United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 25-1064
NAKIA WILSON, on their own behalf and of their deceased husband, Ryan Fortune; KIARA A. FORTUNE, on their own behalf and of their deceased father, Ryan Fortune, and as the legal representative
of the Estate of Ryan Fortune; RYQUIA WILSON, on their own
behalf and of their deceased father, Ryan Fortune, and as the
legal representative of the Estate of Ryan Fortune; RYAN
FORTUNE, JR., on their own behalf and of their deceased father,
Ryan Fortune, and as the legal representative of the Estate of
Ryan Fortune; RYQUAN FORTUNE, on their own behalf and of their
deceased father, Ryan Fortune, and as the legal representative
of the Estate of Ryan Fortune; STEPHANIE TOWNSEND, on their own
behalf and of their underage son, CT; LAJUAN JOHNSON, on behalf
of their son, RF, a minor who forms part of the Estate of Rawle
Fortune; KIMBERLY LUCIANO, on behalf of their daughter, KS, a
minor who forms part of the Estate of Rawle Fortune; CHARRITA
WILLIAMS, on behalf of their son, JW, a minor who forms part of
the Estate of Rawle Fortune; ARNOLD FORTUNE, on their own behalf as parent of the decedents; LUCILLE FORTUNE, on their own behalf
as parent of the decedents,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
IGUANA SPORT SERVICES, CORP.,
Defendant, Appellee,
COURTYARD MARRIOTT ISLA VERDE BEACH RESORT; HR PROPERTIES, INC.;
INTERNATIONAL HOSPITALITY ENTERPRISES, INC.; CHUBB INSURANCE
COMPANY OF PUERTO RICO; INSURERS 1-10; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS 1-10;
INTERNATIONAL HOSPITALITY MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. María Antongiorgi-Jordán, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge,
Breyer,* Associate Justice,
Gelpí, Circuit Judge.
Jorge R. Quintana Lajara, with whom Pedro R. Vázquez, III,
Pedro R. Vazquez, III PSC, and Quintana & Suárez, P.S.C., were on brief, for appellants.
José M. Martínez Chevres, with whom Martínez Chevres Law
Office was on brief, for appellee.
July 15, 2026
* Hon. Stephen G. Breyer, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the
Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.
GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. This case presents questions of
first impression regarding the heightened duty of care that applies
to certain entities under Puerto Rico law. The central point of
contention is whether an entity contracted to run the operation of
a hotel's beach area owes a heightened duty of care to its guests.
Appellants are the family members of two deceased hotel
guests who drowned in the ocean waters fronting the property. They
brought this suit against a number of entities including Iguana
Sport Services, Corp., ("Iguana"), which was contracted to provide
beach and towel attendants for the hotel. According to Appellants,
Iguana breached duties arising from its contractual obligations,
a government permit, and the heightened standard of care
established by Puerto Rico precedent, by failing to prevent the
guests' tragic deaths. Appellants appeal from the district court's
entry of summary judgment for Iguana based on the ground that
Iguana had no duty to protect them. Because the outcome of this
case turns on unresolved questions of Puerto Rico law regarding
the applicability of the heightened duty of care, we certify the
dispositive state law questions to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court.
See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, app. V, Rule 52.2(d).
I. BACKGROUND
In reviewing the district court's grant of summary
judgment to Iguana, we recite the facts in the light most favorable
to the Appellants and draw all reasonable inferences in their
- 3 -favor. See Axis Ins. v. Barracuda Networks, Inc., 160 F.4th 1, 4
(1st Cir. 2025).
A. Facts
1. The Fortune Brothers
In November 2021, three couples traveled to Puerto Rico
for a vacation at the Courtyard Marriott Isla Verde Beach Resort
(the "Marriott"), a beachfront hotel located in the Municipality
of Carolina. The couples were: (1) Nakia Wilson and her husband,
Ryan Fortune; (2) Stephanie Townsend and her husband, Rawle
Fortune; and (3) Sean Devonish and his girlfriend, Stephanie
Byers.
