[Cite as State v. Mele, 2026-Ohio-2604.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COLUMBIANA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER C. MELE,
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Case No. 25 CO 0046
Criminal Appeal from the
Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio
Case No. 24 CR 33
BEFORE:
Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.
JUDGMENT:
Reversed and Remanded.
Atty. Vito J. Abruzzino, Columbiana County Prosecutor and Atty. Alec A. Beech, Assistant Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Atty. David J. Betras and Atty. Frank L. Cassese, Betras Kopp, LLC, for DefendantAppellant
Dated: July 2, 2026
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WAITE, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant Christopher C. Mele appeals a November 7, 2025 judgment entry
convicting him of various offenses related to driving under the influence following a traffic
accident. Appellant’s arguments are specifically directed towards three judgment entries
by the trial court denying his three separate motions to suppress evidence: September
30, 2024 (search warrant); March 13, 2025 (refrigeration of blood vials); and June 4, 2025
(time limit to draw blood samples). Appellant contends that the Columbiana County
Municipal Court Judge lacked jurisdiction to issue a warrant for a search in Mahoning
County, his blood sample was taken outside of the time limits prescribed by law, and his
sample was left unrefrigerated for a lengthy period of time in violation of provisions
contained in the Ohio Administrative Code. Because Appellant’s blood sample was left
unrefrigerated for thirty-two hours and nineteen minutes between transit periods,
Appellant’s arguments have merit, in part. The judgment of the trial court denying
suppression of the blood evidence is reversed and the matter is remanded to allow the
state to elect whether sufficient grounds remain to proceed with prosecution without the
relevant blood test results.
Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} On August 12, 2023, officers responded to the scene of an accident
involving two motor vehicles where multiple persons had been injured. The accident
occurred on State Route 14 near Timberline Road in Columbiana County. The record
reflects that Appellant operated his vehicle left of center and struck an oncoming vehicle,
causing significant injuries to its passengers.
{¶3} Officers responded to the scene at 6:02 p.m. Patrolman Colin Trayes spoke
to Appellant and observed that he exhibited signs of intoxication, including slurred speech
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and glassy, bloodshot eyes. Following the accident, Appellant was transported to St.
Elizabeth’s Hospital in Youngstown, Mahoning County.
{¶4} Patrolman Trayes sought and obtained a search warrant from a municipal
court judge in Columbiana County to seize a sample of Appellant’s blood for purposes of
performing a blood-alcohol test. At 10:04 p.m., a registered nurse drew Appellant’s blood
using an Ohio State Patrol blood draw kit, and transferred the blood vials to the officers.
Patrolman Trayes transported the vials to the Columbiana Police Department. He placed
them in a temporary evidence locker at 12:33 a.m. on August 13, 2023. It is undisputed
this locker was not refrigerated. Patrolman Trayes opted not to refrigerate the samples
due to his unsubstantiated belief that refrigeration was not required.
{¶5} Appellant’s vials of blood were not mailed to the Ohio State Patrol Crime
Lab until 8:52 a.m. on August 14, 2023, approximately forty-seven hours after the draw
and thirty-two hours after placement in the evidence locker. It is unclear why mailing was
delayed, however the reason is irrelevant, as the issue is whether the sample remained
unrefrigerated during the time it was stored and not whether the sample was timely
mailed. Nonetheless, the vials were received by the lab on August 16, 2023, two days
after mailing. An analysis showed the sample to contain 0.160 grams by weight of alcohol
per one hundred milliliters of whole blood.
{¶6} On January 11, 2024, Appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated
vehicular assault, a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a); one
count of vehicular assault, a felony of the fourth degree in violation of R.C.
2903.08(A)(2)(b); and two counts of operating a vehicle under the influence,
misdemeanors of the first degree in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and R.C.
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4511(A)(1)(B). The state later nolled the R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(B) charge due to the failure
of police to obtain a blood sample within the legal time constraints.
