[Cite as State v. Butler, 2026-Ohio-2560.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
UNION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 14-26-01
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
OPINION AND
JORDAN DANIEL BUTLER, JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 24-CR-0046
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: July 6, 2026
APPEARANCES:
Alison Boggs for Appellant
Andrew M. Bigler for Appellee
Case No. 14-26-01
ZIMMERMAN, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jordan Daniel Butler (“Butler”), appeals the
December 16, 2025 judgment entry of sentence of the Union County Court of
Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} Stemming from conduct that occurred in October 2013, the Union
County Grand Jury indicted Butler on March 8, 2024 on Count One of rape in
violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), (B), a first-degree felony, and Count Two of
disseminating matter harmful to juveniles in violation of R.C. 2907.31(A)(1), (F), a
fourth-degree felony. On May 2, 2024, Butler appeared for arraignment and pleaded
not guilty to the indictment.
{¶3} On January 15, 2025, Butler withdrew his pleas of not guilty and
entered a guilty plea, under a negotiated plea agreement, to Count One of the
indictment. In exchange for his change of plea, the State agreed to dismiss Count
Two. The trial court accepted Butler’s guilty plea, found him guilty, and ordered a
pre-sentence investigation.
{¶4} On April 2, 2025, the trial court sentenced Butler to a mandatory
minimum term of 11 years to a maximum term of 16 years and 6 months in prison.
The trial court ordered the sentence imposed in this case to run consecutively to the
sentence imposed in a Champaign County case. The trial court also classified Butler
as a Tier III sex offender.
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{¶5} Butler appealed his sentence on May 2, 2025. On November 17, 2025,
this court determined that the trial court erred by imposing an indefinite prison term
because the rape offense was committed in 2013, prior to the enactment of the
Reagan Tokes Law. See State v. Butler, 2025-Ohio-5176 (3d Dist.).
{¶6} Following remand for resentencing, the trial court sentenced Butler to
11 years in prison, ordered the sentence to run consecutively to the Champaign
County case, and again classified Butler as a Tier III sex offender.
{¶7} Butler filed his notice of appeal on January 7, 2026. He raises one
assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The Trial Court Erred When It Ordered The Sentence To Be
Served Consecutive To A Sentence Appellant Is Already Serving,
Creating A Sentence That Is Contrary To Law.
{¶8} In his assignment of error, Butler argues that the trial court erred by
ordering that he serve the sentence imposed in this case consecutively to the
sentence imposed in another county. Specifically, he contends that his sentence is
contrary to law because the trial court improperly fashioned his penalty around
subsequent, unrelated convictions rather than the 2013 offense at issue.
Standard of Review
{¶9} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a sentence
“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not
support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is
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otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. When
reviewing the imposition of consecutive sentences, “[t]he plain language of R.C.
2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate court to defer to a trial court’s consecutivesentence findings, and the trial court’s findings must be upheld unless those findings
are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record.” State v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 5. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the
mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be
established.’” Marcum at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954),
paragraph three of the syllabus.
Analysis
{¶10} “Except as provided in . . . division (C) of section 2929.14, . . . a prison
term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any
other prison term, jail term, or sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this
state, another state, or the United States.” R.C. 2929.41(A). R.C. 2929.14(C)
provides, in its relevant part, that
the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms
consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is
necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the
offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender
poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while
the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction
imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the
Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
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(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more
of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no
single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of
the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the
offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future
crime by the offender.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
{¶11} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a trial court to make specific findings on
the record before imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Hites, 2012-Ohio-1892,
¶ 11 (3d Dist.); State v. Peddicord, 2013-Ohio-3398, ¶ 33 (3d Dist.). Specifically,
the trial court must find: (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to either protect
the public or punish the offender; (2) the sentences would not be disproportionate
to the offense committed; and (3) one of the factors in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b),
or (c) applies. Id.; Id.
{¶12} The trial court must state the required findings at the sentencing
hearing prior to imposing consecutive sentences and incorporate those findings into
its sentencing entry. State v. Sharp, 2014-Ohio-4140, ¶ 50 (3d Dist.), citing State v.
Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 29. A trial court “has no obligation to state reasons to
support its findings” and is not “required to give a talismanic incantation of the
words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record
and are incorporated into the sentencing entry.” Bonnell at ¶ 37.
