Opinion issued July 9, 2026.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-25-00673-CR
GERALD DWAYNE WOODS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
And
NO. 01-25-01100-CR
EX PARTE GERALD DWAYNE WOODS
On Appeal from the 262nd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case Nos. 1695082, 1695082A
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Gerald Dwayne Woods was indicted for the offence of indecency
with a child by exposure. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11(a)(2). Pursuant to a pleabargain agreement with the State, Woods pled guilty to the third-degree felony of
indecency with a child by exposure, enhanced by a prior felony conviction, and the
trial court placed him on deferred adjudication for a period of five years. See TEX.
PENAL CODE § 12.425; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.101(a), 42A.104(a).
The State subsequently filed a First Amended Motion to Adjudicate alleging
Woods had violated several terms of his community supervision. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.108(a). Woods pled not true to the violations. After a hearing,
the trial court adjudicated Woods guilty and sentenced him to eight years in prison.
Woods timely filed a notice of appeal.
Woods’s appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw, along with a
supporting brief, stating the record presents no reversible error and requesting
permission to withdraw from his representation of Woods under Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Because we find no meritorious substantive issues
after an independent review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
Discussion
Counsel filed an Anders brief stating he has complied with all Anders
requirements and requesting he be allowed to withdraw from his representation of
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Woods. Counsel states his professional opinion that after reviewing the record, no
arguable grounds for reversal exist and thus any appeal of the trial court’s judgment
and sentence would lack merit and be frivolous. See id. at 744; Mitchell v. State, 193
S.W.3d 153, 155 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Counsel’s brief
meets the minimum Anders requirements by presenting a professional evaluation of
the record and explaining why, after careful review of the record, he is unable to
advance any grounds of error warranting reversal. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744;
Mitchell, 193 S.W.3d at 155. The State waived its right to file a response and Woods
filed a pro se brief in response to the Anders brief.1
In Anders, the United States Supreme Court held that “the responsibility to
determine whether an appeal is frivolous in nature lies with the appellate court—not
1
In response to his counsel’s Anders brief, Woods filed a pro se brief on December
8, 2025, a “provisional” brief on December 19, 2025, and a supplemental brief on
March 30, 2026. On December 17, 2025, Woods also filed a document titled
“Habeas Corpus Defendant Provisional Pro Se Brief of Meritorious Grounds on
Appeal,” which this Court filed under Appellate No. 01-25-00673-CR. Although
titled as a “Habeas Corpus” provisional pro se brief, Woods’ December 17th filing
is, in substance, his second response to his counsel’s Anders brief.
To the extent Woods’ December 17th filing is seeking post-conviction habeas relief
from his felony conviction in this case, we dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction. See
Hicks v. State, No. 01-20-00017-CR, 2020 WL 894442, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Feb. 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Only
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction to grant such relief in final
post-conviction felony proceedings, which are governed by Article 11.07 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07 § 3(a)
(“After final conviction in any felony case, the writ [of habeas corpus] must be made
returnable to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas at Austin, Texas.”).
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with the attorney of record.” Garner v. State, 300 S.W.3d 763, 765–66 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009). We must thus independently decide whether the present appeal raises
any meritorious “arguable grounds” for review. Id. at 767. If we determine that
arguable grounds for appeal exist, we must “remand the cause to the trial court so
that new counsel may be appointed to brief the issues.” Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d
824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If, on the other hand, we conclude the appeal is
frivolous, we may issue an opinion affirming the trial court’s judgment and
explaining that, after reviewing the record, we find no reversible error. Id. at 826–
27. Woods may challenge that holding by filing a petition for discretionary review
with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. at 827 & n.6.
After conducting an independent review of the record on appeal, we agree
with counsel that there is no reversible error in the record, there are no arguable
grounds for review, and the appeal from Woods’s conviction is frivolous. See
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (emphasizing that reviewing court—and not counsel—
determines, after full examination of proceedings, whether appeal is frivolous);
Garner, 300 S.W.3d at 767 (stating reviewing court determines whether arguable
grounds for review exist); Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827 (same); Mitchell, 193 S.W.3d
at 155 (stating reviewing court determines whether arguable grounds exist by
reviewing entire record).
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Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court and grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(a).2 Court-appointed counsel Tom Abbate must
immediately send Woods the notice required under Rule of Appellate Procedure
6.5(c) and file a copy of the notice with the Clerk of this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P.
6.5(c). We dismiss any pending motions as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Rivas-Molloy and Guiney.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
2
Appointed counsel still has a duty to inform Woods of the result of this appeal and
that he may, on his own, pursue discretionary review with the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals. See Ex parte Wilson, 956 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
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