MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2026 ME 61
Docket: SRP-25-288
Argued: April 7, 2026
Decided: July 14, 2026
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, and LIPEZ, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
JOSEPH M. MURRAY
MEAD, J.
[¶1] Joseph M. Murray appeals from a judgment of conviction of unlawful
sexual contact and two counts of visual sexual aggression against a child
entered by the trial court (Cumberland County, Cashman, J.) following his plea
of guilty. Murray argues that the sentencing court (1) erred in not considering
his intellectual functioning to any degree, and that its failure to do so violated
the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and article one,
section nine of the Maine Constitution; (2) improperly double-counted his
grooming of the victims; (3) abused its discretion by considering his prior
sexual victimization as an aggravating factor; and (4) imposed a
disproportionate sentence. We affirm the sentence.
2
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[¶2] The following facts are drawn from the procedural record and the
sentencing court’s oral findings. See State v. Goncalves, 2025 ME 70, ¶ 2, 340
A.3d 639.
[¶3] On July 27, 2023, the State filed a complaint against Murray alleging
three crimes based on conduct that occurred between January 1, 2018, and
July 3, 2023. Murray was charged by indictment on December 8, 2023, with the
same three crimes: unlawful sexual contact (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.
§ 255-A(1)(E-1) (2026) (Count 1) and two counts of visual sexual aggression
against a child (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 256(1)(B) (2026) (Counts 2 and 3). On
October 28, 2024, the trial court held a Rule 11 hearing, see M.R.U. Crim. P. 11,
and Murray entered guilty pleas to all three counts. On May 7, 2025, the court
conducted a sentencing hearing and imposed concurrent sentences of five
years’ imprisonment on the two charges of visual sexual aggression and a
consecutive sentence of eight years’ imprisonment, with all but two years
suspended, and twelve years of probation on the charge of unlawful sexual
contact. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1602 (2025). 1
1 Since the imposition of Murray’s sentence, 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(B) has been amended. See P.L.
2025, ch. 402, § 1 (effective Sep. 24, 2025) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(B) (2026)); P.L. 2025, ch. 420, § 1 (effective Sep. 24, 2025) (codified at 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(B)).
3
[¶4] The victims were, at all relevant times, under the age of twelve. The
relationship between the family and Murray was close, and the victims referred
to Murray as “Uncle Joe.”
[¶5] In July 2023, the victims’ mother found the victims engaged in a
“urination act,” after which the victims disclosed that Murray had been
engaging in certain acts with them, noted below, since they were as young as
three. Murray pressured the victims into performing these acts by continually
asking them to do “the thing.” He told the victims that the acts were a secret
and encouraged the victims to not disclose the acts to their parents. The acts
occurred multiple times over a four-year span during which Murray groomed
the victims and otherwise attempted to normalize his aberrant behavior.
[¶6] Murray “would expose himself to the [victims]. And while he was
exposed, he would ask the [victims] to either urinate over him into a diaper he
was holding or he would urinate on them. And in either instance, it involved
masturbation.” In another instance, Murray walked into the bathroom while
the older victim was showering, exposed himself, and masturbated. Murray
also touched the younger victim’s genitals and clitoris, referring to it as “the 4
ticklish spot,”2 and the older victim touched Murray’s genitals on at least one
occasion.
[¶7] The court determined that the basic sentences on Counts 2 and 3
were the statutory maximum of five years and that the basic sentence on
Count 1 was between seven and eight years. After the court weighed the
aggravating and mitigating factors, it concluded that the maximum sentences
for Counts 2 and 3 remained at five years and that the maximum sentence for
Count 1 was eight years. The court imposed concurrent unsuspended
sentences of five years’ imprisonment on Counts 2 and 3. On Count 1, the court
imposed a sentence, consecutive to the sentence on Counts 2 and 3, of eight
years’ imprisonment, with all but two years suspended, and twelve years of
probation, to “maximize both the gravity of the offense and . . . appropriately
match[] the conduct while at the same time providing for services and
supervision of Mr. Murray . . . because . . . supervision will help . . . make sure
this conduct does not happen again.”
