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Buccieri v. Brewster Ambulance Service, Inc.

2026-07-13

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 25-1732

JOHN BUCCIERI,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

BREWSTER AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC.,

Defendant, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Margaret R. Guzman, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Dunlap, Lynch, and Kayatta,

Circuit Judges.

Andrew Rozynski and Eisenberg & Baum, LLP for appellant.

Sarah B. Herlihy and Herlihy Law LLC for appellee.

July 13, 2026

LYNCH, Circuit Judge. In this Americans with

Disabilities Act ("ADA") case, appellant John Buccieri appeals

from the district court's grant of a Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 50(b) motion filed by Brewster Ambulance Service, Inc.

("Brewster") and entry of judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL")

following the liability phase of a jury trial. Buccieri v.

Brewster Ambulance Serv., Inc., 792 F. Supp. 3d 273, 283 (D. Mass.

2025). The jury had returned a verdict for Brewster on Buccieri's

claim of failure to hire for a Chair Car Driver position, finding

that Brewster had "prove[d] by a preponderance of the evidence

that providing Mr. Buccieri with the requested accommodation(s)

would have been an undue hardship to Brewster Ambulance and/or

posed a direct threat to Mr. Buccieri or others." The district

court held on the evidence presented no reasonable jury could

conclude that Brewster had failed to engage in an interactive

process as required by the ADA. Id. at 282-83.

On de novo review, we affirm the district court's entry

of JMOL. We hold that no reasonable jury could conclude that

there was a reasonable accommodation that would have allowed

Buccieri to perform the essential communications functions of the

driver positions without undue hardship to Brewster.

- 2 -I.

We describe the facts of record that were not materially

disputed, largely documented in contemporaneous writings or

testimony from the trial.

A.

Brewster is a family-owned medical transportation

services company. Collectively, Mark Brewster, the President and

CEO, his brother and co-owner George Brewster Jr., and his father

George Brewster Sr. have close to a hundred years of experience in

the medical transport business.1 Brewster employs approximately

1,800 people and operates approximately 300 vehicles daily,

including ambulances, Day Care Vans, and Chair Cars.

Chair Cars are vehicles that transport a single

wheelchair-using patient, typically to medical appointments.

According to the undisputed testimony of Mark and of Brewster

employees with expertise in its Chair Car program, Brewster staffs

Chair Cars with only one driver, and Chair Car Drivers must

communicate frequently with patients, dispatch, and medical

1 Mark Brewster testified that his great-grandfather founded

the original Brewster Ambulance company in 1906, which was run by

his family and which Mark's father, George Brewster Sr., sold in

1997. Mark and his brother, George Brewster Jr., restarted the

company in its current iteration in 2010. George Sr. came out of

retirement in 2015 to help the company during an expansion phase

and re-retired in 2023. All three were involved in the

decisionmaking in this case. For clarity, the opinion refers to

the three Brewsters by their first names.

- 3 -facilities during day and night shifts. "[E]very [Chair Car] ride

is required to have a medical necessity form completed by a

licensed health care provider" attesting that the patient being

transported has a medical reason why he or she cannot be

transported by other means for Brewster to receive insurance

reimbursement for the ride. The patients who qualify for Chair

Car services typically come from skilled nursing facilities where

they receive supervised care due to their medical issues. In

Brewster's experience, as Mark testified at trial, such patients

from time to time experience medical emergencies while in Chair

Cars, including heart attacks, strokes, vomiting, and problems

with oxygen tanks. Such emergencies require immediate responses

from the driver of the Chair Car. All drivers, as a result, must

have first responder training and be CPR certified, and are trained

to call 911 in a medical emergency.

In addition, Brewster's Chair Car supervisor, William J.

Sefton, testified about other patient incidents requiring

immediate responses from the driver, including a patient who got

out of the wheelchair while the van was moving and had to be told

by the driver to sit back down, and a patient falling out of the

wheelchair due to a broken seatbelt. Sefton also testified that

Chair Car Drivers monitor patients visually via the rearview

mirror. He further testified that, from his experience as a Chair

Car Driver, it is helpful when drivers talk to patients because it

- 4 -"puts them at ease" and helps "mak[e] sure that they're

comfortable."

Chair Car Drivers also frequently communicate with

dispatch in addition to talking to patients in the car. Dispatch

assigns patients to Chair Car Drivers and notifies the drivers of

the patients' names, locations, and destinations throughout the

day. Drivers must also notify dispatch every time there is a

status change, such as when they are arriving at a location,

beginning transport, and experiencing a delay. The number one

cause of distracted driving at Brewster is cell phone use.

