United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 25-1801
BRUNO PROJECT RESCUE INC., a 501(c)(3) corporation; ANNIE'S
FAITH FOUNDATION, a 501(c)(3) corporation; CARIBBEAN CANINE
CONNECTION CO., a 501(c)(3) corporation; ARUBA FLIGHT VOLUNTEERS
INC., a 501(c)(3) corporation, d/b/a New Life for Paws
Foundation; POTCAKE PLACE K9 RESCUE (USA) INC., a 501(c)(3)
corporation; SAVE THE SATOS, a 501(c)(3) corporation,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; JIM O'NEILL, in the
official capacity as Director of the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Denise J. Casper, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Montecalvo, Lynch, and Dunlap,
Circuit Judges.
Aaron M. Katz and Aaron Katz Law LLC for appellants.
Brian J. Springer, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, with whom Brett A. Shumate,
Assistant Attorney General, Leah B. Foley, United States Attorney,
and Thomas Pulham, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, were on brief, for appellees.
July 13, 2026
DUNLAP, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-Appellants are
organizations that rescue stray puppies on Caribbean islands and
place the puppies with adoptive families in the United States.
Plaintiffs challenge a regulation issued by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention ("CDC"), an agency within the United States
Department of Health and Human Services. See Control of
Communicable Diseases; Foreign Quarantine: Importation of Dogs and
Cats, 89 Fed. Reg. 41726 (May 13, 2024) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
71). The regulation requires that "[a]ll dogs presented for
admission into the United States must be at least six (6) months
old at the time of their arrival into the United States," and that
dogs not meeting this criterion "shall be denied admission and
returned to the country of departure." 42 C.F.R. § 71.51(f)
(2026). Plaintiffs claim that this age requirement -- as applied
to dogs imported into the United States from Caribbean
islands -- exceeds the CDC's authority under 42 U.S.C. § 264(a)
and is otherwise arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). The district court
granted the CDC summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims. After
careful review, we discern no error in the district court's
judgment. We therefore affirm.
I.
The dog-maintained rabies virus variant (sometimes
referred to by the acronym "DMRVV," but which, for purposes of
- 3 -simplicity, we will refer to as "rabies") is a deadly infectious
disease that can be transmitted from an infected dog to any mammal
and, "once clinical signs appear, . . . is almost always fatal."
89 Fed. Reg. at 41726, 41754. "There is no treatment available
for persons ill with rabies." Id. at 41754. Although the United
States has been declared rabies-free since 2007, id. at 41726,
rabies remains a "serious public health threat in . . . more than
100 countries" and "kills approximately 59,000 people, mainly
children, per year globally from dog bites." Id. at 41754.
Addressing reintroduction of rabies is costly and difficult. Id.
at 41756–57. Thus, the CDC seeks to prevent reintroduction of
rabies into the United States -- as has happened before, in 1988.
See id. at 41754; see also id. at 41756–57.
The United States has regulated the import of dogs into
the United States and has imposed rabies vaccine requirements since
at least 1956. See Revision of Chapter, 21 Fed. Reg. 9805, 9879
(Dec. 12, 1956). As updated in 1985, see Foreign Quarantine, 50
Fed. Reg. 1516 (Jan. 11, 1985), the relevant regulation established
that -- except for certain dogs that were admitted into the country
for research purposes, were under six months old and had never
been in a country with rabies, or were at least six months old and
had not been in a country with rabies in the past six months -- a
dog could not enter the United States without a "valid rabies
vaccination certificate" that showed that the dog had been
- 4 -vaccinated when the dog was at least three months old and at least
thirty days before arrival at the port of entry. 42 C.F.R.
§ 71.51(a), (c) (1985).
