FILED
JULY 14, 2026
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 40603-2-III
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
ROBERT T. TARVER, ) PUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
STAAB, C.J. — Robert Tarver, a former Department of Children, Youth and
Families (the Department) caseworker, was charged with several crimes after having
sexual contact with a mother he was assigned to investigate. Following a bench trial, he
was acquitted of extortion but convicted of perjury and receiving unlawful compensation.
On appeal, he challenges only his conviction for receiving unlawful compensation. He
contends the trial court misconstrued RCW 9A.68.030, which forbids a public servant
from requesting or accepting “compensation” for advice or assistance in preparing a
“transaction” regarding which the public servant has official discretion to exercise.
Specifically, he argues that sexual contact is not “compensation,” and a “transaction”
does not include parent-child visitations or a dependency case. The State argues the trial
court properly interpreted the statute in accordance with the legislature’s intent. No. 40603-2-III
State v. Tarver
We conclude that the superior court did not err in its interpretation of the statute
and affirm.
BACKGROUND
The trial court entered detailed findings of fact following a bench trial. Tarver
does not assign error to any of these findings, and they are therefore verities on appeal.1
State v. Hartman, 27 Wn. App. 2d 952, 965, 534 P.3d 423 (2023).
Robert Tarver was employed as a caseworker with Washington State Child
Protective Services (CPS). R.J. resided in Colfax with seven of her children and B.C.,
her boyfriend and the father of R.J.’s three youngest children.
In July 2020, CPS received an allegation that B.C. had physically abused one of
R.J.’s children. On July 6, all of the children were removed from the home pursuant to a
court order. The Department placed the three youngest children with their maternal
grandmother who lived a block from R.J.’s house in Colfax. The Department filed a
dependency petition seeking dependency over all seven of R.J.’s children, alleging that
the children lacked a parent capable of caring for them.
On July 9, a family team decision-making meeting was held at the Department’s
Colfax office to discuss the care and placement of the children and services to be
1
Because Tarver does not challenge the court’s factual findings, and his argument largely pertains to the legal interpretation of language used in the statute, we truncate the factual background accordingly.
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provided to R.J. Those in attendance included R.J., R.J.’s attorney, R.J.’s mother, Tarver,
and Tarver’s supervisor. During this meeting, Tarver was tasked with assisting R.J. in
procuring a domestic violence protection order against B.C. to protect R.J. and her
children. Tarver was also tasked with arranging visitation between R.J. and her three
youngest children. Following this meeting, R.J.’s attorney prepared the petition for a
protective order and sent it to Tarver. Tarver then met R.J. at the courthouse and
presented the petition to the court.
After the court signed the order, Tarver told R.J. that he would accompany her
home for her safety. When Tarver and R.J. first arrived at R.J.’s house, R.J.’s brother
was present. R.J.’s brother lived with his and R.J.’s mother, but when the Department
placed the children in her care he was told to leave until a background check could be
completed. Nevertheless, shortly after arriving at R.J.’s house, Tarver told the brother he
could return to his mother’s house. Although the inconsistent directive confused the
brother, he gathered his items and returned to his mother’s home. The court later found
that “Tarver’s directions to [the brother] entailed an exercise of discretion as a CPS
caseworker.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 116 (Finding of Fact (FF) 29).
Tarver stayed at R.J.’s house from 5:00 p.m. on July 9 until 12:05 a.m. on July 10.
While Tarver initially told R.J. that he was off the clock and they should not discuss the
dependency case, he spoke about the case and R.J.’s children multiple times throughout
the evening. Tarver told R.J. he was amazed by the amount of information he had
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located regarding her history, dating back to the birth of her first child. He believed he
knew her well enough to diagnose her. He also indicated he was considering what
services the Department would provide.
Tarver and R.J. had sexual contact throughout the evening. During this time, the
two continued to talk about R.J.’s children and the children’s fathers. Around midnight,
Tarver announced that he was going to return to his office and work on R.J.’s case. He
told R.J. that he would arrange for R.J.’s visitation with her three children the following
day. “He spoke in a manner and tone signifying his being in the best position within [the
Department] to facilitate the return of the children to R.J.” CP at 121 (FF 58).
On July 10, Tarver telephoned R.J. and told her she could visit her children.
“Contrary to practice, Tarver did not arrange for a visitation supervisor.” CP at 122 (FF
63).