{¶7} Appellant’s counsel filed three separate motions to suppress the blood test
results. On May 23, 2024, he filed a motion seeking to exclude the test results due to
violations of the Ohio Administrative Code, arguing that the vials were held in an
unrefrigerated storage locker for forty-seven hours before being mailed to the testing lab.
On August 14, 2024, Appellant sought exclusion of the testing results because the
warrant to seize the blood samples was signed by a Columbiana County Municipal Court
judge despite the fact that Appellant was located at the time in a Mahoning County
hospital. In his final motion, filed on April 16, 2025, Appellant urged exclusion of the
testing results because his blood was drawn outside of the three-hour time limit set forth
within the Code.
{¶8} While the trial court found that multiple violations of law had occurred in
regard to the blood draw, it determined that suppression was not warranted because
officers had substantially complied with the law. The court found that the issuing judge
lacked jurisdiction to authorize the warrant, but inferred the error was nonfundamental
and did not warrant suppression. Following denial of all suppression motions, on
September 5, 2025 Appellant entered into a no contest plea. On November 7, 2025, the
court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate thirty-month prison term. Appellant
unsuccessfully filed motions seeking stay of execution of his sentence with both the trial
court and this Court.
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Motion to Suppress
{¶9} A motion to suppress presents mixed issues of law and fact. State v. Lake,
2003-Ohio-332 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Jedd, 146 Ohio App.3d 167, 171 (4th Dist.
2001.). If a trial court's findings of fact are supported by competent credible evidence, an
appellate court must accept them. Id. The court must then determine whether the trial
court's decision met the applicable legal standard. Id.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress because the
warrant authorizing seizure of Appellant’s blood was issued in violation of
Crim.R. 41(A) and Appellant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution,
where the issuing judge lacked lawful authority to issue the warrant and the
warrant was void as a matter of law.
{¶10} Appellant argues that the Columbiana County Municipal Court judge lacked
authority to issue the warrant for a blood draw to be executed outside of its jurisdiction.
Because the judge lacked jurisdiction to issue the warrant, Appellant claims it was invalid
and was without legal force. If the warrant was void, there was no need for the trial court
to engage in an analysis to determine if the error was fundamental or nonfundamental.
Appellant explains that Crim.R. 41(A) bases jurisdiction on the physical location where
the search is to occur, not where the investigation began. Appellant urges that not only
did the judge lack jurisdiction to issue a warrant, but Patrolman Trayes also lacked
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jurisdiction as a Columbiana County Patrolman to execute the warrant in Mahoning
County.
{¶11} In response, the state concedes that the judge lacked jurisdiction to issue
the warrant, but contends the warrant was not invalid, as this violation is nonfundamental
in nature. The state addresses a “split” among Ohio courts as to whether a judge’s action
in issuing a warrant outside of its jurisdiction requires suppression of the evidence
collected under such a warrant.
{¶12} Our analysis begins with a review of Crim.R. 41(A)(1), which provides the
authority to a judge to issue a warrant: “[a] search warrant authorized by this rule may be
issued by a judge of a court of record to search and seize property located within the
court's territorial jurisdiction.” By the statute’s plain language, a judge may only issue a
warrant for a search within its own jurisdiction. Thus, as the state concedes, the judge
erred in signing this warrant. The question becomes whether this error should result in
suppression of the evidence.
{¶13} The Ohio Supreme Court adopted a test arising out of federal court practice
to determine if a violation of Crim.R. 41 is considered “fundamental” or “nonfundamental.”
