Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-24-00174-CR
10-24-00175-CR
Richard Alan Curlee,
Appellant
v.
The State of Texas,
Appellee
On appeal from the
12th District Court of Walker County, Texas
Judge David W. Moorman, presiding
Trial Court Cause Nos. 29142, 29144
JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Richard Alan Curlee of two counts of continuous sexual
abuse of a young child committed against two different children.1 See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02. Curlee was sentenced to Life in prison in each case,
to run consecutively. In his original appeals, Curlee raised issues concerning
the trial court’s refusal to sequester the jury, failure to conduct a competency
1 These counts were indicted separately, but they were tried together to the jury. hearing before the punishment phase, denial of his motion for continuance, and
assessment of court costs. On original submission, we affirmed the trial court’s
judgments. Curlee filed a motion for rehearing, which we granted in part,
withdrew our original opinions, and abated the appeals for the trial court to
make a retrospective competency determination. The trial court complied and
issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon reinstating the appeals,
both parties filed supplemental briefs. We will address the issues raised in the
original briefing as well as the supplemental issues Curlee raises. We affirm
the judgments of the trial court.
Jury Sequestration
In his first issue in his original appeals, Curlee contends that the trial
court reversibly erred by refusing his request to sequester the jury after the
charge was given in the guilt-innocence phase of trial. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 35.23. The State, conceding error, argues that the error was
harmless.
ANALYSIS
We agree with the parties that the trial court erred in denying Curlee’s
request to sequester the jury. Article 35.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure provides, in relevant part:
Richard Alan Curlee v. The State of Texas Page 2
The court on its own motion may and on the motion of either party
shall, after having given its charge to the jury, order that the jury
not be allowed to separate, after which the jury shall be kept
together, and not permitted to separate except to the extent of
housing female jurors separate and apart from male jurors, until
a verdict has been rendered or the jury finally discharged.
Id. (emphasis added). When a party timely moves to sequester the jury after
the charge has been given, sequestration is mandatory and a trial court errs
by denying the request. See Polk v. State, 367 S.W.3d 449, 454 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d). Here, while the jury was deliberating
during the guilt-innocence phase, the trial court asked if any party objected to
recessing the jury for the day. Curlee immediately voiced an objection and
requested jury sequestration. The trial court denied the request and permitted
the jury to separate. This was error. See id.
A trial court’s error in failing to sequester the jury in violation of article
35.23 is a statutory violation subject to harmless error analysis under Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b).2 See id.; see also Rojas v. State, 986
S.W.2d 241, 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (Keller, J., concurring); TEX. R. APP. P.
2 In his motion for rehearing, as he did in his original appeals, Curlee cited to Sanchez v. State, 906
S.W.2d 176 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref’d), in support of his argument that the jury sequestration error was not harmless. Claiming that the Court of Criminal Appeals has not disapproved of the holding in Sanchez, he faulted this Court for “not following or distinguishing” this holding in our original opinion. Sanchez was decided before the 1997 amendments to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and applied a harm analysis under Rule 81(b)(2). Sanchez, 906 S.W.2d at 179. Rule 81(b)(2) is no longer the standard that we apply in our non-constitutional harm analysis. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); see Lake v. State, 532 S.W.3d 408, 418-19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (Yeary, J., concurring).
Richard Alan Curlee v. The State of Texas Page 3 44.2(b). Under this standard, we must disregard any error that did not affect
Curlee’s substantial rights. See id. An error does not affect substantial rights
if a reviewing court has fair assurance from an examination of the record as a
whole that the error did not influence the jury, or had but slight effect.
Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
Here, before recessing for the day, the trial court instructed the jury with
regard to their conduct as jurors while separated. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 35.23. The jury was admonished to refrain from discussing the case
with anyone, to abstain from performing any independent research, and to “not
do anything on this case until you’re back in the jury room with all 12 of you.”
Curlee does not point to, nor do we find, any evidence in the record that the
jury failed to follow the trial court’s instructions. The record does not indicate
that Curlee suffered any harm from allowing the jurors to separate. We find
that the trial court’s error in refusing to sequester the jury was harmless.
Accordingly, we overrule Curlee’s first issue in his original brief.
Competency and Voluntary Absence
The jury found Curlee guilty in both cases on a Friday. The trial court
recessed the proceedings and scheduled the punishment phase to begin the
following Tuesday morning. Curlee was taken into custody by the Walker
County Sheriff’s Office and permitted to use the restroom before leaving the
Richard Alan Curlee v. The State of Texas Page 4 courthouse. He used a firearm - which he had disassembled, concealed on his
person, and brought into the courthouse - to shoot himself in the head.
Curlee was taken to a hospital. Evidence developed at the retrospective
competency hearing demonstrated that by the next day, Curlee was oriented
and conversational and “his mental status, range of motion, and motor function
were normal.” Though the shooting rendered Curlee blind, he suffered no
brain damage.
