[Cite as State v. Maynard, 2026-Ohio-2558.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
HENRY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 7-25-10
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
OPINION AND
ROBBY W. MAYNARD, JUDGMENT ENTRY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Henry County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 24 CR 0012
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: July 6, 2026
APPEARANCES:
Joseph C. Patituce for Appellant
Gwen Howe-Gebers for Appellee
Case No. 7-25-10
ZIMMERMAN, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Robby W. Maynard (“Maynard”), appeals the
October 28, 2025 judgment entry of sentence of the Henry County Court of
Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
{¶2} On December 15, 2023, a fatal two-vehicle crash occurred at the
intersection of Township Road E and County Road 10A in Marion Township, Henry
County, Ohio, in which a vehicle owned by Maynard struck another vehicle,
resulting in the death of its driver. While both Maynard and his passenger sustained
serious injuries and had to be extricated from the vehicle, investigators ultimately
determined that Maynard was driving at the time of the collision. Subsequent
testing revealed that Maynard had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.228 grams per
100 milliliters of whole blood.
{¶3} On January 31, 2024, Maynard was indicted by the Henry County
Grand Jury on Count One of aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of R.C.
2903.06(A)(1), (B)(2)(a), a second-degree felony; Count Two of aggravated
vehicular homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a), (B)(3), a third-degree
felony; Count Three of aggravated vehicular assault in violation of R.C.
2903.08(A)(1)(a), (B)(1), a third-degree felony; Count Four of vehicular assault in
violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b), (C)(2), a fourth-degree felony; Counts Five and
Six of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs of
abuse (“OVI”) in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and (f), respectively, and
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(G)(1)(a), first-degree misdemeanors. Maynard appeared for arraignment on
February 21, 2024 and pleaded not guilty to the indictment.
{¶4} On May 30, 2025, Maynard withdrew his not guilty pleas and entered
guilty pleas, under a negotiated plea agreement, to Counts One, Two, Three, and
Four of the indictment. In exchange for his change of pleas, the State agreed to
dismiss Counts Five and Six and to a joint sentencing recommendation. The trial
court accepted Maynard’s guilty pleas, found him guilty of Counts One, Two,
Three, and Four, and ordered a presentence investigation.1
{¶5} On June 30, 2025, through his newly retained counsel, Maynard filed a
presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. In the motion, Maynard asserted
a claim of actual innocence and argued that a seizure suffered just prior to the change
of plea hearing rendered his pleas less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and
that his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing the change of plea hearing to
proceed. The State filed a memorandum in opposition to Maynard’s presentence
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas on July 21, 2025. After a hearing on July 29,
2025, the trial court denied Maynard’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas on August 28, 2025.
{¶6} On October 27, 2025, the trial court sentenced Maynard (based on the
joint recommendation of the parties) to a mandatory minimum term of 8 years in
1
At sentencing, the trial court dismissed Counts Five and Six of the indictment.
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prison to a maximum term of 12 years in prison as to Count One and to 3 years in
prison as to Count Three.2 The trial court ordered Maynard to serve the prison
sentences concurrently for an aggregate sentence of a mandatory minimum term of
8 years in prison to a maximum term of 12 years in prison. Further, the trial court
merged Counts One and Two and Counts Three and Four for purposes of
sentencing, respectively. Additionally, the trial court suspended Maynard’s driver’s
license for his lifetime.
{¶7} On October 28, 2025, Maynard filed his notice of appeal. He raises
three assignments of error for our review. In his three assignments of error,
Maynard raises intertwined arguments challenging the validity of his guilty pleas.
Because these arguments stem from the identical factual predicate—the medical
emergency that Maynard suffered immediately prior to his plea colloquy—we will
address them together. In particular, while Maynard’s first assignment of error
challenging the trial court’s denial of his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas is dispositive, we will address his second and third assignments of error within
that framework.
First Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s pre-sentence Motion
To Withdraw his plea when right before the plea hearing
Appellant suffered an extreme medical emergency witnessed by
all parties and Appellant’s timely filed Motion demonstrated a
2
The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence on October 28, 2025.
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plausible defense to the crimes for which he was convicted and he
consistently maintained his actual innocence.
Second Assignment of Error
Appellant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel as
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio
Constitution when trial counsel permitted a plea bargain and plea
hearing to occur after Appellant suffered a major neurological
event in the courtroom.
Third Assignment of Error
Appellant did not enter a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea
of guilty when suffering from a major neurological event and the
trial court failed to strictly inform Appellant of all of his
constitutional rights during the Crim. R. 11 plea colloquy.
{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Maynard argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by denying the presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas
despite his consistent claim of actual innocence and a medical emergency which he
suffered immediately before the change of plea hearing. Specifically, Maynard
contends that the trial court failed to freely and liberally grant his request since his
timely motion demonstrated a plausible defense to the charges and established that
the medical emergency compromised his ability to knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily enter his guilty pleas.
{¶9} Likewise, in his second and third assignments of error, Maynard
contends that his original trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by permitting
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the change of plea hearing to proceed, and that his guilty pleas were not knowing,
intelligent, or voluntary, respectively.
Standard of Review
{¶10} “Appellate review of the trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion.” State v.
Streeter, 2009-Ohio-189, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.). An abuse of discretion suggests the trial
court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62
Ohio St.2d 151, 157-158 (1980).
Analysis
{¶11} Criminal Rule 32.1 provides that a defendant is permitted to file a
presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Driscol, 2022-Ohio-1810, ¶
15 (3d Dist.). As a general rule, “a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea
should be freely and liberally granted.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527 (1992).