Brewster uses a radio system for communications between

drivers and dispatch, which is highly reliable and generally has

no delays or downtime. Use of the radio system requires the driver

to contact dispatch by picking up a small microphone which is

clipped on the dashboard, depressing a button on the side of the

mic, and speaking into it. Mark testified that Brewster used a

radio-based communication system rather than a cell-phone-based

communication system because the radio system, unlike cell phones

or tablets, does not require the driver to remove their eyes from

the road to find the correct buttons or dial a number on the cell

phone. Mark's undisputed testimony stated that the number one

cause of accidents involving Brewster vehicles is distracted

driving. Drivers also must communicate with staff at the

facilities where patients are picked up and dropped off.

- 5 -B.

John Buccieri applied for a position as a Chair Car

Driver on January 10, 2019. Buccieri was born deaf, and his

primary language is American Sign Language ("ASL").2 Brewster

scheduled Buccieri for an interview with Joseph Hughes, a regional

manager who had no experience personally driving Chair Cars. 3

Before the interview, Hughes had internal conversations with

Brewster's Human Resources ("HR") Department about how Brewster

might reasonably accommodate a deaf Chair Car Driver. On

January 18, 2019, Hughes asked HR "what [Brewster] can offer as a

reasonable accommodation for [Buccieri's] disability and this

job," and Paul Mohnkern, Brewster's HR manager who also had no

personal experience driving Chair Cars, responded that evening and

identified relevant issues to discuss with Buccieri, including

"how will he handle dealing with the general public, and how will

2 At the time that Buccieri applied to Brewster, he had

previously worked for about four years at Advocates Inc. as a

residential counselor in a group home for deaf individuals. At

Advocates, part of his job included driving group home residents

to appointments, stores, and other locations, and Buccieri

testified that two residents he transported used wheelchairs.

Buccieri also testified he was able to communicate directly using

sign language with all of the Advocates residents. Buccieri had

also done delivery work for two years at Jerry's Marine Services,

and had been a volunteer firefighter for almost six years in

Florida.

3 As regional manager for the Worcester region, Hughes

managed day-to-day operations of approximately thirty ambulances

and about ten Chair Cars.

- 6 -he handle an emergency/ lift breaking/ less than great patient"

and "[h]ow will he properly and timely communicate with

[d]ispatch." Mohnkern noted that "[t]hose questions need to be

asked . . . because the[se] [issues] will happen daily" and

Brewster "need[s] to make sure [Buccieri], the patient, the

vehicle, and the company are safe." Hughes responded by email to

Mohnkern that he "would like to send [Buccieri] the job description

and have him prepare some answers for the interview on how he would

meet all the job requirements," which Mohnkern replied was "a great

idea." Hughes emailed the job description to Buccieri on

January 22, 2019, informing him of Brewster's concern that "[t]he

biggest hurdle will be communicating effectively with our dispatch

center and the clients," and adding that "[w]e are 100% radio

dispatched." Hughes also asked Buccieri to "[p]lease take a look

and think of ways we can help you achieve the requirements of the

job." The job description listed as a "Qualification[] and

Education Requirement[]" of the position that Chair Car Drivers

"[m]ust be able to read, speak and write English." It listed

"Roles and Responsibility" of the Chair Car Driver position,

including:

Preserve a secure environment for all

clients transported in a Brewster Ambulance

vehicle. Proper restraints will be used at

all times.

Communicate with Field Supervisor for any

scanning . . . and unusual occurrences.

- 7 -. . . .

Participate in assigned base duties [of

providing patient Chair Car transportation

services] to be performed in support of base

operations. Adherer [sic] to base duties as

well as policies and procedures of Brewster

Ambulance.

Cultivate a professional relationship

while interfacing with shift crews, Field

Supervisors, Customers and patients.

Provide safe and courteous

transportation to any client transported by

Brewster Ambulance Service.

Use proper and professional radio

etiquette at all times.

Hughes conducted the in-person interview with Buccieri

on January 24, 2019, which Buccieri attended with an in-person ASL

interpreter. The only accommodation that Buccieri requested from

Brewster was to use Video Relay Services ("VRS") to communicate

with dispatch. VRS is a federally funded service that "enables

persons with hearing disabilities who use [ASL] to communicate

with voice telephone users through video equipment, rather than

through typed text." Consumer Guide: Video Relay Services, Fed.

