that his 2020 tax return reflected adjusted
gross income of $93,590.49, that his 2021 tax return reflected adjusted
gross income of $146,756, and that his 2022 tax return reflected adjusted
gross income of $124,227. The father testified that his income had
decreased substantially in 2023 and estimated that his income for that
year was approximately $35,000 to $36,000.
The mother testified that the child had been continuously covered
by Medicaid since his birth. The stepmother testified that she maintained
health-insurance coverage through her employer, that both she and the
father were covered under the policy, and that the father had asked the
mother, when he was added to the stepmother's policy, to also add the
child. She testified that she paid approximately $375 every two weeks for
coverage for herself, the father, and her two children and that her
premium would not increase if the child were added to the policy.
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However, according to the stepmother, the mother declined to have the
child added to the policy because the mother believed it would interfere
with Medicaid and cause a loss of benefits.
On July 18, 2025, the trial court entered a CS-42 Child-Support
Guidelines form reflecting that it had determined the father's gross
monthly income to be $13,937, his monthly income available for support
to be $11,013, and his recommended child-support obligation to be $1,299
per month. The form further reflected that the mother's share of the
parties' combined adjusted gross income was twenty-eight percent and
the father's share was seventy-two percent.
On July 22, 2025, the trial court entered a final judgment granting
in part and denying in part the parties' respective petitions for a rule nisi
and for modification, finding both parties in contempt, and ordering them
to attend and successfully complete at least twenty-four coparentingtherapy sessions within twenty-four months. With respect to child
support, the trial court imputed monthly income to the mother in the
amount of $5,417 based on the parties' stipulation and determined that
the father's average gross monthly income was $13,937, which it stated
was "based upon an average of the gross income of [the father] minus
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ordinary and necessary expenses as determined by his tax returns for the
years 2020, 2021, and 2022." Using those income figures, the trial court
calculated the father's child-support obligation to be $1,299 per month.
The final judgment also modified certain financial and custodial
provisions contained in the prior judgments. It required the father to
provide health-insurance coverage for the child, authorized him to add
the child to the stepmother's health-insurance policy, and allocated
responsibility for the child's uninsured medical expenses at twenty-eight
percent to the mother and seventy-two percent to the father. The trial
court further modified the parties' Christmas and birthday custodial
schedule.
The father filed a postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate
the judgment or, alternatively, for a new trial. In that motion, the father
challenged the trial court's determination of his income, the resulting
child-support calculation, the allocation of uninsured medical expenses,
the custodial schedule, and certain holiday-visitation provisions. The
trial court conducted a hearing on the father's motion, after which it
entered an amended final judgment modifying the Christmas,
Thanksgiving, birthday, custodial, and child-support provisions
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contained in the judgment. With respect to Christmas visitation, the
amended judgment provided that, in odd-numbered years, the father
would exercise visitation from the day school was released until
December 25 at 2:00 p.m. and that the mother would exercise visitation
from December 25 at 2:00 p.m. until January 1 at 2:00 p.m., with the
schedule reversing in even-numbered years. The amended final judgment
also modified the Thanksgiving schedule, provided birthday visitation for
the noncustodial parent, and revised the father's custodial periods to
begin at 3:00 p.m. on Fridays and Mondays rather than at 6:00 p.m.
Finally, the trial court reduced the father's child-support obligation from
$1,299 per month to $1,253 per month.
The mother filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the amended
final judgment, which the trial court denied. The father filed a timely
notice of appeal.
Standard of Review
" ' " 'Our standard of review is very limited in cases where the
evidence is presented ore tenus.' " ' " Gordon v. Gordon, 231 So. 3d 347,
352 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017) (citations omitted). A custody determination
entered upon oral testimony is accorded a presumption of correctness on
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appeal, and this court will not reverse that determination unless the
evidence so fails to support it that it is plainly and palpably wrong or
unless an abuse of the trial court's discretion is shown. Id. To substitute
our judgment for that of the trial court would be to reweigh the evidence,
which Alabama law does not permit. Id. " 'It is also well established that,
in the absence of specific findings of fact, appellate courts will assume
that the trial court made those findings necessary to support its
judgment, unless such findings would be clearly erroneous.' " Id. (citation
omitted).
Analysis
The father argues that the trial court should have modified the
parties' custodial arrangement to a week-on/week-off schedule because,
he says, material changes in circumstances had occurred since the entry
of the 2021 modification judgment. Specifically, he relies on the child's
transition from daycare to elementary school, the child's increased
participation in extracurricular activities, the child's maturation and
changing developmental needs, concerns regarding the fiancé and the
mother's household, and ongoing communication and coparenting
disputes between the parties. He further contends that his own
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household offers greater stability and structure and that a week-on/weekoff arrangement would materially promote the child's best interests.