State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251 (1986). The test provides:
. . . Suppression is not required in all cases where the issuance of a
search warrant fails to conform to the dictates of Rule 41. Only a
‘fundamental’ violation of Rule 41 requires automatic suppression, and a
violation is ‘fundamental’ only where it, in effect, renders the search
unconstitutional under traditional fourth amendment standards. * * *
Violations of Rule 41 which do not arise to constitutional error are classified
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as ‘non-fundamental.’ ‘Non-fundamental’ noncompliance with Rule 41
requires suppression only where:
(1) there was ‘prejudice’ in the sense that the search might not have
occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed,
or (2) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision
in the Rule. United States v. Radlick [ (C.A. 9, 1978), 581 F.2d 225], supra,
at 228, quoting United States v. Burke [ (C.A. 2, 1975), 517 F.2d 377],
supra.” (Footnote omitted.)
Wilmoth at *263.
{¶14} As stated within the quote, the test was created and applied in cases
involving a warrant obtained through a deficient affidavit, not on jurisdictional failure.
Several Ohio appellate districts have addressed this issue. The early cases in Ohio held
that a judge signing a warrant for execution outside of its jurisdiction did not rise to a
Fourth Amendment violation, thus the evidence collected was not subject to suppression.
Since those cases were issued, the Third District has come to the opposite conclusion
based on its reading of federal caselaw.
{¶15} Because Appellant’s second assignment of error is dispositive in this case,
we need not delve into an exhausting review of the lengthy caselaw addressing this issue.
Nonetheless, the vast majority holds that while a municipal court judge lacks jurisdiction
to issue an out-of-county search warrant, when the warrant was acquired under all of the
processes set up to protect Fourth Amendment principles and the location of the evidence
seized does not impinge strongly on those principles, it is a nonfundamental error which
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does not rise to the level requiring suppression of any otherwise lawfully obtained
evidence. Because the judge in this matter reviewed the search warrant application and
found probable cause existed, the warrant itself appears valid. The trial court correctly
characterized this as a nonfundamental violation which did not rise to the level necessary
to require suppression of the blood evidence obtained. Appellant’s first assignment of
error is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
The trial court erred in admitting and refusing to exclude the blood
toxicology evidence because exclusion is required as the remedy for the
Crim. R. 41(A)/Fourth Amendment violation, and because the State failed
to establish admissibility under Ohio’s statutory and administrative
requirements governing blood-alcohol testing.
{¶16} In this assignment, Appellant raises a two-fold argument. He first contends
the court erred in allowing the blood evidence to be presented despite the fact that his
blood draw occurred four hours and two minutes after the accident, well over the threehour limit prescribed by Ohio law. He next argues that the vials containing his blood
samples were not mailed for testing until forty-seven hours after the draw, and thirty-two
hours and nineteen minutes after placement in the evidence locker.
{¶17} Addressing only the second prong of Appellant’s argument, the state
responds that there is a split among Ohio districts as to whether prolonged periods without
refrigeration will result in suppression of blood evidence. The state focuses on a case
arising out of the Eleventh District, State v. Price, 2008-Ohio-1134 (11th Dist.). In that
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case, the Eleventh District held that a six-hour pre-mailing period, along with an eight-day
mailing period, was not unreasonable. Hence, the blood test was not subject to
suppression. The state also cites caselaw explaining that because regular mail delivery
is unpredictable, the police cannot be held responsible for transit time. See State v.
Partin, 2011-Ohio-794 (12th Dist.). The state also cites to testimony that there was no
indication the blood analysis was unreliable.
{¶18} The timing of the blood draw will be addressed first. In relevant part, R.C.
4511.19(D)(1)(b) provides:
In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for a violation
of division (A) or (B) of this section or for an equivalent offense that is
vehicle-related, the court may admit evidence on the presence and
concentration of alcohol, drugs of abuse, controlled substances,
metabolites of a controlled substance, or a combination of them in the
defendant's whole blood, blood serum or plasma, breath, urine, oral fluid,
or other bodily substance at the time of the alleged violation as shown by
chemical analysis of the substance withdrawn within three hours of the time
of the alleged violation.
{¶19} There appears to be no dispute that this accident occurred at 6:02 p.m.
which would mark the start of the time clock for purposes of applying this code section.
