In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
No. 02-25-00672-CV
WISE ACQUISITIONS, LLC, Appellant
V.
LLANO RIDGE HOLDINGS, LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from the 342nd District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 342-363995-25
Before Birdwell, Womack, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Wise Acquisitions, LLC attempts to appeal the trial court’s “Order
Granting Plaintiff Llano Ridge Holdings, LLC’s Traditional Motion for Summary
Judgment” that granted a bill of review but did not dispose of the merits of the
underlying controversy between the parties. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f) (providing
that after the trial court’s plenary power expires, a judgment cannot be set aside
except by a bill of review for sufficient cause, filed within the time allowed by law).
Appellee Llano Ridge Holdings, LLC moved to dismiss this appeal for lack of
appellate jurisdiction, and Wise requested that we “treat this appeal as a mandamus” if
we conclude that we lack jurisdiction. We will dismiss the appeal for want of
jurisdiction and deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2024, Wise filed two lawsuits in the span of two weeks in two Texas
counties over the sale of one piece of real estate.
Wise first sued Carye Lou Angell and Will Young Benge IV (collectively, the
Sellers) on May 2, 2024, in Culberson County. Wise alleged that the Sellers had
breached their contract with Wise for the sale of over 3,000 acres of land (the
Property) in Culberson County by failing to close the sale by April 30, 2024, and
sought specific performance. Wise alleged that it suspected that the Sellers had
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subsequently received a higher offer from another buyer and that they were
attempting to sell the property to that buyer.
In a second lawsuit, Wise sued Llano on May 14, 2024, in Tarrant County,
alleging that Llano had tortiously interfered with the contract between Wise and the
Sellers for the purchase of the Property. The Tobin Firm P.C. served as Llano’s
registered agent and governing person. On May 22, 2024, Wise allegedly served
notice of the Tarrant County lawsuit on “Amanda V. Rodriguez,” a purported
employee of the Tobin Firm.
On May 30, 2024, the Sellers sold the Property to Llano. Llano intervened in
the Culberson County lawsuit on June 7, 2024, but did not answer the Tarrant County
lawsuit. Alleging that it had served Llano, Wise sought a default judgment in the
Tarrant County lawsuit.1 On July 19, 2024, the trial court rendered a default
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At the hearing on Wise’s motion for entry of final default judgment, the trial court inquired into Wise’s service of process on Llano:
THE COURT:··Let me ask you something right quick because I am
seeing here on your service [that]·an employee authorized to accept
service for the registered agent?
[WISE]:··Yeah.··So the registered agent is The Tobin Firm, PC.··And so
the --THE COURT:··You served a law firm?
[WISE]:··Yes, I served a law firm.··And that was -- he was there to
accept service. And if you look -- when you make an entity a registered
agent, you can serve anybody that says they’re authorized to accept
service at that location.
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judgment.2 From July 2024 through December 2024, Llano and Wise actively litigated
the Culberson County lawsuit.
On March 17, 2025, Wise sent Llano an email notifying it of the default
judgment and demanding that it convey the Property to Wise and pay
$1,707,946.97—the purchase price of the Property—and $3,264,748.20 in exemplary
damages.3 Llano, alleging that it had never been served with process, filed an original
petition for bill of review, explaining that Wise had purportedly “served an individual
named Amanda Rodriguez, who [did] not work for Llano Ridge’s registered agent for
service and [was] not authorized to accept service on behalf of Llano Ridge.” Llano
also complained that the default judgment was not supported by Wise’s pleadings4
THE COURT:··Have you had any conversations with Llano?
[WISE]:··With Llano?··I mean, we --THE COURT:··Do they know this lawsuit is filed or no?
[WISE]:··I don’t think they do since they haven’t filed an answer.··I
don’t really·know, though.·
The default judgment granted Wise specific performance—ordering Llano to
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convey the Property to Wise—and awarded exemplary damages.
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Two days later, Wise moved for summary judgment against Llano in the Culberson County lawsuit and attempted to use the default judgment from the Tarrant County lawsuit, claiming that “Llano Ridge’s claims [were] barred by res judicata” and that “[c]ollateral estoppel prevent[ed] Llano Ridge from relitigating the key issues adjudicated in the Tarrant County Lawsuit.”
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Llano complained that Wise had not pleaded a claim for specific performance.
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and that Wise had failed to provide the clerk with Llano’s last known email address
when it moved for default judgment, as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
239a.5 See Tex. R. Civ. P. 239a (“At or immediately prior to the time an interlocutory
or final default judgment is rendered, the party taking the same or his attorney must
certify to the clerk in writing the last known email address and mailing address of the
party against whom the judgment is taken, which certificate shall be filed among the
papers in the cause.”). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the
bill of review proceeding.
In support of its summary-judgment motion, Llano attached affidavits from
Christopher S. Tobin and Amanda Rodriguez. Tobin attested that he was the
president and registered agent of the Tobin Firm, that the Tobin Firm had always
been Llano’s registered agent for service of process, that Rodriguez had never been an
employee of the Tobin Firm, that no employee of the Tobin Firm had been served
with process for the Tarrant County lawsuit, and that he had no knowledge of the
Tarrant County lawsuit until March 17, 2025—the day that Wise’s attorney emailed
him the demand letter and the default judgment.
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Llano asserted that Wise “was fully aware of Llano Ridge’s email address,” explaining that (1) Wise had sent a demand letter—which contained Llano’s email address—to Llano a week before filing the Tarrant County lawsuit and (2) Wise “had been in active litigation against [Llano] in Culberson County and communicating regularly with its lawyer in that case” and “had served discovery on Llano Ridge just ten days earlier.”
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Rodriguez attested that she was employed as a legal assistant at the Zadeh
Firm,6 a position that she held in May 2024, when Wise claimed to have served her on
behalf of Llano. She further attested she had never been an employee or independent
contractor of the Tobin Firm, that the Tobin Firm had never authorized her to accept
service for its firm or clients, and that she had no recollection of having accepted
service for Llano.
Llano later supplemented its summary-judgment evidence with Tobin’s and
Rodriguez’s deposition testimony. Tobin testified that neither he nor any employee
of the Tobin Firm had been served with process in the Tarrant County law suit and
that he had not authorized Rodriguez to accept service. Rodriguez testified that she
had never been an employee or independent contractor for the Tobin Firm, that she
never had any agency role for the Tobin Firm, and that she had neither been
authorized nor told anyone that she was authorized to accept service for the Tobin
Firm.
Wise argued in its summary-judgment motion and its response to the crossmotion that it had served Rodriguez, that she was an “employee” of the Tobin Firm,
and that parties from other cases had served her on behalf of the Tobin Firm. Llano
responded that “[w]hether other parties have tried to effectuate service by improperly
serving Ms. Rodriguez is immaterial to whether Llano Ridge was properly served.”
The Zadeh Firm is in the same building as the Tobin Firm.
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Following a hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial
court granted Llano’s summary-judgment motion, which granted the bill of review but
did not dispose of the merits of Wise’s tortious interference claim. The trial court’s
order is as follows:
On this day, the Court heard Llano Ridge Holdings, LLC’s
(“Llano Ridge”) Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”).
After considering the Motion, response, supporting evidence, and
arguments of counsel, the Court concludes that Llano Ridge’s Motion
should be and hereby is GRANTED. Therefore,
It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that a bill of
review is entered in favor of Llano Ridge, and the Final Default
Judgment signed by this Court on or about July 19, 2024 in favor of
Wise Acquisitions, LLC in Cause No. 342-352756-24 is hereby
VACATED, SET ASIDE, and RESCINDED.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that
abstracts of judgment and writ of execution issued by the clerk on the
basis of the Final Default Judgment are hereby VACATED, SET
ASIDE, and RESCINDED.
The clerk of court is INSTRUCTED to issue all appropriate
documents necessary to effectuate this order.
Wise appealed, and Llano moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate
jurisdiction.
III. DISCUSSION
A. JURISDICTION
We have jurisdiction to consider appeals only from final judgments and from
certain interlocutory orders made immediately appealable by statute. Lehmann v. Har7
Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195, 200 (Tex. 2001); see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code.
§ 51.014(a) (listing appealable interlocutory orders).
A final judgment is one that (1) “actually disposes of every pending claim and
party” or (2) “clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and
all parties.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205. Unless one of the statutory exceptions listed
under Section 51.014(a) applies, an order that does not dispose of all pending parties
and claims remains interlocutory and unappealable until the trial court signs a final
judgment. Id.
B. BILL OF REVIEW
1. Applicable Law
A bill of review proceeding, like an equitable motion for new trial and a
restricted appeal, is a method of attacking a default judgment.7 See PNS Stores, Inc. v.
Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 275 (Tex. 2012). The bill of review is the chosen method
when, as here, the default judgment under attack is no longer subject to a motion for
new trial or otherwise appealable. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f); Frost Nat’l Bank v.
Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 504 (Tex. 2010). The final resolution of the bill of review
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The Texas Supreme Court has demonstrated a growing hostility toward noanswer default judgments—particularly when the record hints at gamesmanship in the face of reasonably available means of providing notice—and described them as “greatly disfavor[ed]” and barely tolerable. In re Lakeside Resort JV, LLC, 689 S.W.3d 916, 920–21 (Tex. 2024) (discussing importance of adversarial presentation); see Shamrock Enters., LLC v. Top Notch Movers, LLC, 728 S.W.3d 693, 702–03 (Tex. 2026) (Blacklock, C.J., concurring); Mitchell v. MAP Res., Inc., 649 S.W.3d 180, 190–91 (Tex. 2022).
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proceeding will involve either a one-step process or a two-step process, depending
upon whether the trial court denies or grants the bill. See Alaimo v. U.S. Bank Trust
Nat’l Ass’n, 551 S.W.3d 212, 215 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.).
If the bill of review is denied, the matter is determined in one step—the order
denying the bill of review, whether by dismissal, summary judgment, or conventional
judgment, becomes a final order from which an appeal may be taken. See generally
Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 409 (Tex. 1979) (explaining that, depending upon
the petitioner’s proof, a bill of review may be adjudicated by pretrial dismissal or after
a trial on the merits); Mandel v. Lewisville Indept Sch. Dist., 499 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. denied) (considering a petition for bill of review that
was adjudicated by summary judgment).
If, however, the bill of review is granted, a second step is added to the
process—adjudication of the original, underlying cause of action. Hartford Underwriters
Ins. v. Mills, 110 S.W.3d 588, 590 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (holding that
“when the trial court grants a bill of review and sets aside a judgment in a prior case,
the subsequent trial on the merits of the prior case occurs”).
In Baker, the Texas Supreme Court explained that although “only one final
judgment may be rendered in a bill of review proceeding,” that judgment contains two
components: (1) whether “the complainant is suffering under a wrongfully-obtained
judgment,” and, if so, (2) “whether the bill of review defendant, the original plaintiff,
has proved the elements of his original cause of action.” 582 S.W.2d at 409. And,
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applying the approach articulated in Baker, in 2003, our court explicitly stated that the
second step—the adjudication of the merits of the underlying lawsuit—should occur
in the bill of review proceeding. Hartford, 110 S.W.3d at 590 (holding that “when the
trial court grants a bill of review and sets aside a judgment in a prior case, the
subsequent trial on the merits of the prior case occurs in the same proceeding as the
trial on the bill of review”).
A year later, we applied this rule in describing what a final judgment from a bill
of review should adjudicate. In re J.B.A., 127 S.W.3d 850, 851 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2004, no pet.). In J.B.A., we explained that the final judgment in a bill of
review should either: (1) deny any relief to the bill of review petitioner, or (2) “grant
the bill of review and set aside the former judgment, insofar as it is attacked, and
substitute a new judgment which properly adjudicates the entire controversy.” Id.
2. Analysis
As explained above, a judgment following the granting of a bill of review must
not only grant the bill of review, thereby setting aside the default judgment, but also
must adjudicate the underlying controversy. See id. Whether as one order standing
alone or two orders taken together, structurally, in an action in which a bill of review
is granted, two matters must be resolved: (1) a finding that the default judgment was
wrongfully granted, and (2) a determination of whether the plaintiff in the underlying
controversy ultimately prevails. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 409.
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Here, the trial court’s order grants the bill of review and vacates the default
judgment, but it does not purport to resolve the underlying controversy. The order
also is not immediately appealable by statute, does not state with unmistakable clarity
that it is a final judgment, and does not contain any finality language. See Lehmann,
39 S.W.3d at 192–93; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a).
Wise maintains that we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal because the
trial court’s order granting the bill of review “constitutes” either an appealable
interlocutory order or a final judgment. We disagree.
First, Wise argues that the order functions as a temporary injunction under
Section 51.014(a)(4) because it prevents “Wise from enforcing the default judgment
and directs the clerk to issue ‘all documents necessary’ to effectuate that restraint.”
An interlocutory order “functions as a temporary injunction”—and is therefore
appealable—if it requires a party to perform according to the relief demanded in the
suit and “operates during the pendency of the suit.” Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T
Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. 2000). “[A] temporary injunction is inextricably
bound with the merits”; when evaluating whether an interlocutory order has the
“character and function” of a temporary injunction, we are to focus on “whether the
order restricts (or commands) a party’s conduct during the suit[] based on a
determination that the opposing party has demonstrated a probable right to relief.”
Harley Channelview Props., LLC v. Harley Marine Gulf, LLC, 690 S.W.3d 32, 39, 41 (Tex.
2024). Thus, an order “has the character and function of a temporary injunction” if it
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“(1) requires the enjoined party to perform; (2) is made effective and operates while
[the] suit remains pending; and (3) compels performance based on a determination
that the opposing party’s claim has merit.” Id. at 40. We are unpersuaded by Wise’s
argument that the granting of the bill of review functions has a temporary injunction
because it does not prevent Wise from enforcing the default judgment; rather, the
order vacates the judgment and leaves nothing to enforce. In other words, the order
does not restrain Wise from exercising any legal right or compel it to perform
anything. See id.
Second, Wise argues that “[b]y not ordering any further proceedings, or
specifying grounds for summary judgment, the November 21, 2025 [order]
presumptively disposed of the underlying tortious interference dispute.” Again, we
are unpersuaded by this argument. As noted, absent a conventional trial on the
merits, a judgment is final if it either (1) states with unmistakable clarity that it is a
final judgment as to all claims and all parties or (2) actually disposes of all claims and
parties then before the court, regardless of its language. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d. at 192–
93.
In determining whether an order is a final judgment, we should first examine
the language of the order itself. In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. 2018)
(orig. proceeding) (citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195, 205–06); In re M & O
Homebuilders, Inc., 516 S.W.3d 101, 106 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, orig.
proceeding). If the order does not clearly and unequivocally indicate finality, we then
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look at the record to determine finality. Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 827–28; M & O
Homebuilders, Inc., 516 S.W.3d at 106. Although no “magic language” renders a
judgment final, “a trial court may express its intent to render a final judgment by
describing its action as (1) final, (2) a disposition of all claims and parties, and
(3) appealable.” Bella Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020).
Examples of clear and unequivocal finality language include: “This judgment finally
disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable,” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206,
and “This judgment is final, disposes of all claims and all parties, and is appealable,”
Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 825. Here, no such clear and unequivocal finality language is
included in the trial court’s order, and it did not dispose of the merits of the
underlying controversy; rather, it vacated, set aside, and rescinded the trial court’s
default judgment.
Because the order in the bill of review proceeding fails to dispose of the merits
of the underlying controversy between Llano and Wise, it does not dispose of all
parties and claims before the court for adjudication. We therefore conclude that the
order granting the bill of review is not final but remains interlocutory and
unappealable. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. See e.g., Pak v. Yang,
No. 02-18-00167-CV, 2018 WL 3385589, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 12,
2018, no pet.) (dismissing appeal from summary-judgment order which granted a bill
of review but did not dispose of the merits of the underlying controversy between the
parties); Unidivine, LLC v. Tex. Champps Americana, Inc., No. 02-17-00104-CV,
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2017 WL 2375772, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 1, 2017, no pet.) (“An order
granting a bill of review that sets aside a prior judgment without also disposing of all
issues in the case on the merits is interlocutory and is not a final judgment appealable
to the court of appeals or the supreme court.”); Norvell v. Bruton, No. 02-12-00090-CV,
2012 WL 1868587, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 24, 2012, no pet.) (“Because
the trial court’s February 7, 2012 order [granting the bill of review] does not dispose
of all issues and parties in the case, it is not an appealable interlocutory order.”).
C. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Wise requested that we treat its appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus if we
conclude that the trial court’s granting of the bill of review was not directly
appealable.
Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy. In re Acad., Ltd., 625 S.W.3d 19,
25 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding). The party seeking mandamus relief must show
both that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and that the party has no
adequate remedy by appeal. In re Allstate Indem. Co., 622 S.W.3d 870, 875 (Tex. 2021)
(orig. proceeding). In certain circumstances, we may exercise our mandamus
jurisdiction when an appellant specifically requests that we treat its attempted appeal
as a petition for writ of mandamus. See CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 452
(Tex. 2011) (construing impermissible interlocutory appeal as mandamus proceeding
upon appellant’s request and remanding to court of appeals for consideration as
such).
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Here, in the interest of judicial economy—and to the extent that mandamus
relief may be an appropriate remedy—we will consider the documents filed in this
attempted appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. See Rylander v. Archer Sys. LLC,
No. 01-25-00185-CV, 2025 WL 1460733, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
May 22, 2025, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (dismissing appeal for want of
jurisdiction and considering appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus at appellant’s
request).
Treating this appeal as a mandamus proceeding, the court has considered
Wise’s petition for writ of mandamus and is of the opinion that relief should be
denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having held that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, we dismiss it for want of
jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 42.2(f). Alternatively, treating the attempted
appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus—as requested by Wise—we deny its
petition. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a), (d).
/s/ Brian Walker
Brian Walker
Justice
Delivered: July 9, 2026
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