A shelter care hearing began on July 13. One purpose of the hearing was to decide
temporary placement of the children including the option of in-home placement. If the
children were not returned home, the court would also decide visitation.
Tarver testified at this hearing as the assigned case worker. He testified that in his
opinion the children would not be safe with R.J. even if B.C. was no longer present in the
home. He recommended services including a chemical dependency assessment, domestic
violence victim services, mental health services, and random alcohol testing. Tarver was
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State v. Tarver
still testifying at the end of the day, and the hearing was continued for one week due to a
scheduling issue.
On July 14, with the assistance of her attorney, R.J. reported the sexual contact
with Tarver to the Colfax police.
When the shelter care hearing resumed on July 20, Tarver was recalled as a
witness. He admitted that he was no longer assigned to R.J.’s case. R.J.’s attorney then
asked Tarver whether he had been removed from the case because he was being
investigated for “having sex with [R.J.] in exchange for helping her on her CP[S] case.”
CP 123-24 (FF 70). After the court overruled the State’s objection, Tarver denied that he
had been to R.J.’s house on July 9. He also denied bringing alcohol to R.J.’s house in his
work vehicle. At Tarver’s later trial on the criminal charges, the trial court found that
Tarver’s denials were false and the falsehoods were material because truthful answers
would have affected Tarver’s credibility at the shelter care hearing.
The State charged Tarver with receiving unlawful compensation, second degree
extortion, and first degree perjury.
At the bench trial on the criminal charges, the State called R.J., who testified
consistently with the facts above. She also testified that she felt “uncomfortable”
numerous times throughout the encounter. When asked how the first instance of oral sex
occurred, R.J. replied, “Because he said that’s what he wanted.” Rep. of Proc. at 180.
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Following the bench trial, the court found Tarver guilty of first degree perjury and
the crime of receiving unlawful compensation with sexual motivation. In addition to the
above findings, the court found:
As a Child Protective Services caseworker assigned to the dependency case
of R.J.’s children, Robert Tarver possessed discretion with regard to
arranging the dates, times, lengths, and frequency of visitation between R.J.
and her removed children. The CPS caseworker also decides and has
discretion as to whether a parent’s visitation will be supervised.
CP at 121 (FF 61).
The superior court has the ultimate authority on determining whether
children removed from home will be returned home and, if not returned
home, the extent of visitation with a parent. As a Child Protective Services
caseworker assigned to the dependency case of R.J .’s children, Robert
Tarver advised the superior court as to whether R.J.’s children should be
returned to their home with R.J. and what, if any visitation, should occur.
In advising the court, Tarver exercised discretion.
CP at 121-22 (FF 62).
With respect to receiving unlawful compensation, the court concluded:
On July 9, 2024, Robert Tarver, being a public servant, requested and
accepted sexual contact from R.J. and such contact was compensation
within the meaning of RCW 9A.68.030(1)(a).
CP at 126 (Conclusion of Law (CL) 3).
Tarver appeals.
ANALYSIS
Tarver argues the trial court erred by convicting him of receiving unlawful
compensation based on an erroneous interpretation of RCW 9A.68.030. Specifically, he
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contends that “compensation” does not include sexual acts and that “transaction” does not
include parent-child visitation or a dependency case. We address these arguments by first
interpreting the statute to determine the applicable definitions, and then we assess
whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction using those definitions.
A. Statutory Interpretation
Matters of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. State v. B.O.J., 194
Wn.2d 314, 323, 449 P.3d 1006 (2019). Our primary duty in statutory interpretation is to
ascertain and carry out the legislature’s intent. Id. To discern legislative intent, we
consider the plain language of the statute; if the plain language is unambiguous, our
inquiry ends. Id. The ordinary meaning of a statute is considered in context with
“ʻrelated statutory provisions, the entire statute, and related statutes.’” State v. Morgan,
4 Wn.3d 261, 266, 562 P.3d 360 (2025) (quoting AURC III, LLC v. Point Ruston Phase
II, LLC, 3 Wn.3d 80, 87, 546 P.3d 385 (2024)). “A contextual analysis includes reading
the statute as a whole, applying grammatical conventions, and giving meaning to each
word.” State v. Elwell, 17 Wn. App. 2d 367, 370, 486 P.3d 152 (2021).
