UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
NIKOLA SOBOT,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 22-cv-1846-TSC-MJS
CLEAN THE WORLD FOUNDATION INC.,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Now that Plaintiff Nikola Sobot’s various legal claims against his former employer Clean
the World Foundation Inc. (“CTWF”) are resolved—some in his favor and some not—Sobot
returns to the Court with a renewed request for prevailing-party attorney’s fees and costs in the
total amount of $90,404.38. In opposing that request, CTWF presses a panoply of arguments for
why any potential fee award in Sobot’s favor should be substantially reduced. The matter is before
this Court once more on referral from Judge Tanya Chutkan. For the reasons that follow, the
undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court GRANT IN PART Sobot’s renewed motion for
attorney’s fees (ECF No. 50) and award a total of $57,879.38 in attorney’s fees and costs. 1
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
For present purposes, the Court provides a high-level background and otherwise points the
reader to prior rulings in the case for more context. Sobot v. Clean the World Found. Inc. (“Sobot
I”), 2024 WL 4119389 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2024); Sobot v. Clean the World Found. Inc. (“Sobot II”),
1
The Court can quickly resolve Sobot’s request for costs. He seeks only $204.38 in costs associated with the initial filing fee and service efforts. (See ECF No. 44-3 at 3.) CTWF does not object to or oppose these requested costs, and they are properly recoverable. So the Court should award costs in the amount of $204.38. With that issue sorted, the rest of this decision focuses on Sobot’s fee request. 2025 WL 2336414 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL
4083336 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2025). In short, Sobot worked for CTWF from August 2019 until January
2022. Over that period, CTWF reduced Sobot’s salary three times—in November 2019, January
2020, and April 2020—before eventually restoring his original salary effective July 2021 (and
slightly raising it soon after). CTWF terminated Sobot’s employment in January 2022.
Several months later, Sobot sued. His four-count complaint against CTWF alleged statutory
violations under the D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law (“DCWPCL”) (Count I) and the D.C.
Accrued Sick and Safe Leave Act (“ASSLA”) (Count II), as well as common-law claims for breach
of contract (Count III) and unjust enrichment (Count IV). (See ECF No. 9, Compl.) The DCWPCL
and breach-of-contract claims, more specifically, implicated seven different theories related to
seven different payment issues (see id. ¶¶ 22–23, 33–34): Sobot’s three salary reductions
referenced above; CTWF’s non-payment of vacation at Sobot’s termination; CTWF’s non-increase
of Sobot’s salary tied to two different fundraising thresholds; and pay for time that Sobot allegedly
spent working on vacation. See Sobot I, 2024 WL 4119389, at *2–5 (breaking down Sobot’s claims
along these same lines). After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment,
and Judge Chutkan ruled in CTWF’s favor on most of Sobot’s claims, including Counts II in its
entirety and Counts I, III, and IV in substantial part. See id. at *2–6. Two aspects of Sobot’s claims
in Counts I and III came out differently, though: Judge Chutkan awarded summary judgment in
Sobot’s favor on the first of the two salary-increase claims, and she denied summary judgment to
both sides on the November 2019 salary-decrease claim. See id.
CTWF then moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of damages as to the
remaining claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(g). On referral, the undersigned ruled that Sobot was
entitled to $14,667.38 in DCWPCL damages on the salary-increase claim and that Sobot’s
2
maximum potential DCWPCL damages on the November 2019 salary-decrease claim would be
$8.666.67 (with no duplicative award on either claim under a breach-of-contract theory). See Sobot
II, 2025 WL 2336414, at *3–5. The undersigned separately recommended denying without
prejudice Sobot’s original petition for attorney’s fees (ECF No. 44), with leave to renew that
request at the close of the case. Id. at *7–8. Judge Chutkan adopted those recommendations in full.