Commc'ns Comm'n (July 18, 2022), https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/

guides/video-relay-services [https://perma.cc/W3AU-XGK7]. VRS

connects Buccieri to an ASL interpreter via a video application on

his personal cell phone, while the ASL interpreter is on a

telephone call with the hearing party. See id. The interpreter

then "relays the conversation back and forth between the parties,"

signing spoken comments from the hearing party to Buccieri over

- 8 -the video link, and saying Buccieri's signed comments to the

hearing party over the telephone call. Id. Buccieri demonstrated

the VRS system to Hughes during the interview, and Hughes reported

in an email to Mohnkern later that day that the VRS system allowed

Brewster to call Buccieri or Buccieri to call Brewster.4 Buccieri

and Hughes discussed Brewster providing a phone holder for

Buccieri's personal phone in the Chair Car to allow Buccieri to

see when a call from dispatch is coming in, pull over, and answer

that call and communicate with dispatch through VRS. Buccieri

clarified in his testimony that the VRS system has had "WiFi issues

and technical issues" and was "really not a professional process."

Buccieri, however, did not propose VRS as a means to communicate

with patients and presented no evidence that it would allow

communication with patients.

In his email to Mohnkern after the interview had

concluded, Hughes recommended that Buccieri be hired and that, in

addition to the VRS and phone holder accommodation, Buccieri have

an in-person ASL interpreter for orientation and his first day of

training. On January 30, 2019, Mohnkern notified Mark, George

Jr., and George Sr. by email about Buccieri's application, Hughes's

recommendation, and Buccieri's articulated accommodation request

4 Hughes also reported in that email that in the

demonstration VRS worked "very well" and allowed "a normal

conversation back and forth with almost no lag."

- 9 -of VRS and a phone holder. Like Hughes, Mohnkern had never worked

as a Chair Car Driver. Mark, by contrast, who had worked as a

Chair Car Driver for four years, used his and his family's

experience in considering whether and how Buccieri could be

accommodated. Mark responded to Mohnkern's email on the same day,

with George Sr. and George Jr. copied, and expressed his concerns

that Buccieri "would [not] be able to communicate with staff or

hear the radio when we call him for runs," concerns that Mark,

consistent with that contemporaneous email, testified at trial he

had "[b]ecause all of what [Brewster] do[es] in [the medical

transportation] industry requires verbal communication . . . not

only radio transmissions but staff at the facility [a patient was

being transported to or from]." George Sr. responded to

Mohnkern's email after Mark, stating that "it would be awesome to

hire him if he can do the job," but expressing concerns about

Buccieri's communication abilities beyond communication with

dispatch, such as "how would he communicate with staff at

facilities," "[h]ow would he know if a patient needed help in the

back of the vehicle," and "[h]ow would he communicate with his

patients."

Despite these concerns, reading the evidence most

favorably to Buccieri, Brewster apparently extended a verbal offer

of employment to Buccieri at some point after his January 24, 2019,

interview. Brewster also arranged for Buccieri to join one of its

- 10 -Chair Cars on trips picking up and dropping off patients on

January 31, 2019.5 While in the Chair Car during this ride-along,

Buccieri did not have an ASL interpreter with him, and he never

drove the Chair Car; Buccieri helped the wheelchair patients into

and out of the car and helped secure their wheelchairs in the

vehicle. The next day, on February 1, 2019, Hughes sent an email

to Mohnkern reporting that Buccieri:

rode yesterday with our [Chair Car]

supervisor6 for 3 calls. Our supervisor is

concerned he will not be able to do the job

and expresses concerns on his ability to

communicate with the clients and staff at the

facility. As much as I would like to hire him

as he is very dedicated to this I also share

the same concerns.

Given these concerns about Buccieri's ability to fulfill the

essential communications functions of the Chair Car Driver role,

Hughes asked in the same email to Mohnkern on February 1, 2019,

whether Brewster could "offer him anything else in our

organization."

That same day, Mohnkern contacted Matt Churchill, the

supervisor of Brewster's Day Care Van services where there was an

5 Hughes's undisputed testimony was that he and Buccieri had

agreed during the interview to have Buccieri ride along with a

Brewster Chair Car, although he could not remember whose idea it

was to have Buccieri join a Chair Car ride.

6 Hughes testified at trial he believed the supervisor in

question was William J. Sefton, as Sefton was "the only supervisor" in the Chair Car division. Sefton testified, however, that he was

not the driver who had Buccieri ride along with him.

- 11 -opening for the different position of a Day Care Van Driver, via

email to ask "would [Buccieri] be a candidate for Day Care, or is

there too much communication with that as well." Brewster's Day

Care Vans are fifteen-passenger vans that transport multiple

patients, who are generally less medically fragile than Chair Car

patients, to and from appointments during the day. On February 4,

2019, Churchill informed Mohnkern by email that "Day[] [C]are Vans

require the same amount of communications [as Chair Cars]

unfortunately."

On February 4, 2019, Mohnkern emailed Mark and shared

Hughes's email with the concerns about Buccieri's communication

abilities and Churchill's assessment that Day Care Vans required

the same amount of communication. Mark responded by email the

same day and stated that "[a]s much as I would like to give him an

opportunity, . . . [i]f he can't communicate with the patients I

don't see how it would work."

Mohnkern consulted with the billing department manager

to determine if that department had a suitable opening and was

told there were no opportunities for individuals, such as Buccieri,

who were inexperienced in billing.

In the meantime, Buccieri heard nothing further from

Brewster after his January 31, 2019, ride-along. On February 14,

2019, Jennifer Courville, a Career Resource Specialist who had

been aiding Buccieri in his job search, reached out to Brewster

- 12 -via email to inquire about the status of Buccieri's application.

Later that day, Buccieri received a verbal rejection from Brewster,

apparently with the promise that "he would be receiving a formal

letter from the [HR] [D]epartment explaining the reason why he was

not hire[d] for the [C]hair[] [Car] [D]river position." When that

letter did not come within a week, Courville again emailed Brewster

on Buccieri's behalf, asking on February 21, 2019, when Buccieri

could expect the letter. Three days later, on February 24, 2019,

Mohnkern responded, emailing Courville a formal rejection letter,

which he asked her to forward to Buccieri. Buccieri later

confirmed he had received the email. The email stated that

Brewster had concerns that "someone would be successful without

the ability to hear," given that the "three primary components" of

the position were "Passenger Safety, Operations, and Customer

Service." It also informed Buccieri of alternative positions that

Brewster had considered once it had determined that the Chair Car

Driver position "would not be a fit" and the reasons why Buccieri

was not eligible for those positions.

The email had an attached document identifying the

specific issues Brewster had with Buccieri's ability to perform

the Chair Car Driver job. The attached document listed five

questions and answers, addressed to Buccieri from the perspective

of Brewster, that detailed "the contributing factors as to why

Brewster Ambulance Service will not be extending a job offer to

- 13 -you for the Chair Car Driver position." The first question asked

"[w]ould a person sitting behind you, out of reach, be able to

notify you they had an urgent medical concern?" The answer to

Question 1 stated:

No. Because you would not be able to

hear a request for assistance, or hear an

unusual sound like an audible grunt or

respiratory noises, you would have to rely on

visual monitoring of a passenger in the

rearview mirror, or by turning around. This

would cause a safety concern when driving as

the mirror is designed for vehicle operation

and not monitoring internal occupants. While

the mirror could be used to look at a passenger

when queued by them, it is not a sufficient

means of continuous monitoring by itself. It

could also delay a response to intervene with

first aid until the situation was noticed

visually.

Question 2 asked "[w]ould you be able to quickly identify a

passenger who has unsecured themselves from the seat with the

intention of moving about the chair car cabin or attempting to

exit the vehicle, experiencing distress, or requesting

assistance?" The answer to Question 2 stated:

No. We felt that without hearing the

belts become unbuckled, noise of movement in

the chair and with securing devices, it would

be possible for a passenger to become

unsecured and interrupt vehicle operation

before it was visually noted.

Question 3 asked "[w]ould the inability to communicate over the

radio cause a delay or disruption in service?" The answer to

Question 3 stated:

- 14 -Yes. The dispatcher is responsible for

dispatching emergencies to ambulances and

non-emergent transports to chair cars and

transport ambulances. They also use a

computer system to enter dispatching data

simultaneously in a fast-paced, high stress

environment. They would need to stop or delay

these processes to make a phone call on the

VRS system. In order to make sure the

information was transmitted correctly this

would require additional time to confirm

transmitted information to the VRS interpreter

is relayed correctly.

Question 4 asked "[a]re their [sic] potential problems with the VRS

system?" The answer to Question 4 stated:

Yes. A study from the National

Consortium of Interpreter Education Centers

identified that users of the VRS system report

the skill level of interpreters was much

higher than when VRS call centers were first

established. Interviewees cited examples

such as interpreters not being able to sign

fluently, not being able to read

fingerspelling or numbers, and not being able

to recognize sign variations.

This could lead to delays in getting the

right passenger to the right destination [if]

incorrect information was transmitted.

Question 5 asked "[w]ould there be a means to overcome the

requirement in the posted job description to speak English?" The

answer to Question 5 stated:

With difficulty. Most of our customers

speak English and those with some level of

functional communication problems struggle to

speak or speak clearly. They may not have any

other means of communicating because of

developmental or cognitive delays. In many

cases, their low audible, difficult to

understand speech, is the only means of

communication. It would be difficult to speak

- 15 -to this population who already struggle to

communicate.

Mohnkern's email also invited further conversation,

asking Buccieri's Career Resource Specialist to "[p]lease let me

know if you have any questions." Mohnkern also testified that

Brewster was open to further discussions concerning accommodations

based on the detailed explanation that Mohnkern's email provided.

Buccieri admits he never responded to this invitation or raised

any questions with Brewster.

II.

Buccieri's ADA suit against Brewster was filed on

November 14, 2022, in federal court.7 On February 7, 2025, over

Brewster's objection to separating the liability and damages

portions of the trial, the court entered an order that "the

liability portion of the trial [will] start[] first, followed by

the damages portion," and that "[a]t the close of the liability

portion, the [c]ourt will hear the parties on whether to continue

with the same jurors."

The jury trial began on February 10, 2025. At the close

of testimony on day three, Brewster's counsel made a Rule 50(a)

7 The court sua sponte dismissed Buccieri's claim under

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, as

untimely, and Buccieri voluntarily withdrew his time-barred claim

under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B. Buccieri does not appeal the

dismissal of his Section 504 claim.

- 16 -motion for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that the evidence

was insufficient on three different grounds.8 Counsel argued that:

(1) There was insufficient evidence to find that Buccieri could

perform the essential functions of the Chair Car Driver position:

[T]he jury cannot find that he has presented

evidence that with a reasonable accommodation

he could have performed the essential

functions of this job.

(2) Brewster had shown that accommodating Buccieri would be an

undue hardship:

So [Buccieri's] own testimony, his own

admission of a party opponent is that the

technology he proposed was not reliable, and

translate that into an emergency situation or

a medically sensitive situation, such as

Brewster, and I don't know how the jury could

find that he could do this job based on the

facts my client knew at this time.

(3) There was insufficient evidence on the facts presented to

permit a separate theory of liability for Brewster's alleged

failure to engage in the interactive process:9

[T]he interactive process ended with my client

outlining the concerns and Mr. Buccieri never

8 At trial, Brewster's counsel and the district court

referred to the Rule 50(a) motion as a "directed verdict" motion,

which is "the term the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] used for

a Rule 50(a) motion for 'judgment as a matter of law' prior to the

1991 amendment." Santos-Arrieta v. Hosp. Del Maestro, 14 F.4th

1, 9 n.14 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 advisory

committee's note to 1991 amendment).

9 Buccieri's complaint had not included failure to engage in

an interactive process as a potential basis for liability.

Buccieri apparently first raised that theory at the February 5,

2025, pre-trial conference.

- 17 -responding. So he ended the interactive

process on this.

Brewster's counsel later expanded:

[T]here has to be a failure on my client's

part in the interactive process . . . for that

theory to be cognizable. . . . I'm

struggling with where the failure is because

[Buccieri] presents the VRS. My client, you

see from the emails very clearly, considers

the VRS, considers his . . . operation in the

field, considers other jobs for him,

. . . goes even the extra step in saying,

hey, look, he hasn't asked for it, but can we

bring in a translator for orientation.

The court denied the Rule 50(a) motion on all three grounds. At

the charge conference the next day, Brewster also objected to the

wording of Question 6 of the jury verdict form concerning the

interactive process, which the court overruled.10

10 Question 6, which was not in the proposed jury verdict

form submitted by Buccieri or Brewster, asked the jury whether

Buccieri proved that "had a good faith interactive process

occurred, Mr. Buccieri and Brewster Ambulance could have found

reasonable accommodation(s) that would have enabled Mr. Buccieri

to perform the job's essential functions." Brewster's counsel

argued that the phrase "had a good faith interactive process

occurred" "suggests that a good faith interactive process did not

occur" but "[the jurors are] not asked that question," and

suggested alternate wording to avoid "assuming that there's been

a lack of an interactive process, which I think is very much in

dispute." The court overruled the objection, and Brewster's

counsel renewed the objection before the jury retired. As

Brewster does not develop a verdict form impropriety argument on

appeal, we do not address this issue. See Xirum v. Bondi, 141

F.4th 345, 355 (1st Cir. 2025) ("[I]ssues adverted to in a

perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed

argumentation, are deemed waived." (quoting United States v.

Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990))).

- 18 -The jury found as follows. Question 1, which the

verdict form labeled as a "COMMON ELEMENT" to both failure to hire

and failure to engage in an interactive process, asked the jury

whether:

the Plaintiff, Mr. John Buccieri, prove[d] by

a preponderance of the evidence that he could

have performed the essential functions of this

position on or about February 24, 2019, [the

date of Brewster's written explanation of its

decision not to hire Buccieri,] if Brewster

Ambulance had made reasonable accommodations

for Mr. Buccieri's disability?

The jury responded "Yes" to Question 1.11

The verdict form labeled Questions 2-4 as concerning the

"FAILURE TO HIRE" basis for liability. Question 2 asked the jury

whether:

the Plaintiff, Mr. John Buccieri, prove[d] by

a preponderance of the evidence that he was a

qualified individual under the Americans with

Disabilities Act on or about February 24,

2019?

The jury answered yes. Question 3 asked the jury whether:

the Plaintiff, Mr. John Buccieri, prove[d] by

a preponderance of the evidence that his

disability was a motivating factor in Brewster

11 During deliberations, the jury asked a question regarding

"Question 1 and its reference to reasonable accommodation," and

asked the court whether it "[s]hould . . . be considering the phone holder and VRS as the only reasonable accommodations or just

reasonable accommodations in general?" The court responded, "I'm

going to go back to the jury instruction," repeating that "[t]he

burden is on the employee or the potential employee to offer what

the accommodation is intended to be. You cannot speculate what

was not in the evidence. You can only take the evidence that you

heard that was believable and the instructions."

- 19 -Ambulance's decision to take an adverse

employment action against him?

The jury answered yes. Question 4 asked the jury whether:

the Defendant, Brewster Ambulance, prove[d] by

a preponderance of the evidence that providing

Mr. Buccieri with the requested

accommodation(s) would have been an undue

hardship to Brewster Ambulance and/or posed a

direct threat to Mr. Buccieri or others?

The jury answered yes.

The verdict form labeled Questions 5 and 6 as concerning

the "FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN AN INTERACTIVE PROCESS" basis for

liability. Question 5 asked the jury whether:

the Plaintiff, Mr. John Buccieri, prove[d] by

a preponderance of the evidence that he made

a request for an accommodation that was

sufficiently direct and specific so as to put

Brewster Ambulance on notice of the need for

that accommodation?

The jury answered yes. Question 6 asked the jury whether:

the Plaintiff, Mr. John Buccieri, prove[d] by

a preponderance of the evidence that, had a

good faith interactive process occurred,

Mr. Buccieri and Brewster Ambulance could have

found reasonable accommodation(s) that would

have enabled Mr. Buccieri to perform the job's

essential functions?

The jury answered yes. In light of these verdict form answers,

the court and the parties understood the jury as returning a split

verdict, finding for Brewster on Buccieri's failure-to-hire theory

but finding for Buccieri on his interactive-process theory.

- 20 -At a status conference on April 29, 2025, the court told

the parties that it was taking the jury trial for the damages phase

off the schedule and directed the parties to present supplemental

briefing "specific[ally]" on the issue of "the level of

interaction -- interactive process, the participation by both

parties." The court had not entered final judgment as to

liability, and it stated that it had "serious doubts that there

was sufficient evidence to support the interactive process

verdict." The court stated that "[t]he First Circuit is very

clear that the interactive process is a two-way street," citing

EEOC v. Kohl's Department Stores, Inc., 774 F.3d 127 (1st Cir.

2014), which held that Kohl's was not liable under the ADA where

the employee had failed to engage in an interactive process, see

id. at 132-34. Brewster's counsel stated that the defendant

"anticipated filing a post[-trial] motion," but that the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure were "clear we didn't need to do it until

after a judgment had issued." Counsel offered "to get [the motion]

in by the end of the week in a [Rule 50(b) motion], if that would

be easier." The court responded that both parties should "brief

this specific issue" by May 20, 2025.

In Brewster's supplemental briefing submitted on May 20,

2025, Brewster argued that the court should "direct entry for

- 21 -Brewster as a matter of law" under "FRCP 50(b)(3),"12 "given the

lack of evidence that Brewster failed to engage in the interactive

process in good faith":

The evidence . . . makes it clear that

Brewster was more than willing to support the

one accommodation . . . that [p]laintiff

requested. . . . The undisputed testimony is

that Brewster was open to further discussions,

but [p]laintiff ceased the dialogue.

. . . Brewster determined that the

accommodation would not be fully effective.

Brewster looked for other accommodations, but

did not fail to consider other accommodations

or refuse to communicate with [p]laintiff.

Brewster's brief also argued:

The Court should also consider whether

there was any evidence that a reasonable

accommodation would have been found to enable

[p]laintiff to perform the essential functions

of the job. The jury's second question [to

the court during deliberations] ("Should we be

considering the phone holder and VRS as the

only reasonable accommodations or just

reasonable accommodations in general?")

suggest[s] the jury was speculating on this.

There is no evidence in the record as to an

accommodation identified or requested by

[p]laintiff that would have permitted him to

communicate as needed.

The brief also stated that "Brewster reserves its right to file

for post-judgment relief on a broader range of issues if necessary"

12 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that

Rule 50(b) motions must be filed "[n]o later than 28 days after

the entry of judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). As judgment had

not yet entered at the time of defendant's post-trial briefing,

the Rule 50(b) motion was timely.

- 22 -as the post-trial brief was only responsive to "[t]he [c]ourt['s]

. . . requested briefing on a narrow issue."

In Buccieri's supplemental briefing submitted on May 20,

2025, he argued that "the verdict [was] impervious to a renewed

motion for judgment as a matter of law" because there was "a

substantial and compelling evidentiary basis for each of th[e]

[jury's interactive process] findings." Buccieri argued that the

evidence established there had been a "[p]ost-[i]nterview

[b]reakdown . . . in the interactive process attributable to

Brewster":

Despite Mr. Hughes' positive assessment

[after the initial interview], the interactive

process deteriorated after Brewster's

ownership and senior human resources became

more involved without direct, meaningful

dialogue with Mr. Buccieri about their

emerging internal concerns.

. . . [Brewster's] alleged and vague

ride-along concerns were never discussed with

Mr. Buccieri, nor was he given any opportunity

to address them or suggest alternative

approaches. . . . [This] represent[ed] a

clear breakdown in the "meaningful dialogue"

required.

Buccieri also argued that "the jury heard evidence" that Brewster

engaged in "empty gestures on the part of the employer [that do]

not satisfy the good faith standard" (second quoting Kohl's Dep't

Stores, 774 F.3d at 132).

On July 28, 2025, the district court granted defendant's

motion and entered judgment in favor of Brewster on all counts.

- 23 -Buccieri, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 283. The court stated that "Brewster

cannot be liable . . . when it concluded it could not provide

Mr. Buccieri a reasonable accommodation" and that "[t]here was

ample evidence at trial that established Brewster's undue

hardship," so "the verdict on [failure to engage in the interactive

process] should be set aside because 'the jury failed to reach the

only result permitted by the evidence.'" Id. at 282 (quoting

Quiles-Quiles v. Henderson, 439 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006)).

Buccieri's appeal followed.

III.

This court "review[s] Rule 50 challenges to the

sufficiency of evidence presented at trial de novo, affirming entry

of judgment as a matter of law only if there is no legally

sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for

[the non-moving party]." Intercity Maint. Co. v. Loc. 254, Serv.

Emps. Int'l Union, 241 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 2001) (second

alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

Under de novo review, where, as here, arguments are

properly made in Rule 50(a) and Rule 50(b) motions and properly

preserved, this court "can affirm on any independent basis that

appears in the record." McMillan v. Mass. Soc'y for Prevention

of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 298 n.3 (1st Cir. 1998)

(affirming denial of Rule 50(b) JMOL motion); see also

- 24 -Quiles-Quiles, 439 F.3d at 5-8 (considering defendant's arguments

that plaintiff had produced insufficient evidence to establish

three elements of his disability harassment claim, only one of

which was the basis of the district court's grant of JMOL on that

claim); cf. Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546

U.S. 394, 407 (2006) (when party "fail[s] to renew its preverdict

[Rule 50(a)] motion as specified in Rule 50(b), there [i]s no basis

for review of [party]'s sufficiency of the evidence challenge in

the Court of Appeals").

We affirm the district court's order granting JMOL to

Brewster. On the evidence before it, no reasonable jury could

conclude that there was a reasonable accommodation that would have

enabled Buccieri to perform the essential functions of the Chair

Car Driver or Day Care Van Driver positions without undue hardship

to Brewster.

It has long been the law that "an employee's request for

accommodation sometimes creates 'a duty on the part of the employer

to engage in an interactive process,'" which "involves an informal

dialogue between the employee and the employer" "for the purpose

of discussing alternative reasonable accommodations." Kohl's

Dep't Stores, 774 F.3d at 132 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)

(quoting Enica v. Principi, 544 F.3d 328, 338 (1st Cir. 2008)).

An employer cannot be held liable on an interactive process theory

where "the record forecloses a finding that the plaintiff could

- 25 -perform the duties of the job[] with . . . reasonable

accommodation." Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 2001);

see also Echevarría v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 856 F.3d 119, 133

(1st Cir. 2017) ("The omission of an interactive process is of no

moment if the record forecloses a finding that the employee could

do the essential duties of the job, with or without reasonable

accommodation, -- which . . . is the case here." (internal

quotation marks and alteration omitted) (quoting Lang v. Wal-Mart

Stores E., L.P., 813 F.3d 447, 456 (1st Cir. 2016))).

No reasonable jury could conclude there was a reasonable

accommodation that would have allowed Buccieri to perform the

essential communications functions of the Chair Car Driver

position or the Day Care Van Driver position without undue hardship

to Brewster. As the jury did find, Buccieri's requested

accommodation of VRS and a phone holder would be an undue hardship

on Brewster. We reject Buccieri's argument to us that,

nonetheless, a jury could reasonably find that "at least one of

th[e] other accommodations" "presented at trial -- including

reassignment [to the Day Care Van Driver position], [text-based

and] tablet-based dispatch, or structured visual-monitoring

protocols" "could have enabled Mr. Buccieri to perform the

essential functions of" either the Chair Car or Day Care Van Driver

positions without undue hardship to Brewster. We treat Buccieri

as having presented a challenge to both driver positions despite

- 26 -language in his brief failing to specify which position he was

addressing and referring only to "the job." The undisputed

testimony at trial established that Chair Car Drivers are required

to communicate with dispatch, patients, and facilities staff, and

no accommodation would permit Buccieri to do so without imposing

an undue hardship on Brewster. The undisputed evidence was that

the same was true for the Day Care Van Driver job.

Buccieri presented no evidence to rebut that his

proposed tablet-based or any cell-phone-based accommodation for

communicating with dispatch, even if it was available at the

relevant time, would pose safety risks to all concerned of the

driver's eyes being taken off the road, risks the ADA did not

require Brewster to undertake. Brewster's radio system for

dispatch communications has safety advantages over Buccieri's

alternative accommodation of tablet-based communications, because

the radio system allows drivers to connect instantly to dispatch

with the press of one button on the radio and without taking their

eyes off the road. Brewster established that distracted driving

is the number one cause of accidents involving Brewster vehicles

and that cell phone use is the number one cause of distracted

driving.

As for the essential functions of communicating with

patients and ensuring their safety, Buccieri argues that the jury

had sufficient evidence to find that "a structured mirror- 27 -monitoring protocol" would allow him sufficient visual monitoring

to supervise the patients for medical emergencies. There are

multiple problems with Buccieri's argument, as "[t]he law does not

require an employer to accommodate a disability by foregoing an

essential function of the position." Kvorjak, 259 F.3d at 57

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The alternative

"visual-monitoring protocol[]" he proposes to us did not meet

Brewster's service and safety standards. Beyond that, Buccieri

produced no evidence that, for example, mirror-based monitoring

could ensure patient safety in darker conditions. As the district

court recognized, Buccieri presented "no evidence, none, that he

had that ability" "to speak to the patients."

For the same reasons, there is also no evidence to

support a finding that there were reasonable accommodations that

would have allowed Buccieri to perform the essential

communications functions of the Day Care Van Driver position, the

alternative position that Brewster considered as a potential

accommodation for Buccieri, without undue hardship. Brewster's

Day Care Van manager's undisputed assessment was that the role of

Day Care Van Driver still "require[d] the same amount of

communications" as the Chair Car Driver role, but with even more

patients in the Day Care Van vehicles.

The district court's order, mistakenly, referred to

rationales based on supposed verdict inconsistency and the

- 28 -impropriety of verdict form Question 6, which were not raised by

Brewster as grounds for JMOL "in either its Rule 50(a) or

Rule 50(b) motion . . . [thus making] the district court's sua

sponte tackling of th[ese] issue[s] error." Santos-Arrieta v.

Hosp. Del Maestro, 14 F.4th 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2021) (emphasis omitted)

(overturning the district court's grant of JMOL to defendant on an

issue argued in defendant's Rule 59(a) motion but not in

defendant's Rule 50(a) or Rule 50(b) motion). "[A]llowing a judge

to sua sponte raise a new issue post-verdict, and proceed to

overturn a jury verdict on that basis[,] [would] contravene[] the

dictates of Rule 50(b)," id. at 9 (quoting Robles-Vazquez v. Tirado

Garcia, 110 F.3d 204, 207 (1st Cir. 1997)), as Rule 50(b) forbids

a district court from granting a defendant's Rule 50(b) motion

based on a new ground not contained in a Rule 50(a) motion, id. at

8-9. Notwithstanding this mistake, we can affirm on the

insufficiency-of-the-evidence basis already explained, given that

Brewster did raise that issue in its Rule 50(a) and Rule 50(b)

motions.

IV.

The order of the district court is affirmed.

- 29 -