“ʻLegislative definitions included in the statute are controlling, but in the absence
of a statutory definition this court will give the term its plain and ordinary meaning
ascertained from a standard dictionary.’” Id. (quoting State v. Watson, 146 Wn.2d 947,
954, 51 P.3d 66 (2002)). When the legislature uses two different terms, we presume the
difference was purposeful. Royal Oaks Country Club v. Dep’t of Revenue, 2 Wn.3d 562,
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No. 40603-2-III
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571, 541 P.3d 336 (2024). This approach requires examining not just isolated provisions
but also related statutes to understand the legislature’s overall intent. Seto v. Am.
Elevator, Inc., 159 Wn.2d 767, 773-74, 154 P.3d 189 (2007). The presumption that
different terms have different meanings helps courts fulfill their duty to construe each
part of a statute in connection with every other part. State v. Keller, 98 Wn. App. 381,
384, 990 P.2d 423 (1999).
The relevant criminal statute reads:
(1) A person is guilty of receiving or granting unlawful compensation if:
(a) Being a public servant, he or she requests, accepts, or agrees to
accept compensation for advice or other assistance in preparing a bill,
contract, claim, or transaction regarding which he or she knows he or she
is likely to have an official discretion to exercise.
RCW 9A.68.030 (emphasis added).
In this case, the issue is whether “compensation” encompasses sexual contact and
whether “transaction” includes a dependency case and visitation with one’s child.
B. Compensation
The parties agree the term “compensation” as used in RCW 9A.68.030 is not
ambiguous. Nevertheless, they disagree as to whether its definition encompasses sexual
contact.
“Compensation” is not defined in the statute; therefore, we turn to the ordinary
dictionary definition. See Elwell, 17 Wn. App. 2d at 370. “Compensation” means “the
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No. 40603-2-III
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act or action of making up, making good, or counterbalancing : rendering equal : . . .
something that constitutes an equivalent or recompense.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 463 (1993). The term neither specifies nor limits the
instrument used to affect the exchange. As such, compensation can be conceivably
achieved in an infinite number of ways—including sexual contact—so long as its
function is to make good or counterbalance.
Tarver argues the term “compensation” does not include sexual favors. In support
of this position, he points to other statutes in the same chapter. While acknowledging
that chapter 9A.68 RCW uses two terms, compensation and pecuniary benefit, Tarver
argues the terms are used synonymously in RCW 9A.68.020 and therefore must be
synonymous throughout the chapter. We disagree with this logic.
For context, we consider related statutes. Chapter 9A.68 RCW governs “Bribery
and Corrupt Influence” and establishes six crimes: bribery (.010); requesting unlawful
compensation (.020); receiving or granting unlawful compensation (.030); trading in
public office (.040); trading in special influence (.050); and commercial bribery (.060).
All of these offenses except RCW 9A.68.030 concern offering, requesting, accepting, or
conferring a “pecuniary benefit.” Whereas RCW 9A.68.030—receiving or granting
unlawful compensation—uses the undefined term “compensation.”
The term “compensation” is broader than “pecuniary benefit.” “‘Pecuniary
benefit’ means any gain or advantage in the form of money, property, commercial
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interest, or anything else the primary significance of which is economic gain.” RCW
9A.04.110(16) (emphasis added). Whereas the definition of compensation is not limited
to an economic or financial exchange. While compensation might include something of
pecuniary value, nothing in its ordinary meaning limits compensation to an economic
benefit. Instead, the definition of compensation, along with the context in which the
word is used in RCW 9A.68.030(1)(a), focuses on whether the thing received functioned
as remuneration.
Tarver is correct that another statute, RCW 9A.68.020, employs both terms:
A public servant is guilty of requesting unlawful compensation if he or she
requests a pecuniary benefit for the performance of an official action
knowing that he or she is required to perform that action without
compensation or at a level of compensation lower than that requested.
(Emphasis added.) However, Tarver is incorrect that the two terms are used
synonymously in RCW 9A.68.020. Instead, the different terms have different meanings.
The statute prohibits requesting a pecuniary benefit, one specific type of compensation.
Thus, his argument that compensation and pecuniary benefit are used synonymously
throughout the chapter fails. In short, we conclude compensation and pecuniary benefit
are not interchangeable or synonymous.
Tarver urges us not to read sexual contact into the statute, arguing State v.