Thereafter, CTWF reportedly agreed—without conceding liability on the salary-decrease
claim—to tender the full measure of potentially recoverable damages to Sobot, totaling $23,334.05
($14,667.38 + $8,666.67). (See ECF No. 49; ECF No. 51 at 3–4.) But the parties continued to
dispute attorney’s fees. So Sobot filed a renewed motion for fees (ECF No. 50 (“Mot.”)), which
added new details about counsel’s billing activity since the original petition and otherwise pointed
back to the prior submission (ECF No. 44 (“Original Mot.”); ECF No. 46). CTWF timely opposed,
and Sobot filed a reply. (ECF No. 51 (“Opp’n”); ECF No. 52 (“Reply”).) In total, Sobot now seeks
$90,404.38 in fees and costs (all but $204.38 of which represents attorney’s fees). (See Reply at
12.) 2 CTWF presses several arguments as to why Sobot’s claimed fees should be “significantly
reduced if not denied entirely.” (ECF No. 51.) The matter is fully briefed and ripe for decision. 3
2
Specifically, Sobot’s original billing records reflect a total of 128.8 hours of time spent on non-fee-briefing activity, for a total of $96,600. (See ECF No. 44-3.) He discounted that figure by 25%, such that he seeks $72,450, plus $3,000 for 4 hours spent preparing the fee petition (with no discount). (See Original Mot. at 3.) The billing records that accompany Sobot’s renewed motion—which capture time spent from midMarch 2025 through October 2025—seek recovery for another 19 hours in the amount of $14,250, and then Sobot requested a final 2 hours for time spent on his latest reply brief in the amount of $1,500. (Reply at 12.) For what it’s worth, based on the Court’s own math, these amounts collectively total $91,404.38 (an extra $1,000 above what Sobot’s counsel lists in the briefing). The apparent discrepancy is immaterial, though, because the Court recommends awarding a substantially reduced amount for the reasons explained. 3
After briefing was complete, Sobot moved for a status hearing so that counsel could “address any questions about the fee petition” to facilitate the Court’s “decision on the motion as soon as possible.” (ECF No. 53.) In light of the Court’s ruling today, it DENIES AS MOOT Sobot’s motion for a status hearing.
3
LEGAL STANDARDS
Under “the bedrock principle known as ‘the American Rule,’” litigants “pay [their] own
attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.” Peter v. Nantkwest,
Inc., 589 U.S. 23, 28 (2019) (quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242,
252–53 (2010)). The DCWPCL operates as one of those fee-shifting statutes. It provides that the
court “shall” award “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs” to a prevailing plaintiff. D.C. Code §
32-1308(a)(1)(A). A “typical formulation” of what it means to be a “prevailing party,” as the
Supreme Court explained it decades ago, focuses on whether a plaintiff “succeed[ed] on any
significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit … sought in bringing suit.”
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
In reviewing the reasonableness of a fee request, a court’s general starting point is the
lodestar amount, derived by “multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984). The fee
applicant “bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award, documenting the appropriate
hours, and justifying the reasonableness of the rates[.]” Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d
1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The applicant must provide “sufficiently detailed information about
the hours logged and the work done ... based on contemporaneous time records,” Nat’l Ass’n of
Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and show that the
hourly rates are “in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of
reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation,” Ventura v. L.A. Howard Constr. Co., 134
F. Supp. 3d 99, 105 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Kattan ex rel. Thomas v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d
274, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
4
Against those baseline considerations, courts then consider a variety of factors to determine
if the requested fee award should be adjusted “upward or downward, including the important factor
of the ‘results obtained.’” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. In making this “equitable judgment,” a court
“may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the
award to account for the limited success.” Id. at 436–37; see also Goos v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors,
68 F.3d 1380, 1384 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he district court does indeed have broad discretion to
reduce requested fees when a plaintiff has achieved limited success.”).
Finally, although “courts have a duty to ensure that claims for attorneys’ fees are
reasonable,” Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 1261, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1993), the process
“should not result in a second major litigation,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437; see also Fox v. Vice, 563
U.S. 826, 838 (2011) (“[T]rial courts need not, and indeed should not, become green-eyeshade
accountants. The essential goal in shifting fees … is to do rough justice[.]”).
DISCUSSION
Through his renewed motion, Sobot asks the Court to award more than $90,000 in fees, an
amount that reportedly reflects a 25% discount—at least on some fees—to account for Sobot’s
relative success on his various claims. (See Original Mot. at 6; Reply at 12.) CTWF, understandably,
does not contest Sobot’s prevailing-party status. After all, the Court awarded summary judgment
in Sobot’s favor on at least some of his claims. But CTWF still urges the Court to substantially
reduce any fee award based on Sobot’s limited success and various criticisms of Sobot’s counsel’s
billing entries. After addressing a few initial points, the Court takes CTWF’s arguments in turn.
