[Cite as State v. Stokes, 2026-Ohio-2580.]
THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO
Case No. 2025 CA 00085
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Stark County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 2024CR2383
QUENTIN STOKES
Judgment: Affirmed
Defendant - Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: July 6, 2026
BEFORE: William B. Hoffman, Robert G. Montgomery, and Kevin W. Popham, Judges
APPEARANCES: Kyle L. Stone, Prosecuting Attorney, Christopher A. Piekarski, for Plaintiff-Appellee; George Urban, for Defendant-Appellant
OPINION
Popham, J.,
{¶1} Appellant Quentin Stokes (“Stokes”) appeals his conviction and sentence
after a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas for Stark County, Ohio. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
The Indictment
{¶2} On December 20, 2024, the Stark County Grand Jury indicted Stokes on
three counts of strangulation, one count of retaliation, one count of intimidation of an
attorney, victim, or witness in a criminal case, one count of disrupting public services,
and one count of domestic violence.
{¶3} Prior to trial, the State dismissed the retaliation and intimidation charges.
(1Tr. 20-21). Following a jury trial, Stokes was acquitted of all three strangulation counts
but convicted of disrupting public services and domestic violence. The trial court
subsequently sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of two years.
{¶4} The charges arose from events occurring on November 8, 2024.
November 8, 2024, Incident
Police Response to the 9-1-1 Call
{¶5} Officer Aminata N'Diaye of the Canton Police Department testified that she
was dispatched to a residence on Garaux Street N.E. in Canton, Ohio, in response to a 9-1-1 call reporting a possible domestic violence incident involving victim S.M.
{¶6} During the 9-1-1 call, S.M.’s sister informed the dispatcher that S.M. texted
her from S.M.’s son's iPad, stating "her son's dad is putting his hands on her and took
her phone," and asking that 9-1-1 be contacted. St. Exh. 60. Video footage from Officer
N'Diaye's body-worn camera was admitted into evidence.
{¶7} Officer N'Diaye testified that upon arriving at the residence, she observed
dried blood around the S.M.'s lips. She also detected a strong odor of alcohol and later
informed medical personnel that she suspected S.M. was intoxicated.
{¶8} Officer Crystal France likewise responded to the scene and arrived while
Officer N'Diaye was speaking with S.M. Officer France testified that S.M. appeared upset,
frustrated, and emotional. She further testified that S.M. had difficulty speaking and
often whispered when attempting to communicate. Officer France also observed blood
around the S.M.’s lips.
{¶9} While officers investigated, Officer France used her cruiser loudspeaker to
direct Stokes and any other occupants to exit the residence. Stokes's uncle, D.S., exited first and informed officers that Stokes and the parties' minor child remained inside.
Stokes subsequently exited the residence and was taken into custody.
{¶10} After D.S. granted officers permission to enter the residence, police
conducted a protective sweep to ensure no one else was inside. S.M., was transported by
ambulance to Aultman Hospital. Subsequent testing revealed that S.M. had a bloodalcohol concentration of 0.128.
Medical Treatment and Examination
{¶11} Officer France later went to the hospital and continued her investigation.
She testified that S.M. remained visibly upset, emotional, and had difficulty speaking.
Officer France photographed S.M.'s visible injuries, and ten photographs were admitted
into evidence.
{¶12} Officer N'Diaye also responded to the hospital and requested that S.M.
complete a written statement concerning the incident.1
{¶13} Sarah Shaffer, a forensic nurse employed through the Aultman Hospital
Serenity Program, testified regarding her examination of S.M. During the narrativehistory portion of the examination, S.M. reported that after smoking marijuana outside,
her partner became angry and began yelling at her. Shaffer testified that - according to
S.M. - after S.M. exited a bathroom at approximately 1:00 a.m., her partner (Stokes)
forced the bathroom door into her leg, shoved his thumbs down her throat, and caused
significant bleeding and breathing difficulties. Shaffer testified that S.M. further
reported that she told Stokes she was dying, but he instead became upset about the blood.
