Appellate Case: 25-5047 Document: 39 Date Filed: 07/14/2026 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 14, 2026
Christopher M. Wolpert
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
CHRISTOPHER J. BARNETT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 25-5047
(D.C. No. 4:23-CV-00232-GKF-JFJ)
CARRIE BRIDGES, Warden; (N.D. Okla.) CHARLES PHILLIPS, Captain;
TRACIE ADAMS, Mail Room
Supervisor; JODY MILLER, Law
Library Supervisor; KATRENA
DAVIS, Law Library Clerk; KEVIN
HODGSON, Captain,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER
Before BACHARACH, McHUGH, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
An Oklahoma prisoner, Mr. Christopher Barnett, appeals the
dismissal of his suit against prison officials. When he appealed, he moved
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We deny this motion.
Under federal law, prisoners can’t ordinarily obtain leave to proceed
in forma pauperis when they have had at least three prior actions dismissed
Appellate Case: 25-5047 Document: 39 Date Filed: 07/14/2026 Page: 2
for frivolousness or failure to state a valid claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An
exception exists when a prisoner shows an “imminent danger of serious
physical injury.” Id.
Mr. Barnett appeared to have at least three prior dismissals for
frivolousness or failure to state a valid claim. 1 So we ordered Mr. Barnett
to show cause why we shouldn’t deny his motion.
Mr. Barnett doesn’t question the existence of three or more
dismissals for frivolousness or failure to state a claim. He instead argues
that
• the prior dismissals were incorrect,
• he had no chance to appeal those dismissals, and
1
These dismissals include
• Barnett v. David L. Moss Crim. Just. Ctr., No. 22-CV-389-GKF-JFJ, Dkt. No. 3 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 28, 2022) (dismissing
an action for failure to state a claim),
• Barnett v. Unnamed TCSO Det. Officer, No. 22-CV-454-GKFSH, Dkt. Nos. 30 & 46 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 2, 2023 & Feb. 7,
2024) (dismissing all causes of action for failure to state a
claim), and
• Barnett v. Okmulgee Cnty. Crim. Just. Auth., No. 23-CV-545-GKF-MTS, Dkt. No. 3 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 25, 2024) (dismissing
all causes of action based on frivolousness and/or failure to
state a claim).
See Barnett v. FBI, Nos. 24-5042 & 24-5065 (10th Cir. Feb. 28, 2025) (characterizing these rulings as dismissals for frivolousness or failure to state a claim).
2
Appellate Case: 25-5047 Document: 39 Date Filed: 07/14/2026 Page: 3
• he is under an imminent danger of serious physical injury.
We can’t revisit the prior dismissals. Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125,
1128 (10th Cir. 2001). But we do need to consider whether he has
adequately shown an imminent danger of serious physical injury.
For this showing, Mr. Barnett needed to “make specific, credible
allegations.” Smith v. Veterans Admin., 636 F.3d 1306, 1309 (10th Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). For the sake of argument, we can
assume that Mr. Barnett has shown an imminent danger of serious physical
injury. But do we require a nexus between the imminent injury and
Mr. Barnett’s underlying claims?
Six other circuits require such a nexus. Owlfeather-Gorbey v. Avery,
119 F.4th 78, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2024); Prescott v. UTMB Galveston Texas,
73 F.4th 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2023); Hall v. United States, 44 F.4th 218, 231
(4th Cir. 2022); Fourstar v. United States, 950 F.3d 856, 859–60 (Fed. Cir.
2020); Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2022); Pettus v.
Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 2009); see also 1 Moore’s Federal
Practice - Civil § 4.40 at 38, n.58 (2026) (collecting cases). In unpublished
opinions, we have joined those circuits. Boles v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., No.
22-1086, 2023 WL 1463248, at *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 2, 2023) (unpublished);
Boles v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 794 F. App’x 767, 770 (10th Cir. 2019);
Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 754 F. App’x 756, 759 (10th Cir. 2018), aff’d on
3
Appellate Case: 25-5047 Document: 39 Date Filed: 07/14/2026 Page: 4
other grounds, 140 S. Ct. 1721 (2020). Here too, we require a nexus in
light of the consensus of authority elsewhere.
The resulting issue is how to gauge that nexus. Two approaches have
emerged in other circuits.