I. Preliminary Points
As an initial matter, the Court rejects CTWF’s suggestion—gestured at a handful of times
throughout its briefing—that Sobot’s fee request should be denied entirely. (See, e.g., Opp’n at 1,
5
4, 7, 19.) It is true that courts retain discretion to deny fees outright in certain cases, including
where a fee request is “outrageously unreasonable.” See, e.g., Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. Reilly, 1 F.3d
1254, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Louise Trauma Ctr LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2026 WL 879190,
at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2026). But beyond a few fleeting references in its filings, CTWF never
develops any concrete argument, much less one supported by applicable caselaw, that would justify
the wholesale denial of Sobot’s fee request here. See Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173,
179 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“A party forfeits an argument by mentioning it only ‘in the most skeletal
way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work[.]’”) (citation omitted); see also Cabrera v. Magoo,
Inc., 2025 WL 1341520, at *4 (D.D.C. May 8, 2025) (rejecting similar argument on similar
grounds) report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1824814 (D.D.C. July 2, 2025).
Next, even though CTWF does not contest Sobot’s counsel’s proposed billing rate, the
Court is independently satisfied with its reasonableness. Sobot’s counsel seeks to recover fees at a
$750 hourly rate, which counsel describes as his “standard rate.” (ECF No. 44-5 ¶ 5; ECF No.
50-1 ¶ 5.) In this Circuit, “an attorney’s usual billing rate is presumptively the reasonable rate.”
Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Assocs., P.C., 735 F. App’x 733, 735 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citation
and quotation marks omitted)); Kattan ex rel. Thomas, 995 F.2d at 278 (“[A]n attorney’s usual
billing rate is presumptively the reasonable rate, provided that th[e] rate is ‘in line with those
prevailing in the community for similar services[.]’”) (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 895–96). More,
as Sobot’s filings reflect, counsel’s proposed $750 hourly rate falls comfortably within the range
supported by several frequently used fee matrices. (Mot. at 4–5 (citing to Laffey and Fitzpatrick
matrices)). Courts “allow a fee applicant to submit attorneys’ fee matrices as one type of evidence
that ‘provides a useful starting point’ in calculating the prevailing market rate.” Eley v. District of
Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109). And finally,
6
counsel submitted past examples where he was awarded similar rates by other courts and
administrative agencies. Sobot’s counsel’s proposed $750 rate is reasonable. 4
II. The Reasonableness of Counsel’s Requested Hours
The Court turns next to CTWF’s remaining arguments for a reduced award.
A. Reduction for Partial Success
Through its lead argument, CTWF insists the Court should reduce Sobot’s requested fees
based on his limited success in prevailing on only certain claims. CTWF urges, more specifically,
a “reduction of at least 70% of the claimed fee[s].” (Opp’n at 9.) For his part, Sobot rightly
acknowledges that some reduction is appropriate on this basis, as his fee petition applied a “25%
discount” to certain fees incurred to account for “claims he did not succeed on.” (Original Mot. at
3; id. at 6 (“Plaintiff is only seeking 75% of the total fees incurred because the court granted
summary judgment to Defendant on Counts II (Accrued Sick and Safe Leave Act) and IV (Unjust
Enrichment).”).) On review, the Court agrees that a degree-of-success reduction is warranted but
finds that neither side strikes the right balance with their proposed cut.
4
The Court observes that, as a prevailing party under the DCWPCL, Sobot could have pursued a fee award based on the hourly rate indicated in the LSI Laffey matrix. See D.C. Code § 32-1308(b)(1); Sanchez v. Ultimo, LLC, 2025 WL 1024970, at *3–4 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2025). But Sobot did not seek fees at that higher rate, whether in his original fee petition or his renewed motion, even though Sobot’s counsel expressly referenced the Laffey matrix in arguing why his proposed $750 hourly rate should be deemed reasonable. (See Original Mot. at 4–5.) Accordingly, and in keeping with the principle of party presentation, the Court will not entertain the prospect of awarding Sobot’s counsel fees at a higher rate than his counsel requested. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors v. United States, 97 F.4th 951, 957 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (“We adopt the framing of the dispute that is advanced by the parties because ‘[i]n our adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the principle of party presentation.’”) (citation omitted); De Paredes v. Zen Nails Studio LLC, 134 F.4th 750, 753–54 (4th Cir. 2025) (“[B]ecause courts follow the principle of party presentation, a district court ordinarily need not consider hourly rates higher than those a fee-seeking party requests or lower than those with which the opposing party counters[.]”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Sanchez v. Devashish Hospitality, LLC, 2018 WL 7252898, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2018) (awarding fees in DCWPCL case at rates “lower than the LSI Laffey matrix rates” when those lower rates were specifically requested by counsel); Ventura v. Bebo Foods, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 8, 34 (D.D.C. 2010) (similar); cf. Mattachine Soc’y of Washington, DC v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 406 F. Supp. 3d 64, 71 (D.D.C. 2019) (“The Court will not award [plaintiff] more than it asked for[.]”).