On the second day of their trip, the National Weather
Service issued rip current warnings for beaches in Carolina, which
were expected to remain in place for the following two days. The
couples received no communication from the Marriott, written or
otherwise, regarding the ocean conditions.
That afternoon, they walked toward the Marriott beach
area through an access point with no flags signaling dangerous
ocean conditions. No signs to that effect were present at the
beach area either. Unaware of the rip current warnings, Ryan and
Rawle Fortune (the "Fortune brothers") went into the ocean fronting
the Marriott. Soon thereafter, their partners noticed them
drifting away from the shore and ran to the front desk of the
Marriott seeking help. A Marriott employee came out of an office
- 4 -and ran to the beach area with a life-saving device but took no
further action. The Fortune brothers drowned.
2. Iguana
Because the beach-area operations involved more than
Marriott personnel alone, we next describe Marriott's relationship
with Iguana, a third-party contractor that provided services in
that area.
Marriott is subject to Regulation 8856 of the Puerto
Rico Tourism Company (the "Lodging Regulation"), which requires
beach-front hotels to provide guests with beach lounge chairs and
towels. P.R. Tourism Co., Regul. 8856, ch. II, art. 7(A)(7)
(Nov. 22, 2016). To satisfy these obligations, in 2011 Marriott
entered into a contract with Iguana whereby Iguana undertook the
obligation to provide towel and beach attendants for the hotel.
The contract imposed no other specific obligations on Iguana.
On a day-to-day basis, Iguana's employees wear Marriott
uniforms and perform tasks such as cleaning the pool and beach
area and setting up beach chairs and umbrellas for hotel guests.
Iguana charges Marriott a management fee based on the number of
employees needed.
Marriott does not possess certain permits and licenses
required for engaging in its beach-related commercial activities,
but Iguana holds them in its place. To that end, Iguana possesses
a permit issued by the Puerto Rico Department of Natural and
- 5 -Environmental Resources (DNER) to operate in the
maritime-terrestrial zone fronting the Marriott (the "DNER
Permit"). Iguana also holds an "Itinerant Business" license issued
by the Municipality of Carolina for the provision of massage
services and beach gear rentals (the "Municipality's License").
B. Procedural History
Appellants are family members of the Fortune brothers.1
In November 2022, they filed a complaint against Marriott; HR
Properties, Inc.; International Hospitality Enterprises, Inc.;
Chubb Insurance Company of Puerto Rico; and other unknown
defendants, in the United States District Court for the District
of Puerto Rico. Appellants later filed an amended complaint adding
International Hospitality Management, Inc. ("IHM") and Iguana as
defendants. Appellants claimed that the Marriott, IHM, and Iguana
1 Appellants are Nakia Wilson, widow of Ryan Fortune, on her
own behalf and on behalf of Ryan Fortune; Kiara A. Fortune,
daughter of Ryan Fortune, on her own behalf and as an heir and
representative of the Estate of Ryan Fortune; Ryquia Wilson,
daughter of Ryan Fortune, on her own behalf and as an heir and
representative of the Estate of Ryan Fortune; Ryan Fortune, Jr., son of Ryan Fortune, on his own behalf and as an heir and
representative of the Estate of Ryan Fortune; Ryquan Fortune, son of Ryan Fortune, on his own behalf and as an heir and
representative of the Estate of Ryan Fortune; Stephanie Townsend, common law wife of Rawle Fortune, on her own behalf and of her
son, CT; Lajuan Johnson, on behalf of her son, RF, who forms part of The Estate of Rawle Fortune; Kimberly Luciano, on behalf of her daughter, KS, of The Estate of Rawle Fortune; Charrita Williams, on behalf of her son, JW, of The Estate of Rawle Fortune; Arnold Fortune, father of the Fortune brothers; and Lucille Fortune,
mother of the Fortune brothers.