Hence, the blood draw was required to occur no later than 9:02 p.m. During Patrolman
Trayes’ testimony, he stated that Appellant’s blood was drawn at 10:04 p.m. (Tr., p. 12.)
The blood draw, then, occurred one hour and two minutes over the three-hour
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requirement of the code. The question becomes whether that one hour and two minute
period rises to the level of reversible error on review of the trial court’s decision that
suppression was unnecessary.
{¶20} As explained by the Ohio Supreme Court, a blood draw that is taken outside
of the time limits is inadmissible to prove a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2), (3), (4),
however:
In prosecutions for violations of such sections [R.C. 4911.19(A)(1)],
the amount of alcohol found as a result of the chemical testing of bodily
substances is only of secondary interest. See Taylor, Drunk Driving
Defense (2 Ed.1986) 394, Section 6.0.1. The defendant's ability to
perceive, make judgments, coordinate movements, and safely operate a
vehicle is at issue in the prosecution of a defendant under such section. It
is the behavior of the defendant which is the crucial issue. The accuracy of
the test is not the critical issue as it is in prosecutions for per se violations.
Furthermore, the statutory presumptions which existed at the time of
Cincinnati v. Sand, supra, no longer exist. Thus, no presumptive weight
can be given to the test results under these sections. The test results, if
probative, are merely considered in addition to all other evidence of
impaired driving in a prosecution for this offense.
City of Newark v. Lucas, 40 Ohio St.3d 100, 104 (1988).
{¶21} Here, the state nolled the per se violation charged under R.C.
4511.19(A)(1)(B) due to the admitted violation of the three-hour rule. The remaining OVI
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charge could still proceed so long as the state offered the appropriate supporting
testimony. At the suppression hearing, the lab technician did provide the relevant
testimony. Hence, Appellant’s argument that suppression was required based on the
timing of the blood draw is without merit.
{¶22} Turning to the second prong of Appellant’s assignment, we find this issue
to be dispositive in this matter. The legal requirements related to when and whether
bodily fluids, including blood, are required to be refrigerated are set forth in the Ohio
Administrative Code (“OAC”.) In order to challenge compliance with an OAC regulation,
a defendant must file a motion to suppress. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 24.
Once the motion is filed, the state has the burden of demonstrating substantial
compliance with the regulation. Id. A showing of substantial compliance creates a
presumption of admissibility. Id. The burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate
he or she suffered prejudice by anything less than strict compliance. Id.
{¶23} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that strict compliance with OAC
regulations is not always realistic or possible. Burnside at ¶ 34, citing State v. Plummer,
22 Ohio St.3d 292 (1986). Thus, “rigid compliance with the Department of Health
regulations is not necessary for test results to be admissible.” Burnside at ¶ 34. This is
why only substantial compliance with the OAC regulations is sufficient. Id. The Burnside
Court explained that substantial compliance excuses errors that are “de minimus,”
meaning “minor procedural deviations.” Id., citing State v. Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d 421,
426 (2000).
{¶24} The issue of refrigeration of bodily fluids is governed by OAC 3701-53-06
(G), which provides: “[w]hile not in transit or under examination, all blood, urine and oral
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fluid specimens will be refrigerated.” Pursuant to OAC 3701-53-01(A)(9), “ ‘In transit’
means in the possession of an individual employed by a hospital, law enforcement
agency, courier, or other delivery entity between the point of collection and a secure
storage location or between secure storage location and a laboratory.” It is clear from the
law that the time following the sample’s collection and its placement in the storage location
and the moment it leaves that location for testing, is not considered transit time. Thus,
the time between placement in the storage facility and mailing to a laboratory requires
refrigeration of these fluids unless some de minimus delay can be deemed reasonable.