7
Start with the governing legal principles. “When determining how to reduce fee awards for
partially successful plaintiffs, the court must analyze the relationships between the successful and
unsuccessful claims.” Cogdell v. Carnahan, 2025 WL 1575617, at *7 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 2025) (citing
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–37). When a case involves “distinctly different claims … based on
different facts and legal theories,” then “counsel’s work on one claim will be unrelated to his work
on another claim” and fees should not be “awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim[s].”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434–35; Goos, 997 F.2d at 1569 (explaining that the goal in such cases is to
prevent a plaintiff from “piggybacking fees incurred for work done on losing claims onto unrelated
winning issues”). But when the claims “involve a common core of facts” or are based on “related
legal theories,” then “[m]uch of counsel’s time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole,
making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at
435. Instead, in those sorts of cases, a court should “focus on the significance of the overall relief
obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Id.; Goos,
997 F.2d at 1565 (“If successful and unsuccessful claims share a common core of facts ... a court
should simply compute the appropriate fee as a function of degree of success.”) (cleaned up). And
ultimately, a court retains broad discretion as to how it chooses to adjust a fee award based on
relative success, including through an across-the-board percentage reduction to the overall fee
request. See Goos, 997 F.2d at 1571 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–37).
Here, Sobot filed and fully litigated four claims against CTWF for: (1) wage violations
under the DCWPCL in Count I; (2) violation of the D.C. ASSLA in Count II, including CTWF’s
alleged retaliatory termination of Sobot’s employment; (3) various wage-related breaches of
contract in Count III; and (4) unjust enrichment in Count IV. (See generally Compl.) With the dust
now settled, Sobot succeeded, but only in part. He partially prevailed on Counts I and III, but the
8
Court ruled against him at summary judgment as to Count II entirely and as to several facets of
Counts I, III, and IV, holding that those claims failed as a matter of law and undisputed fact.
The Court starts by asking whether the unsuccessful claims were “distinctly different” from
the successful ones. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434–35; Goos, 997 F.2d at 1569. For the most part, Count
II fits that bill. Unlike the other claims that turned on discrete payment issues during various
chapters of Sobot’s employment, Count II focused principally on the circumstances of Sobot’s
employment termination in January 2022 and CTWF’s surrounding motivation for that decision
(with another aspect focused on whether CTWF interfered with Sobot’s right to take sick leave
during that same month). So the legal issues underpinning Count II were meaningfully different
from the legal issues underlying the other claims. And even though there was some high-level
factual overlap—i.e., insofar the entire case stemmed from Sobot’s employment relationship with
CTWF—the factual points bearing on Count II were largely distinct from the factual backdrop
relevant to the other claims. These observations likely explain why Sobot voluntarily applied a
reduction of 25% to account for the Court’s adverse ruling on Count II (and Count IV). 5 And since
the Court cannot easily parse counsel’s billing records to identify time spent on Count II versus
the other claims, Sobot’s proposed reduction strikes the Court as a step in the right direction.
But the problem is that the 25% reduction—by Sobot’s own telling—does not account for
any adjustment for Sobot’s limited success on Counts I and III, which is where CTWF trains most
of its focus in opposing Sobot’s request. CTWF parses Counts I and III into seven distinct claims
and argues that Sobot only prevailed on two of the “asserted grounds for recovery”: the initial
5
Sobot’s briefing indicates that the 25% reduction was also meant to account for his loss at summary judgment on the unjust enrichment claim in Count IV. But as the Court recognized in its summary judgment ruling, Count IV was essentially just an alternative legal theory—one sounding in equity, rather than at law—as to certain of Sobot’s pay-related claims in Counts I and III. Count IV, then, was not “distinct” from the successful claims in the same way as Count II, so the Court’s treatment of Sobot’s degree of success of Count IV is baked into the discussion that follows next concerning Counts I and III.
9
salary-increase claim, under both a DCWPCL theory and a breach-of-contract theory. (Opp’n at
7.) Further, CTWF adds, even if Sobot is seen as having nominally “prevailed” on the November
2019 salary-decrease claim (recall that CTWF voluntarily paid those damages to avoid a trial over
less than $10,000), it would mean Sobot prevailed on only four of the “asserted grounds for
recovery” in Counts I and III, representing “at best a 26% success rate.” (Id.) Relatedly, and
through a slightly different lens, CTWF says Sobot recovered only about 11% of the total damages
he sought on Counts I and III—less than $24,000 out of about $204,000. (Id. at 8.) Based on these
metrics, CTWF concludes, a substantial reduction of 70% of Sobot’s request is warranted.
In response, Sobot faults CTWF’s “mathematical” approach to this issue and cites Hensley
for the proposition that “the result is what matters.” (Reply at 3 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435).)
But Sobot then proceeds to claim that he achieved “full success on his DCWPCL claim as
determined by the Court” and thus secured “full statutory damages available under the DCWPCL.”
(Id.) That is a drastic oversimplification, at best. Although Sobot secured relief on two pay-related
theories under Counts I and III, the Court ruled against him on the other five theories at summary
judgment. So, framed appropriately, Sobot certainly did not achieve “full success” on Counts I and
III, his recovery notwithstanding. Neither were Sobot’s various theories so intertwined and
interrelated as to forestall any reduction based on his lack of success. Sobot suggests otherwise
because his theories all stemmed from CTWF’s alleged failure to pay wages. Although that
statement rings true at a certain level of abstraction, it ignores the various legal and factual
differences across Sobot’s multiple theories of underpayment. 6
6
To illustrate: Sobot’s theory for unpaid vacation at termination turned on the proper interpretation of CTWF’s PTO policy under District of Columbia law and whether Sobot was terminated “for cause,” whereas Sobot’s salary-increase claims turned on whether he satisfied certain fundraising thresholds at various points in his employment, and Sobot’s salary-decrease claims turned on whether he voluntarily
10
The Court accordingly agrees with CTWF that some reduction is warranted based on
Sobot’s partial success on Counts I and III, and CTWF’s theory-by-theory methodology admittedly
has some support in the caselaw. See, e.g., Salmeron v. District of Columbia, 195 F. Supp. 3d 153,
174–75 (D.D.C. 2016) (collecting cases where courts “reduced the fee award by an amount directly
proportional to the percentage of unsuccessful issues”). But at the same time, there was still some
overlap to Sobot’s various underpayment theories in Counts I and III, which makes it reasonable
to conclude that at least some of the time “counsel spent on the unsuccessful [theories] undoubtedly
contributed to the litigation” of the successful ones. Craig v. District of Columbia, 197 F. Supp. 3d
268, 284 (D.D.C. 2016). In light of all this, the Court concludes that CTWF’s proposed 70% cut
would be too drastic, while Sobot’s prior 25% cut would be too modest. Instead, to strike an
appropriate balance, the undersigned believes a 50% downward adjustment to Sobot’s requested
fees is warranted on this record. In the Court’s eyes, this reduction accounts for Sobot’s limited
success—both as to Count II overall, and as to Counts I and III (and Count IV) in meaningful
part—while recognizing that a good portion of counsel’s time on the case was devoted to litigating
the claims overall without being focused on specific claims or theories on a discrete basis. 7
Accordingly, the Court should reduce Sobot’s counsel’s proposed lodestar amount by 50%
to account for his limited success on his claims overall. Goos, 997 F.2d at 1571.
continued his employment after receiving notice of the salary reduction(s). At some level, these claims all turned on CTWF’s alleged failure to pay Sobot, but they are meaningfully different in key respects. 7
Although every case must be evaluated on its own terms, the Court is mindful that its proposal comports with prior cases that bear some similarities—thought not a perfect overlap—with the dynamics at play here. See Harrell ex rel. J.W. v. District of Columbia, 2024 WL 3640033, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2024) (reducing fee request by 50% where plaintiff succeeded on one third of the legal issues ); Davis v. District of Columbia, 2018 WL 6181736, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 27, 2018) (same); Howard v. Achievement Prep. Academy Pub. Charter School, 2016 WL 1212409 at *18 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2016) (similar, but 60% reduction).