The day before the punishment phase was scheduled to begin, Curlee’s
trial counsel filed a “Motion Suggesting Incompetency and Request for
Examination” and a separate “Motion for Continuance” based on Curlee’s
attempted suicide. Curlee was still hospitalized at the time. Finding that
Curlee’s suicide attempt was a choice to voluntarily absent himself from the
trial, see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 33.03, the trial court proceeded with
the punishment phase in Curlee’s absence.
Competency Hearing
Curlee’s second issue in his original appeals addressed the trial court’s
failure to order a competency evaluation under article 46B.005 before
proceeding to the punishment phase of trial. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 46B.005. After reviewing Curlee’s motion for rehearing, we found the trial
court conducted an informal inquiry into Curlee’s competency but abused its
Richard Alan Curlee v. The State of Texas Page 5 discretion by not ordering a competency evaluation and holding a formal
competency hearing as a result of the informal inquiry. We abated the appeals
for a retrospective competency evaluation and hearing.
On remand, the trial court appointed a licensed psychologist who
determined that Curlee was competent to stand trial at the time of the
punishment phase. The trial court then conducted a formal competency trial,
received testimony and other evidence, and ultimately found that Curlee was
competent to stand trial for the punishment phase. Our abatement and
remand for the retrospective competency determination thus disposed of
Curlee’s second issue in his original appeals. See Turner v. State, 570 S.W.3d
250, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Accordingly, Curlee’s second issue in his
original appeals is moot. Id.
Curlee’s Competency
In his first supplemental issue, Curlee contends that despite his capacity
to communicate with counsel before the punishment phase, the trial court’s
denial of his motion for continuance violated the due-process protections of
chapter 46B of the Code of Criminal Procedure because hospital restrictions
impeded his ability to consult with counsel. We disagree.
At the retroactive competency hearing, trial counsel explained that he
“was informed that [Curlee] was in ICU and that I would not be allowed in
Richard Alan Curlee v. The State of Texas Page 6 ICU” and that Curlee’s mother and law enforcement officers who were present
at the hospital “strongly discouraged” him from attempting to communicate
with Curlee. As a result, counsel testified that Curlee had no ability to consult
with him concerning the punishment phase. In his closing argument, Curlee
contended that his lack of access to his counsel “precluded him [from] being
competent for the purposes of preparing for the punishment phase of trial.”
A person is not competent to stand trial if the person does not have
“sufficient present ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
46B.003(a)(1). Curlee suggests that we should extend the phrase “ability to
consult” in this definition beyond the defendant’s mental capacity to consult
with counsel to include his access to consult with counsel. Specifically, he
contends that “[t]o construe this requirement to hold due process is satisfied
based on the physical capacity to consult with his lawyer while ignoring
uncontroverted evidence [that Curlee] was precluded from actually
communicating with his lawyer disregards the due process right the standard
seeks to protect.”
Under Chapter 46B, the inability to consult with counsel must be rooted
in and fueled by a mental illness or mental defect. See Turner v. State, 422
S.W.3d 676, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The competency framework focuses
Richard Alan Curlee v. The State of Texas Page 7 on the defendant’s mental capacity, not on whether the defendant has had
adequate access to counsel or whether external conditions have restricted
communication. It asks whether the defendant has sufficient capacity to
consult, not whether the defendant has had sufficient opportunity to consult.
We decline the invitation to separate the “sufficient ability to consult”
requirement from its competency context. Accordingly, we overrule Curlee’s
first issue in his supplemental brief.
Voluntary Absence
In Curlee’s second supplemental issue and the third issue of his original
brief, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
continuance by finding he was voluntarily absent from trial. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 33.03.
We disagree.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 10 of the Texas Constitution guarantee a defendant threatened with
loss of liberty the right to be physically present at all phases of the criminal
proceedings against him. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, §§
10, 19; Miller v. State, 692 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). After the
commencement of trial proceedings, a defendant may voluntarily absent
himself from the trial without a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to be
Richard Alan Curlee v. The State of Texas Page 8 present during all phases of the trial. See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17,
18-19 (1973) (per curiam). The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure affords even
greater protection for defendants than does the Sixth Amendment, permitting
trial to proceed to its conclusion “when the defendant voluntarily absents
himself after pleading to the indictment or information, or after the jury has
been selected when trial is before a jury[.]” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
33.03; Tracy v. State, 14 S.W.3d 820, 826 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. ref’d).
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for continuance for an abuse
of discretion. See Moore v. State, 670 S.W.2d 259, 260-61 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984). Absent evidence to the contrary, we will uphold a trial court’s
determination that a defendant voluntarily absented himself from the
proceedings. See id.
DISCUSSION
The record reflects that Curlee was physically present for voir dire and
the entire guilt-innocence phase of trial. It is uncontested that Curlee’s
absence from the punishment phase of trial was due to his hospitalization from
attempted suicide by self-inflicted gunshot wound after the guilty verdicts.
The psychologist who evaluated Curlee for competency spoke with him about
his suicide attempt. She testified that Curlee admitted he “had planned all
along before the trial even began that if he was convicted, he was going to shoot
Richard Alan Curlee v. The State of Texas Page 9 himself in the head.” She further described the suicide attempt as a “calculated
decision.” The trial court expressly found that Curlee’s suicide attempt “was a
calculated response to an unfavorable verdict and was not the result of
incompetency or an irrational break from reality.”
Curlee argues that his absence from the punishment phase was not
voluntary because he had “no control over the timing of his discharge which
was a decision of the medical staff.” However, several courts have determined
that a defendant may be considered voluntarily absent from trial when he is
not present in the courtroom because he has chosen to attempt suicide. See,
e.g., Smith v. State, 494 S.W.3d 243, 251-54 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no
pet.); Trotti v. State, 692 S.W.3d 679, 686 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2023, pet. ref’d); Bottom v. State, 860 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1993, no pet.); see also Mayfield v. State, 536 S.W.3d 523, 526 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2017, no pet.); Johnson v. State, Nos. 01-19-00602-CR, 01-19-00603-CR, 2020 WL 6065535 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 15, 2020, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication).
In Smith, the Texarkana Court of Appeals directly addressed whether
the trial court abused its discretion in proceeding to the punishment phase of
trial by deciding that the defendant’s hospitalization following a suicide
attempt constituted “voluntary absence,” as the trial court did here. Smith,
Richard Alan Curlee v. The State of Texas Page 10 494 S.W.3d at 251-54. The court stated, “Texas courts have held that a
defendant voluntarily absents himself from trial when he attempts to commit
suicide, is placed in a hospital, and, as a result, is not present in the
courtroom.” Id. at 254. Noting that a defendant cannot avoid trial by
intentionally disabling himself, the appellate court held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in deciding that the defendant had voluntarily
absented himself from trial and proceeding to the punishment phase in his
absence. Id. at 253-54 (citing Maines v. State, 170 S.W.3d 149, 150 (Tex. App.
– Eastland 2005, no pet.).
Curlee contends that Trotti does not apply because the voluntaryabsence finding in that case was not based on the defendant’s suicide attempt.
However, as the State notes in its supplemental brief, Trotti voluntarily
absented himself from trial on multiple occasions. Trotti, 692 S.W.3d at 682-85. On one such occasion, Trotti was located in his jail bed with a self-inflicted
injury. Id. at 684. He was taken to the hospital where he received treatment,
and the trial was recessed for eight days. Id. at 684-85. On Friday, July 23,
2021, the trial court reconvened and, having determined that Trotti was
competent to stand trial, decided that Trotti had voluntarily absented himself
and “proceeded with the trial.” Id. at 685. The opinion continues, “By Monday,
July 26, [Trotti] had been discharged from the hospital” but refused to enter
Richard Alan Curlee v. The State of Texas Page 11 the courtroom. Id. Thus, the facts as recited by the reviewing court indicate
that trial proceeded while Trotti was hospitalized due to his self-inflicted
wound for one day – Friday, July 23 – and that the decision to continue the
trial was expressly based on the trial court’s decision that Trotti voluntarily
absented himself from the trial.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld a trial court’s denial of a
continuance in Bottom, where the defendant was physically absent from part
of his trial due to hospitalization following a suicide attempt. Bottom, 860
S.W.2d at 267. Though the opinion is concise, the court briefly discussed
Bottom’s suicide attempt (that he was “not absent because of some sudden
unexpected medical emergency, but because he chose to ingest large quantities
of aspirin and arthritis medication”) and determined that “[b]ecause Bottom
chose to act in this way, his absence was voluntary.” Id.
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Curlee’s motion for continuance by finding that he voluntarily absented
himself from trial. We overrule Curlee’s third issue in his original appeals and
second issue in his supplemental brief.
Court Costs
When multiple cases are tried together, the trial court may assess each
court cost or fee only once. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.073(a);
Richard Alan Curlee v. The State of Texas Page 12 Hurlburt v. State, 506 S.W.3d 199, 203-04 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, no pet.). In
his fourth issue of his original brief, Curlee contends that the trial court erred
in assessing court costs in the amount of $290.00 in both judgments, violating
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 102.073(a). The State agrees that
the judgments should be reformed to reflect a single assessment of costs.
Despite the parties’ agreement, our review of the judgments reveals that
the trial court assessed court costs in the amount of $290.00 only in the
judgment for trial court cause number 29142. The judgment for trial court
cause number 29144 lists the amount of assessed court costs at $0.00. This is
also consistent with the trial court’s statements when Curlee was sentenced.
Accordingly, we overrule Curlee’s fourth issue in his original brief.
Conclusion
Having overruled all of Curlee’s issues on appeal, we affirm the
judgments of the trial court in each case.
STEVE SMITH
Justice
Richard Alan Curlee v. The State of Texas Page 13 OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: July 9, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
Do not publish
CRPM
Richard Alan Curlee v. The State of Texas Page 14