Stockton2 disallows such a broad interpretation. However, Tarver’s reliance on Stockton
2
97 Wn.2d 528, 647 P.2d 21 (1982).
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is misplaced. The Stockton court considered whether sexual favors constituted a
“service” within the meaning of the extortion statute. 97 Wn.2d at 530. The term
“services” was defined in the statute and included a nonexhaustive list of examples. Id.
The court applied the rule of “ejusdem generis”—when a list uses both specific and
general terms, the general terms are restricted to mean only items similar to those
designated by specific terms. Id. at 532. It noted that the “kinds of services listed in the
statute are those for which compensation is usually received” and concluded the statute
“thus contemplates only those kinds of services and not the sexual favors which
defendant was asking to be freely given to him.”3 Id. at 532-33.
Here, the relevant statute does not define compensation, nor does it provide a list
of examples. As such, the Stockton court’s application of ejusdem generis and
corresponding analysis is inapposite.
We hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that compensation as used in
RCW 9A.68.030(1)(a) includes sexual contact.
C. Transaction
The parties also agree the term “transaction” as used in RCW 9A.68.030 is not
ambiguous but disagree as to whether its definition encompasses a visit between a parent
and child or a dependency case.
3
The legislature subsequently amended the definition of extortion, which now “specifically includes sexual favors.” RCW 9A.56.110.
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As noted above, the crime of receiving unlawful compensation punishes a public
servant who requests or accepts “compensation for advice or other assistance in preparing
a bill, contract, claim, or transaction regarding which he or she knows he or she is likely
to have an official discretion to exercise.” RCW 9A.68.030(1)(a). “Transaction” is not
defined in the statute; therefore, we turn to the ordinary dictionary definition. See Elwell,
17 Wn. App. 2d at 370. A “transaction” is “a communicative action or activity involving
two parties or two things reciprocally affecting or influencing each other.”4 WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2425 (1993).
The trial court held that “transaction” as used in the statute was a broad term. CP
at 126-27 (CL 8). The court concluded that there were two transactions: the dependency
case itself and the visitation involving R.J. and her children. CP at 127 (CL 9). The court
noted that the dependency case was “a communicative action or activity involving two
parties or two things that reciprocally affect or influence each other.” CP at 127 (CL 9).
The court then concluded that Tarver had discretion to influence the dependency case by
deciding the specific details of R.J.’s visitation with her children and providing the
superior court with his opinion of whether the children should be returned to R.J.
We agree with the trial court that the dependency action in this case qualifies as a
transaction as used in RCW 9A.68.030(1)(a). Here, the dependency action filed by the
4
The trial court adopted this definition but incorrectly attributed it to Black’s Law Dictionary.
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State was a communicative activity that involved and reciprocally affected the children
(through the State) and R.J. Tarver, as a public servant, advised and assisted in preparing
this transaction by providing testimony intended to influence the ultimate decision-maker
and exercising discretional authority to determine the terms of visitation.
Despite claiming that the plain language of RCW 9A.68.030(1)(a) is
unambiguous, Tarver argues that the statutory canon of ejusdem generis should guide our
analysis. He challenges the superior court’s broad interpretation of transaction and
contends that, under the canon of ejusdem generis, the term should be limited to financial
transactions similar to a bill, claim, or contract. He supports his position by relying on
State v. Clark5 where the court applied ejusdem generis to RCW 9A.68.030 and
determined that enforcement of the law was not a transaction. Tarver argues that parentchild visitation resembles enforcement of the law, which is not a transaction under Clark.
He contends no rational reason differentiates a police officer enforcing the law and a
social worker facilitating visitation. We disagree.
“ʻThe ejusdem generis rule requires that general terms appearing in a statute in
connection with specific terms are to be given meaning and effect only to the extent that
the general terms suggest items similar to those designated by the specific
terms.’” Stockton, 97 Wn.2d at 532 (quoting Dean v. McFarland, 81 Wn.2d 215, 221,
5
34 Wn. App. 173, 659 P.2d 554 (1983).
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500 P.2d 1244 (1972). “Courts apply the doctrine only when a statute is ambiguous and
contains the following characteristics: a) an enumeration of specific words that b) suggest
a class, c) which is not exhausted by the enumeration, and d) is followed by a general
reference.” Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Dep’t of Ecology, 112 Wn. App. 712, 726, 50
P.3d 668 (2002).