Under Ex parte McLendon, 455 So. 2d 863 (Ala. 1984), a party
seeking to modify a prior custody judgment must prove that (1) the party
is a fit custodian, (2) a material change in circumstances affecting the
child's welfare has occurred, and (3) the positive good brought about by
the change will more than offset the inherently disruptive effect of
uprooting the child. See Gordon, 231 So. 3d at 353. Alabama courts have
repeatedly emphasized that the burden for a custody modification is
intentionally stringent because " '[t]he need for stability in a child's life
necessitates the requirement that the party seeking the modification
prove to the court's satisfaction that "material changes affecting the
child's welfare since the most recent [judgment] demonstrate that
custody should be disturbed to promote the child's best interests." ' "
Courson v. Hurston, [Ms. CL-2024-0897, Aug. 22, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___,
___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2025) (quoting Hermsmeier v. McCoy, 591 So. 2d 508,
509 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991), quoting in turn Wood v. Wood, 333 So. 2d 826,
828 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976)).
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The evidence established that the child had grown older, had
progressed from daycare to elementary school, and had become more
involved in extracurricular activities. However, the 2021 modification
judgment expressly contemplated the child's future school attendance by
requiring the father to return the child to "daycare or school" at the
conclusion of his custodial periods. Thus, the child's transition to school
was not a new or unforeseen circumstance arising after the entry of the
2021 modification judgment. This court has explained that a party
seeking a custody modification must establish that a material change in
circumstances has occurred since the entry of the prior custody judgment
and that " '[a] material change of circumstances occurs when important
facts unknown at the time of the initial custody judgment arise that
impact the welfare of the child.' " Courson, ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting
K.E.W. v. T.W.E., 990 So. 2d 375, 380 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)).
Likewise, the mere passage of time is not a basis for a custody
modification. Cochran v. Cochran, 5 So. 3d 1220, 1229 (Ala. 2008). As our
supreme court has explained, " ' " [t]he fact that the children have grown
older in and of itself is no sufficient change of condition to warrant a
change in custody," ' " id. at 1229-30 (quoting Engler v. Engler, 455
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S.W.2d 36, 41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970), quoting in turn Fordyce v. Fordyce,
242 S.W.2d 307, 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951)), because "[t]he natural aging
process is a 'contingency to be normally expected' " and is presumed to
have been considered when the original custody judgment was entered.
Id. at 1230 (quoting Fordyce, 242 S.W.2d at 314). Thus, the trial court
reasonably could have concluded that the child's increased age,
educational development, and extracurricular participation did not
establish a material change in circumstances.
The trial court likewise could have concluded that the father's
concerns regarding the fiancé failed to establish a material change in
circumstances. The evidence demonstrated that the fiancé had resided
with the mother since 2018, had been involved in the child's life for years,
and was already a member of the mother's household when the parties
entered into the modification agreement incorporated into the 2021
modification judgment. Consequently, his presence in the mother's home
was not a new circumstance arising after the prior judgment. Although
the father expressed concerns regarding the fiancé's disciplinary methods
and role in the child's life, those concerns involved circumstances that
either predated the 2021 modification judgment or reflected
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disagreements regarding parenting practices rather than newly arising
conditions affecting the child's welfare. Moreover, the father
acknowledged that he did not object to the fiancé's disciplining the child
in appropriate circumstances, and the evidence reflected that both
households utilized similar disciplinary measures.
In addition, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that
the evidence did not establish that a change in custody would materially
promote the child's welfare. The record contains no indication that the
child's welfare had deteriorated under the existing custodial
arrangement. To the contrary, both parents testified that the child was
doing well academically, maintaining good grades, remaining active in
extracurricular activities, and enjoying strong relationships with both
parents. The father himself testified that the child performed well in
school and generally exhibited good behavior. Indeed, the only evidence
of misbehavior concerned occasional disrespect, conduct for which both
parties testified they disciplined the child. Thus, rather than
demonstrating a need for a custody modification, the evidence showed
that the child was thriving under the existing arrangement.
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The father's remaining complaints primarily concerned
communication difficulties, visitation disputes, and the mother's alleged
interference with his relationship with the child. However, Alabama
courts have recognized that custody modification is not the proper
remedy for visitation disputes. See Cochran, 5 So. 3d at 1228-29. Here,
the evidence demonstrated an ongoing coparenting conflict between both
parties, and the trial court ultimately found both parties in contempt for
communication-related violations. Those mutual communication
difficulties are "best characterized as an alleged lack of cooperation,
which is generally an insufficient basis on which to modify custody."
S.L.L. v. L.S., 47 So. 3d 1271, 1279 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) (holding that
allegations involving communication difficulties and failures to keep the
other parent informed of school and medical matters, even if true, did not
constitute the type of material change in circumstances necessary to
justify a custody modification). Likewise, the mother's refusal to continue
granting custodial time beyond that required by the 2021 modification
judgment did not constitute a material change in circumstances. See
E.F.B. v. L.S.T., 157 So. 3d 917, 924 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (holding a
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parent's adherence to the existing custody arrangement, without more,
is not a basis for modifying custody).
Ultimately, the father's evidence established that the child had
grown older, that he had entered school as anticipated by the 2021
modification judgment, that he had become more involved in
extracurricular activities, and that the parties had continued to
experience communication and coparenting difficulties. The trial court
reasonably could have concluded that those circumstances did not rise to
the level of a material change in circumstances affecting the child's
welfare required by McLendon. Because the father failed to satisfy that
threshold requirement, the trial court acted within its discretion in
declining to modify physical custody.