Shaffer also testified that S.M. stated that Stokes lifted her by the neck, took her phone
1 The written statement was not admitted into evidence. 2Tr. at 147, St. Exh. 58. and car keys, and that she later lost consciousness before waking up in bed with no
recollection of how she got there.
{¶14} According to Nurse Shaffer, S.M. reported that she ultimately used her son's
tablet to send a text message to her sister requesting that she contact 9-1-1.
{¶15} Nurse Shaffer conducted a physical examination and testified that the
injuries she observed were consistent with the history provided by S.M. The parties
stipulated to admission of S.M.'s medical records.
{¶16} The records documented posterior pharynx petechiae - described as small
red spots caused by broken blood vessels in the back of the throat, and bleeding within
the oropharyngeal cavity. Nurse Shaffer testified that such findings may be consistent
with both strangulation and vomiting. She further testified that the injuries were
consistent with S.M.'s reported history. Nurse Shaffer also noted that S.M. exhibited an
elevated white blood cell count and remained hospitalized for several days.
S.M.'s Testimony
Initial Reports and Subsequent Recantation
{¶17} Before trial, the trial court granted the State's motion to call S.M. as a court's
witness because she had executed an affidavit that contradicted statements she
previously made to law enforcement and medical personnel. (2Tr. 14, St. Exh. 592).
{¶18} S.M. testified that she and Stokes had been in a relationship for
approximately eleven years, that he was the father of her child, and that she continued
to care for him.
2 The affidavit was not admitted into evidence. 2Tr. at 147, St. Exh. 59..
{¶19} According to S.M., she dropped off their son at Stokes's residence on
November 7, 2024, before spending the evening drinking with her sister and visiting
local bars. She returned to Stokes's residence sometime between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00
p.m. and continued drinking tequila and smoking marijuana. S.M. testified that
marijuana tends to worsen her anxiety, but she used it because she could not afford her
preferred vaping products.
{¶20} S.M. testified that she could not remember much of the remainder of the
evening. She recalled waking up the next morning feeling hungover, experiencing throat
pain, and having difficulty breathing. Because she could not locate her phone, she used
her son's tablet to ask her sister to contact 9-1-1.
{¶21} S.M. testified that her message to her sister did not state that Stokes had
assaulted her. She further testified that when officers arrived, she attempted to tell them
everything was fine, but they separated her from others and continued their
investigation.
{¶22} S.M. acknowledged completing a written statement at the hospital. In that
statement, she reported that Stokes placed his thumbs down her throat, caused bleeding,
took her phone, and that she was unable to swallow. S.M. later recanted those allegations
in a sworn affidavit, asserting that she had been intoxicated when she made the earlier
statements.
Jail Calls
{¶23} S.M. testified that she remained in contact with Stokes while he was
incarcerated. Portions of several recorded jail calls between the two were admitted into
evidence.
{¶24} During her testimony, S.M. acknowledged making false statements to
Stokes during some of those calls, including statements that her jaw had been wired shut
and that she had undergone a rape examination. She also testified that she falsely
reported that Stokes became angry when she locked bathroom doors.
{¶25} In one recorded call, Stokes referred to the two of them "sticking to a plan."
S.M. testified that the statement referred to her efforts to correct what she claimed were
false allegations she made while intoxicated.
Defense Evidence
D.S.'s Testimony
{¶26} Stokes's uncle, D.S., testified that Stokes and his son lived with him and that
S.M. did not reside at the home.
{¶27} According to D.S., he went to bed around 9:00 p.m. on November 7, 2024,
and was not awakened by any disturbance during the night. He testified that Stokes woke
him the following morning and told him that police were at the front door.
{¶28} D.S. testified that when he opened the door, officers immediately ordered
him outside. While seated in a police cruiser, he heard officers directing Stokes to exit
the residence, which he eventually did.
{¶29} D.S. further testified that he declined officers' request to reenter the home
with S.M. to retrieve her belongings because he did not want property mistakenly
claimed as hers to be removed from the residence.