The Second Circuit has adopted a two-part test derived from case law
on standing: “(1) whether the imminent danger of serious physical injury
that [the] litigant alleges is fairly traceable to unlawful conduct asserted in
the complaint and (2) whether a favorable judicial outcome would redress
that injury.” Pettus, 554 F.3d at 298–99 (emphasis in original). Under this
test, Mr. Barnett would need to satisfy both requirements. Id. at 299. The
Ninth and Federal Circuits have taken the same approach. See Ray,
31 F.4th at 701; Fourstar, 950 F.3d at 859–60.
The Fourth Circuit takes a different approach, requiring a nexus but
not redressability. Hall v. United States, 44 F.4th 218, 230 (4th Cir. 2022).
This court reasons that “[n]either the plain language of [the Prison
Litigation Reform Act] 2 nor the Congressional intent point to such a
redressability requirement.” Id.
We regard the Second Circuit’s approach as more persuasive. 3
Granted, the statute (28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)) doesn’t refer to a nexus. Given
2
Section 1915(g) is part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 3
In unpublished opinions, we have adopted the Second Circuit’s approach. Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 754 F. App’x 756, 759 (10th Cir.
4
Appellate Case: 25-5047 Document: 39 Date Filed: 07/14/2026 Page: 5
the statutory purpose, however, every circuit to consider the issue requires
a nexus between the allegations of the complaint and the alleged danger of
serious physical injury. See pp. 3–4, above (citing cases). So it makes little
sense to jettison redressability as an element of the statute while requiring
a nexus. Indeed, the Constitution never refers to redressability; but courts
require it for standing. Cf. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523
U.S. 83, 124 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring) (characterizing redressability
as a “judicial creation” because the term doesn’t appear in the text of the
Constitution).
Applying the same approach used for standing, we require
Mr. Barnett to show both traceability and redressability. Pettus v.
Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 2009). Though these showings are
“often closely related,” they “remain distinct.” United States v. Ramos,
695 F.3d 1035, 1048 n.4 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Traceability requires a causal connection between the injury and
the misconduct, Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992), and
redressability requires a relationship between the injury and the requested
judicial relief, Diamond Alt. Energy, LLC v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 606 U.S.
100, 112 (2025).
2018), aff’d on other grounds, 140 S. Ct. 1721 (2020); Boles v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., No. 22-1086, 2023 WL 1463248, at *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 2, 2023) (unpublished).
5
Appellate Case: 25-5047 Document: 39 Date Filed: 07/14/2026 Page: 6
We may assume for the sake of argument that Mr. Barnett adequately
alleged traceability. The resulting issue is whether the alleged danger
would be redressable through the relief requested in the complaint. For two
reasons, the complaint wouldn’t support redress for the alleged danger to
Mr. Barnett.
First, in the complaint, Mr. Barnett alleged that officials had limited
his access to the courts and retaliated with administrative penalties because
he had complained about a prison mail clerk. But the alleged danger is
based on beatings and relocation to a more dangerous prison. So if
Mr. Barnett were to prevail under the complaint, the remedy wouldn’t
address the alleged danger to his safety.
Second, Mr. Barnett was transferred to another prison during the
litigation in district court. 4 See Dkt. No. 7 at 5. So even if he were to
prevail against officials at his former prison, the relief wouldn’t provide
redress for the danger alleged at a different prison. See Lomax v. OrtizMarquez, 754 F. App’x 756, 760 (10th Cir. 2018) (denying leave to
proceed in forma pauperis when “a favorable judicial outcome” on claims
against guards at one prison would “not redress any mistreatment at the
hands of guards at [a different prison]”), aff’d on other grounds, 140 S. Ct.
4
In his merits brief, Mr. Barnett argued that he couldn’t exhaust his claims because he was beaten when he tried to pursue administrative remedies. But that beating wasn’t alleged in the complaint.
6
Appellate Case: 25-5047 Document: 39 Date Filed: 07/14/2026 Page: 7
1721 (2020); see also Day v. Maynard, 200 F.3d 665, 667 (10th Cir. 1999)
(per curiam) (stating that allegations of an imminent danger at a
Connecticut prison, where the plaintiff was housed, did not satisfy
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) because the complaint had “target[ed] Oklahoma
defendants lacking any control over his current conditions of
confinement”).
** *
We deny Mr. Barnett’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(Dkt. No. 20). If he does not pay the appellate filing fee within 30 days,
the Court may dismiss the appeal without further notice for failure to
prosecute. See 10th Cir. R. 42.1.
7