- 6 -breached the heightened duty of care that hotels owe to their
guests under Puerto Rico law, as well as the duties imposed on
lodging entities under Article 7 of the Lodging Regulation. See
Regul. 8856, ch. II, art. 7(A)(7). According to Appellants, said
breaches consisted of failing to warn guests of the dangerous ocean
conditions, educate them about the proper use of the beach, and
provide them with flotation equipment or beach safety personnel.
These failures, they argued, ultimately led to the deaths of the
Fortune brothers.
In June 2024, Appellants settled with all defendants
except Iguana. The case proceeded to discovery, after which Iguana
moved for summary judgment. Iguana argued that it had no duty,
arising from its agreement with Marriott or otherwise, to warn or
protect the Fortune brothers from dangerous ocean conditions. In
support of this argument, Iguana asserted that its
responsibilities under its agreement with Marriott did not entail
the operation of the hotel. Rather, its responsibilities were
limited to providing pool and beach attendants, who were only
tasked with duties such as cleaning the pool and beach area and
providing umbrellas and towels to guests. Providing lifeguards or
security personnel, Iguana emphasized, was not part of the
agreement. Further, it asserted that neither the DNER Permit nor
the Municipality's License required it to provide these services
or implement these measures, either.
- 7 -Appellants opposed the entry of summary judgment. As a
matter of law, they argued that Iguana owed the Fortune brothers
a duty of care under its agreements with Marriott, the DNER Permit,
and Puerto Rico's negligence laws.
The district court granted summary judgment for Iguana
and dismissed Appellants' claims with prejudice. The court held
that Iguana did not owe a duty of care to the Fortune brothers
under its agreement with Marriott, the heightened duty of care
imposed upon innkeepers under Puerto Rico law, the DNER Permit,
the Municipality's License, or a traditionally recognized duty of
care.
Appellants appealed the first three determinations.2
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment
and its statutory and regulatory interpretations de novo. John B.
2 Appellants do not challenge the district court's
determination that the Municipality's License did not impose any affirmative duties on Iguana to protect Marriott guests, so we do not consider that here. As to the court's decision regarding the traditionally recognized duty of care, Appellants make merely
conclusory arguments regarding its duty to protect guests from a "forseeab[le]" harm. They fail to flesh out a claim that is
separate from the heightened duty of care claim with either law or argument, providing no guidance as to how Iguana failed to "act as would a prudent and reasonable person under the circumstances."
Vázquez-Filippetti v. Banco Popular de P.R., 504 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2007). As such, this argument is waived for lack of
development. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st
Cir. 1990) ("[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner,
unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are
deemed waived.").
- 8 -Cruz Constr. Co. v. Beacon Comtys. Corp., 169 F.4th 89, 95 (1st
Cir. 2026); Jette v. United of Omaha Life Ins., 18 F.4th 18, 26
(1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Strong, 724 F.3d 51, 55
(1st Cir. 2013)). Summary judgment is proper if, based on the
record, there is no genuine dispute of material fact, i.e., "if
there is no factual determination which a rational factfinder could
make as to the existence or nonexistence of a fact that has the
potential to change the outcome of the suit -- such that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Axis, 160 F.4th
at 5 (quoting Ithier v. Aponte-Cruz, 105 F.4th 1, 6 (1st Cir.
2024)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Because this case is based on diversity jurisdiction and
involves only state law claims, "we look to federal law for the
summary judgment framework and to state law for the substantive
rules of decision." Axis, 160 F.4th at 6 (citation modified). In
interpreting state law, we look to Puerto Rico Supreme Court
precedent. Hosp. San Antonio, Inc. v. Oquendo-Lorenzo, 47 F.4th
1, 7 (1st Cir. 2022). Where, as here, the Puerto Rico Supreme
Court has not yet addressed certain issues before us, we must
anticipate how it would resolve them. Id. In doing so, we look
to the relevant statutory and regulatory language, as well as
analogous decisions of Puerto Rico's highest court. Id.