[¶8] Murray filed an application to allow an appeal of sentence, see
15 M.R.S. § 2151 (2026), and the Sentence Review Panel granted the
2 This conduct involving physical contact between Murray and the younger victim formed the basis for Count 1.
5
application, State v. Murray, No. SRP-25-288 (Me. Sent. Rev. Panel Aug. 28,
2025).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Consideration of Sentencing Factors
1. Consideration of Intellectual Functioning in Sentencing
a. Constitutional Argument
[¶9] Murray argues that the sentencing court erred in failing to consider
his “intellectual disabilities” as a mitigating factor when imposing his sentence.
Murray alleges that he has a functional IQ of 77, placing him on “a borderline
intellectual function[ing] level,” but concedes that he does not qualify as having
a clinical intellectual disability, which would require an IQ between 50 and 69.3
See Nat’l Acads. of Scis., Eng’g & Med., Mental Disorders and Disabilities Among
Low-Income Children 171 tbl.9-1 (Thomas F. Boat & Joel T. Wu eds., 2015). He
argues that both the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
article one, section nine, of the Maine Constitution require a court to consider a
defendant’s intellectual disabilities as inherently mitigating. He also contends
that State v. Goncalves, 2025 ME 70, ¶ 40, 340 A.3d 639, supports the idea that
3 The State agrees that Murray does not suffer from a clinical intellectual disability. 6
a permanent mental condition, as compared to a “transient emotional state,” is
inherently mitigating.
[¶10] We review an argument under the Eighth Amendment de novo if
it is preserved because such an argument goes to the legality of sentence. Id.
¶ 32. At the sentencing hearing, Murray argued only that individuals like him,
with lower intellectual functioning, are likely to be victimized in prison, not that
his intellectual functioning is inherently mitigating to his culpability. Because
Murray referenced neither the Eighth Amendment nor article one, section nine
of the Maine Constitution, Murray’s constitutional arguments are not preserved
and we review for obvious error. See id.
[¶11] Maine Rule of Unified Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides that
errors that are “obvious” or that “affect[] substantial rights” may be “noticed”
even if they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. To constitute
obvious error, “there must be (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects
substantial rights. If these conditions are met, we will exercise our discretion
to notice an unpreserved error only if we also conclude that (4) the error
seriously affects the fairness and integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” State v. Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶ 29, 28 A.3d 1147.
7
[¶12] The United States Supreme Court has stated, in the context of
capital cases, that those with intellectual disabilities are “categorically less
culpable than the average criminal,” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002),
and that an intellectual disability is “inherently mitigating,” Tennard v. Dretke,
542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004). Outside of capital cases, however, the Court has
explicitly stated that “legislatures remain free to decide how much discretion
in sentencing should be reposed in the judge or jury” and that “the established
practice of individualized sentences rests not on constitutional commands, but
on public policy enacted into statutes.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603, 605,
(1978). We have never held that an individual’s lower intellectual functioning
inherently mitigates their culpability. See State v. Koehler, 2012 ME 93, ¶ 35, 46
A.3d 1134 (“[I]n examining aggravating and mitigating factors, a court may also
consider the following: whether a defendant has an antisocial, hostile, unstable,
or psychopathic character; [and] the defendant’s age, intelligence, and prior
criminal history . . . .” (emphasis added and citations omitted)).
[¶13] Murray cites to State v. Goncalves as support for the proposition
that his intellectual functioning, as a “permanent condition,” is inherently
mitigating. See 2025 ME 70, ¶ 40, 2340 A.3d 639. In that case, when
considering whether “blind rage” was an inherently mitigating factor, we stated 8
that blind rage is “a transient phenomenon and not the kind of permanent
condition—such as cognitive, intellectual or developmental impairment or
disability—that the Supreme Court has held is inherently mitigating, at least in
capital cases.” Id. (emphasis added). Murray’s intellectual functioning, which
we note does not meet the definition of even a mild intellectual disability, is
simply not the kind of “permanent condition” that was envisioned in Goncalves
as being inherently mitigating. Plainly, we find no constitutional mandate,
under either the federal or the state constitution, that the court must have
found Murray’s intellectual functioning to be inherently mitigating. There was
no error, much less obvious error, nor any infringements of constitutional
rights, in the court’s declining to find Murray’s intellectual functioning to be
inherently mitigating.