Regulations of dog importations have changed over the
years. In 2021, the CDC temporarily suspended dog imports from
countries that the CDC designated as rabies high-risk countries on
account of rabid dogs with fraudulent paperwork entering the United
States from those countries. See Temporary Suspension of Dogs
Entering the United States From High-Risk Rabies Countries,
86 Fed. Reg. 32041 (June 16, 2021).
At issue in this case, the CDC again revised its dog
import regulations through notice-and-comment rulemaking in 2024,
allowing its temporary suspension of dog imports from rabies
high-risk countries to expire and requiring, among other things,
that all dogs "arriving in the United States be at least six months
of age."1 89 Fed. Reg. at 41727, 41738. The regulation's stated
1 The CDC also required that all dogs arriving in the United
States be microchipped and that all dog importers submit a CDC dog
import form for each dog imported to help officials verify that
the dogs presented for admission are the same dogs identified in
their accompanying documentation. Control of Communicable
Diseases; Foreign Quarantine: Importation of Dogs and Cats, 89
Fed. Reg. 41726, 41727–28 (May 13, 2024) (codified at 42 C.F.R.
pt. 71). For dogs imported from countries designated as rabies
high-risk countries, the CDC required that importers "submit a
standardized vaccination form verifying the rabies vaccination
status of the dog." Id. at 41728. If the dogs imported from
rabies high-risk countries were not vaccinated in the United
States, the CDC also required that importers must "have their
dog(s) undergo a veterinary exam and revaccination with a
- 5 -purpose was to "prevent the reintroduction and spread of" rabies
and to "prevent and deter the importation of dogs with falsified
or fraudulent rabies vaccine documentation." Id. at 41726. The
CDC determined that the regulation helps confirm that the dog is
old enough to have had an effective vaccine, because a dog's age
is most easily assessed after six months, as a dog has lost its
baby teeth by that time. Id. at 41765–66. According to the CDC,
the age requirement helps officials determine that "the dog
presented matches the documentation presented, particularly the
age listed for the dog, and that the dog is old enough to have
been adequately vaccinated for rabies." Id. at 41766. Further,
the CDC observed that the age requirement would "align[] with USDA
importation rules, ease[] enforcement of the vaccination
requirements, and reduce[] opportunities for fraud." Id.
Finally, the CDC determined that screening for rabies is easier
after six months due to the difficulty at younger ages of
distinguishing between uncoordinated movements that are simply
part of normal puppy behavior and those that are due to rabies.
Id.
USDA-licensed rabies vaccine at [a] CDC-registered [animal care
facility]" and must either "obtain a rabies serologic test from a
CDC-approved laboratory for their foreign-vaccinated dogs
demonstrating adequate titer levels" or "have their dog remain
under quarantine at the facility for 28 days after revaccination
or until confirmation of adequate rabies serologic test from a
CDC-approved laboratory is obtained, whichever occurs first." Id.
at 41728–29.
- 6 -This age requirement substantially affects Plaintiffs'
dog-rescue efforts in the Caribbean islands, as Plaintiffs assert
that they have been harmed because they now have to care for
rescued puppies on the islands until the puppies reach six months
old and that fewer people in the United States want to adopt
six-month-old dogs (causing Plaintiffs to experience difficulty
fundraising for their rescue efforts). Accordingly, Plaintiffs
brought this lawsuit under the APA, alleging that the age
requirement exceeds the CDC's statutory authority and is otherwise
arbitrary and capricious. After the parties cross-moved for
summary judgment, the district court granted judgment to the CDC.
The court reasoned that the age requirement is within the CDC's
statutory authority because it facilitates reliable inspections of
imported dogs. Further, the court reasoned that in promulgating
the age requirement, the CDC duly considered the relevant issues
and reasonably explained its decision. Plaintiffs now appeal from
the district court's judgment.
II.
We review the district court's decision granting summary
judgment de novo. Littlefield v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 85
F.4th 635, 643 (1st Cir. 2023). Instead of the usual Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56 standard, however, the summary judgment
"rubric . . . has a special twist in the administrative law
context." Int'l Junior Coll. of Bus. & Tech., Inc. v. Duncan, 802
- 7 -F.3d 99, 106 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Associated Fisheries of Me.,
Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 1997)). Under the APA,
we "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . [or]
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
"Because the APA standard affords great deference to agency
decisionmaking and because the Secretary's action is presumed
valid, judicial review, even at the summary judgment stage, is
narrow." Littlefield, 85 F.4th at 643 (quoting Visiting Nurse
Ass'n Gregoria Auffant, Inc. v. Thompson, 447 F.3d 68, 72 (1st
Cir. 2006)).