{¶25} The state concedes that the blood sample drawn from Appellant sat in an
unrefrigerated storage locker from just after midnight in the very early morning of August
13, 2023 until the vials were mailed out at 8:52 a.m. on August 14, 2023. As Appellant
calculates within his brief, the blood remained unrefrigerated for almost forty-seven hours.
It is possible that this time may actually be greater, as it does not appear that the sample
was refrigerated from the time of collection at 10:04 p.m. until the paperwork was
completed after midnight.
{¶26} When asked about the issue at the suppression hearing, Patrolman Trayes
testified on cross-examination as follows:
Q. And you collected it on 8/12 and mailed it on 8/14? Do I have
that down correctly?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it refrigerated in your possession at that --- during that time?
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A. No.
Q. So it is fair for me to say from October 12 at 10:00 until it got
mailed on October the 14th, two-and-a-half days, roughly, it was in your
evidence locked not under refrigeration; isn’t that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Are you aware that the Ohio Revised Code and the Administrative
Code mandates that those vials be refrigerated while not in transit and not
being examined?
A. I’m under the influ --Q. I’m just asking a question. Do you know whether or not the Ohio
Revised Code and the Ohio Administrative Code mandate that while those
items are not in transit they need to be refrigerated? That is a yes or no
question.
Q. I can’t answer it with a yes or no. If you could let me answer that
question.
A. Go right ahead.
Q. It is my impression there was a memo several years ago that the
State released that these collection kits no longer needed to be refrigerated.
Q. Okay. That is your understanding?
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A. Correct.
(Tr., pp. 17-18.)
{¶27} Later, Lindsie Mayfield, a criminologist from the Ohio State Highway Patrol
Crime Lab, testified about the issue.
Q. All right. And what did the evidence technician do when they
received the evidence? What kind of storage facility did they put it in?
A. It was placed into Evidence Receiving Refrigerator Prelog.
Q. Refrigerator?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Why a refrigerator?
A. The Ohio Administrative Code requires it to be refrigerated.
Q. Because you know as a scientist that if it’s not stored in a
refrigerator it can be corrupted. Fair for me to say?
A. It’s a possibility.
Q. Well, that is in the Administrative Code; right?
A. It just says it needs to be stored in refrigeration.
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(Tr., pp. 61-62.) She also testified that she was unaware of any memorandum asserting
that blood vials did not require refrigeration.
{¶28} While the state focuses its attention on the time the vials spent without
refrigeration following their mailing to the laboratory, it ignores the time the blood was
without refrigeration prior to mailing. Unlike mailing transit time, where the length of time
in transit is no longer under law enforcement’s control, during the sample’s storage in
custody prior to mailing, an officer does control whether the sample is refrigerated.
Patrolman Trayes admittedly did not refrigerate the vials. He did not provide a reasonable
explanation other than his ignorance of the law. His testimony suggests that he relied on
an alleged memorandum to the contrary. However, the laboratory technician testified that
she had never heard of such memorandum. Even so, as an officer he would likely
understand that the OAC cannot be changed by means of a “memorandum.” Any action
to amend or repeal such law can only be accomplished by the legislature. Regardless,
ignorance of the law is never a defense to a violation of Ohio law.
{¶29} Contrary to the state’s assertions, there does not appear to be a “split”
among Ohio courts on this issue. The state is correct in that mailing transit time is not to
be weighed against the state. However, the state ignores the analysis requiring a showing
as to reasonableness of the pre-mailing time. Because the law includes a
reasonableness component, Ohio courts have appropriately applied a case-by-case
analysis; there is no bright-line test on the matter.
{¶30} Because of the fact specific nature of the caselaw, the issue is best
addressed by examining the decisions where the time delay was deemed acceptable
against what has been determined to be unacceptable. Beginning with the caselaw
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finding that a delay in refrigeration during storage was unreasonable, these times range
from twelve to twenty-two hours. In these cases, where the fluid samples have remained
without refrigeration for these lengths of time, no court has found this to be a “de minimus”
violation of law.