- 9 -III. DISCUSSION
Appellants argue that the district court erred in
holding that Iguana did not owe a duty of care to the Fortune
brothers. According to Appellants, though, this duty arose from
(1) Marriott's express and implied agreements with Iguana; (2) the
DNER Permit; and (3) the heightened duty of care imposed upon
certain entities under Puerto Rico law.3
A legal duty may arise from one of several sources:
(1) "by a statute, regulation, ordinance, bylaw or contract";
(2) "as the result of a traditionally recognized duty of care
particular to the situation"; or (3) "as the result of a special
relationship between the parties that has arisen through custom,"
De-Jesus-Adorno v. Browning Ferris Indus. of P.R., Inc., 160 F.3d
839, 842 (1st Cir. 1998), such as hotel-guest, school-student, and
hospital-patient relationships, see Elba A.B.M. v. Univ. of P.R.,
125 D.P.R. 294, 308, P.R. Offic. Trans. (1990). At issue here are
3 Appellants also argue that the district court erred in
excluding certain lay witness statements under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Because we are certifying a question to the Puerto
Rico Supreme Court that centers on the principal issue on appeal, i.e., Iguana's duties towards Marriott guests, we need not address the admissibility of the witness's statements now.
- 10 -various duties arising from the first and third sources. We
address each in turn.
A. The Agreements Between Marriott and Iguana
Appellants first contend that Iguana had a legal duty to
provide safety to Marriott guests arising from its express and
implied agreements with Marriott. According to Appellants, that
duty stemmed both from Iguana's written agreement with Marriott
and from additional responsibilities Iguana undertook throughout
the course of their business relationship. Like the district
court, we are unpersuaded.
Contractual duties may arise from both express and
implied agreements. See Mattei Nazario v. Vélez & Asociados, 145
D.P.R. 508, 521, P.R. Offic. Trans. (1998). Here, however, no
record evidence supports the conclusion that Iguana
agreed -- either expressly or impliedly -- to provide for the
safety of Marriott guests.
Appellants first argue that, under its written contract
with Marriott, Iguana was tasked with managing the operation of
the hotel's beach area. By taking on this role, the argument goes,
Iguana assumed the duty of providing security to Marriott guests
there. This argument paints with too broad a stroke. As the
district court correctly observed, Iguana's duties under the
written contract were limited to providing beach and towel
attendants to Marriott. There was no provision requiring Iguana
- 11 -to protect Marriott guests, such as a provision regarding security
personnel, lifeguards, medical personnel, or safety equipment, in
the contract. As such, the written agreement did not impose upon
Iguana a duty to protect Marriott guests.
The parties' course of dealing does not fill in that gap
either. Appellants next argue that Iguana undertook more
responsibilities than the written contract shows, and that these
amounted to an implied agreement under which Iguana assumed
Marriott's responsibilities for the operation of the beach area,
which included warning guests of dangerous ocean conditions and
providing emergency services to them. They point to the fact that
Iguana employees participated in tasks such as "cleaning the pool
deck, straightening out the chairs, [providing] umbrellas in the
pool area, . . . putting out beach chairs and beach umbrellas,"
and offering guests "masks, snorkels, and other aquatic
equipment," all of which were not in the written agreement.4 None
of these tasks, however, suggest that the parties implicitly agreed
4 Appellants also seem to contend that the use of Marriott
uniforms by Iguana employees supports a finding that Iguana assumed Marriott's safety duties over the beach area. Appellants base this argument on the "apparent principal" doctrine, under which
"an apparent principal may be held liable for the acts of its
apparent agent where the apparent principal's actions led the
plaintiffs to reasonably believe in its representation of
authority and control over the apparent agent." Grajales-Romero
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 194 F.3d 288, 293 (1st Cir. 1999) (citation modified). Because Marriott would be the apparent principal
subject to liability here, and not Iguana, the argument is
inapposite. See id.
- 12 -that Iguana would be responsible for ensuring guest safety on the
beach area. And the record evidence does not support a finding to
that effect, either.