b. Alternative Argument
[¶14] Murray argues, separate and apart from his constitutional
arguments noted above, and pointing to our decisions in State v. Lovejoy, 2024
ME 42, ¶ 27, 315 A.3d 744; State v. Carrillo, 2021 ME 18, ¶ 45, 248 A.3d 193;
State v. DeWalt, 684 A.2d 1291, 1293 (Me. 1996); and State v. Michaud, 590 A.2d
538, 544 (Me. 1991), that the court abused its discretion in failing to consider
his mental limitations as a material sentencing factor.
9
[¶15] Because this argument relates to the propriety of the sentence, and
not its legality, “[w]e review the trial court’s application of aggravating and
mitigating factors in determining the maximum sentence for abuse of
discretion.” State v. Gaston, 2021 ME 25, ¶ 36, 250 A.3d 137.
[¶16] While the cited cases feature sentencing courts considering
defendants’ intellectual functioning as potentially mitigating factors, we have
previously held that a sentencing court’s failure to acknowledge a defendant’s
poor physical health at sentencing is not an abuse of discretion. See State v.
Shulikov, 1998 ME 111, ¶ 27, 712 A.2d 504 (holding that although the
sentencing court was aware of the defendant’s health problems and “had the
authority to take [the defendant’s] health into account, it was not required to
do so, and its implicit rejection of [the defendant’s] bad health as a mitigating
factor was within its discretion.” (citation omitted)).
[¶17] Here, while the sentencing court did not address Murray’s
intellectual functioning at all, it could have found, and we infer that it did find,
that Murray’s level of intellectual functioning was either irrelevant or not
particularly compelling as a mitigating factor, given, as the court noted, the
“planful and carefully executed conduct” that Murray took to keep his abuse of
the victims hidden. Although Murray’s intellectual functioning is not in the 10
upper tiers of intellectual functioning, he had enough intelligence and capacity
to effectively and successfully groom the victims and keep his actions secret,
which itself indicates that Murray is sufficiently intelligent to understand that
his conduct was both wrong and criminal. Given the court’s findings of
Murray’s careful planning and execution of these crimes, and the steps he took
to keep them hidden, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s failure to
expressly include Murray’s intellectual functioning as a factor in its sentencing
analysis.
2. Double-Counting
[¶18] Murray contends that the court erred because it included his
grooming of the victims at both step one and step two in its sentencing analysis.
He argues that grooming is “inherently subjective” and thus could be
considered only at step two.
[¶19] We review a claim of double-counting de novo if it is preserved,
because it is a challenge to the legality of the sentence, State v. Ellis, 2025 ME
56, ¶ 16, 339 A.3d 794, but because Murray did not raise this issue below, we
review for obvious error, Goncalves, 2025 ME 70, ¶ 32, 340 A.3d 639.4
4 We recognize the unique challenge facing counsel to identify, object, and preserve arguments
regarding double counting and proportionality of sentences during the actual sentencing proceedings. Those issues often may not be patently apparent until after a thorough review of the record by trial or appellate counsel. Nonetheless, in order to give the trial court the opportunity to
11
[¶20] At step one of the sentencing analysis, “the court shall determine a
basic term of imprisonment by considering the particular nature and
seriousness of the offense as committed by the individual.” 17-A M.R.S.
§ 1602(1)(A). At step two, “the court shall determine the maximum term of
imprisonment to be imposed by considering all other relevant sentencing
factors, both aggravating and mitigating, appropriate to the case.” Id.
§ 1602(1)(B). “Although a factor must be considered only once and at the
proper step in the analysis, the same fact can generate multiple factors.” Ellis,
2025 ME 56, ¶ 18, 339 A.3d 794 (quotation marks omitted). A sentencing court
may refer to the same facts at different steps of the sentencing analysis
provided it does so for different reasons. Lovejoy, 2024 ME 42, ¶ 25, 315
A.3d 744.
correct any missteps, counsel must be vigilant in monitoring the court’s adherence to sentencing protocols and promptly objecting in real time as appropriate.