{¶31} In the instant case, the vials were unrefrigerated for a period of thirty-two
hours and nineteen minutes after transportation to the storage facility and before mailing.
This excludes the time between the blood draw and delivery to the storage location.
{¶32} In 2012, the Ninth District found a twenty-two hour and fifteen-minute delay
was unreasonable in State v. Oliver, 2010-Ohio-6306 (9th Dist.). Similar to the instant
case, the Oliver court reviewed other violations of the code in addition to the refrigeration
issue. While the Oliver holding was largely based on another error, it is important to note
the court clearly found the delay was unreasonable, despite testimony from the expert
witness that there was no indication the failure to refrigerate affected the sample. Id. at
¶ 9.
{¶33} In State v. DeJohn, 2007-Ohio-163 (5th Dist.), while an older version of the
applicable code required temperature storage settings that are no longer part of this law,
the holding is not predicated on the temperature setting at which the sample was stored.
In DeJohn, the officer placed the blood vials in a mailer but did not mail the package until
seventeen hours after collection, while the vials remained unrefrigerated. As was the
case in Oliver, testimony was produced at the suppression hearing that “there was no
indication of fermentation and that the sample appeared normal.” Id. at ¶ 8. The DeJohn
Court held that despite this testimony, the seventeen-hour pre-transit delay was “not a
relatively slight delay or minor procedural deviation” and determined that the trial court
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erred in failing to suppress the evidence. Id. at ¶ 18. Thus, DeJohn held that failure to
refrigerate stored fluids for seventeen hours was not a de minimus violation of the code.
{¶34} In State v. Mullins, 2013-Ohio-2688 (4th Dist.), the Fourth District cited
DeJohn favorably. It found that a twelve-hour delay without refrigeration before mailing
was unreasonable, and suppressed the evidence. The Mullins Court rejected an
argument advanced by the state that the delay was reasonably caused by a shift change
and that the officer took the sample towards the end of one shift and mailed the vials at
the start of his next shift. The Court reasoned that this argument ran afoul of the law
which permits only “clearly de minimus” and “minor procedural deviation(s)” from the
refrigeration requirement. Id. at ¶ 15. As in the prior cases, the Court looked only at the
time the sample was being stored by law enforcement and excluded from its
determination the time during which the sample was in transit. Id. at ¶ 2.
{¶35} In contrast, there is only one case that sanctioned a long period of
unrefrigerated storage and that case appears to be an anomaly, having a dissent noting
its deviation from the established caselaw. In State v. Schneider, 2013-Ohio-4789 (1st
Dist.), the court expressly declined to classify DeJohn as bad law, but instead
distinguished it factually. In Schneider, part of the delay in mailing occurred as a result
of a policy which required the state trooper to return the sample from the local police
district to his assigned OSP patrol post, which was apparently several miles away. The
notations on the paperwork indicated that the trooper transported the sample “by hand.”
Id. at ¶ 17. The court found that because of this policy, the lengthy period without
refrigeration could have been due to the extra time spent hand delivering the sample
which would constitute transit time. We note that in Schneider, the OAC had not defined
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what it meant by “transit” time, causing the court to come up with its own determination
of what “transit” time meant. Thus, it appears the court considered as “transit” time both
time spent in the mail and in the journey to storage.
{¶36} The Schneider dissent questioned the majority decision, explaining that the
delay in the case was “three times greater than the longest of [prior caselaw] pre-mail
periods.” Id. at ¶ 22 (J. Hendon, dissenting). Noting the opinion was an anomaly based
on precedent, the dissent also opined the excessive delay was not a mere procedural
deviation.
{¶37} Nonetheless, the legislature has since defined “transit time” as time
“between the point of collection and a secure storage location or between secure storage
location and a laboratory.”