“However, ‘a defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a plea prior to
sentencing.’” Driscol at ¶ 15, quoting Xie at paragraph one of the syllabus. “As a
result, a ‘trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there is a
reasonable and legitimate basis for withdrawal of the plea.’” Id., quoting Xie at
paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶12} When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a presentence motion to
withdraw a guilty plea, this court balances nine non-exhaustive factors: (1) whether
the withdrawal will prejudice the prosecution; (2) the quality of defense counsel’s
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representation; (3) the adequacy of the Crim.R. 11 hearing; (4) the scope of the
hearing on the motion to withdraw; (5) whether the trial court afforded the motion
full and fair consideration; (6) the reasonableness of the motion’s timing; (7) the
reasons asserted for the withdrawal; (8) the defendant’s understanding of the
charges and potential penalties; and (9) whether the defendant maintains a claim of
innocence or a complete defense. Id. at ¶ 16. See State v. Edwards, 2023-Ohio3213, ¶ 8-9 (3d Dist.) (clarifying that the nine-factor analysis remains the applicable
standard of review for presentence motions to withdraw a plea unless the defendant
alleges that he or she became aware of new evidence that would have affected their
decision to enter the plea). “None of the factors is determinate on its own and there
may be numerous additional aspects weighed in each case.” Driscol at ¶ 16
{¶13} In this case, the trial court denied Maynard’s presentence motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas after applying the reasonable-and-legitimate-basis factors
and determining that the factors weighed in favor of the State. In particular, the trial
court emphasized that withdrawing the guilty pleas would prejudice the State
because the accident occurred in December 2023, and the passage of time—along
with seven prior defense-requested continuances—made prosecution more difficult.
Moreover, as to Maynard’s claim of actual innocence, the trial court determined that
there was no reason to believe that the evidence supporting his defense was
unknown to him at the time of the change of plea, specifically noting that his trial
counsel had fully explored the claims and hired a medical doctor and crash
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reconstructionist to support them. Furthermore, the trial court determined that
Maynard’s pre-hearing medical episode did not render his guilty pleas involuntary.
Rather, the trial court highlighted that EMS personnel evaluated him and found him
alert and responsive, that he declined hospital transport, and that he confirmed
during the plea colloquy that he felt well enough to proceed to change his pleas.
Ultimately, the trial court concluded that Maynard was represented by competent
counsel, fully understood the consequences of his pleas, and that his motion was
merely a change of heart triggered by the trial court revoking his bond pending
sentencing.
{¶14} In addressing the factors to be considered when evaluating a
presentence motion to withdraw a plea, Maynard contends that factors one, two,
three, six, seven, eight, and nine weigh in favor of withdrawal. Specifically,
Maynard argues that the trial court erroneously found that the State would be
prejudiced by further delay (factor one), asserting that the evidence in the case—
such as body camera footage, recorded interviews, and medical records—would
remain static and unaffected by the passage of time. He further contends that his
medical emergency compromised the representation afforded to him by his trial
counsel (factor two), the validity and extent of the Crim.R. 11 colloquy (factor
three), and his ability to genuinely understand the nature of the proceedings and the
sentence to which he was agreeing (factor eight). Finally, he asserts that his timely
motion (factor six) stated specific, legitimate reasons for withdrawal, which were
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rooted in a plausible claim of actual innocence and a complete defense that he was
not the driver of the vehicle (factors seven and nine).
{¶15} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion by denying Maynard’s presentence motion to withdraw his
guilty pleas. While presentence motions are not granted as a matter of absolute
right, the unique facts of this case—namely, a consistently maintained claim of
innocence, a courtroom medical emergency, and a fundamental breakdown in the
constitutional guarantee of effective representation—demand the liberal
consideration envisioned by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Examining these specific
circumstances, the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable, and failed to comport with the established principle that such
motions should be freely granted in the interests of fairness and justice.
First Factor
{¶16} As to the first factor, the State contends that it would be prejudiced
because the passage of time since the December 2023 crash makes prosecuting the
case more difficult due to the fading memories and potential unavailability of its lay
and expert witnesses. This type of generalized claim of prejudice has been
determined to be unavailing. See State v. Zimmerman, 2010-Ohio-4087, ¶ 22-25
(10th Dist.).
{¶17} Indeed, while the State points to the overall age of the case, our
precedent dictates a much narrower review. Although prejudice to the State “‘is
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often classified as the most important factor in the balancing test,’” it is not
presumed. State v. Martre, 2019-Ohio-2072, ¶ 14 (3d Dist.), quoting State v.
Cuthbertson, 139 Ohio App.3d 895, 899 (7th Dist. 2000). Rather, the requisite
prejudice must relate solely to the defendant’s decision to enter the plea agreement.
Zimmerman at ¶ 23. Thus, the inquiry is narrowly focused on whether the State’s
case was materially impaired during the specific window between the entry of the
plea and the motion to withdraw it. See id. (explaining that “the prejudice must
relate ‘solely’ to the entering of the plea bargain”), quoting Cuthbertson at 900
(“Absent any showing of some other real prejudice to the state which occurred
solely as a result of entering into a plea bargain, as here, the potential harm to the
state in vacating the plea is slight, whereas the potential harm to the defendant in
refusing to vacate the plea is great.”).
{¶18} Here, we perceive the State’s arguments as relating primarily to the
routine inconvenience of having to prosecute its case, rather than to actual,
articulated prejudice. Accord id. at ¶ 24 (rejecting similar arguments regarding
fading memories and concluding they related “only to the inconvenience of having
to prosecute its case, rather than relating to actual, articulated prejudice”).