We note that the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have specifically mandated a final opportunity for counsel to object to sentencing irregularities after the trial court has pronounced sentence. See United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e exercise our supervisory powers over the district courts and announce a new procedural rule, requiring district courts, after pronouncing the defendant’s sentence but before adjourning the sentencing hearing, to ask the parties whether they have any objections to the sentence just pronounced that have not previously been raised.”); United States v. Campbell, 473 F.3d 1345, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[A]fter imposing a sentence, the district court must give the parties an opportunity to object to the court’s ultimate findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the manner in which the sentence is pronounced, and must elicit a full articulation of the grounds upon which any objection is based.”). While stopping short of mandating such a judicial practice, we nevertheless recognize it as beneficial for both counsel and judges.
12
[¶21] Contrary to Murray’s contention, the court did not double-count
Murray’s grooming of the victims. We have never held that grooming is
inherently subjective and may be considered only at step two of a court’s
sentencing analysis. See State v. Pfeil, 1998 ME 245, ¶¶ 15-18, 720 A.2d 573
(affirming a sentence where grooming behavior was considered at step one for
the seriousness of the offense and at step two for its impact on the victim). At
step one, the court appropriately considered grooming in determining the
seriousness of the conduct, indicating that Murray’s grooming behavior was a
part of his larger efforts to keep this conduct secret for many years. Because
Murray’s grooming and trust building prolonged the conduct by convincing the
victims to remain silent, the court properly considered it at step one for the
seriousness of the offense.
[¶22] At step two, the court explicitly considered the subjective impact
that Murray’s grooming had on the victims and their family, stating:
The subjective impact of these . . . acts . . . between [the victims] and
[Murray] has had a significant impact . . . . The behaviors that they
were exposed to not only impacted them at the time that it
happened, when it was ongoing, but will also likely to impact them
with this learned behavior for some period of time . . . . There’s also
the subjective impact that this conduct has had on [the victims’]
parents, who let [Murray] into their home and into their family and
trusted him. And trust within all members of this family, nuclear
family unit, has been impacted. . . . And there’s a subjective impact
of grooming on these two [victims]. . . . I also find . . . the [victims]
13
have taken this learned behavior and replicated it when [Murray]
is not there. And that is a long-standing subjective impact that will
be with these [victims] for some period of time.
Because the court’s statements demonstrate that it considered the impact of the
conduct on the victims and the family, not the acts themselves, it was an
appropriate consideration at step two. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1602(1)(B). Given
that the court very clearly considered the grooming behavior for different
purposes at each step of the analysis, we conclude that there was no
double-counting and thus no error, let alone obvious error. See Pfeil, 1998 ME
245, ¶¶ 15-18, 720 A.2d 573; Lovejoy, 2024 ME 42, ¶ 27, 315 A.3d 744 (holding
that no double-counting occurred where the court considered the defendant’s
mental state at steps one and two for different purposes); State v. Schlosser,
2025 ME 76, ¶ 46, 345 A.3d 25 (holding that no double-counting occurred
where the sentencing court considered a fact at step one for the scope of the
drug trafficking and considered the same fact at step two for the defendant’s
personal role in the trafficking).
3. Consideration of Prior Abuse
[¶23] Murray stated during the sentencing hearing that he had suffered
sexual abuse when he was ten years old and now argues that the court
14
considered the past sexual abuse he suffered as an aggravating factor, rather
than as a mitigating factor, and that the court abused its discretion in doing so.
[¶24] Because Murray’s argument challenges the propriety of the
sentence, “[w]e review the trial court’s application of aggravating and
mitigating factors in determining the maximum sentence for abuse of
discretion.” Gaston, 2021 ME 25, ¶ 36, 250 A.3d 137.
[¶25] In considering the past sexual abuse that Murray suffered, the
court stated during its discussion of mitigating factors:
And while there are certainly some factors [being a victim of sexual
abuse] that could be considered mitigating with respect to that
reality, the Court also finds that to be a factor that could be
considered in aggravation. Namely, Mr. Murray understands,
firsthand, how this type of behavior and exposure at a young age
can have a significant impact on a young person.