{¶38} In the instant case, omitting as transit time all of the time from the collection
of samples to their arrival at the pre-mailing storage site and the time in transit after being
mailed until the samples reached the lab, there were clearly thirty-two hours and nineteen
minutes during which the blood was without refrigeration in this case. Even when looking
to the Schneider opinion, where just under nineteen hours passed between the collection
time to mailing, this period is excessive. Thirty-two hours and nineteen minutes passed
in this case from placement into the storage facility to mailing, fifteen more hours than in
Schneider.
{¶39} In contrast, in 2016, the Ohio Supreme Court found a pre-mailing delay of
four hours and ten minutes was not unreasonable and remanded the matter for a
determination of whether the defendant could rebut the presumption of substantial
compliance. State v. Baker, 2016-Ohio-451. In 2023, the Sixth District held that a delay
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of six hours was not unreasonable, and so was determined to be a de minimus violation
of the code. State v. Urbanski, 2023-Ohio-3966 (6th Dist.). In a recent Second District
case, the court reviewed whether a one hour delay between collection and refrigeration
violated the OAC where the cruiser carrying the blood vials to refrigeration storage was
required to respond to an emergency call because a person had jumped into a river. State
v. Quinones, 2024-Ohio-2552, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.). After the delay for the emergency call,
where the vials remained in the cruiser, the vials were transported to the storage
refrigerator. The Court found that the delay was de minimus and the officer substantially
complied with the law. Id. at ¶ 53.
{¶40} In this case, the failure to refrigerate the blood samples was clearly
unreasonable. The instant matter involves a delay of more than fifteen hours in excess
of even the Schneider case and such delay cannot be considered a de minimus violation
of code. The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence on
this basis.
{¶41} Inexplicably, despite testimony the vials had been locked in an evidentiary
locker during the relevant time, the trial court issued the following: that “[t]he Court finds
the blood sample was in transit from the time it was collected on August 12, 2023 until it
arrived at the Ohio State Highway Patrol Crime Lab on August 16, 2023.” (5/13/25J.E.)
The language of the statute clearly defines “in transit” as the time “between the point of
collection and a secure storage location or between secure storage location and a
laboratory.” This language clearly applies only to the time before and after storage, and
does not include the time spent while in a secure storage facility. At all times while not
“in transit,” bodily fluid samples must be refrigerated. The violation here is not de
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minimus, and it was error for the court to rule otherwise. As the state violated the storage
requirements for Appellant’s blood samples, any blood evidence, including the resulting
laboratory report, was required to be suppressed.
{¶42} While the state points out that the definition of transit time was not added to
the code until January 23, 2023, the accident at issue occurred on August 12, 2023.
Regardless, caselaw reveals that no court has ever permitted body fluid samples to
remain unrefrigerated for a period longer than twelve hours excluding transit time even
before the revised language providing a definition of “transit” time.
{¶43} Based on the above, Appellant’s second assignment of error has merit in
part and is sustained.
Conclusion
{¶44} Appellant contends his three motions seeking suppression of the results of
laboratory testing of his blood should all have been granted. However, his contentions
that the search warrant was void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sign the
warrant and that his blood was drawn shortly after the period provided by law are not well
taken. Appellant’s third reason seeking suppression, that his blood samples remained
unrefrigerated for such a lengthy period while in storage in police custody that
suppression should have been granted is well-taken, however. The failure to refrigerate
for the lengthy period of storage in this case was not reasonable nor did it amount to a de
minimus violation of law. Because the blood sample was stored unrefrigerated for at least
thirty-two hours and nineteen minutes between transit periods, Appellant’s argument has
merit and the judgment of the trial court is reversed. Suppression of all blood-related
evidence must be granted and the matter is remanded in order to allow the state to
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determine if there are any grounds to proceed with prosecution absent the blood test
evidence.
Robb, concurs.
Hanni, J. concurs.
Case No. 25CO0046
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For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, Appellant’s assignments of
error are sustained in part and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio, is reversed and
remanded. Costs to be taxed against the Appellee.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.
Case No. 25CO0046