Importantly, the State failed to provide any indication that any of its witnesses
became unavailable during the narrow, thirty-day window between Maynard
entering his pleas on May 30, 2025, and filing his motion to withdraw it on June 30,
2025. Accord id., citing State v. Boyd, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4914, *15 (10th
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Dist. Oct. 22, 1998) (asserting that, “[g]enerally, [prejudice] involves one or more
witnesses becoming unavailable due to the delay in the trial resulting from the plea
withdrawal”). Consequently, we decline to presume that the State’s evidence
degraded, its witnesses became unavailable, or their memories faded where such
prejudice has not been demonstrated on the record. Accord id. (“We will not
presume that the two victims have become unavailable where it has not
been demonstrated” when “mere days passed between the plea and the
filing of the motion to withdraw it.”).
{¶19} Moreover, the trial court’s reliance on the age of the case and the
history of pretrial continuances was misplaced. Critically, delays and continuances
granted prior to Maynard’s May 30, 2025 change of pleas—for reasons unrelated to
Maynard’s pleas—have no bearing on the prejudice caused by the withdrawal of
those pleas. Accord id. at ¶ 25. Therefore, since the State failed to demonstrate
actual, articulated prejudice resulting solely from the withdrawal of the pleas, the
trial court erred by weighing this factor against Maynard. See id.
Second Factor
{¶20} The second factor in our analysis requires us to consider whether
Maynard was represented by effective counsel. Correspondingly, Maynard
challenges the effectiveness of his original trial counsel in his second assignment of
error. See State v. Tingler, 2022-Ohio-3792, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.) (noting that,
“[g]enerally, a guilty plea waives all appealable errors, including claims of
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ineffective assistance of counsel, except to the extent that the alleged errors
precluded appellant from knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entering his guilty
plea”). Because this constitutional claim goes to the very heart of the second
withdrawal factor, we will address them together.
{¶21} A defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must
establish: (1) the counsel’s performance was deficient or unreasonable under the
circumstances; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. State v.
Kole, 92 Ohio St.3d 303, 306 (2001), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). In order to show counsel’s conduct was deficient or unreasonable, the
defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel provided competent
representation and must show that counsel’s actions were not trial strategies
prompted by reasonable professional judgment. Strickland at 687. Counsel is
entitled to a strong presumption that all decisions fall within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 673, 675 (1998).
Tactical or strategic trial decisions, even if unsuccessful, do not generally constitute
ineffective assistance. State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558 (1995). Rather, the
errors complained of must amount to a substantial violation of counsel’s essential
duties to his client. See State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-142 (1989),
quoting State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 396 (1976), vacated in part on other
grounds, 438 U.S. 910 (1978).
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{¶22} “Prejudice results when ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.’” State v. Liles, 2014-Ohio-259, ¶ 48 (3d Dist.), quoting Bradley at 142,
citing Strickland at 691. “‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id., quoting Bradley at 142 and citing
Strickland at 694.
{¶23} “Ineffective assistance of counsel can affect the voluntariness of a
guilty or no-contest plea when ‘a defendant is represented by counsel during the
plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel.’” State v. Drain, 2022-Ohio-3697, ¶ 37, quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). “In that situation,
‘the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice “was within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”’” Id., quoting Hill
at 56, quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
{¶24} We agree with Maynard’s contention that his original trial counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation. Indeed,
it is undisputed that just prior to executing his plea agreement, Maynard suffered a
significant medical emergency—described as a seizure—inside the courthouse.
Relevantly, the record reflects that Maynard had a documented history of seizures
requiring medical care—a condition that was actively incorporated into his defense
strategy. Nevertheless, despite the acute medical event in the courthouse,
Maynard’s original trial counsel permitted the change of plea hearing to proceed.
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Corroborating Maynard’s claim, his original trial counsel provided an affidavit in
support of Maynard’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, explicitly
admitting that his failure to request a continuance or object to the proceedings
thereafter constituted deficient performance.
{¶25} While an attorney’s own post-hoc admission of deficiency is not
strictly dispositive, the nature of the admissions in the affidavit dictate how they are
weighed. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a “broad, open-ended assertion
of ineffective counsel” in an affidavit is merely a “conclusion of law” that, without
a showing of actual prejudicial factors, does not meet the burden of proof. State v.
Jackson, 64 Ohio St.2d 107, 112 (1980). Similarly, an affidavit that lacks operative
facts and instead serves merely as “notarized legal argument” is insufficient to
establish deficient representation. State v. Agee, 2017-Ohio-7750, ¶ 11 (7th Dist.).
However, an attorney’s affidavit serves as competent evidence of an inexcusable
omission when it details specific, factual instances demonstrating that counsel fell
below the objective standard of reasonable representation. See State v. Pheils, 2014-Ohio-1454, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.)
{¶26} Here, rather than presenting a mere conclusion of law, Maynard’s
original trial counsel’s affidavit details specific, operative facts regarding an
inexcusable omission: failing to act in the face of a client’s acute medical
emergency. See id. at ¶ 19. Critically, Maynard’s original trial counsel averred that
Maynard “maintained his innocence” throughout the representation and “wanted to
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proceed to trial” right up until the pleas were entered. (Doc. No. 106). Detailing
Maynard’s compromised condition, his original trial counsel attested that, following
the seizure, Maynard “appeared to be sluggish, slow, and not thinking clearly,” “did
not appear to be his normal self,” and was not in a mental state to proceed. (Id.).
Finally, acknowledging his own deficient performance, Maynard’s original trial
counsel conceded that he “should have objected to moving forward” and asked to
reset the matter, expressing his belief that Maynard would not have entered the
guilty pleas but for the seizure and its effect on his mental state. (Id.).
{¶27} Crucially, these admissions do not stand alone. Maynard’s original
trial counsel’s affidavit is independently corroborated by the objective record,
evidencing that his original trial counsel did not merely invent a post-hoc
justification for his ineffectiveness. Rather, Maynard’s original trial counsel’s
admission of Maynard’s cognitive state is tied to the documented two-hour
emergency medical services (“EMS”) delay and a plea agreement that appeared to
offer little in the way of an actual bargain. Compare State v. Waters, 2023-Ohio721, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.) (rejecting an unsupported post-hoc claim of ineffectiveness
where the totality of the circumstances, including a highly beneficial plea deal,
contradicted the defendant’s argument).
{¶28} Moreover, beyond the admissions in the affidavit, the record reveals
no tactical justification for forging ahead. In particular, the objective circumstances
of the record in this case demonstrate that Maynard’s original trial counsel provided
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ineffective assistance by failing to request a continuance. Generally, an attorney’s
decision whether to request a continuance is considered a matter of trial strategy and
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Hooper, 2022-Ohio2990, ¶ 54 (3d Dist.). However, the failure to request a continuance rises to the
level of constitutionally deficient performance when there is no strategic advantage
to proceeding and the failure severely prejudices the defendant. See United States
v. Abney, 812 F.3d 1079, 1092 (D.C.Cir. 2016) (concluding that trial counsel’s
failure to request a continuance was unjustifiable where there was no strategic
reason not to act, noting that “it cost the defense nothing and the possible benefit . .
. was undoubtedly significant”); Green v. Stephens, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71132,
*24 (S.D.Tex. May 10, 2017) (determining that trial counsel’s performance was
deficient where “there is simply no strategic reason for not [requesting a
continuance], as the only negative outcome could have been a denial of said
request”).
{¶29} Applying these principles, there was no valid tactical justification for
Maynard’s original trial counsel’s failure to intervene. In other words, by failing to
request a continuance to ensure that his client had regained the requisite cognitive
clarity to proceed following a sudden neurological event, Maynard’s original trial
counsel permitted him to waive fundamental constitutional rights while in a
compromised state. Importantly, the haste in executing this waiver is underscored
by the limited practical value of the plea agreement itself. Indeed, Ohio courts
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recognize that an attorney may fail in their duty of competent representation by
advising a client to enter a guilty plea that offers no actual benefit. State v. Brown,
2017-Ohio-184, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). To determine whether a defendant received a
genuine benefit, reviewing courts must examine the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the plea. Id.
{¶30} Examining those circumstances here, Maynard’s plea agreement
resulted in concessions of potentially limited benefit. Critically, while the State
agreed to dismiss the two misdemeanor OVI charges (Counts 5 and 6), the trial court
explicitly noted on the record that these counts would merge with the felony
convictions at sentencing anyway; thus, their dismissal offered no actual reduction
in Maynard’s overall sentencing exposure. Furthermore, while the plea agreement
included a joint sentencing recommendation for concurrent sentences, this
recommendation was not binding. Rather, by accepting the plea agreement and
pleading guilty in this case, Maynard agreed to the maximum statutory sentences of
eight years on Count 1 (including a lifetime driver’s license suspension) and 36
months on Count 3, while still facing the very real possibility that the trial court
could run those terms consecutively. Thus, in light of the concessions offered, a
brief continuance to ensure Maynard’s cognitive clarity would have been a
reasonable safeguard. See State v. Yarber, 102 Ohio App.3d 185, 190 (12th Dist.
1995) (“Trial counsel’s ‘strategy’ was so far out of the realm of legitimate trial
strategy, ordinary trial counsel would ‘scoff’ at the hearing of it.”).
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{¶31} Furthermore, the record includes affidavits from Maynard and his
wife, which provided the trial court with additional context to weigh when
evaluating the validity of Maynard’s pleas. These affidavits outline their assertions
regarding communications with Maynard’s original trial counsel, with Maynard
alleging that he was urged to plead guilty despite maintaining his innocence. (Doc.
No. 104, Ex. E). His wife’s affidavit similarly raised concerns regarding Maynard’s
original trial counsel’s trial preparation. (Doc. No. 104, Ex. D). This information
was part of the broader record available to the trial court to assess credibility and
determine whether the decision to proceed with the plea was the result of a reasoned
strategy or other underlying factors.
{¶32} Having concluded that his original counsel’s omissions fell below an
objective standard of reasonable representation, we must now determine whether
this deficient performance prejudiced Maynard. “‘[W]hen a defendant claims that
his counsel’s deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept
a plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a “reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.”’” Drain, 2022-Ohio-3697, at ¶ 38, quoting Lee v. United
States, 582 U.S. 357, 363 (2017), quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. When evaluating the
prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim following a guilty plea,
a court must examine the “totality of circumstances” to determine whether it would
have been rational for the defendant to reject the plea and proceed to trial. State v.
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Romero, 2019-Ohio-1839, ¶ 29. In assessing this rationality, the court’s evaluation
can include, but is not limited to, considering (1) the consequences of going to trial;
(2) the defendant’s priorities; (3) the defendant’s personal ties and circumstances;
(4) judicial advisements. See id. at ¶ 29-34. “From these and other factors present
in a given case, [a] court will determine whether the totality of circumstances
supports a finding that counsel’s performance was deficient and, if so, whether the
deficient performance was prejudicial to the defendant.” Id. at ¶ 34.
{¶33} In the context of a plea withdrawal, the prejudice inquiry does not
require a defendant to prove that he would have fared better at trial. Id. at ¶ 30.
“While a defendant without any viable defense ‘will rarely be able to show
prejudice’ from accepting a plea agreement, the United States Supreme Court
declined to adopt a ‘per se rule’ that a defendant with no viable defense at trial
cannot show prejudice.” Id., quoting Lee at 367. Instead, the “reasonableness
inquiry focuses on the defendant’s perspective” at the time of the plea. Id.
{¶34} Under the totality of the circumstances here, Maynard can demonstrate
the requisite prejudice. Compare Lee at 369. As we previously addressed, the plea
agreement offered limited benefits regarding Maynard’s overall sentencing
exposure. Accord State v. Khoshknabi, 2018-Ohio-1752, ¶ 43 (8th Dist.)
(determining “that the consequences of taking a chance at trial were not markedly
harsher than pleading guilty”). Indeed, because the potential consequences of the
pleas were comparable in severity to those of a conviction at trial, “even the smallest
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chance of success at trial” would have made his decision to reject the plea agreement
entirely rational. Lee at 367. Given that the plea agreement provided little tangible
mitigation of his potential sentence, a trial, however daunting, represented a
reasonable alternative for seeking a more favorable outcome.
{¶35} In addition to the limited sentencing concessions, the record contains
contemporaneous evidence of Maynard’s priorities at the time of the pleas. See
Romero at ¶ 30; Lee at 369. Importantly, the record reflects that Maynard
consistently maintained his innocence throughout the proceedings, insisting that his
passenger was the driver at the time of the fatal crash. In other words, this was not
a post hoc rationalization. Indeed, Maynard had already retained a medical doctor
and a traffic crash reconstructionist to prepare this exact theory for trial. These
actions objectively demonstrate that Maynard’s priority was to contest the charges.
See Romero at ¶ 31. Moreover, Maynard’s prompt retention of new counsel and the
filing of a motion to withdraw his pleas shortly after recovering from the medical
incident strongly corroborate his assertion that the pleas were the result of his
compromised state rather than a genuine desire to admit guilt. Consequently, there
is a reasonable probability that, had trial counsel intervened and requested a
continuance to allow Maynard to fully recover from the neurological event,
Maynard would have continued to assert his innocence and would have insisted on
going to trial. Compare Lee at 369 (“In the unusual circumstances of this case, we
conclude that Lee has adequately demonstrated a reasonable probability that he
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would have rejected the plea had he known that it would lead to mandatory
deportation.”).
{¶36} Therefore, given the unique medical event that preceded the plea
hearing, uncertainties remain regarding whether Maynard received competent
representation when his original trial counsel permitted the change of plea to
proceed. In evaluating a presentence motion to withdraw, we look to the totality of
the circumstances to determine if there is a reasonable and legitimate basis for
withdrawal, which includes assessing whether the accused was represented by
“highly competent counsel.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d at 527. See also State v.
Dellinger, 2002-Ohio-4652, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.). Here, Maynard’s original trial
counsel’s inexcusable failure to intervene during an acute medical crisis leaves these
concerns unresolved, demonstrating that Maynard was not afforded highly
competent counsel at the time of his pleas. Accordingly, for purposes of our
withdrawal analysis, we conclude that the second factor of—the quality of
representation—weighs heavily in favor of withdrawal.
Third and Eighth Factors
{¶37} The third factor asks us to consider whether the defendant was
afforded a full Crim.R. 11 hearing before entering his plea, and the eighth factor
evaluates whether he understood the charges and potential penalties. Both of these
factors strike at the heart of Maynard’s third assignment of error, which asserts that
his guilty pleas were invalid because they were not entered knowingly, intelligently,
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and voluntarily. Because these are inextricably linked, we will address them
together.
{¶38} “All guilty pleas must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently.” State v. Moll, 2015-Ohio-926, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.). “‘“Failure on any of
those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United
States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.”’” State v. Montgomery, 2014-Ohio1789, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 7, quoting State v.
Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996). Crim.R. 11(C)(2), which governs guilty
pleas for felony-level offenses, provides:
In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea
of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest
without first addressing the defendant personally . . . doing all of the
following
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with
understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum
penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible
for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at
the sentencing hearing.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant
understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the
court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and
sentence.
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury
trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to
require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify
against himself or herself.
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{¶39} “‘[A] defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he
demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the
provisions of Crim.R. 11(C).’” State v. Sessom, 2024-Ohio-130, ¶ 25 (3d Dist.),
quoting State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 16. “‘The test for prejudice is ‘whether
the plea would have otherwise been made.”’” Id., quoting Dangler at ¶ 16, quoting
State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990).
{¶40} However, there are two exceptions to this general rule. Id. “First, ‘a
trial court’s complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates
the defendant’s burden to show prejudice.’” State v. Caudill, 2023-Ohio-3843, ¶ 7
(3d Dist.), quoting Dangler at ¶ 15. Second, a trial court’s failure to explain the
constitutional rights listed in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) creates a presumption that the plea
was involuntary, and no showing of prejudice is required. Dangler at ¶ 14.
{¶41} In light of these standards, this court applies a three-step approach to
analyze challenges under Crim.R. 11(C)(2). Caudill at ¶ 8, citing Dangler at ¶ 17.
First, we must determine whether the trial court complied with the relevant
provision of Crim.R. 11. Id., citing Dangler at ¶ 17. If compliance was not literal,
we determine whether the failure is of the type that excuses the defendant from
showing prejudice. Id., citing Dangler at ¶ 17. Finally, if a showing of prejudice is
required, we must assess whether the defendant has met that burden. Id., citing
Dangler at ¶ 17.
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{¶42} To start, Maynard contends that his guilty pleas were not knowing,
intelligent, or voluntary because the trial court failed to strictly comply with Crim.R.
11 by omitting an explanation of his constitutional right to testify. This contention
lacks merit. Decisively, the Supreme Court of Ohio expressly rejected the argument
that a trial court must advise an accused of the right to testify. State v. Brown, 2019-Ohio-313, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Bey, 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 499 (1999).