That said, when we review whether an action was within
an agency's statutory authority, we "may not defer to an agency
interpretation of the law," Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603
U.S. 369, 413 (2024), but "must exercise [our] independent judgment
in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory
authority, as the APA requires," id. at 412. Because the
"judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory
construction," id. at 401 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984), overruled
by, Loper Bright, 603 U.S. 369), we have an "obligation to
independently interpret the statute . . . us[ing] every tool at
- 8 -[our] disposal to determine the best reading of the statute," id.
at 400. We are to "interpret statutes, no matter the context,
based on the traditional tools of statutory construction." Id.
at 403.
When we review whether an agency action is arbitrary or
capricious, however, we are "not to substitute [our] judgment for
that of the agency" and we only evaluate whether it was "based on
a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been
a clear error of judgment." DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
591 U.S. 1, 16 (2020) (first quoting FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009); and then quoting Citizens
to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)).
This standard of review is "highly deferential," and we will
"uphold an agency determination if it is 'supported by any rational
view of the record.'" Littlefield, 85 F.4th at 643 (quoting
Marasco & Nesselbush, LLP v. Collins, 6 F.4th 150, 172 (1st Cir.
2021)).
A. Statutory Authority
Plaintiffs' first argument on appeal is that the age
requirement as applied to dogs imported from the Caribbean islands
exceeds the CDC's statutory authority under 42 U.S.C. § 264(a).
The CDC relied on § 264(a) for the legal authority to impose the
age requirement challenged here. 89 Fed. Reg. at 41737. That
section states in relevant part:
- 9 -The Surgeon General, with the approval of
the Secretary, is authorized to make and
enforce such regulations as in his judgment
are necessary to prevent the introduction,
transmission, or spread of communicable
diseases from foreign countries into the
States or possessions . . . . For purposes
of carrying out and enforcing such
regulations, the Surgeon General may provide
for such inspection, fumigation,
disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination,
destruction of animals or articles found to be
so infected or contaminated as to be sources
of dangerous infection to human beings, and
other measures, as in his judgment may be
necessary.
42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (emphases added).2 The Supreme Court has noted
that "[r]egulations under this authority have generally been
limited to quarantining infected individuals and prohibiting the
import or sale of animals known to transmit disease." Ala. Ass'n
of Realtors v. HHS, 594 U.S. 758, 761 (2021) (citing Ban on Sale
and Distribution of Small Turtles, 40 Fed. Reg. 22543 (May 23,
1975) (banning sale of small turtles to prevent the spread of
salmonella)); see, e.g., Control of Communicable Diseases;
Restrictions on African Rodents, Prairie Dogs, and Certain Other
Animals, 68 Fed. Reg. 62353 (Nov. 4, 2003) (restricting imports
and sales of certain animals to prevent the spread of monkeypox).
In Alabama Association of Realtors, the Supreme Court
held that § 264(a) likely did not authorize the CDC to extend a
2 The Surgeon General's authority has been delegated to the
CDC. See 42 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2026).
- 10 -residential eviction moratorium in order to prevent the spread of
COVID-19. 594 U.S. at 763–64. The Court stated that the
authority granted in the first sentence of § 264(a) -- making and
enforcing regulations as "necessary to prevent the introduction,
transmission, or spread of communicable diseases" -- is informed
by the second sentence of § 264(a). Id. at 763. The second
sentence "informs the grant of authority by illustrating the kinds
of measures that could be necessary: inspection, fumigation,
disinfection, sanitation, pest extermination, and destruction of
contaminated animals and articles. These measures directly relate
to preventing the interstate spread of disease by identifying,
isolating, and destroying the disease itself." Id. Applying the
text of § 264(a) to the eviction moratorium, the Court noted that
there was a far more indirect, downstream connection between
evicting tenants and the interstate spread of disease than "the
direct targeting of disease that characterizes the measures
identified in the statute. Reading both sentences together,
rather than the first in isolation," the Court concluded that it
was a "stretch" to read § 264(a) as granting the CDC "authority to
impose th[e] eviction moratorium." Id. at 764.