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{¶13} The requirement to make statutory findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)
applies equally whether the trial court is imposing consecutive sentences on multiple
counts within a single case or ordering a sentence to be served consecutively to a
prison term imposed in an entirely separate case. See State v. Carner, 2026-Ohio1131, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.); State v. James, 2024-Ohio-4567, ¶ 52 (7th Dist.).
{¶14} In this case, the trial court made the three statutorily required findings
before imposing consecutive sentences at the sentencing hearing and it incorporated
those findings into its sentencing entry. Accord State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-5274,
¶ 17 (5th Dist.). See also State v. Kunzer, 2019-Ohio-1042, ¶ 24-25 (3d Dist.).
Specifically, at Butler’s sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that
consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public and to punish Butler, and
that the sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct or the
danger that he poses. Applying R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b), the trial court further found
that Butler committed multiple offenses as part of a course of conduct—explicitly
pointing to the separate offenses in Union and Champaign counties—and that the
resulting harm was so great or unusual that a single prison term would not
adequately reflect the seriousness of his conduct. Alternatively, pursuant to R.C.
2929.14(C)(4)(c), the trial court determined that Butler’s criminal history
demonstrated that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from
future crime. The trial court subsequently incorporated all of these findings into its
sentencing entry.
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{¶15} Despite the trial court’s compliance with these statutory requirements,
Butler argues that his consecutive sentences are contrary to law because the trial
court’s findings under both R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) and (c) improperly relied on
conduct that occurred after his October 2013 offense. In essence, Butler asserts that
a trial court is strictly bound by the chronological timeline of events as they existed
at the exact moment that the crime was committed, which would render his 2013
criminal history insufficient to justify consecutive sentences. However, because a
trial court need only find one of the alternative factors under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) to impose consecutive sentences, this court need not address Butler’s arguments
regarding his “course of conduct” under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b). See State v.
Robinson, 2017-Ohio-2703, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.) (noting that the factors under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) operate as alternatives and a trial court need only find one to
impose consecutive sentences).
{¶16} Consequently, the dispositive issue is whether the trial court possessed
the legal authority to consider Butler’s subsequent convictions when determining
that his overall criminal history warranted consecutive sentences under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4)(c) in this case. We conclude that it could. Indeed, Ohio law requires
a trial court to make the statutorily mandated consecutive-sentencing findings based
on the record as it stands at the time of sentencing. See State v. Hiles, 2021-Ohio1622, ¶ 25 (3d Dist.) (noting that “R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c) does not contain any
temporal limitation prohibiting a trial court from considering an offender’s history
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of criminal conduct”). “Furthermore, ‘it is settled law that a sentencing judge can
take into account facts relating to other charges, even charges that have been
dismissed or which resulted in an acquittal.’” Id. at ¶ 26, quoting State v. Esmail,
2014-Ohio-2297, ¶ 11 (7th Dist.). See also State v. Steele, 2017-Ohio-7605, ¶ 10
(8th Dist.) (addressing the broad scope of material that a sentencing court may take
into consideration, including a defendant’s complete criminal history and
information addressed in the presentence investigation report). Therefore, since the
Champaign County conviction was an established part of Butler’s record when he
stood before the trial court for resentencing in December 2025, the trial court
properly considered it as part of his “history of criminal conduct” under R.C.
2929.14(C)(4)(c). Compare State v. Feller, 2012-Ohio-6016, ¶ 40-41 (1st Dist.)
(holding that a trial court errs by ordering a sentence to run consecutively to a
sentence that has not yet been imposed, illustrating that a court’s consecutivesentencing authority hinges on the sentences actively in existence at the time of the
hearing).
{¶17} Accordingly, the record reflects that the trial court made the
appropriate R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings before imposing consecutive sentences and
incorporated those findings in its sentencing entry. Based on our review of the
record, we conclude that the trial court’s findings are not clearly and convincingly
unsupported by the record and that Butler’s consecutive sentences are not contrary
to law.
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{¶18} Butler’s assignment of error is overruled.
{¶19} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI and WALDICK, J.J., concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is
overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
John R. Willamowski, Judge
Juergen A. Waldick, Judge
DATED:
/hls
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