Indeed, while the right to testify is a fundamental and personal right, “a trial court
is not required to conduct an inquiry with the defendant concerning the decision
whether to testify in his [or her] defense.” Id., quoting Bey at 499. Consequently,
because a trial court has no duty to advise a defendant of their right to testify, the
failure to do so cannot constitute error or render a plea invalid under Crim.R. 11.
Accord id., citing Bey at 500.
{¶43} Having disposed of Maynard’s argument regarding the right to testify,
we turn to his primary contention: that his pleas were not knowing, intelligent, or
voluntary due to his compromised cognitive state following his medical emergency.
Here, Maynard argues that, regardless of the trial court’s procedural compliance
with Crim.R. 11, a procedurally proper colloquy cannot overcome a compromised
defendant. That is, he contends that the seizure impaired his cognitive clarity to the
extent that he lacked the mental capacity required to knowingly and intelligently
waive his constitutional rights or to comprehend the nature of the charges and the
potential penalties that he faced.
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{¶44} “In addition to the requirement that a defendant’s guilty plea be
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, a trial court must satisfy itself that a defendant
who seeks to plead guilty is competent.” State v. Swoveland, 2018-Ohio-2875, ¶ 25
(3d Dist.). “‘The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity;
the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings.’” State v.
Lawson, 2021-Ohio-3566, ¶ 73, quoting Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401, fn.
12 (1993). “‘The purpose of the “knowing and voluntary” inquiry, by contrast, is
to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and
consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.” Id.,
quoting Godinez at 401, fn. 12.
{¶45} “‘A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial, and the burden is
on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not
competent.’” Swoveland at ¶ 25, quoting State v. Prophet, 2015-Ohio-4997, ¶ 13
(10th Dist.). See also R.C. 2945.37(G). “In assessing whether to order such a
hearing, the trial court should consider ‘“(1) doubts expressed by counsel as to the
defendant’s competence, (2) evidence of irrational behavior, (3) the defendant’s
demeanor at trial, and (4) prior medical opinion relating to competence to stand
trial.”’” Swoveland at ¶ 26, quoting State v. Hartman, 2007-Ohio-6555, ¶ 16 (3d
Dist.), quoting State v. Rubenstein, 40 Ohio App.3d 57, 60-61 (8th Dist. 1987). As
the United States Supreme Court has noted, “[t]here are, of course, no fixed or
immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine
-25-Case No. 7-25-10
fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of
manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
162, 180 (1975). Accordingly, trial courts are tasked with evaluating these
indicators to determine if the circumstances call a defendant’s competency into
doubt. See State v. Were, 94 Ohio St.3d 173, 175 (2002).
{¶46} “‘The constitutional standard for assessing a defendant’s competency
to enter a guilty plea is the same as that for determining his competency to stand
trial.’” Swoveland at ¶ 27, quoting State v. Montgomery, 2016-Ohio-5487, ¶ 56,
reconsideration granted in part on other grounds, 2016-Ohio-7677. “‘The
defendant must have a “‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and [have] ‘a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.’”’” Id., quoting Montgomery at ¶ 56,
quoting Godinez at 396, quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
Importantly, even when a defendant possesses the requisite mental capacity, the trial
court maintains an independent duty to ensure that the waiver of constitutional rights
is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See Godinez at 400-401.
{¶47} Applying these principles here, the medical emergency that took place
in the presence of the trial court introduced a level of uncertainty regarding
Maynard’s cognitive state. Under the totality of these circumstances, the situation
warranted, at a minimum, a brief pause in the proceedings. Compare State v. Mink,
2004-Ohio-1580, ¶ 66 (holding that “[a]dditional inquiry is necessary into a
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defendant’s mental state once a defendant seeking to enter a guilty plea has stated
that he is under the influence of drugs or medication”). Rather than automatically
triggering a formal competency hearing, the totality of the circumstances suggested
that a temporary delay would have been a reasonable safeguard. Importantly,
because this event occurred in real-time and was documented contemporaneously,
the record objectively reflects why allowing the defendant sufficient time to recover
was necessary before accepting a waiver of his constitutional rights.
{¶48} Specifically, emergency personnel treated Maynard for over two hours
following his seizure. While Fire Chief David Bowen (“Chief Bowen”) of the City
of Napoleon Fire Department testified that he did not observe postictal trembling
upon his arrival, he confirmed that the medical report documented a primary
impression of “[s]eizures without status epileptics.” (July 29, 2025 Tr. at 18). Chief
Bowen also acknowledged assessing Maynard with a Glasgow Coma Scale score of
15, indicating a mild brain injury. Furthermore, following a consultation with a
medical doctor—a consultation in which Maynard’s original trial counsel
participated—the formal medical recommendation was that Maynard be transported
to the hospital for further evaluation. Although Maynard refused transport against
medical advice, emergency personnel remained in the courtroom throughout the
plea hearing should he require further medical assistance. When asked why EMS
personnel stayed for that duration, Chief Bowen testified it was at the request of the
parties, noting that “everybody in the courtroom was concerned with what they
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saw.” (Id. at 23). He further acknowledged that, despite his own initial
observations, he could not “negate what was seen in the courtroom.” (Id. at 24).
{¶49} These medical observations align with the affidavits of both Maynard
and his original trial counsel. In particular, Maynard’s account of his cognitive
impairment reflects that he “was not thinking clearly after [his] seizure,” “did not
feel like [his] normal self when [he] signed the plea agreement,” and did “not believe
[he] was mentally sound enough to proceed[] with entering a plea . . . .” (Doc. No.
104, Ex. E). Significantly, Maynard attested that he did “not believe [he] would
have plead [sic] if it were not for [his] seizure clouding [his] judgment.” (Id.).
These subjective accounts are bolstered by the external observations of his original
trial counsel, who averred that, following the seizure, Maynard was “sluggish, slow,
and not thinking clearly,” and that he “did not appear to be in a mental state where
he should have proceeded with entering a plea.” (Doc. No. 106).