In Clark, the defendant owned a business being investigated for prostitution
activities. 34 Wn. App. at 175. She was charged with attempted bribery after placing a
roll of $20 bills in the investigating officer’s pocket. At trial, Clark requested a lesser
included offense jury instruction for the crime of granting unlawful compensation under
RCW 9A.68.030(1)(b). Id. at 176. The trial court denied Clark’s proposed instruction
and Division Two affirmed, finding “there simply is no evidence supporting an inference
that granting unlawful compensation was committed.” Id. at 176-77. Specifically, the
court held that there was no evidence that Clark paid the deputy for advice or assistance.
Id. at 177. With little analysis, the court applied the canon of ejusdem generis and held
that the general term “other transaction” was restricted by the more specific preceding
terms of bill, contract, and claim. Id.
It is unclear why the court in Clark applied ejusdem generis to the statute or
whether it first determined the statute was ambiguous. It is also unclear how the court
characterized “bill, contract, claim” to conclude that “enforcement or lack thereof of vice
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or licensing laws” was not a transaction contemplated by the statute.6 Id. at 177.
Nevertheless, the court’s holding is not dispositive in this case.
First, as stated, “ejusdem generis is a canon of statutory interpretation” that applies
“only when a statute is ambiguous.” Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 112 Wn. App. at 726.
And here, Tarver agrees the statute is unambiguous.7
Even if we were to apply the canon, it does not change our conclusion. Tarver
contends that the specific terms “bill,” “contract,” and “claim” pertain exclusively to
business or financial matters, thereby limiting the meaning of transaction to only those
types of matters. However, it appears the “bill” originally contemplated by the
legislature was a legislative bill, not a financial bill or invoice. 1976 Op. Att’y Gen. No.
6. Although this may not have been the only meaning “bill” was intended to confer, it
6
We note that although RCW 9A.68.030(1)(a) and (b) share similar language, the differences may be meaningful to Clark’s holding. In RCW 9A.68.030(1)(a), the provision that Tarver was charged with violating, a public servant is prohibited from requesting “compensation for advice or other assistance in preparing a bill, contract, claim, or transaction regarding which he or she knows he or she is likely to have an official discretion to exercise.” Whereas subsection (1)(b), applicable in Clark, prohibits a person from offering “to pay compensation to a public servant for advice or other assistance in preparing or promoting a bill, contract, claim, or other transaction regarding which the public servant is likely to have an official discretion to exercise.” (Emphasis added.)
7
We decline Tarver’s request to apply the rule of lenity for the same reason. “[T]he rule of lenity applies only where a statute is ambiguous, and a statute is ambiguous only if it is ‘subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.’” State v. Cyr, 195 Wn.2d 492, 505, 461 P.3d 360 (2020) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Cruz, 157 Wn.2d 83, 88, 134 P.3d 1166 (2006)).
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tends to disprove Tarver’s theory that ejusdem generis constrains transaction to mean a
business or financial transaction. Otherwise, Tarver makes no attempt to define the terms
“bill,” “contract,” or “claim.”
We also disagree with Tarver’s argument that parent-child visitation resembles
enforcement of the law and is therefore not a transaction under Clark. In Clark, the
defendant did not pay the deputy for advice or assistance regarding a transaction; rather,
she was attempting to bribe the officer to refrain from enforcing the law against her.
While her act fit within the bribery statute, it does not fit within the offense of receiving
or granting unlawful compensation. See RCW 9A.68.030(1). There is no readily
apparent way to fit enforcement of the law or declining to enforce the law into the same
framework. In other words, declining to enforce the law is not a communicative activity
that a deputy could advise or assist in preparing.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the trial court did not err in its interpretation of the terms
“compensation” and “transaction” as used in RCW 9A.68.030(1)(a). Tarver’s request for
sexual contact was a request for compensation in exchange for his advice and assistance
in preparing a transaction, which included R.J.’s visitation with her children and his
influence in the dependency action. Tarver concedes that if the superior court’s
interpretation of these two terms was correct, the evidence is otherwise sufficient to
support his conviction for requesting unlawful compensation. Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral
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argument, State v. Tarver, No. 40603-2-III (Mar. 10, 2026), at 3 min., 03 sec. through 3
min., 18 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network,
http://www.tvw.org.
Affirmed.
Staab, C.J.
WE CONCUR:
Hill, J.
Murphy, J.
17