Alabama Association of Realtors instructs that we must
review the age restriction at issue here to determine whether it
is consistent with the kinds of illustrative measures listed in
the second sentence of § 264(a) and whether it directly relates to
- 11 -preventing the introduction, transmission, or spread of
communicable diseases. We conclude that the age restriction is
not only consistent with the types of measures described in
§ 264(a), but is in fact one of the enumerated measures set out in
that section: The age requirement is an "inspection" measure.
Additionally, we conclude that such measure directly relates to
preventing the introduction of rabies into the United States.
The edition of Black's Law Dictionary that was current
in 1944, when § 264(a) was first enacted, defined "inspection" as
"more than perusal, . . . a critical examination, close or careful
scrutiny, a strict or prying examination, or an investigation."
Inspection, Black's Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1933); see also
Inspection, Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary (1943) ("The
act or process of looking into; especially, a careful critical
investigation or scrutiny."); Inspection, Webster's New
International Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) ("Act or process of
inspecting; a strict or prying examination."). The definition of
inspection's root word, "inspect," was "[t]o look, to view or
oversee for the purpose of ascertaining the quality or condition
of the thing." Inspect, Black's Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1933); see
also Inspect, Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary (1943) ("To
examine carefully or critically; investigate and test
officially."); Inspect, Webster's New International Dictionary (2d
ed. 1934) ("To look upon; to view closely and critically, esp. so
- 12 -as to ascertain quality or state, to detect errors, etc.; to
scrutinize.").
Under these definitions, the CDC's age requirement
qualifies as an inspection measure that allows officials "to
ascertain the quality or condition of the dogs." U.S. Sportsmen's
All. Found. v. CDC, 167 F.4th 813, 819 (6th Cir. 2026). It helps
officials conduct a "close or careful scrutiny" or "prying
examination" of imported dogs to ascertain their condition or state
by making screening for rabies easier. Although "puppies are
susceptible to rabies," it can be difficult to screen them for
rabies because it is hard to discern whether awkward movements are
due to rabies or normal puppy growth and development. See 89 Fed.
Reg. at 41766. The age requirement helps officials rule out young
age as a reason for any uncoordinated movement patterns that might
otherwise potentially signify rabies. Id. As the Sixth Circuit
has determined in another case involving a challenge to the same
regulation at issue here, "if the officials can rule out age as a
cause for the uncoordinated movements, then the officers can more
accurately ascertain the condition of the dog." U.S. Sportsmen's
All. Found., 167 F.4th at 819.
The age requirement also helps officials ascertain that
a "dog is old enough to have been adequately vaccinated for rabies"
because veterinarians can have difficulty determining "with
specificity whether a dog has reached the age at which it can be
- 13 -fully protected by the rabies vaccine before six months of age."
89 Fed. Reg. at 41765–66. "Many rabies vaccines are licensed for
use in dogs on or after 12 weeks of age," and laboratories have
suggested that it can take thirty days for the vaccine to become
effective. See id. at 41765. It takes time "to ensure the animal
has developed an adequate antibody response to vaccination." Id.
But "it is difficult to accurately assess the age of dogs that are
between four and six months old due to variability in an individual
dog's dental eruption patterns (loss of baby teeth)." Id. Once
a dog loses its baby teeth by six months old, veterinarians can
then inspect its teeth to accurately assess if it "has reached the
age at which it can be fully protected by the rabies vaccine."
Id. The age requirement is thus an inspection measure that
directly relates to preventing reintroduction of rabies into the
United States.
Plaintiffs object that the CDC's age requirement cannot
be characterized as facilitating an inspection for rabies because
any dog imported from countries that the United States has
recognized as rabies-free "will definitely not be infected with
rabies." This is incorrect for at least two reasons. First,
Plaintiffs fail to recognize that a dog imported from a country
recognized as "rabies-free" could still potentially have rabies
because rabies could have been reintroduced into that country but
not yet discovered. See, e.g., 89 Fed. Reg. at 41787 (citing
- 14 -Malaysia as an example of a country where, after having previously
been recognized as rabies-free, rabies was reintroduced in 2017
and where forty-five people died after having been infected with
rabies between 2017 and 2022). Second, a dog arriving from a
country recognized as "rabies-free" could still potentially have
rabies if the dog's importer brought the dog from a high-risk
country but stopped over in a rabies-free country and then
misrepresented the dog's country of origin at a U.S. port of entry.