{¶50} Moreover, the change of plea hearing occurred on a Friday with a jury
pool summoned for the following Monday, a timeline that naturally created
momentum to finalize the proceedings. We are mindful of the difficult position trial
courts face and the necessity of managing dockets in an expeditious, judicious
manner. State v. Biggers, 118 Ohio App.3d 788, 790 (10th Dist. 1997). However,
the requirement of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea remains paramount
and must outweigh considerations for administrative efficiency. See Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972); State v. Lane, 60 Ohio St.2d 112, 122 (1979).
-28-Case No. 7-25-10
{¶51} Given the extraordinary circumstances and the objective indicia of
Maynard’s potentially compromised capacity resulting from a neurological event,
the trial court bore a heightened duty to ensure the validity of the plea. Compare
United States v. Damon, 191 F.3d 561, 565 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a plea
colloquy cannot be reduced to a “formalistic ritual,” and when circumstances raise
questions about a defendant’s state of mind, the trial court must broaden its inquiry
to ensure the plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary). Despite this duty, the trial
court’s reliance on a single, superficial inquiry—asking Maynard if he was “feeling
well enough to proceed”—was insufficient. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,
384 (1966) (determining that, while a defendant’s demeanor or responses might be
relevant, they cannot be relied upon to dispense with a constitutionally required
competency inquiry).
{¶52} Furthermore, the lack of meaningful inquiry also implicates whether
Maynard understood the nature of the charges and the potential penalties. Although
the trial court properly recited the penalties, this mechanical compliance did not
ensure that Maynard actually understood them in his compromised state as
evidenced by Maynard’s confusion when he was remanded to custody following the
hearing. See State v. Lawson, 2021-Ohio-3566, ¶ 76 (suggesting that a medicalbased challenge to a plea requires a specific showing that the defendant “failed to
understand the waiver proceedings” or that the “decision was somehow
involuntary” because of the medical circumstances).
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{¶53} Therefore, given the unique medical event that preceded the hearing,
legitimate questions remain regarding whether Maynard possessed the cognitive
clarity to enter his pleas knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and whether he
fully comprehended the nature of the charges and potential penalties. For the
purposes of a presentence motion to withdraw, a defendant need only demonstrate
a reasonable basis for such concern, rather than proving a definitive constitutional
defect. See Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d at 527. Because the circumstances surrounding the
Crim.R. 11 colloquy leave these concerns unresolved, we conclude that the third
and eighth factors of our presentence withdrawal analysis weigh in favor of granting
the motion to withdraw.
Fourth and Fifth Factors
{¶54} We next turn to the fourth and fifth factors: the scope of the hearing
on the motion to withdraw and whether the trial court afforded the motion full and
fair consideration. Here, the trial court conducted a thorough evidentiary hearing
and issued a detailed written decision denying Maynard’s motion, meaning that the
fourth and fifth factors weigh against withdrawal. See Driscol, 2022-Ohio-1810, at
¶ 23-24 (3d Dist.).
Sixth Factor
{¶55} Turning to the next procedural consideration, the sixth factor examines
the reasonableness of the motion’s timing. Because Maynard filed his motion just
one month after the change of plea hearing—and well in advance of his scheduled
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sentencing—the parties agree that this factor weighs in favor of granting the
withdrawal. Accord id. at ¶ 25 (weighing the sixth factor in the defendant’s favor
where the motion was filed less than one month after the plea).
Seventh and Ninth Factors
{¶56} As to factor seven—the stated reasons for the motion to withdraw—
this factor touches directly upon factor nine in this case: whether the accused
maintained a claim of innocence or had a complete defense to the charges. See id.
at ¶ 26. Here, Maynard’s primary reason for seeking withdrawal is his consistent
assertion of actual innocence. Specifically, Maynard maintains that he was the
passenger, not the operator, of the vehicle involved in the fatal crash. Maynard’s
secondary reason is that his decision to abandon this defense and plead guilty was
driven by the compounding pressures of a looming court deadline and coercion from
his original trial counsel—a perfect storm that he was left unable to navigate due to
his compromised mental state following his in-court seizure.
{¶57} In addition to standard procedural factors, a trial court evaluating a
presentence motion to withdraw a plea must consider whether the defendant has
presented a meritorious defense. State v. Tull, 2006-Ohio-3365, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.). In
assessing this factor, we are mindful that a jury could ultimately determine a claimed
defense lacks merit, and we make no comment on its future viability. State v.
Gaughan, 2020-Ohio-4092, ¶ 27 (6th Dist.). However, “the law regarding
presentence motions to withdraw a plea only require a defendant to identify a
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reasonable and legitimate basis for the requested withdrawal.” Id. Therefore, “a
defendant is not required to prove such a defense at the time of the motion to
withdraw; rather they must show that the claimed defense provides a reasonable and
legitimate basis on which to withdraw the plea.” Id. When a trial court prematurely
weighs the ultimate merits of a claimed defense rather than simply assessing its
legitimacy, it fails to afford the motion full and fair consideration. Id.
{¶58} “‘In weighing the ninth factor, “the trial judge must determine whether
the claim of innocence is anything more than the defendant’s change of heart about
the plea agreement.”’” State v. Ferdinandsen, 2016-Ohio-7172, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.),
quoting State v. Davis, 2015-Ohio-5196, ¶ 19 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. Davison,
2008-Ohio-7037, ¶ 45 (5th Dist.). “‘“A change of heart or mistaken belief about
pleading guilty is not a reasonable basis for withdrawal of a guilty plea.”’” Id.,
quoting State v. Jones, 2011-Ohio-2903, ¶ 20 (7th Dist.), quoting State v. Smith,
2010-Ohio-5784, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). “Claims of innocence must be substantiated.” Id.