11
B. Reduction for Proportionality to Sobot’s Recovered Damages
Next, CTWF insists that a reduction is separately warranted because Sobot’s counsel’s
requested fee award would be unreasonably disproportionate to the total monetary recovery
obtained by Sobot himself as the party: more than $90,000 to counsel, versus less than $24,000 to
Sobot. Not so. As the undersigned has previously written, “fee awards need not ‘necessarily be
proportionate to the amount of damages’ recovered.” Cabrera, 2025 WL 1341520, at *7 (quoting
City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986)). And there are good policy reasons
underlying that principle. As our Circuit has recognized, a rule of proportionality “would make it
difficult, if not impossible, for individuals with meritorious ... claims but relatively small potential
damages to obtain redress from the courts.” Williams v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Invs. Corp., 225 F.3d
738, 747 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Rivera, 477 U.S. at 574). That dynamic is especially apparent
in cases involving unpaid wages. See, e.g., Seo v. Oh, 2024 WL 4381191, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 3,
2024) (“[T]his Court frequently awards reasonable attorneys’ fees in excess of the unpaid wages
awarded in FLSA and DCMWA cases) (collecting cases); Driscoll v. George Washington Univ., 55
F. Supp. 3d 106, 114 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[C]alculating attorneys’ fees as a proportion of damages
runs directly contrary to the purpose of fee-shifting statutes: assuring that civil rights claims of
modest cash value can attract competent counsel.”). So the broader legal premise behind CTWF’s
argument misses the mark. Plus, in light of the Court’s proposed 50% reduction based on Sobot’s
limited success—just explained above—the resulting differential between Sobot’s recovery and
his counsel’s requested fee award will not be nearly as “whopping” as CTWF presupposes. (Opp’n
at 9.) The Court should not impose any additional reduction on proportionality grounds.
C. Reduction Based on Specific Billing Practices
Separately, CTWF seeks additional reductions from Sobot’s fee request based on several
specific billing-related criticisms, including that counsel’s records arguably reflect: (1) non12
contemporaneous billing; (2) block billing; (3) non-compensable administrative and clerical work;
and (4) unreasonable and excessive time. The Court addresses each issue in turn. 8
First, the Court is not persuaded by CTWF’s accusation of after-the-fact timekeeping. Fee
applications should, to be sure, rest on “contemporaneous time records,” In re Donovan, 877 F.2d
982, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1989), not “[c]asual after-the-fact estimates of time expended on a case,”
Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1327. The fee petition here is supported by reasonably detailed
billing records that include the dates of the hours billed and descriptions of the services provided,
accompanied by sworn declarations from Sobot’s counsel. (See ECF Nos. 44-3, 44-5, 50-1, 50-2.)
In arguing that the records were created post hoc, CTWF misses the mark. To start, CTWF points
to three entries involving deposition notices to several witnesses—contrasting an April 2023
billing entry describing the preparation and service of those notices with two entries in late June
and early July 2023 reflecting additional work on the same notices. (Opp’n at 10.) But even if the
work described is arguably a bit redundant in certain respects, the Court fails to appreciate how
that chain of billing entries would be indicative of non-contemporaneous timekeeping. And
importantly, later billing entries confirm that the depositions themselves took place in late July
after all three notice-related entries (see ECF No. 44-3 at 8), so it’s not as though counsel recorded
time working on deposition notices for depositions that were already complete. Separately, CTWF
highlights a September 2024 email exchange in which Sobot’s counsel wrote that the back-andforth communications with CTWF’s counsel about a potential settlement resulted in “an additional
half-hour” of attorney time for which Sobot would be seeking recovery, yet no such billing entry
8
In reviewing these arguments, the Court focuses on the specific billing entries that CTWF identifies in its briefing, without independently combing through the billing records to hunt for other potential problems or concerns. See Munoz v. Telligent Masonry LLC, 2023 WL 6389129, at *6 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2023) (“If a plaintiff requesting attorneys’ fees makes a reasonable showing of the hours expended in litigation, it is defendants’ obligation to identify specific time entries that should not be compensated.”).
13
appears in counsel’s records. (Opp’n at 10.) But again, the Court is not persuaded that this reflects
after-the-fact timekeeping issues. It might be a different story if counsel recorded that work on the
wrong date or something along those lines, but CTWF does not suggest that to be so. If anything,
the complete absence of a billing entry for that work is perhaps more reflective of counsel’s
judgment in not billing the time in the first place.
Second, CTWF fails to convince the Court that any reductions are warranted on the theory
that counsel seeks fees for clerical, non-legal work. It is well settled, of course, that “purely clerical
or secretarial tasks should not be billed,” Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 973
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted), but the billing entries that CTWF identifies—which total 6.3
hours of billable time—do not fall into that category. Instead, they generally reflect time spent
reviewing orders, filings, communicating with opposing counsel, and updating the client. (Opp’n
at 12–13.) Although the Court could conceivably raise a few questions about a line item or two
within the full list of billing entries that CTWF compiled on this argument, the time associated
with those specific entries is negligible, so the Court declines to impose any reduction on this basis.
Third, the Court does not believe any reductions are necessary based on CTWF’s
complaints about alleged block-billing—i.e., lumping together distinct tasks in a single billing
entry without delineating the time spent on each task. Block-billing is disfavored because the
practice makes it “difficult to determine the accuracy and reasonableness of billing entries,” Smith
v. District of Columbia, 466 F. Supp. 2d 151, 158 (D.D.C. 2006), especially where “some tasks are
not reimbursable” because “the court cannot verify that the party deducted the proper amount of
time,” Pursuing Am.’s Greatness v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 463 F. Supp. 3d 11, 20 (D.D.C. 2020).
But the caselaw also recognizes that courts should not unduly penalize block-billing if there is
“sufficient detail” to “evaluate what the lawyers were doing and the reasonableness of the number
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of hours spent on those tasks.” Smith, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 158. Applying these tenets to the nine
specific entries CTWF criticizes here (Opp’n at 11–12), the Court is not inclined to reduce or
exclude those hours on block-billing grounds. For many of the challenged entries, the tasks all
relate to a common workstream—e.g., deposition logistics (April 24, 2023), preparing the plaintiff
for deposition (April 30, 2023), extending and rescheduling discovery (June 12, 2023), and
summary-judgment reply briefing (August 26, 2023). And for the others, the entries contain
sufficient detail to allow the Court to evaluate the overall reasonableness of time spent.
Fourth and finally, CTWF comes up short in arguing that some of Sobot’s counsel’s billing
records reflect excessive time. CTWF flags two entries—totaling 2.2 hours of time—capturing
what CTWF chalks up as mere “communication on relatively simple topics.” (Opp’n at 13–14.)
But those entries reflect more than simple communications; they include coordination with
opposing counsel and the preparation of a court filing on a brewing discovery dispute that the
parties ultimately raised with Judge Chutkan. Viewed in that full context, the time spent is not
obviously excessive. Separately, CTWF refocuses on the billing entries related to deposition
notices from April, June, and July 2023—totaling 2.7 hours—which the Court already addressed
above in rejecting CTWF’s argument about non-contemporaneous billing. But once again, those
entries reflect broader activity than just preparing notices; they also reference time spent, at a
minimum, communicating with opposing counsel about the depositions and coordinating with the
client. Finally, CTWF attacks two billing entries totaling 2 hours of time on the initial client intake
and consultation. While CTWF is entitled to its own views about counsel’s efficiency, the Court
does not agree that the time spent was so excessive as to warrant exclusion.
All in all, CTWF’s entry-by-entry arguments for targeted reductions of Sobot’s claimed
fees simply fail to persuade. The Court should not reduce counsel’s claimed fees on these grounds.
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D. CTWF’s Remaining Arguments
CTWF mounts two final arguments in urging a reduction in fees. Neither carries.
CTWF says that Sobot’s counsel’s discovery conduct in the case should lead the Court to
“reduce all discovery-related entries” from a fee award, or at least all “fees incurred in connection
with preparing his discovery responses and his deposition.” (Opp’n at 15–16.) This argument
stretches too far. The Court recognizes that Sobot’s counsel clearly dropped the ball on written
discovery for some time, prompting an admonishment from Judge Chutkan and a warning about
possible sanctions. (See Min. Order, Apr. 14, 2023.) But counsel ultimately got back on track and
completed the necessary work. That last point matters because counsel did ultimately spend the
time on discovery for which he seeks an award, even if he should have done that work earlier and
in keeping with the Court’s deadlines. The Court is certainly not endorsing counsel’s missteps in
this case. But just as Judge Chutkan stopped short of imposing sanctions during the litigation, the
undersigned is not prepared to foreclose recovery of fees for discovery-related activity, whether
on a wholesale basis or on the slightly narrower terms that CTWF suggests.
Otherwise, CTWF argues the Court should reduce the fee award because Sobot’s counsel,
in CTWF’s view, unnecessarily prolonged the litigation. But, practically, CTWF is really arguing
that Sobot should be penalized for rejecting CTWF’s prior settlement offers. (See Opp’n at 16–18.)
CTWF first focuses on its September 2024 offer to resolve the case for the grand total of $20,000,
which represented about 85% of the total monetary recovery Sobot ultimately achieved, but
without any additional component attributable to attorney’s fees. Sobot was fully entitled to decline
that offer, though, and the Court cannot say that the decision to do so was patently unreasonable,
especially since it barely included any value for fees at a stage when Sobot was entitled to an award
of reasonable fees by statute (having already prevailed at least in part on his DCWPCL claim). Cf.
Cabrera, 2025 WL 1341520, at *6–7 (rejecting argument that counsel “needlessly racked up” fees
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by continuing to litigate for an additional year only to achieve an additional $5,000 in monetary
recovery). Beyond that, CTWF says Sobot should have at least accepted the offer it extended after
the Court’s second summary judgment ruling—reportedly, a full recovery to Sobot and some
amount in fees. (Opp’n at 18–19.) But as Sobot rejoins, the fee-related component of the offer was
a maximum of $5,000. (Reply at 10.) 9 Sobot should not be penalized for declining such a low
amount. Plus, from that point forward, the billing records indicate that counsel spent only about
five hours of additional time, including on the renewed fee petition. So even if the Court were to
credit CTWF’s argument on this score (and it does not), it would not meaningfully change the
result. At bottom, CTWF is arguing that Sobot should be blamed for allowing the issue of
attorney’s fees to become the tail that wagged the dog. But in the Court’s view, if anything, that is
a problem of both parties’ making—stemming, at least in part, from CTWF’s steadfast refusal to
offer anything beyond a mere pittance in fees.
III. Fees on Fees
Sobot additionally requests an award of attorney’s fees for time spent on his fee-related
motions—so-called “fees on fees.” Across both sets of briefing, Sobot’s counsel seeks recovery
for about 16 hours of time totaling $12,225 spent on fees-related briefing. (See ECF No. 44-3 at 9;
ECF No. 50-2 at 4; Reply at 12.) This request is reasonable as a general matter. But unlike the time
spent on the merits-related litigation, where counsel proactively reduced his fee request based on
the relative degree of success, Sobot’s counsel did not apply any discount to his request for fees
on fees. Following the approach employed by other judges in this District, the undersigned
recommends that the Court reduce the fees-on-fees award “proportionally to the percentage of fees
actually awarded as compared to [counsel’s] request.” Colorado Wild Pub. Lands v. U.S. Forest
9
CTWF’s filing did not specify the amount of the settlement offer attributable to fees. That important context was only presented to the Court with Sobot’s reply brief.
17
Serv., 2025 WL 2406340, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2025); 12 Percent Logistics, Inc. v. Unified
Carrier Registration Plan Bd., 2020 WL 7248347, at *10 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2020) (applying the
same “70-percent reduction” to fees on fees as applied to the merits-litigation fees). In other words,
the Court should award 50% of the fees on fees.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court GRANT IN PART Sobot’s renewed
motion for attorney’s fees. The supporting billing records (ECF Nos. 44-3, 50-2) reflect a total of
151.8 hours, and Sobot’s counsel spent 2 additional hours on the latest reply brief, yielding a total
lodestar of $115,350 (153.8 hours x $750 per hour). Applying a 50% discount to that overall
baseline amount based on Sobot’s relative success would net a total fee award of $57,675. Plus, as
set forth above (see supra n.1), the Court should separately award $204.38 in costs. All told, then,
the Court should approve a fees-and-costs award to Sobot in the amount of $57,879.38.
Dated: July 14, 2026
MATTHEW J. SHARBAUGH
United States Magistrate Judge
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* * *
The Court hereby advises that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and LCvR 72.3(b),
any party who objects to a report and recommendation must file a written objection within fourteen
(14) days of the party’s receipt of the report and recommendation. The written objections must
specifically identify the portion of the report or recommendation to which objection is made and
the basis for such objections. Failure to file timely objections to the findings and recommendations
set forth in this report may waive that party’s right of appeal from an order of the District Court
that adopts such findings and recommendations. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
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