{¶30} According to D.S., members of S.M.'s family later contacted him regarding
her missing phone and keys. He testified that S.M., through her sister's Facebook
Messenger account, informed him where the phone could be found. D.S. testified that
the phone was ultimately located inside a shoebox in a closet and that the keys were found on a shelf in a sitting area. He acknowledged, however, that he had never
previously known S.M. to store her phone in a shoebox.
Stokes's Testimony
{¶31} Stokes testified in his own defense.
{¶32} According to Stokes, S.M. dropped off their son earlier on November 7
before spending the evening with her sister and friends. He testified that S.M. returned
to the residence after 10:00 p.m. and appeared intoxicated.
{¶33} Stokes testified that when S.M. complained of throat pain the following
morning, Stokes was not alarmed because it was not unusual for S.M. to experience
vomiting after consuming alcohol. He stated that his primary concern that morning was
preparing their son for school, although he also intended to take S.M. to the hospital.
{¶34} Stokes testified that when police arrived, he asked S.M. what was
happening, but she offered little explanation. He stated that he told her to go outside and
speak with the officers. After officers ordered him to exit the residence over a
loudspeaker, he secured the family's pit bull before leaving the home.
{¶35} Stokes testified that he was confused by the officers' presence but complied
with their commands and did not resist arrest.
Verdict and Sentence
{¶36} Following deliberations, the jury found Stokes not guilty of all three
strangulation charges but guilty of disrupting public services and domestic violence. The
trial court subsequently sentenced Stokes to an aggregate prison term of two years.
Assignments of Error
{¶37} Stokes raises two assignments of error for our consideration.
I.
{¶38} In his first assignment of error, Stokes argues that the trial court committed
plain error by permitting jurors to submit written questions to witnesses without
providing all the instructional safeguards contemplated by Crim.R. 24(J). Specifically,
Stokes contends that the court failed to instruct the jury that it should not draw any
adverse inference from the court's refusal to ask a juror's proposed question. We are not
persuaded that Stokes has proven plain error.
Plain Error
{¶39} Because Stokes did not object to the procedure employed by the trial court,
he has forfeited all but plain error. Crim.R. 52(B).
{¶40} Under the plain-error doctrine, an appellant must establish (1) an error, (2)
that is plain or obvious, and (3) that affected a substantial right. State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22. To satisfy the third requirement, the appellant must demonstrate a
reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. Id.; United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81-83 (2004). Even
where those elements are established, an appellate court exercises its authority to
recognize plain error only in exceptional circumstances to prevent a manifest
miscarriage of justice. Rogers at ¶ 23; State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph
three of the syllabus.
Juror Questions
{¶41} The practice of permitting jurors to question witnesses rests within the trial
court's discretion. State v. Fisher, 2003-Ohio-2761, ¶ 29. In Fisher, the Supreme Court
of Ohio recognized several concerns associated with juror questioning, including the risk of improper questions, reluctance by counsel to object in the jury's presence, disruption
of courtroom procedure, and the potential erosion of juror impartiality. Id. at ¶ 24.
{¶42} To address those concerns, the Court approved safeguards that include
requiring jurors to submit questions in writing, permitting counsel to raise objections
outside the jury's presence, and requiring questions to be submitted only after counsel
have completed their examinations. Id. at ¶ 25.
{¶43} Following Fisher, Crim.R. 24(J) was adopted to govern juror questions.
Relevant here, Crim.R. 24(J)(7) provides that if a proposed juror question is not asked,
the trial court shall instruct the jurors that they are not to draw any adverse inference
from the court's refusal to ask the question.
Application
{¶44} At the conclusion of S.M.'s testimony, the jurors submitted written
questions to the trial court. The court asked three of the proposed questions but declined
to ask one. (2Tr. 104-106). The court did not thereafter instruct the jury that it should
not draw any adverse inference from the court's refusal to ask the omitted question.