See id. at 41766 (stating that the CDC has documented numerous
instances where dogs under six months old and from countries with
a high risk of rabies were routed to the United States through
rabies-free countries and then were fraudulently represented as
coming from rabies-free countries of origin). Thus, puppies
arriving from countries recognized as rabies-free still pose a
risk of carrying rabies.
In response to the CDC's fraud-prevention rationale,
Plaintiffs argue that the age requirement is unnecessary to
determine that an imported dog matches its documentation because
the regulation also imposes a requirement that all dogs be
microchipped in order to enter the country. See id. at 41727.
This argument does not get Plaintiffs very far. Even assuming
arguendo that the age requirement does not help officials assess
whether a dog matches its proffered documentation, the age
requirement still helps officials screen dogs for rabies and
- 15 -ascertain whether they are old enough to have been adequately
vaccinated against rabies. Further, where "[t]he importation of
just one dog infected with [rabies] risks reintroduction of the
virus into the United States, which could result in loss of human
and animal life and substantial public health response costs," id.
at 41736, nothing prevents the CDC from using a belt-and-suspenders
approach to ensure that the dog presented at a port of entry is
the same dog described in its documentation. The CDC retains
substantial discretion on what measures are necessary to prevent
the reintroduction of rabies into the United States; Congress has
directed that whether a measure is "necessary" to prevent the
introduction of rabies into the United States is a "judgment"
committed to the CDC. See 42 U.S.C. § 264(a).
We also reject Plaintiffs' argument that the age
requirement is effectively a prophylactic import prohibition of a
broadly defined class (dogs that are less than six months old)
that, under 42 U.S.C. § 265, must be accompanied by
country-specific findings that there is a "serious danger" of dogs
from that country having rabies. Section 265 allows the
CDC -- upon making a determination that "there is serious danger
of the introduction of" any communicable disease from a foreign
country and that this danger "is so increased by the introduction
of persons or property from such country that a suspension of the
right to introduce such persons and property is required in the
- 16 -interest of the public health" -- to prohibit "the introduction of
persons and property from such countries or places as [it] shall
designate in order to avert such danger." 42 U.S.C. § 265. The
age requirement, however, is not an import prohibition. It does
not prohibit the importation of dogs; rather, it is merely a
condition of entry for all dogs being imported. Once puppies are
six months old, if they meet all other conditions of entry, they
are allowed entry. Because the age requirement is properly viewed
as a measure enacted under § 264(a), not a prohibition on the
importation of dogs enacted under § 265, the CDC was not obligated
to make country-specific findings concerning rabies risk to adopt
the age requirement.
Our reading of the age requirement as a condition of
entry does not render § 265 superfluous. It is true that § 264(a)
and § 265 both authorize the CDC to take preventative measures
against the introduction of communicable disease. But "we
approach federal statutes touching on the same topic with a 'strong
presumption' they can coexist harmoniously." Dep't of Agric.
Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 63 (2024)
(quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 510 (2018)). And
here, each provision has effect in distinct cases. See J.E.M. Ag
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144
(2001) ("[T]his Court has not hesitated to give effect to two
statutes that overlap, so long as each reaches some distinct
- 17 -cases."). Section 264(a) authorizes the CDC to enact measures
that identify or isolate infected animals to prevent the
introduction or spread of a communicable disease, without regard
to whether the communicable disease is known to exist in the
animal's country of origin. By contrast, § 265 gives the CDC the
power to ban the entry of animals from a foreign country where a
communicable disease exists, regardless of whether any specific
animals are infected. Thus, a dog could be barred from entry
under § 264(a) because it failed disease-prevention-related
inspection requirements, even if its country of origin was
classified as rabies-free; and a dog could be independently barred
from entry under § 265 due to the existence of rabies in its
country of origin, even if the dog could otherwise pass all
disease-prevention-related inspection requirements. "Where two
laws are merely complementary -- as is undisputedly the case
here -- our duty lies not in preferring one over another but in
giving effect to both." Kirtz, 601 U.S. at 63.
B. Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Plaintiffs also argue that the age requirement as
applied to dogs imported from Caribbean islands is arbitrary and
capricious under the APA. Arbitrary and capricious review "simply
ensures that the agency has acted within a zone of reasonableness
and, in particular, has reasonably considered the relevant issues
and reasonably explained the decision." FCC v. Prometheus Radio
- 18 -Project, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021). Although "we must conduct a
searching examination to ensure that the agency's decision is
reasonably supported by the administrative record," we will -- in
our "highly deferential" review -- "uphold an agency determination
if it is 'supported by any rational view of the record.'"
Littlefield, 85 F.4th at 643 (quoting Marasco & Nesselbush, LLP,
6 F.4th at 172).
[W]e will not vacate an agency's decision
unless it "has relied on factors which
Congress had not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to
a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise."
Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644,
658 (2007) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
Ultimately, an agency simply needs to articulate a "rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made." State
Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
In its final regulation, the CDC articulated several
reasons to support its decision to impose the six-month age
requirement. As already discussed, the CDC's primary rationale
was that the age requirement would better facilitate efforts to
- 19 -identify potentially rabid dogs at ports of entry and ensure the
effectiveness of rabies vaccinations. See 89 Fed. Reg. at 41765–
66. For the same reasons underlying our conclusion that the age
requirement facilitates inspection, we agree with the Sixth
Circuit that the "age requirement made it easier to spot
potentially rabid dogs before they enter the country and ensure
that rabies vaccinations were effective. It is reasonable for the
CDC to have drawn the conclusions it did on this record." U.S.
Sportsmen's All. Found., 167 F.4th at 822.3
Plaintiffs primarily attack the CDC's age requirement by
arguing that it is overbroad in that it applies to rabies-free
countries such as the Caribbean islands. An agency, however,
usually need not show that it has adopted the most narrowly
tailored option to address its concerns4; we are "not to ask whether
a regulatory decision is the best one possible or even whether it
is better than the alternatives." FERC v. Elec. Power Supply
3Some other reasons the CDC gave for the age requirement
included the ability of dogs older than six months to better endure
the "long travel times, temperature fluctuations, oxygen or
altitude changes, and food/water deprivation" common in
international transport, 89 Fed. Reg. at 41788–89, and the age
requirement's alignment with the minimum six-month age requirement
for dog imports for commercial purposes under USDA regulations,
id. at 41766. These reasons provide additional rational support
for the CDC's age requirement.
4 Of course, regulations must be narrowly tailored in certain
circumstances, such as when they impinge on First Amendment rights
by effecting "[a] content- or speaker-based restriction on
protected speech." Time Warner Cable Inc. v. FCC, 729 F.3d 137,
155 (2d Cir. 2013).
- 20 -Ass'n, 577 U.S. 260, 292 (2016). Inquiring instead whether the
agency's decision was rational, see State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, we
conclude that it is. It is not irrational to conclude that
importers may attempt to transport dogs from high-risk countries
into the United States through countries in the Caribbean, given
their proximity to the United States. The CDC has identified
instances of fraud regarding dogs transported through other
rabies-free countries including Canada and Mexico, 89 Fed. Reg. at
41766, and it is a reasonable inference that individuals could do
the same through Caribbean nations. An agency is allowed to make
"a reasonable predictive judgment based on the evidence it had."
Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. at 427. This is especially
true here, where § 264(a) gives the CDC authority to make
"regulations as in [its] judgment are necessary to prevent the
introduction . . . of communicable diseases from foreign
countries," 42 U.S.C. § 264(a), and where the CDC has noted the
extraordinary costs and difficulties of dealing with the
importation of just one dog with rabies -- not to mention the risk
to lives from such an event, 89 Fed. Reg. at 41754–57.5 In short,
Plaintiffs' reliance on National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v.
5
FERC, 468 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 2006), is misplaced. In that case,
the D.C. Circuit held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC") had not provided "evidence of a real problem" where FERC's
order at issue did "not include a single example of abuse" by a
certain class of entities; rather, any potential for abuse was
merely theoretical. Id. at 841. By contrast, here, the analogous
class of entities is rabies-free countries, and the CDC has
- 21 -it was "acceptable for the CDC to regulate across the global board
rather than target only high-risk areas." U.S. Sportsmen's All.
Found., 167 F.4th at 822.
Plaintiffs relatedly attack the CDC's regulation on the
basis that the CDC did not adequately explain how the age
requirement could prevent fraud. We disagree. The CDC noted that
it had been "document[ing] a marked increase in fraud committed by
importers of dogs from [rabies] high risk countries." 89 Fed.
Reg. at 41755 (citing numerous sources). The CDC observed that
"[m]ultiple international and U.S. investigations have identified
importations of puppies that were too young to meet rabies
vaccination requirements," and that "reports of . . . underage
dogs with fraudulent vaccination records have been documented in
the United States and abroad." Id. Specifically, the CDC
outlined several instances between 2015 and 2021 where rabid dogs
with falsified vaccination documentation were imported into the
United States from countries with a high risk of rabies, requiring
significant effort and expense to locate, treat, and monitor the
persons and animals with whom the rabid dogs had come into contact
while infectious. Id. at 41755–56. Further, the CDC noted that
documented examples of importers attempting to fraudulently
transport dogs from high-risk countries into the United States
through nearby rabies-free countries. Thus, the threat of
fraudulent transfer of dogs through the Caribbean rabies-free
countries is not simply theoretical, as was the threat of abuse in
National Fuel.
- 22 -it had "documented many instances of young dogs under six months
of age being routed from [rabies] high-risk countries through
[rabies]-free countries, such as Canada or Mexico, to circumvent
U.S. entry requirements," and where the importers "made claims
that their dogs had not been in a [rabies] high-risk country."
Id. at 41766. It also stated that it had "documented several
instances of importers attempting to import an unvaccinated dog
using the vaccination paperwork for another dog." Id. at 41767.
Given the concerns raised by all these reports of fraud, it was
reasonable for the CDC to impose the age requirement for all
imported dogs, not just those coming directly from high-risk
countries. As the CDC stated, requiring all dogs to be at least
six months of age will allow the CDC to "better confirm that the
dog presented matches the documentation presented, particularly
the age listed for the dog." Id. at 41766.
Plaintiffs argue that the age requirement and other
measures imposed by the regulation at issue are not adequate to
solve the vaccination-paperwork fraud problem, seemingly implying
that the age requirement is underinclusive and thus irrational.
Although the age requirement may not be fully adequate to prevent
the reintroduction of rabies into the United States, that is beside
the point. "We know of no law that prohibits an agency from
attacking the evils within its jurisdiction in a piece-meal
fashion." BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 663 n.53
- 23 -(1st Cir. 1979). That the age requirement rationally facilitates
identifying potentially rabid dogs at ports of entry, ensuring the
effectiveness of rabies vaccinations, and deterring fraud is
sufficient. The CDC's action did not need to solve all dog import
problems all at once. We further note that the age requirement
was not imposed in isolation. It was accompanied by other measures
that, taken together, likewise facilitate identifying potentially
rabid dogs, ensuring that imported dogs are adequately vaccinated
against rabies, and deterring fraud. See 89 Fed. Reg. at 41727–
29.
Finally, Plaintiffs' contention that the CDC overlooked
Plaintiffs' reliance interests fails as well. When an agency
changes its existing policies, it must recognize "that
longstanding policies may have 'engendered serious reliance
interests that must be taken into account.'" Regents, 591 U.S.
at 30 (quoting Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 222
(2016)). "It would be arbitrary and capricious to ignore such
matters." Id. (quoting Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515).
Here, in imposing the six-month age requirement, the CDC acted
within the zone of reasonableness by considering the relevant
issues, including the interests of importers. Contrary to
Plaintiffs' argument, the CDC sufficiently accounted for
Plaintiffs' reliance interests in their dog rescue efforts in
rabies-free countries. After providing opportunity for and
- 24 -receiving public comments, the CDC stated that it was "provid[ing]
additional flexibility and less burden to importers without
compromising public health goals" by adopting a six-month age
requirement instead of a seven-month age requirement recommended
by some in the scientific community. 89 Fed. Reg. at 41765. The
CDC thus "reasonably considered the relevant issues and reasonably
explained the decision" in imposing the age requirement. See
Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. at 423.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment
is affirmed.
- 25 -