Take, for example, Sandra Santos's sworn deposition. As
the head of security at the Marriott, Santos avowed that whenever
the National Weather Service issues an alert, the general manager
of the Marriott determines whether guests will be notified and
chairs and umbrellas will be removed from the beach area. The
security team then executes the measures directed by the general
manager. Santos also stated that when emergencies arise in the
beach area, the front desk staff informs the security team, rather
than any other group or entity working at the hotel. The security
team then responds to the scene and provides any necessary aid to
those involved.
The same is not true for Iguana employees. As Eddie
Rivera, president of Iguana, stated in his deposition, Iguana was
not hired to assist in emergencies, and its employees do not have
the training to do so. Although (according to deposition testimony
by Santos and Iguana employee Pedro Pagán) Iguana employees every
so often inform guests about adverse ocean conditions, these
actions alone do not amount to an implied contractual obligation
to provide security to guests. The fact that the security team
and Iguana employees maintained communications that were later
divulged to hotel guests does not, by itself, show that Iguana was
- 13 -under an implied agreement with Marriott to implement measures to
prevent emergency situations, let alone to provide assistance in
any such situation.
Because no duty to provide for the safety of hotel guests
was imposed on Iguana under its agreements with Marriott, Iguana
is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on this basis.
B. The DNER Permit
We turn to Appellants' second argument. They contend
that the district court erred in holding that the DNER Permit
imposed a duty on Iguana to protect Marriott guests. Recall that
the DNER Permit authorizes Iguana to use a space of the maritimeterrestrial zone for commercial purposes.5 To operate in this
zone, Iguana must comply with certain terms and conditions.
Appellants specifically point to Condition 22 of the permit, which
provides that Iguana will "be responsible for the cleanliness,
maintenance, and safety of the area during the time authorized for
operation." (Emphasis added). And to Condition 28, which
recognizes that Iguana's "business will be subject to weather
conditions," and thus, it "will be responsible for exercising
prudence in climatic conditions that may become adverse."
5 The maritime-terrestrial zone is defined under the Dock and
Harbor Act of Puerto Rico of 1968 as "the space of the coasts of Puerto Rico touched by the sea during its ebb and flow, where tides are noticeable, and where the largest waves during a storm are
felt in places where tides are not noticed." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 23, § 2103(n).
- 14 -(Emphasis added). They argue that, under these conditions, Iguana
acquired a "separate, direct[,] and independent" duty to provide
for the safety of the Fortune brothers in the ocean area. We
disagree.
Our analysis of both arguments begins, and ends, with
the language of the permit. Cf. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya v.
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 195 D.P.R. 39, 95 P.R. Offic. Trans.
4, 7 (2016) (explaining that, in construing the meaning of a
statute, courts must first look to its text); Marcial v. Tomé, 144
D.P.R. 522, 536, P.R. Offic. Trans. (1997) (explaining that, if
the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the
intention of the parties, courts must observe their literal sense).
We will take each one at a time. Appellants point to
Condition 22 (responsibility for the safety of the area) to argue
that it creates a duty to protect guests that is "not limited to
the 250 [square feet] of sand where the chairs are located," but
rather extends to the ocean area fronting the hotel.6 In making
this argument, however, Appellants ignore other provisions in the
permit that set forth the limits of the "area" where Iguana is
responsible for providing "safety." The DNER Permit provides that
Iguana's "occupancy space" is limited to 250 square feet.
6Although Appellants refer to "250 meters" in their brief,
we take this to be a typographical error, as the DNER Permit limits the area where the chairs must be placed to 250 square feet, not meters.
- 15 -Condition 1, in turn, establishes that Iguana is only authorized
to "use a total of" that square footage. Moreover, Condition 4
provides that "[d]uring the validity of [the permit], it will not
be possible to carry out extensions that imply a greater area of
occupation on the lands" of the maritime-terrestrial zone, without
prior authorization from the DNER. (Emphasis added). Reading
these conditions together, it is clear that the permit uses the
terms "space" and "area" interchangeably to refer to the 250 square
feet of sand where Iguana may operate. Thus, Iguana's obligation
to provide for the "safety" of the "area" was limited to those
boundaries. Appellants' argument that Iguana's duty under
Condition 22 went beyond that square footage, extending to the
ocean, fails.