While not a strict bar to withdrawal, a defendant’s awareness of a possible defense
at the time the plea was entered permits a trial court to reasonably conclude that a
legitimate basis for withdrawal does not exist. State v. North, 2015-Ohio-720, ¶ 27
(3d Dist.).
{¶59} Based on the specific facts and circumstances presented by this case,
Maynard’s claim is not a mere, unsupported claim of innocence. In particular, the
record demonstrates that the other occupant confessed to driving the vehicle to law
-32-Case No. 7-25-10
enforcement, and early search warrants named Maynard as the passenger. Compare
State v. Hartman, 2018-Ohio-4452, ¶ 28 (6th Dist.) (weighing factors seven and
nine in the defendant’s favor because his consistent assertion of innocence, if true,
provided a valid defense to the charges). It is inherently difficult to evaluate the
ultimate success of a defense without the benefit of a full evidentiary trial. State v.
Patrick, 2016-Ohio-3283, ¶ 60 (7th Dist.). Thus, at this stage of the proceedings,
the existence of this corroborated evidence is sufficient to establish a legitimate
claim of innocence.
{¶60} Moreover, while Maynard was aware of this defense beforehand, the
record raises questions about the circumstances surrounding his decision to abandon
it. Indeed, the evidentiary materials reflect that the severe neurological event
compromised Maynard’s decision-making process regarding his defense. In
particular, the record contains evidence supporting the assertion that the medical
emergency—by compounding the normal stresses of an impending court deadline
and his communications with his original trial counsel—left Maynard unable to
withstand the dual coercive pressures of his attorney and the looming trial date. See
State v. Walcot, 2013-Ohio-4041, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.) (suggesting that a coercion claim
could be meritorious if the record shows an attorney’s pressure went beyond routine
recommendations and the defendant lacked a clear understanding of the plea).
Consistent with the Maynards’ affidavits outlining their communications with
original trial counsel, Maynard attested in his affidavit that he “caved to the pressure
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of [his] attorney, and the stress and mental effect of [his] seizure at the courthouse
when [he] signed the plea agreement.” (Doc. No. 104, Ex. E).
{¶61} Consequently, given the corroborated evidence of a complete defense,
combined with the documented medical event and the surrounding circumstances
under which the pleas were executed, we conclude that factors seven and nine weigh
in Maynard’s favor. See State v. Williams, 2025-Ohio-4352, ¶ 53 (6th Dist.)
(suggesting that concrete evidence demonstrating “how or if [the defendant’s]
health conditions impacted his case” would be highly relevant to supporting a
withdrawal).
Conclusion
{¶62} In conclusion, although we find that the fourth and fifth factors weigh
against withdrawal, the remaining factors weigh in Maynard’s favor. Therefore, we
conclude that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Maynard demonstrated a
reasonable and legitimate basis to withdraw his guilty pleas. Unlike cases involving
a mere change of heart, the record here presents a unique confluence of factors.
Critically, despite a documented medical emergency, Maynard’s original trial
counsel failed to request a continuance to ensure that his client was fully recovered
and competent to proceed. Instead, counsel permitted a compromised client to enter
a plea agreement with limited guaranteed sentencing concessions, all while
Maynard maintained his actual innocence. “When a defendant claims he is innocent
and wishes to withdraw his plea of guilt prior to sentencing, a comparison of the
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interests and potential prejudice to the respective parties weigh heavily in the
interests of the accused.” Hartman, 2018-Ohio-4452, at ¶ 29 (6th Dist.).
{¶63} Indeed, when evaluating the legitimacy of a claim of innocence, we
recognize a fundamental distinction between a defendant who wields the withdrawal
process as a mere delay tactic and a defendant who articulates a corroborated
defense, establishes that the plea was executed following a documented medical
emergency, and causes no actual prejudice to the State. Compare State v. Johnson,
2023-Ohio-371, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.) (recognizing that “‘[t]here is a huge difference
between a presentence-plea-withdrawal case in which a defendant uses the plea-and
plea-withdrawal process as a delay tactic or refuses to articulate a potential defense
to the charges and a case like this one in which the defendant made very specific
assertions about his innocence and problems with the plea process, did so without
delay, and there was no assertion of prejudice by the state. Such cases should not
be treated the same”), quoting State v. Harmon, 2021-Ohio-4109, ¶ 7 (Donnelly, J.,
dissenting). Thus, since Maynard’s motion is rooted in objective medical
documentation and a promptly asserted defense rather than tactical gamesmanship,
it demands the liberal consideration envisioned by the Supreme Court.
{¶64} Thus, under this liberal standard, the trial court’s denial of Maynard’s
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas—when viewed in light of the documented
medical event and the surrounding circumstances of the pleas—was arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unconscionable. See Patrick, 2016-Ohio-3283, at ¶ 61 (7th Dist.).
-35-Case No. 7-25-10
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
Maynard’s presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Accord State v. Adams,
2012-Ohio-5979, ¶ 35 (7th Dist.).
{¶65} Maynard’s first assignment of error is sustained.3
{¶66} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars
assigned and argued in his first assignment of error, we reverse the judgment of the
trial court and remand for further proceedings.
Judgment Reversed
and Cause Remanded
MILLER and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
3
In light of our decision to sustain Maynard’s first assignment of error, his second and third assignments of error are rendered moot, and we decline to address them. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c)
-36-Case No. 7-25-10
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the first assignment of
error is sustained and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of
the trial court is reversed with costs assessed to Appellee for which judgment is
hereby rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings and for execution of the judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
Mark C. Miller, Judge
John R. Willamowski, Judge
DATED:
/hls
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