The father next contends that the trial court abused its discretion
in calculating child support. Specifically, he contends that the trial court
improperly determined his monthly gross income, failed to consider his
most recent income information, and failed to properly account for
health-insurance coverage provided through the stepmother's employer.
To the extent that the father argues that the trial court erred by
failing to rely on his alleged 2023 income, the record does not support
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reversal on that basis. Rule 32(F), Ala. R. Jud. Admin., provides that
"[i]ncome statements of the parents shall be verified with documentation
of both current and past earnings." However, the record on appeal
includes neither the father's complete 2023 tax return nor any indication
that it was admitted into evidence. At the postjudgment hearing, the trial
court specifically questioned the father's attorney regarding whether the
2023 return had been admitted, and the father's counsel was unable to
confirm that it had been. Instead, the record contains only the father's
testimony estimating his 2023 income. A trial court " ' " is not bound by
the income figures advanced by the parties, and it has discretion in
determining a parent's gross income." ' " Whatley v. Whatley, [Ms. CL2025-0151, Oct. 24, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2025)
(quoting Walker v. Lanier, 221 So. 3d 470, 473 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016),
quoting in turn Morgan v. Morgan, 183 So. 3d 945, 961 (Ala. Civ. App.
2014)). Accordingly, the trial court was not required to accept the father's
testimony estimating his 2023 income, and the father's argument on that
point does not establish reversible error.
The father's challenge to the income figure the trial court
ultimately used to calculate child support, however, has merit. The trial
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court found that the father's gross monthly income was $13,937 and
expressly stated that it derived that figure from the father's 2020, 2021,
and 2022 tax returns. In cases involving self-employment income, Rule
32(B)(3)(a), Ala. R. Jud. Admin., provides that " 'gross income' means
gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary expenses required to
produce [that] income." Rule 32(B)(3)(b) further provides that
" '[o]rdinary and necessary expenses' does not include amounts allowable
by the Internal Revenue Service for the accelerated component of
depreciation expenses, investment tax credits, or any other business
expenses determined by the court to be inappropriate for determining
gross income for purposes of calculating child support."
Although the trial court identified the evidence upon which it
relied, neither its judgment nor the accompanying CS-42 form reveals
how it converted the information contained in the father's 2020, 2021,
and 2022 tax returns into a gross monthly income of $13,937. This court
has attempted multiple calculations using the income figures reflected in
those returns and the provisions of Rule 32 governing self-employment
income, but none of those calculations yields the figure the trial court
adopted. This court has reversed child-support judgments when it could
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CL-2025-1069
not determine from the record how the trial court calculated the childsupport obligation. See, e.g., Nelson v. Landis, 709 So. 2d 1299, 1300 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1998) ("This court is unable to determine, from the record and
from its own calculations of the various potential obligations, how the
trial court determined the father's child-support obligation.").
The father's separate argument regarding health-insurance
premiums does not independently warrant reversal. Rule 32(B)(7)(d)
provides that health-insurance costs are to be "divided between the
parents in proportion to their adjusted gross income" as reflected on the
applicable CS-42 form. Rule 32(B)(7)(e) further provides that the healthinsurance cost attributable to the child is calculated by dividing the total
health-care-coverage cost actually paid by, or on behalf of, the parent
providing the coverage by the total number of covered individuals and
then multiplying that figure by the number of children who are the
subject of the support order.
Unlike the father's income calculation, the record provides a
sufficient basis to determine how the trial court accounted for the child's
health-insurance coverage. Although the CS-42 form is not entirely clear
and the trial court did not expressly explain its methodology, the record
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reflects that the trial court included the cost attributable to the child's
health-insurance coverage in the total child-support obligation, allocated
that obligation according to the parties' respective income shares, and
then credited the father for paying the health-insurance premium. When
calculated in that manner, the resulting child-support obligation is
$1,253 per month, as set forth in the amended judgment. Thus, despite
any apparent discrepancies on the face of the CS-42 form, the record
supports the conclusion that the trial court properly accounted for the
child's health-insurance expense. Nevertheless, because we reverse the
trial court's determination of the father's income, the child-support
obligation must be recalculated on remand, and the health-insurance
calculation will necessarily be revisited as part of that recalculation
Accordingly, the father's argument regarding his alleged 2023
income does not establish reversible error, and the record supports the
trial court's apparent adjustment for health-insurance coverage.
Nevertheless, because the record does not disclose how the trial court
derived the father's gross monthly income of $13,937 from the evidence
it expressly identified, this court cannot determine whether the childsupport award complies with Rule 32. The judgment is therefore due to
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CL-2025-1069
be reversed insofar as it calculated the father's child-support obligation,
and the cause must be remanded for the trial court to recalculate child
support in compliance with Rule 32 and to clearly identify the basis for
its income determination.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's judgment as to
the issues of child custody and contempt, we reverse that portion of the
judgment concerning the child-support award, and we remand the case
to the trial court for it to recalculate that award.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Moore, P.J., and Hanson and Bowden, JJ., concur.
Edwards, J., concurs in the result, without opinion.
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