Next, Appellants point to Condition 28 (responsibility
for exercising prudence in adverse climatic conditions) and argue
that rip currents fall under the "weather conditions" that Iguana's
business was subject to, and had to "excercis[e] prudence" in. As
such, they contend that after the National Weather Service issued
the warnings, Iguana had to implement safety measures, such as
displaying warning signs and closing the beach operations, and had
to provide emergency services to guests. Its failure to do so,
- 16 -they argue, breached the duties imposed upon it under the permit.
We are not persuaded.
As laid out above, Iguana's obligations under the DNER
Permit extend only to the portion of the maritime-terrestrial zone
Iguana is authorized to operate in. Accordingly, Iguana's
responsibilities under Condition 28 are limited to responding to
adverse climatic conditions that arise in that space, which does
not include the ocean. Taking the language of the permit's terms,
we conclude that Iguana had no duty to protect hotel guests from
the dangers of the ocean under Condition 28.
Appellants' argument that the district court erred in
holding that Iguana had no duty to protect the Fortune brothers
under the DNER Permit therefore fails.
C. Heightened Duty of Care
Lastly, Appellants claim that the district court
incorrectly determined Iguana did not owe a heightened duty of
care to Marriott guests. On this point, the Court understands
Appellants' argument to be two-fold. First, they contend that
Iguana assumed the responsibilities of an "innkeeper" under Puerto
Rico law by taking over Marriott's beach-area operations, and thus,
it owes hotel guests a heightened duty of care in that area. See
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10, § 711(b). Second, they argue that, even
if not considered an "innkeeper" under the relevant statute,
because Iguana operates in an area adjacent to the ocean, which
- 17 -may pose dangers to the individuals it provides services to, it
has the duty to protect and assist them if dangerous conditions
arise. Given the nature of its services, the argument goes, Iguana
must be held to a heightened standard of care.
To prevail on a negligence claim under Puerto Rico law,
a plaintiff must first establish that the defendant owed him or
her a duty of care. Blomquist v. Horned Dorset Primavera, Inc.,
925 F.3d 541, 547 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Woods-Leber v. Hyatt
Hotels of P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 1997)). With
respect to that first element, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has
identified schools, hospitals, and hotels as entities that, given
the "essential nature" of the activities they perform, must be
held to a heightened standard of care. Elba, 125 D.P.R. at 320,
P.R. Offic. Trans. (emphasis omitted). Relevant here, hotels and
innkeepers, though not "absolute insurers of their guests'
well-being . . . must ensure that the areas to which [their]
guests have access are safe." Blomquist, 925 F.3d at 547 (first
citing Woods-Leber, 124 F.3d at 51; and then citing Cotto v. C.M.
Ins., 116 D.P.R. 644, P.R. Offic. Trans 786, 793 (1985)); see
Baum-Holland v. Hilton El Con Mgmt., LLC, 964 F.3d 77, 88 (1st
Cir. 2020) (discussing the heightened duty of care hotels owe their
guests); Woods-Leber, 124 F.3d at 51 (discussing the same for
innkeepers).
- 18 -Under Puerto Rico law, a "hotel" is defined as "any place
of shelter operated for profit [that provides] protection for
persons and property." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10, § 711(a) (second
alteration in original). An "innkeeper," in turn, is "any person,
firm, corporation, or other type of business organization, engaged
for profit, in the operation of a hotel." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10,
§ 711(b) (emphasis added). The first question on this subject,
then, is whether Iguana may assume the responsibilities of an
innkeeper by running the operation of a limited area adjacent to
the Marriott.