(Emphasis added). Immediately afterwards, the court stated, “There are
factors that I do consider in aggravation as well,” before it discussed what it
considered to be aggravating factors. (Emphasis added).
[¶26] Although the court clearly considered Murray’s argument
regarding the past abuse, the court stopped short of making a finding of prior
sexual abuse as either an aggravating or a mitigating factor. The court’s use of
the word “could” illustrates that the mitigating and aggravating aspects of the
abuse were either in equipoise in the court’s thinking or, if the abuse was to be
15
considered as a factor that was either an aggravating or mitigating one, it did
not significantly affect the analysis. Further, despite suggesting that being a
victim of sexual abuse conceivably could be an aggravating factor, the court’s
statements immediately thereafter created a clear line of demarcation between
its consideration of the mitigating factors and its consideration of the
aggravating factors that it actually did find to be present in this case, and
Murray’s sexual victimization was not amongst either of them.
[¶27] We discern no abuse of discretion in the sentencing court’s
declining to include Murray’s prior sexual victimization as a mitigating factor.
See State v. Watson, 2024 ME 24, ¶ 22, 319 A.3d 430 (“[T]he trial court is
generally afforded significant leeway in determining which factors are
considered and the weight a factor is assigned.” (quotation marks omitted)).
B. Proportionality of Sentence
[¶28] Murray argues that his ultimate sentence of seven years’
imprisonment with twelve years’ probation is disproportionate because the
court did not provide enough justification for setting the basic sentences on
Counts 2 and 3 at the statutory maximum, did not articulate where the unlawful
sexual contact charge fell on the continuum of seriousness, and did not refer to 16
any sentences for comparable crimes in reaching its decision. 5 He maintains
that the court failed to conduct a separate sentencing analysis for each count
and failed to adequately explain why it was imposing consecutive sentences.
[¶29] Murray’s arguments that the court did not provide sufficient
justification for setting the basic sentences at the statutory maximum or
articulate the seriousness of the unlawful sexual contact charge are immaterial
to his argument that his ultimate sentence is disproportionate, and we do not
address them further. See State v. Hoover, 2017 ME 158, ¶ 25, 169 A.3d 904 (“In
evaluating [the defendant’s] constitutional proportionality claim, neither the
general propriety of the sentence, evaluated according to the so-called Hewey
analysis, nor [the defendant’s] lack of a serious criminal record or other
individual factors, have any significance in determining whether his
punishment is disproportionate and thus unconstitutional.” (footnote
omitted)); State v. Gilman, 2010 ME 35, ¶ 21, 993 A.2d 14 (holding that article
I, section 9 of the Maine Constitution “does not require consideration of the
individual circumstances of each offender”). Murray’s argument on the court’s
imposition of consecutive sentences is likewise immaterial to a constitutional
5 We have already foreclosed this argument in State v. Freeman, and we do not address it further.
See 2014 ME 35, ¶ 15, 87 A.3d 719 (“Although it is permissible, and often helpful, for the sentencing court to consider sentences imposed for comparable crimes in determining the basic period of incarceration, neither the sentencing statute nor our precedent requires that it do so.”).
17
proportionality analysis, and we do not address it further. See State v. Ward,
2011 ME 74, ¶ 22, 21 A.3d 1033 (holding that, because “a defendant does not
have a constitutional right to serve concurrent sentences for multiple violent
offenses,” any “constitutional argument concerning the legality of his sentences
is limited to a determination of whether each sentence individually is cruel or
unusual” (footnote and quotation marks omitted)).
[¶30] Because a proportionality challenge implicates the legality of the
sentence, we review de novo whether a sentence is proportionate. State v.
Scott, 2019 ME 105, ¶ 50, 211 A.3d 205. However, because Murray did not raise
this argument below, we again review for obvious error. See Goncalves, 2025
ME 70, ¶ 32, 340 A.3d 639.