{¶45} Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred by failing to provide
the instruction contemplated by Crim.R. 24(J)(7), Stokes cannot establish that the
omission affected his substantial rights.
{¶46} Stokes does not identify any adverse inference that the jury allegedly drew
from the court's refusal to ask the proposed question. Nor does he explain how the
absence of the instruction prejudiced his defense or created a reasonable probability of
a different outcome. Rather, his argument rests entirely upon speculation.
{¶47} Likewise, the record provides no basis for concluding that the jury's verdict
was affected by the omission. Significantly, the jury acquitted Stokes of the three most serious charges submitted for its consideration. Those acquittals undermine any claim
that the jury improperly inferred that the unanswered question reflected negatively upon
the defense or otherwise deprived Stokes of a fair trial.
{¶48} On this record, we cannot conclude that there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the instruction been given.
Accordingly, Stokes has failed to satisfy the prejudice requirement necessary to establish
plain error.
Conclusion
{¶49} Stokes has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's omission of the
instruction set forth in Crim.R. 24(J)(7) affected his substantial rights or created a
reasonable probability of a different outcome. Nor has he established the type of
exceptional circumstance warranting the exercise of our discretionary authority to
recognize plain error.
{¶50} Accordingly, Stokes's first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶51} In his second assignment of error, Stokes argues that his convictions are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
Standard of Review, Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶52} A manifest-weight challenge concerns the persuasive force of the evidence.
Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. The relevant inquiry is whether the greater
amount of credible evidence supports one side of the issue rather than the other. State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997).
{¶53} In conducting a manifest-weight review, an appellate court sits as a
"thirteenth juror" and independently reviews the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers witness credibility, and determines whether the jury
clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 17; Thompkins at 387. Reversal on manifest-weight grounds is reserved for
the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.
Thompkins at 387.
{¶54} Even so, substantial deference is afforded to the factfinder's credibility
determinations. Because the jury personally observes the witnesses' demeanor, voice
inflections, and manner of testifying, it is in the best position to evaluate credibility.
Eastley at ¶ 21; Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984).
{¶55} Additionally, the Ohio Constitution requires the unanimous concurrence of
all three appellate judges before a conviction may be reversed as against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 3(B)(3); Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko,
2007-Ohio-4918, ¶¶ 2-4.
Application
Domestic Violence Conviction
{¶56} Stokes was convicted of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A),
which prohibits knowingly causing or attempting to cause physical harm to a family or
household member. "Physical harm to persons" includes "any injury, illness, or other
physiological impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration." R.C. 2901.01(A)(3).
{¶57} Ohio courts have repeatedly recognized that physical harm may be
established even in the absence of severe or lasting injury. See State v. Cook, 2021-Ohio3841, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.); In re A.T., 2021-Ohio-2934, ¶ 67 (8th Dist.); State v. Perkins, 1998
Ohio App. LEXIS 1213 (11th Dist. Mar. 27, 1998). The slightest injury, or even the
infliction of pain, may satisfy the statutory definition.
{¶58} Here, the jury was presented with substantial evidence that S.M. suffered
physical harm. Responding officers observed blood around her mouth and noted that
she was emotional and had difficulty speaking. Photographs documenting her condition
were admitted into evidence. The jury also received medical records and heard testimony
from Nurse Shaffer, who documented bleeding within S.M.'s throat and petechiae in the
posterior pharynx. Nurse Shaffer testified that these findings were consistent with the
history S.M. provided during her examination.
{¶59} Although S.M. later recanted portions of her earlier allegations, the jury
heard evidence regarding both her initial statements and her subsequent recantation.
The jury also heard testimony concerning her intoxication on the night of the incident
and her continued relationship with Stokes.
{¶60} Stokes argues that S.M. lacked credibility because she was intoxicated,
changed her account over time, and admitted making false statements during jail calls.
He further contends that the medical evidence was consistent with non-criminal
explanations.
{¶61} Those arguments were presented to the jury. The jury was free to believe all,
part, or none of any witness's testimony. State v. Petty, 2017-Ohio-1062, ¶ 63 (10th
Dist.); State v. Davis, 2024-Ohio-1504, ¶ 60 (5th Dist.). Moreover, conflicting evidence
does not render a conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Morris,
2018-Ohio-5252, ¶ 51 (10th Dist.).
{¶62} The jury had the opportunity to observe S.M. and Stokes firsthand, evaluate
their credibility, and weigh the competing explanations for S.M.'s injuries. We cannot
conclude that the jury clearly lost its way in finding that Stokes knowingly caused
physical harm to S.M.
Disrupting Public Services Conviction
{¶63} Stokes also challenges his conviction for disrupting public services.
{¶64} R.C. 2909.04(A) prohibits conduct that interrupts or impairs the ability of
another to use public services, including emergency communications. The Supreme
Court of Ohio has recognized that the destruction or concealment of a cellular telephone
may constitute conduct prohibited by the statute. State v. Robinson, 2009-Ohio-5937, ¶
29. As this Court has noted, the statute is intended to prevent conduct that interferes
with a victim's ability to seek emergency assistance. State v. Galindo, 2012-Ohio-3626,
¶ 17 (5th Dist.).
{¶65} The jury heard evidence that S.M. was unable to locate her cellular
telephone on the morning of the incident and instead used her son's tablet to send a
message to her sister requesting that she call 9-1-1. S.M. initially reported to police and
medical personnel that Stokes had taken her phone. Nurse Shaffer testified that S.M.
reported during her examination that Stokes took both her phone and her keys. S.M.
likewise testified that she told police on the day of the incident that Stokes had possession
of her phone when she wanted to contact law enforcement.
{¶66} The jury also heard evidence concerning the phone's eventual discovery.
D.S. testified that the phone was located inside a shoebox in a closet after S.M. identified
its location through messages sent from her sister's Facebook Messenger account. D.S.
further testified that he had never known S.M. to keep her phone in a shoebox.
{¶67} To be sure, conflicting evidence existed. S.M. later testified that she no
longer believed Stokes had taken her phone because both were searching for it that
morning. Stokes likewise denied placing the phone in the shoebox.
{¶68} Again, however, it was the jury's role to resolve those conflicts. The jury
could reasonably credit S.M.'s contemporaneous statements to police and medical
personnel over her later recantation. It could likewise infer from the evidence that Stokes
concealed the phone, thereby preventing S.M. from contacting emergency services and
forcing her to seek assistance through her son's tablet.
{¶69} The record therefore contains competent, credible evidence supporting the
jury's verdict on the disrupting-public-services charge.
{¶70} The jury's verdict further supports this conclusion. Although the jury found
Stokes guilty of domestic violence and disrupting public services, it acquitted him of all
three strangulation charges. The mixed verdict demonstrates that the jury carefully
evaluated each charge and did not simply accept the State's evidence wholesale. Rather,
it reflects a deliberate assessment of the evidence and witness credibility as to each
offense.
Conclusion
{¶71} This is not the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against
conviction. The jury was presented with competing versions of events, corroborating
physical evidence, medical testimony, and evidence bearing on witness credibility. After
independently reviewing the entire record, we cannot conclude that the jury clearly lost
its way or created a manifest miscarriage of justice.
{¶72} Accordingly, Stokes's convictions are not against the manifest weight of the
evidence, and his second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶73} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas for Stark County, Ohio is
affirmed. Costs to be paid by appellant Quentin Stokes.
By: Popham, J.
And Montgomery, J., concur
Hoffman, P.J., concurs separately
Hoffman, P.J., concurring
{¶74} I fully concur in the majority opinion.
{¶75} I write separately only to note with regard to Appellant’s first assignment of
error, I determine it was error not to instruct the jury not to draw any adverse inference
from the court’s refusal to ask a juror’s proposed question. However, I find such error
was not only not plain error, as does the majority, but also harmless error in this case.