As noted above, Iguana is tasked with providing towel
and beach attendants to Marriott in a specific space of the beach
area adjacent to it, see supra Section III.A-B. On its face, the
text of the statute does not provide clear guidance on what
"operati[ng]" a hotel entails. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10, § 711(b).
Nothing in the text indicates whether the definition may extend to
entities tasked with providing services in limited areas of a
hotel. See id. § 711. Moreover, neither party cites any
legislative history affording additional insight into this
question, nor have we found any. See Banco Bilbao, 195 D.P.R. 39,
95 P.R. Offic. Trans. at 7 ("Only before a textual ambiguity should
courts fulfill the legislative purposes." (quoting Cruz Parrilla
v. Departamento de la Vivienda, 184 D.P.R. 393, 404, P.R. Offic.
Trans. (2012)). And Puerto Rico caselaw sheds no further light on
- 19 -this either. See e.g. Pabón Escabí v. Axtmayer, 90 D.P.R. 20,
Offic. Trans. (1964) (imposing liability on a defendant who was
both the owner and innkeeper of a hotel for an assault committed
on a guest by a third party). Although the statute may be read to
suggest that the term "innkeeper" only refers to persons or
entities that run the entirety of a hotel's operations, we lack
sufficient guidance to definitively conclude this. As such, we
cannot anticipate how the Puerto Rico Supreme Court would solve
the question as to whether an entity such as Iguana could assume
the responsibilities of an "innkeeper" for the area it operates
in.
Appellants' second argument similarly leaves us with an
interpretive gap. Besides schools, hospitals, and hotels, the
Puerto Rico Supreme Court has not named other entities or
institutions subject to a heightened standard of care. It has,
however, distinguished those entities from "contractor[s]" or
"business[es] whose scope of activity does not encompass the need
to provide said protection." Montalbán v. Centro Comercial Plaza
Carolina, 132 D.P.R. 785, 793, P.R. Offic. Trans. (1993) (emphasis
added) (quoting Estremera v. Inmobiliaria Rac, Inc., 109 D.P.R.
852, 855-56 (1980)). In our view, the court seems to have left
open the possibility that other entities may also be held to a
stringent standard of care, dependent on the nature of the
activities they undertake.
- 20 -Appellants' argument that, given the nature of the
services it provides, Iguana must be held to a heightened standard
of care, therefore, is not necessarily foreclosed by Puerto Rico
caselaw. But no precedent leads us to definitively conclude that
a heightened duty of care applies to Iguana either.
For the foregoing reasons, we cannot anticipate how the
Puerto Rico Supreme Court would rule on either of these matters.
Carrasquillo-Ortiz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 812 F.3d 195, 199-200
(1st Cir. 2016). And answering those questions ourselves would
offend the comity due to Puerto Rico courts. Id. (quoting
Santiago-Hodge v. Parke Davis & Co., 859 F.2d 1026, 1033 (1st Cir.
1988)). Because these local issues of law are
outcome-determinative for Appellants' negligence claim against
Iguana, we believe the best course is to certify both questions to
the Puerto Rico Supreme Court. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32, app.
V, Rule 52.2(d).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we hereby certify the following questions
to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court:
1. Under Puerto Rico law, can an entity tasked with providing
services in a limited area adjacent to a hotel assume the
responsibilities of an "innkeeper" for that area?
2. Under Puerto Rico law, does an entity contracted to run
the operation of a hotel's beach area owe a heightened duty
of care to hotel guests based on the nature of its services?
- 21 -We would also welcome any further guidance from the
Puerto Rico Supreme Court on any other aspect of Puerto Rico law
that it understands would aid in the proper resolution of these
issues. See Nicholls v. Veolia Water Cont. Operations USA, Inc.,
144 F.4th 354, 359 (1st Cir. 2025).
The Clerk of this court is directed to forward to the
Puerto Rico Supreme Court, under the official seal of this court,
a copy of the certified questions and our opinion in this case,
along with copies of the briefs and appendix filed by the parties.
We retain jurisdiction over this appeal pending resolution of the
certified questions.
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