[¶31] The Maine Constitution provides that “all penalties and
punishments shall be proportioned to the offense.” Me. Const. art. I, § 9. We
have established a test for determining whether a sentence is violative of article
one, section nine. State v. Stanislaw (Stanislaw II), 2013 ME 43, ¶ 29, 65 A.3d
1242.
[¶32] First, we “see whether a particular sentence is greatly
disproportionate to the offense for which it is imposed.” State v. Lopez, 2018
ME 59, ¶ 15, 184 A.3d 880 (quotation marks omitted). If the sentence is not 18
greatly disproportionate, we scrutinize “whether it offends prevailing notions
of decency.” 6 Id. (quotation marks omitted). A sentence that fails either prong
of this test is unconstitutional. Id.
[¶33] In determining whether the sentence is disproportionate, we
“begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.”
Id. ¶ 16 (quotation marks omitted). “Factors affecting the proportionality of a
sentence to the offense are determined on a case-by-case basis because no one
factor will be dispositive in a given case.” Stanislaw II, 2013 ME 43, ¶ 30, 65
A.3d 1242 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶34] We compare the gravity of the offense to the severity of the
sentence “by (1) evaluating where that defendant’s term of imprisonment fell
within the range of incarceration time authorized by the Legislature and
(2) considering the facts of a case in conjunction with the commonly accepted
goals of punishment.” 7 Lopez, 2018 ME 59, ¶ 16, 184 A.3d 880 (citations and
quotation marks omitted). If this comparison “results in an inference of gross
6Because Murray does not argue that his sentence offends prevailing notions of decency, we evaluate only whether the sentence is proportionate. See Lopez, 2018 ME 59, ¶ 15 n.3, 184 A.3d 880 (explaining that because the defendant challenged only the proportionality of the sentence and did not argue that the sentence offended prevailing notions of decency, review of the claim was limited to the issue of proportionality).
Title 17-A M.R.S. § 1501 (2026) lists the goals of sentencing, including to prevent crime,
7
encourage individualization of sentences, minimize correctional experience, and permit sentences based on certain factors related to the crime committed, among others.
19
disproportionality we then compare the defendant’s sentence with the
sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction.” Id. ¶ 17.
(quotation marks omitted).
[¶35] We conclude that the sentence is proportionate to Murray’s
crimes. In examining the gravity of the offense, we note that Murray had
unlawful and repeated sexual contact with two extremely young children, made
them participate in his repugnant fetishes, normalized his aberrant practices in
their minds, and violated the trust not only of the victims but also of their
family. The ultimate sentence imposed was within the range of incarceration
authorized by the Legislature, as Murray received two concurrent five-year
sentences on Counts 2 and 3, which are the statutory maximums for a class C
crime, and eight years, with all but two years suspended, for Count 1, a Class B
crime, where a maximum of 10 years is authorized. See 17-A M.R.S.
§ 1604(1)(B), (C) (2026).
[¶36] Murray’s sentence furthers the sentencing goals of preventing
crime and minimizing correctional experiences, and considers the factors
specifically related to the charged conduct. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1501(1), (3),
(8)(A) (2026). The extended period of probation acts as a strong deterrent to
ensure that Murray does not commit acts like these again once he is released, 20
the suspension of six years of the ultimate sentence on Count 1 works to
minimize correctional experiences, and the overall sentence is reflective of the
young age of the victims and the length and perversity of the conduct.
[¶37] We conclude that this is not the “rare” case leading to an inference
of gross disproportionality, and therefore we do not proceed to step two of the
proportionality analysis. See Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶ 20 n.5, 21 A.3d 1033. The
sentences are tailored to serve the purposes of sentencing, see 17-A M.R.S.
§ 1501, and are not constitutionally disproportionate, Me. Const. art. I, § 9; see
State v. Hansen, 2020 ME 43, ¶¶ 34-37, 228 A.3d 1082.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
James M. Mason, Esq. (orally), Handelman & Mason LLC, Brunswick, for
appellant Joseph Murray
Christopher J. Coleman, Asst. Dist. Atty., and McKenzi Stevens, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Office of the District Attorney, Portland, for appellee State of Maine
Cumberland County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2023-2900
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY