IN re: B.Cd. & B.Cb.

majority opinion

In re: B.Cd. & B.Cb., No. 47, September Term, 2025. Opinion by Killough, J.

FAMILY LAW – CINA – SAFE HAVEN ACT – NEGLECT

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a parent who surrenders a newborn pursuant to the Safe Haven Act may be found to have neglected that child within the meaning of the Child in Need of Assistance (CINA) statute where the surrendered newborn has no legal custodian and no provision for long-term care upon hospital discharge, thereby placing the child at a substantial risk of harm. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 3-801(t)(1) (2024), 5-641 (2024).

FAMILY LAW – CINA – SAFE HAVEN ACT – CIVIL LIABILITY – IMMUNITY

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the Safe Haven Act’s immunity from “civil liability” does not bar a CINA neglect finding, which is the non-punitive jurisdictional predicate that allows the juvenile court to adjudicate the child’s case and grant the local department of social services the authority to make long-term arrangements for the child’s needs. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-641(b)(1) (2024).

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

Case No.: C-02-JV-24-000463

Case No.: C-02-JV-24-000464

Argued: March 6, 2026

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 47

September Term, 2025

IN RE: B.CD. & B.CB.

Fader, C.J.,

Watts,

Booth,

Biran,

Gould,

Eaves,

Killough,

JJ.

Opinion by Killough, J.

Watts and Eaves, JJ., concur and dissent.

Filed: July 15, 2026

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal

Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State

Government Article) this document is authentic.

2026.07.15

15:25:54 -04'00'

Gregory Hilton, Clerk

The Maryland Safe Haven Act, codified at Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article

(“CJP”) § 5-641, (2020 Repl. Vol.), permits a parent to surrender an unharmed newborn at

a designated facility within sixty days of birth, free from criminal prosecution or civil

liability for the act of surrender. Within 24 hours after accepting the newborn, the hospital

or other designated facility that accepts the newborn must notify the local department of

social services. Id. at § 5-641(c) (2). Where a newborn is dropped off at a designated

facility in accordance with the Safe Haven Act, that person “shall be immune from civil

liability or criminal prosecution[.]” Id. at § 5-641 (b)(1). Under the regulations adopted

to implement the Safe Haven Program, a local department of social services is required to

file a “child in need of assistance” (“CINA”) petition with the juvenile court. COMAR

07.02.27.03(E). The CINA statute provides the legal framework through which the State

cares for, protects, and finds a permanent home for a surrendered newborn. CJP § 3-801

(2024). In order for a juvenile court to adjudicate a child who was abandoned at a

designated facility under the Safe Haven Act to be a CINA, the court must make a finding

of “neglect,” that is, the child has been “placed at substantial risk of harm.” Id. at § 3-801(f)(1), (t)(1).

Petitioner A.C. (“Mother”) surrendered her four-day-old twin sons, B.Cd. and

B.Cb., at Baltimore Washington Medical Center (“BWMC”), pursuant to the Safe Haven

Act on September 16, 2024. The Anne Arundel County Department of Social Services

(the “Department”) took custody and filed CINA petitions. Mother was subsequently

identified and participated fully in the proceedings. At the de novo adjudicatory and

disposition hearing, she contested the neglect finding on statutory interpretation grounds.

She also invoked CJP § 3-819(e) and requested that custody be awarded to Father. The juvenile court found that Mother’s actions constituted neglect, denied her CJP § 3-819(e)

motion to award custody to Father, and committed the children to the Department’s

custody.

Mother timely appealed the circuit court’s CINA finding to the Appellate Court of

Maryland, which affirmed in a reported decision. In re B.Cd., 267 Md. App. 61 (2025).

While the appeal was pending, the CINA case closed, and Father was awarded full

custody.1 We granted certiorari to address the following questions, In re: B.Cd & B.Cb.,

492 Md. 646 (2025):

1. Does a parent neglect their child—i.e., place them at “substantial risk of harm”—

when they act in line with Maryland’s Safe Haven Program?

2. Is a CINA neglect finding a “civil liability” against which the Safe Haven Program

provides a shield?

For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland.

Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Surrender and Initial CINA Proceedings

Twins boys, B.Cd. and B.Cb. (the “Twins”), were born on September 12, 2024, at

the University of Maryland Medical Center. Mother, a twenty-three-year-old woman who

Although the CINA case underlying this appeal closed on April 7, 2025, the CINA framework does not merely protect the child. It protects the parent as well. Parents have a fundamental constitutional right to the care and custody of their children. Therefore, we conclude that the appeal is not moot. The potential for collateral consequences of the neglect finding preserve a live controversy sufficient to maintain justiciability. See In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 453 (2006) (citation omitted) (“Where . . . it seems apparent that a party may suffer collateral consequences from a trial court’s judgment, the case is not moot.”). We therefore proceed to the merits.

was raising two other children, brought the Twins to BWMC on September 16, 2024—

four days after their birth. She dressed each child in a onesie, taped a note with each child’s

name to him, and told hospital staff the Twins’ ages and information about their birth. She

did not disclose her identity, did not provide information about other potential caregivers,

and did not express an intent to return. She specifically told staff she was invoking the

Safe Haven Act and wanted the Twins placed out of her care. Hospital staff evaluated the

children and found them “healthy” with “no medical concerns.”

BWMC notified the Department on September 16, 2024. The following day, the

Department took the Twins into emergency shelter care and placed them in an approved

foster home. On September 18, the Department filed a CINA petition for each Twin in the

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, sitting as the juvenile court, requesting continued

shelter care. A magistrate held a shelter care hearing that same day, recommended that the

court authorize the Department to assume temporary custody, and the court so ordered.

See Md. Rule 11-103(a)(1), (3).

On September 19, 2024—two days after the surrender—the Department received a

call from the Twins’ maternal grandmother, who identified Mother. Mother spoke with

the Department on that call, explaining that she had surrendered the Twins due to concerns

about domestic violence from the children’s father. The Department also learned Father’s

identity in part because, in late September 2024, Father had filed a custody action in circuit

court seeking custody of the Twins. That action, however, could not establish Father’s

parental rights until paternity was confirmed through DNA testing and adjudicated on the

merits. That process required service of process, a DNA confirmation hearing, and a merits

hearing—none of which could have produced emergency relief for these newborns. On

October 9, 2024, the Department contacted Mother to ask whether she was willing to

complete maternity testing, and she agreed to do so. During the same conversation, she

indicated her desire to reunify with her children. The Department amended the CINA

petitions to reflect the putative parents’ identities, noting that DNA testing was pending.

A magistrate held an adjudicatory hearing on October 18, 2024. Because DNA

results had not yet returned, Mother and Father were not yet parties. The magistrate

recommended sustaining the adjudicatory facts and, after the Department’s unopposed

motion, deferred disposition pending the DNA results. In early November 2024, genetic

testing confirmed that Mother and Father were the biological parents of B.Cd. and B.Cb.

At the disposition hearing on November 15, 2024, the magistrate recommended the Twins

be declared CINA and, due to concerns about Mother’s decision to surrender the children

as well as Father’s criminal history and the domestic violence allegations against him,

recommended commitment to the Department’s custody instead of either parent. Both

parents filed exceptions and invoked their rights to a de novo hearing. Md. Rule 11-103(e).

B. The De Novo Hearing and Disposition

On January 14, 2025, the circuit court held a de novo adjudicatory and disposition

hearing. The Department called the two caseworkers on the Twins’ case as witnesses. The

Department introduced the Twins’ birth certificates and DNA results establishing

parentage.

Mother argued that her actions did not satisfy the statutory definition of neglect and

that, in any event, the Safe Haven Act’s immunity from civil liability precluded a neglect

finding. She introduced no evidence. She litigated the case entirely on the legal question

of statutory interpretation.

The juvenile court rejected Mother’s arguments. It found that Mother’s actions

constituted neglect, stating:

I think the mere leaving the children even in a safe place . . . is

neglectful . . . I think when you leave a child with that little information,

especially a four day old child, that is placing a child in substantial risk

because how does the one receiving the child know . . . anything about the

child[.]

The court further determined that an interpretation of the Safe Haven Act that would

prevent a CINA proceeding would lead to an illogical result, because it would bar a neglect

finding even in cases where the parents were never identified.

At disposition, Mother invoked CJP § 3-819(e) and requested that custody be

awarded to Father rather than the Department, acknowledging that “today is not the day

that the children should be coming to her.” Subsection (e) permits the court to award

custody to the other parent in lieu of declaring a child a CINA. On January 16, 2025, the

juvenile court denied Mother’s § 3-819(e) motion, found the Twins to be CINA and

committed them to the Department’s custody. Both parents appealed. On April 7, 2025,

while the appeal was pending, the CINA cases were terminated with Father obtaining full

custody.

C. The Appellate Court

The Appellate Court affirmed the circuit court in a reported opinion. In re B.Cd.,

267 Md. App. at 61. On the question of whether the conduct of a person who follows the

Safe Haven Program can support a finding of “neglect” under the CINA statute, the court

noted that “Maryland law is clear that ‘a finding of neglect may be based on a substantial

risk of harm to the child if the [Department of Social Services] does not take charge of the

child.’” Id. at 88 (alteration in original) (quoting Doe v. Allegany Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 205 Md. App. 47, 60 (2012)). The court explained that under the reasoning in Doe,

a finding of statutory neglect may focus “on the impact the actions of [the parents] could

have had on [the child] had the local department not taken charge of [the child].” Id.

(alternations in original) (quoting Doe, 205 Md. App. at 60).

Applying this reasoning, the court concluded that Mother neglected the Twins not

at the moment of surrender but when she “failed and refused to make herself available to

render proper care and attention” upon their discharge. Id. at 93 n.6. Turning to Mother’s

assertion that a statutory finding of “neglect” under CINA is at odds with the immunity

from “civil liability” provided under the Safe Haven Act, the Appellate Court determined

that the term “civil liability” was ambiguous. Id. at 95-96. The court examined the

legislative history, as well as the regulatory framework that had been in place for over

twenty years. Id. at 97-98. The court concluded that Mother’s interpretation of the Safe

Haven Act would lead to an absurd result, because the CINA framework is the only

mechanism by which the Department can legally intervene to care for abandoned children.

Id. at 96-100.

II.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews CINA determinations under three interrelated standards: factual

findings are reviewed for clear error; questions of law are reviewed de novo; and mixed

questions of law and fact, if based on correct legal principles and factual findings that are

not clearly erroneous, are reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re T.K., 480 Md. 122, 143

(2022).

Both questions presented are pure questions of statutory construction, which are

reviewed de novo. Ledford v. Jenway Contracting, Inc., 490 Md. 666, 680 (2025).

Because Mother introduced no evidence and contested only a legal question, there are no

factual findings to review for clear error; the underlying facts were uncontested.

III.

Discussion

A. Legal Framework

1. CINA Statute

The CINA statute provides the legal framework through which the State protects

children who lack adequate care. See CJP § 3-802(a)(1), (3); In re M.Z., 490 Md. 140,

143–44 (2025). The statute’s purposes include “[t]o provide for the care, protection, safety,

and mental and physical development of any child coming within” its provisions and “[t]o

conserve and strengthen the child’s family ties and to separate a child from the child’s

parents only when necessary for the child’s welfare.” CJP § 3-802(a)(1), (3). A child

qualifies as a CINA when court intervention is required because (1) the child has been

abused, neglected, has a developmental disability, or has a mental disorder, and (2) the

child’s parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care and

attention to the child and the child’s needs. CJP § 3-801(f)(1), (2). “Neglect” means:

the leaving of a child unattended or other failure to give proper care and

attention to a child by any parent or individual who has permanent or

temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of the child under

circumstances that indicate: (i) That the child’s health or welfare is harmed

or placed at substantial risk of harm; or (ii) That the child has suffered mental

injury or been placed at substantial risk of mental injury.

CJP § 3-801(t)(1).2

A CINA case proceeds in two phases. At the adjudicatory hearing, the Department

must prove by a preponderance that the child falls within one of the enumerated categories

of CJP § 3-801(f)(1). At the subsequent disposition hearing, the court determines whether

court intervention is required and, if so, the appropriate placement. See In re T.K., 480 Md.

at 134-35. If the allegations are not sustained, the court must dismiss the petition. CJP §

3-819(b)(1)(i). If the allegations are sustained against only one parent and the other is able

and willing to care for the child, the court may award custody to that parent before

dismissing without a CINA finding. CJP § 3-819(e).

2. Safe Haven Act

The Maryland General Assembly enacted the Maryland Safe Haven Act in 2002.

Md. Laws, Ch. 441 (codified as amended at CJP § 5-641). The Safe Haven Act provides

in relevant part:

(b)(1) A person who leaves an unharmed newborn with a responsible adult

or at a designated facility within 60 days after the birth of the newborn, as

determined within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, and does not

express an intent to return for the newborn shall be immune from civil

liability or criminal prosecution for the act.

(2) If the person leaving a newborn under this subsection is not the mother

of the newborn, the person must have the approval of the mother to do so.

* * * *

(d) A responsible adult and a designated facility that accepts a newborn under

this section and an employee or agent of the facility shall be immune from

The General Assembly amended CJP § 3-801 to redesignate, without change, CJP § 3-801(s) as CJP § 3-801(t), effective October 1, 2024. Although Mother placed the Twins in the Safe Haven Program before October 1, 2024, we refer to the current subsection for clarity.

civil liability or criminal prosecution for good faith actions taken related to

the acceptance of or medical treatment or care of the newborn unless injury

to the newborn was caused by gross negligence or willful or wanton

misconduct.

* * * *

(f) The Secretary of Human Services shall adopt regulations to implement

the provisions of this section.

CJP § 5-641.

Pursuant to subsection (f), the Secretary promulgated implementing regulations in

2003 at COMAR 07.02.27.01-.03. The Department’s regulations describe the program’s

purpose as providing a mother “the opportunity to provide a safe abandonment of her

newborn.” COMAR 07.02.27.01(A). Relevant provisions of COMAR 07.02.27.03

provide as follows:

C. The hospital or other designated facility that accepts a

newborn shall notify the LDSS [local department of social

services] within 24 hours after accepting the newborn.

D. The LDSS in the jurisdiction where the hospital is located

shall take responsibility of the newborn when medically ready

for discharge under an OSC [Order of Shelter Care].

E. A CINA petition shall be filed by the LDSS on behalf of the

abandoned newborn in the jurisdiction where the hospital is

located in conjunction with the request for an OSC.

F. A Child Protective Services investigation shall be initiated

if the mother, father, or relative of the newborn comes forth to

identify the newborn and requests that the newborn be placed

in the individual's care.

G. The child shall remain in the care of the LDSS under an

OSC with a CINA finding and commitment to the LDSS

pending the outcome of the investigation.

COMAR 07.02.27.03(C)–(G) (emphasis added).

With the applicable statutory framework in mind, we turn to the parties’ arguments.

B. Parties’ Contentions

Mother asserts that by “leav[ing] [] unharmed newborn[s] with a responsible adult

or at a designated facility” in accordance with Subsection 5-641(b)(1) of the Safe Haven

Act, she did not place the Twins “at substantial risk of harm” and thus, did not neglect

them. According to Mother, a parent does not neglect—i.e., does not place a child at

substantial risk of harm—by placing them unharmed with a responsible adult or at a

designated facility. According to Mother, she acted precisely within the instructions given

by the Safe Haven Program, which was created by the Safe Haven Act, and her care plan

did not pose any risk—much less a “substantial risk”—to the Twins’ well-being under the

CINA statute.

For its part, the Department points out that it can take custody of a child only if the

juvenile court finds the child to be a CINA, and the court cannot make that finding unless

it determines that “[t]he child has been abused, has been neglected, has a developmental

disability, or has a mental disorder.” CJP § 3-801(f)(1). The Department further explains

that, because the newborn must be unharmed when left with a responsible adult or at a

designated facility, the court cannot make a finding of “abuse” when the Safe Haven Act

is followed. Thus, the Department, reasons, absent evidence that the newborn has a

“developmental disability” or a “mental disorder,” a juvenile court could only find a

newborn, left pursuant to the Safe Haven Act, to be a CINA on the basis that the newborn

has been “neglected.”

Citing Doe, 205 Md. App. at 47, the Department argues that Maryland precedent

establishes that, as a matter of law, a parent or other caregiver who abandons an otherwise

helpless but unharmed child to the custody of the local department of social services has

neglected the child. The Department argues that abandonment of newborns under the Safe

Haven Act constitutes “neglect,” because absent the Department’s intervention, the Twins

would have been left completely helpless. Therefore, the Department asserts, Mother’s

actions placed the Twins at substantial risk of harm and the juvenile court correctly found

that the Twins had been neglected.

Mother also argues that a finding of neglect in a CINA case would violate the Safe

Haven Act’s immunity “from civil liability.” Mother cites to the definition of “liability”

from Black’s Law Dictionary as “the quality, state, or condition of being legally obligated

or accountable.” Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). According to

Mother, a CINA neglect finding is a finding that the parent has failed in their obligation of

providing appropriate care and attention to a child and is thus encompassed within the

definition of “civil liability.”

In support of her statutory argument, Mother points to direct and collateral

consequences that can flow from a CINA finding. Direct consequences of a CINA action

can include the loss of custody of a child, and an order to pay support. According to

Mother, collateral consequences of a CINA finding include (1) the inclusion of the parent

on the state’s child abuse registry under Family Law Article (“FL”) § 5-714 (2017), (2) the

adverse impact on an individual’s qualification to become a foster parent, (3) the ability of

a parent to maintain a parental relationship with other children, and (4) the shifting of the

burden of proof to a parent at hearings regarding visitation with or custody of other children

under FL § 9-101.

Mother also asserts that a neglect finding under CINA would be contrary to the

legislative intent of the Safe Haven Act. Mother directs us to the purpose of the Act, which

“is to provide the mother of a newborn the opportunity to provide a safe abandonment of

her newborn by . . . [p]roviding immunity from civil liability and criminal prosecution for

a mother who leaves an unharmed newborn with a responsible adult under certain

circumstances[.]” Mother argues that, by subjecting a parent to a judicial finding of neglect

in a CINA proceeding, such a statutory interpretation creates a disincentive for a party to

rely upon the Safe Haven Act in direct contravention of the plain language and intent of

the statute.

Finally, Mother argues that precluding a CINA neglect finding in a case arising

under the Safe Haven Act will not “prevent a CINA case,” as suggested by the juvenile

court. According to Mother, the Department can properly take custody of the child under

CJP § 3-815(a), which authorizes shelter care. Then, Mother asserts, the Department can

proceed in one of three ways: (1) if the parents are unknown, the Department can proceed

to file a petition for guardianship under FL § 5-313, which can lead to adoption; (2) if the

parents consent, the Department can file for guardianship under FL § 5-320(a)(1)(iii)(1);

or (3) if one or both parents desire custody, the child can be returned as the Department has

no legal basis for holding the child.

In response, the Department argues that a CINA finding of neglect does not impose

“civil liability” on the parent. The Department relies on the definition of “liability” in

Black's Law Dictionary as “[t]he quality, state, or condition of being legally obligated or

accountable . . ., enforceable by civil remedy or criminal punishment.” In re B.Cd., 267

Md. App. at 94. According to the Department, Mother has made no showing that the

neglect finding by the juvenile court imposed any specific legal responsibility on her

enforceable by any civil or criminal remedy. The Department points out that a CINA

finding requires a finding of both past abuse or neglect and a present inability or

unwillingness of both parents to provide proper care. In addition, the Department argues

that a CINA neglect finding cannot be affected by what Mother has identified as “collateral

consequences,” because Mother has not adduced any evidence that she has suffered or will

suffer any such consequence.

With respect to legislative intent, the Department argues that the “narrow” purpose

of the Safe Haven Act was to “‘prevent newborn deaths’ that result when parents abandon

newborn infants in public places.” The Department contends that to effectuate such

purpose, the Act provides for (1) immunity from criminal prosecution for desertion of a

child or for causing a child to become a CINA, and (2) immunity from civil liability for the

“act” of leaving an unharmed newborn without an expressed intention to return, an act

which would not otherwise be protected by the common-law doctrine of parent-child

immunity.

Finally, the Department argues that Mother’s interpretation of “civil liability” would

lead to an absurd result by rendering the local department and juvenile courts powerless to

protect a newborn in a CINA proceeding. The Department points out that a CINA petition

for an unharmed newborn cannot proceed unless the child is found to be neglected, and

that a guardianship petition under FL § 5-313 suggested by Mother cannot be pursued

absent a judicial finding that the newborn was a CINA. The Department argues that the

General Assembly did not vest authority in the hospital or another designated facility to

assume custody of the child and did not provide a mechanism separate from the CINA

proceeding for the local department to assume custody.

C. Statutory Construction

As noted above, the issues in this case present questions of law that we consider

without deference to the decisions of the juvenile court or the Appellate Court. To answer

Mother’s questions, we must examine the meaning of the word “neglect” in the context of

the CINA statute, CJP § 3-801(f)(1), as well as the meaning of the phrase “immune from

liability” under the Safe Haven Act, CJP § 5-641.

“As in any question of statutory interpretation, the goal is to discern and implement

the intent of the Legislature.” In re O.P., 470 Md. 225, 255 (2020). We begin, as we must,

with the plain text of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning. McClanahan

v. Washington Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 445 Md. 691, 701 (2015). We review “the text

of the particular provision within the context of the statutory scheme of which it is part.”

In re O.P., 470 Md. at 255. When considering the context of the language, we may look

to related statutes, earlier and subsequent enactments, and other materials that bear on

legislative purpose. Williams v. State, 492 Md. 295, 307 (2025). “Review of the legislative

history, as well as prior caselaw concerning the provision or similar provisions, may

provide guidance and help confirm conclusions drawn from the text or resolve its

ambiguities.” In re T.K., 480 Md. at 145 (citation modified).

Where the words of a statute are ambiguous on their face, or

where the words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in

isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a larger

statutory scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by

searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the

history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and

extrinsic to the legislative process.

Williams, 492 Md. at 307–08 (citation modified). “In resolving ambiguities, [we]

consider[] the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its general purpose, and

the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions.” Bennett v.

Harford County, 485 Md. 461, 486 (2023) (citations omitted). “In every case, the statute

must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible

with common sense.” Williams, 492 Md. at 308.

Finally, where the General Assembly directs an administrative agency to

promulgate regulations to implement a statute, we may give deference to the agency’s

interpretation of the statute as carried out by the regulations, particularly where the

interpretation has been consistently applied for a long period of time. Comptroller of Md.

v. FC-GEN Operations Invs. LLC, 482 Md. 343, 362 (2022); Smith v. Higinbothom, 187

Md. 115, 132-33 (1946) (explaining that “where the language of a statute is susceptible of

two constructions, a long-continued and unvarying construction applied by administrative

officials is strong persuasive influence in determining the judicial construction of the

statute”).

D. A Parent’s Action in Delivering a Newborn to a Designated Facility Under the

Safe Haven Act May Support a Finding of “Neglect” Under the CINA Statute

As we previously noted, “neglect” is defined under the CINA statute as the “failure

to give proper care and attention to a child by any parent . . . under circumstances that

indicate . . . [t]hat the child’s health or welfare is . . . placed at substantial risk of harm[.]”

CJP § 3-801(t)(1)(i). Mother argues that she could not have neglected the Twins, because

she left them “unharmed” within 60 days of their birth at a designated facility under the

Safe Haven Act. We disagree with Mother’s narrow interpretation of the word “neglect.”

Although the act of dropping the Twins off at a designated facility may not have caused

them immediate harm, the child’s health or welfare is nonetheless “placed at a substantial

risk of harm[,]” because there is no parent or legal guardian who can make decisions on

their behalf. Id. It is necessary for the Department to intercede on their behalf for their

health and safety.

We agree with the Appellate Court’s prior interpretation that “a finding of neglect

may be based on a substantial risk of harm to the child if the Department of Social Services

“does not take charge of the child.” In re B.Cd., 267 Md. App. at 88 (citing Doe, 205 Md.

App. at 60). A “neglect” finding may be based upon the impact the parent’s actions could

have on the child if the local department does not take charge of the child. Id.; see also

Owens v. Prince George’s County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 182 Md. App. 31, 54–55 (2008)

(affirming a finding of neglect for refusing to permit a child to return to the home); In re

Nathaniel A., 160 Md. App. 581, 601 (2005) (finding neglect due to substantial risk of

harm that the child would incur if not placed in foster care). The act of abandoning the

child at the designated facility places the child at “substantial risk of harm[,]” CJP § 3-801(t)(1)(i), because without intervention by the local department, there is no one to

provide for the child’s basic health or welfare needs.

Applied to the uncontested facts of this case, the neglect definition is satisfied. By

the time the Twins were ready for discharge from BWMC on September 17, 2024, there

was no parent available, no legal custodian, no provision for their ongoing care, and no one

legally obligated to feed, shelter, provide medical care for, or make decisions for them in

the long-term. These children had been left without permanent provision for their care,

placing them at substantial risk of harm. Every element of CJP § 3-801(t)(1) was satisfied.

That the Department intervened after the surrender does not alter the analysis. The focus

is on whether the parent’s conduct placed the child at substantial risk of harm, not on

whether a third party subsequently ameliorated that risk. See Doe, 205 Md. App. at 61.

E. The Safe Haven’s Immunity From “Civil Liability” Does Not Prevent a Court

From Making a Finding of Neglect in a CINA Proceeding Where the Parent

Delivers a Newborn to a Designated Facility In Accordance With the Safe

Haven Act.

We turn to Mother’s contention that interpreting the definition of “neglect” under

the CINA statute to support a finding of neglect under these circumstances is inconsistent

with the provision of the Safe Haven Act that provides immunity from civil liability when

an individual acts in accordance with the statute. The Safe Haven Act states:

A person who leaves an unharmed newborn with a responsible adult or at a

designated facility within 60 days after the birth of the newborn, as

determined within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, and does not

express an intent to return for the newborn shall be immune from civil

liability or criminal prosecution for the act.

CJP § 5-641(b)(1). We start our statutory analysis by noting that the Act does not define

the term “civil liability.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “liability” as “[t]he quality, state,

or condition of being legally obligated or accountable; legal responsibility to another or to

society, enforceable by civil remedy or criminal punishment.” Liability, BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024).

Mother interprets “civil liability” broadly to include a CINA neglect finding because

of the potential adverse direct and collateral consequences of such a finding. The

Department, on the other hand, takes a narrower approach, by suggesting that immunity

from “civil liability” simply precludes legal action against the parent by a person on behalf

of the newborn for the “act” of abandonment, which would not be precluded by the doctrine

of parent-child immunity. The dictionary definition supports both interpretations. We

determine that the Act’s language on immunity from “civil liability” is ambiguous.

1. Legislative History

To resolve this ambiguity, we turn to the legislative history. That history, however,

reveals no reference to, or information about, the meaning of immunity from “civil

liability.” The Floor Report prepared by the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee noted

that the immunity from criminal prosecution included criminal penalties that arose from

crimes for deserting a minor child or by engaging in an act that “willfully renders a child

in need of assistance.” Floor Report for House Bill 602, Safe Haven Act, 2002 Leg., 418th

Sess. (Md. 2002). The Revised Fiscal Note for Senate Bill 3 contains an extensive

discussion on the criminal laws in Maryland “related to desertion of a minor child.”

Revised Fiscal Note, Senate Bill 3, 2002 Leg., 416th Sess. (Md. 2002). Although the Floor

Report for House Bill 602 and the Revised Fiscal Note for Senate Bill 3 contain an

extensive discussion on the criminal laws in Maryland “related to desertion of a minor

child,” there is no discussion concerning what the General Assembly intended insofar as

immunity from “civil liability.”

Notwithstanding the lack of legislative history on the meaning of “civil liability,”

the legislative history reflects that an alternative to the CINA process was considered and

rejected. As introduced, Senate Bill 3, the “Maryland Safe Haven Act,” proposed making

a parent’s voluntary surrender of an unharmed newborn under the statute constitute the

“relinquishment” of parental rights. S.B. 3. (2001) at 1. The bill also proposed to create a

new subtitle in the Family Law Article that would have required the local departments to

“[t]ake control and custody of the relinquished newborn within 24 hours” and “file a

petition to terminate the parental rights of the relinquished newborn in accordance with

[former] § 5-313” of the Family Law Article, repealed by 2005 Md. Laws, ch. 464 (S.B.

710) § 2, and to vest judicial authority over the child with the guardianship court. S.B. 3

at 2-3. The bill would have barred the guardianship court from returning the child to a

parent’s custody absent a specific finding that the return would not present “an

unacceptable risk to the future and safety of the child.” Id. at 3.

While the Senate was considering Senate Bill 3, the House considered a different

bill, H.B. 602—titled “Maryland Safe Haven Act of 2002”—with a more limited scope.

H.B. 602 (2002). Instead of creating a new process for custody and guardianship

proceedings for a newborn, the House Bill did not modify the existing CINA subtitle and

limited its impact to providing immunity from certain potential criminal sanctions. Id. at

After both chambers passed their respective bills, the General Assembly appointed

a conference committee to reconcile them. On April 2, 2002, J. Theodore Wieseman,

Counsel for the Office of the Public Defender, wrote a letter to Walter H. Baker, in which

he advocated for the Senate to adopt the House Bill. Letter from J. Theodore Wieseman,

Couns., Off. of the Pub. Def., to Walter H. Baker, Senator, Md. State Senate (Apr. 2, 2002).

The letter explained that the “House Bill does not change existing CINA law as to the

duties and responsibilities of all persons after the baby is delivered to a safe haven.” Id.

Mr. Wieseman further noted that after the legislature had spent “the last three years writing

and rewriting the complex provisions of our CINA laws, there is no reason to do it again

this time.” Id.

On April 6, 2002, the Conference Committee reconciled the bills with an agreement

that struck the proposed statutory text in both bills in favor of the text that was ultimately

enacted as CJP § 5-641. 2002 Md. Laws, chs. 441–42. Consistent with Mr. Wieseman’s

letter, the enacted law did not modify any provision of the CINA statute. This legislative

history reflects that the General Assembly considered whether to establish procedures

outside the CINA statute to protect and manage the care and protection of a baby that was

subject to the Safe Haven Act and rejected that approach.

2. Subsequently Enacted Regulations

The Safe Haven Act directs the Secretary of Human Resources to “adopt regulations

to implement the provisions of this section.” CJP § 5-641(f). The Secretary adopted

regulations for the Safe Haven Act in 2003. COMAR 07.02.27.01-03.

The purpose of the Act “is to provide the mother of a newborn the opportunity to

provide a safe abandonment of her newborn” and to “[p]rovide for a long-term plan of care

of the abandoned newborn.” COMAR 07.02.27.01(A), (B)(4). The regulations set forth

the duties of the local department of social services upon being notified that a hospital or

other designated facility has accepted a newborn. COMAR 07.02.27.03D-H; CJP § 5-641(c)(2). The local department must “take responsibility of the newborn when medically

ready for discharge under an [order for shelter care].” COMAR 07.02.27.03D. The local

department shall then file a CINA petition “on behalf of the abandoned newborn

in . . . conjunction with the request for an [order of shelter care].” COMAR 07.02.27.03E.

If the mother, father, or relative of the newborn comes forward, and requests that the

newborn be placed in the individual’s care, a Child Protective Services investigation shall

be initiated, during which the child shall remain in the care of the local department under

an order of shelter care “with a CINA finding and commitment to the [local department of

social services].” COMAR 07.02.27.03F, G. All of the above regulations have remained

in effect and unchanged since 2003.

It is clear from a review of the above regulations that the Secretary interpreted the

Safe Haven Act to require the local department of social services to assume the care and

custody of a newborn, when medically ready for discharge, under the provisions of the

CINA statute, including seeking shelter care for an alleged CINA under CJP § 3-815, filing

a CINA petition under CJP § 3-809, and pursuing a CINA finding under CJP § 3-801(f).

The Secretary’s 2003 regulations require local departments to file CINA neglect petitions

following Safe Haven surrenders. See COMAR 07.02.27.03(C). The regulations adopted

by the Secretary under the Safe Haven Act constitute “a long-continued and unvarying

construction applied by administrative officials” and are “strong persuasive influence in

determining the judicial construction of the statute[.]” Higinbothom, 187 Md. at 133.

“[L]ong-standing legislative acquiescence gives rise to a strong presumption that the

interpretation is correct.” Sinai Hosp. of Balt., Inc. v. Dep’t of Emp. & Training, 309 Md.

28, 46 (1987); Macke Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 302 Md. 18, 22 (1984). The

General Assembly has left those regulations undisturbed for more than twenty years. We

find no reason to disturb that interpretation now.

3. Additional Evidence of Legislative Intent—Related Statutes

We find additional support for an interpretation of the Safe Haven Act’s immunity

from civil liability as not extending to a finding of “neglect” under the CINA statute in a

related statute: the guardianship provisions set forth in Subtitle 3 of Title 5 of the Family

Law Article. It is instructive to discuss the statutory history related to the guardianship

statute.

As both parties acknowledged in their briefs, at the time of the Safe Haven Act’s

enactment, a guardianship statute permitted a court to grant the Department guardianship,

with the right to consent to adoption, of an “abandoned” child. See FL § 5-313(a)(1) & (b)

(2002). To do so, the court had to find that “[t]he identity of the child’s natural parents is

unknown” and that “[n]o one has claimed to be the child’s natural parent within 2 months

of the alleged abandonment of the child.” FL § 5-313(b)(1) & (2) (2002). The guardianship

subtitle also permitted a court to grant guardianship of a child to the Department if the

child’s parent consented. FL § 5-317(c) (2002). This meant that the Department could

obtain guardianship of a Safe Haven child without a court needing to find that the parent

“neglected” the child under the CINA statute.

In 2005, the General Assembly overhauled the guardianship subtitle. 2005 Md.

Laws, Ch. 464. Notably, the 2005 overhaul repealed provisions in former FL § 5-313 that

permitted guardianship petitions of abandoned children, but reenacted those provisions,

with amendments, at FL § 5-323(c). See Committee Note, 2005 Md. Laws, Ch. 464, at

2625 (noting that new subsection § 5-323(c) was “derived from” former § 5-313(b)).

The 2005 overhaul retained the existing provisions that permitted a court to order

guardianship to the local department without providing specific grounds of unfitness if “the

identities of the child’s parents are unknown” and “no one has claimed to be the child’s

parent” within a specified 60-day period. 2005 Md. Laws, Ch. 464, at 2622 (codified as

amended at FL § 5-323(c)). Significantly, the General Assembly expressly clarified that

the 60-day period would “run from adjudication rather than abandonment.” 2005 Md.

Laws, Ch. 464, at 2625 (emphasis added). The same Committee Note also explained that

“abandonment as an alternative basis for nonconsensual [termination of parental rights] is

omitted in light of the limited scope of this subtitle under new § 5-302.” 2005 Md. Laws,

Ch. 464 at 2627 (emphasis added).

As a result of the 2005 amendments, the statutory provision that authorized the

Department to file a guardianship petition for a child who was “abandoned” was removed.

Under the newly enacted guardianship statute, the Department could be granted

guardianship under Subtitle 3 of Title 5 of the Family Law Article only for children already

committed to it as CINA. FL § 5-302(a) (2005). Moreover, as reflected in the abovedescribed Committee Notes, the General Assembly was aware that guardianship

proceedings of an abandoned child could proceed only if the juvenile court had first

adjudicated the child to be a CINA.

4. Failed Attempts to Modify the Statute to Amend CJP § 3-801 to Create a CINA

Finding for a Child Relinquished as a Newborn Without a Finding of Neglect

Mother argues that the 2005 amendments to the guardianship statute that eliminated

the ability for the Department to seek a guardianship of an “abandoned” child led to

confusion about how to handle Safe Haven cases. To illustrate her point, Mother directs

us to legislation that was proposed in 2019. That year, the Department proposed

legislation—H.B. 167—that would have modified the language of CJP § 3-801 to permit

the Department to assume guardianship of a child without a finding that the parents had

neglected the child. H. B. 167, 2019 Leg., 415th Sess. (Md. 2019). It did this by proposing

to add the phrase “has been relinquished as a Safe Haven newborn” as one of the ways that

a child can be found CINA. Id. Maryland’s Legal Aid Bureau’s written testimony in

support of the proposed legislation stated:

Currently, it is not clear that children relinquished in accordance with [CJP

§] 5-641, otherwise known as “safe haven newborns” may be adjudicated as

children in need of assistance (CINA). Without a finding that the safe haven

newborn is a child in need of assistance there are no statutory procedures in

place regarding how the Department of Social Services should move forward

with a “safe haven newborn” once the child has been relinquished.

Testimony in Support of H.B. 167, H.B. 167, Judiciary Committee, 2019 Leg., 415th Sess.

(Md. 2019). The General Assembly did not enact the bill into law. Although we do not

treat the “amendment-rejection” theory as “a completely determinative method of

ascertaining legislative intent,” it “strengthens the conclusion that the Legislature did not

intend to achieve the results that the amendment would have achieved, if adopted.” State

v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 721 (1998) (citation modified); Demory Bros.Inc. v. Bd. of Pub.

Works, 273 Md. 320, 326 (1974).

5. The Consequences of Mother’s Interpretation

Finally, we note that “every . . . statute must be given a reasonable interpretation,

not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense.” FC-GEN

Operations, Invs., LLC, 482 Md. at 380 (citation modified). We must “consider the

consequences of alternative interpretations of the statute, in order to avoid constructions

that are illogical, . . . nonsensical, or that render a statute meaningless.” Nationstar Mortg.

LLC v. Kemp, 476 Md. 149, 170 (2021) (citation modified). Here, the Department argues

that it would be an absurd result to interpret the Safe Haven Act to render the local

department and juvenile courts powerless to protect a newborn in a CINA proceeding. We

agree.

As noted above, a juvenile court can find a child to be a CINA only upon a finding

that the child “has been abused, has been neglected, has a developmental disability, or has

a mental disorder[.]” CJP § 3-801(f)(1). For an unharmed newborn who is left with a

responsible adult or at a designated facility under the Safe Haven Act, the child cannot be

a CINA unless the juvenile court finds that the child “has been neglected.” See id. If, as

Mother argues, the language of the Safe Haven Act granting immunity from “civil liability”

precludes a CINA neglect finding, a local department of social services would have no

legal authority to provide the care, protection, safety, development, and placement or

reunification required by the CINA Statute. See id. § 3-802(a).

To avoid the absurdity of a statutory interpretation that precludes a juvenile court

from assuming jurisdiction of the newborn as a CINA, Mother argues that the local

department can take custody of the newborn under the shelter care provision, CJP § 3-815(a), and then file a petition for guardianship leading to adoption, FL § 5-313. However,

as discussed above, any path toward guardianship with the right to consent to adoption

requires a prior judicial finding that the newborn is a CINA. See FL § 5-302(a)(1) (“This

subtitle applies only to: (1) guardianship of an individual who is committed to a local

department as a child in need of assistance[.]”).

Next, Mother argues that the local department can assume guardianship of a

newborn without a neglect finding by petitioning for guardianship of a minor under Section

13-702 of the Estates and Trusts Article (“ET”). We are unpersuaded. As the Department

points out, the Estates and Trusts Article does not contain any procedures for emergency

orders that would provide legal custody. Moreover, under ET § 13-702, only a “person

interested in the welfare of the minor” is permitted to file a petition for appointment as a

“guardian” of a minor child, but the statutory definition of “person” excludes the local

government and all other State agencies. Md. Code Ann. Gen. Prov. § 1-114 (2025); see

also Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. Phillips, 413 Md. 606, 622–23 (2010)

(explaining that “[w]e have long recognized that . . . the term ‘person’ in a statute does not

include the State and its agencies and instrumentalities” unless “such an intention is

manifest” (citation modified)).

Finally, it is noteworthy that no reference to the Estates and Trust article is found

within the legislative history of the enactment of the Safe Haven Act. We agree with the

Department that it strains credulity that the General Assembly would have so substantially

altered the statutory scheme to permit the local governments to determine which cases to

pursue in private guardianship proceeding instead of the comprehensive CINA subtitle—

the latter process being the one recognized by the Department in its implementing

regulations for the past twenty years.

In conclusion, Mother’s interpretation of the Safe Haven Act would lead to an

absurd and illogical result. We agree with the Appellate Court that “[t]o preclude a CINA

neglect finding would abrogate a regulatory system that was designed to implement the

provisions of the Safe Haven Act,” which “has been in operation for over twenty years,

and [would] replace it with an unproven scheme that clearly does not provide the proper

care and attention for an abandoned newborn.” In re B.Cd., 267 Md. App. at 101.

We are aware that our holding requires us to attach the label of “neglect” to an act

the General Assembly has affirmatively encouraged and sought to protect. That cannot be

helped. The label is what the statute requires, and it is what the agency implementing the

statute has applied for twenty-two years. A parent who complies with the Safe Haven Act

faces a neglect finding—a finding that is necessary for the protective machinery of the

State to operate.3 The Dissent would avoid that label by reading the Safe Haven Act to

foreclose a neglect finding for a parent who surrenders a newborn in compliance with the

statute. We cannot accept that reading.4 Treating a compliant surrender as neglect does

not, however, erase the distinction between a lawful surrender and an unlawful

abandonment. We observe that other states have addressed this problem directly by

creating a distinct category for cases of abandonment. See, e.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §

1012(f)(ii); D.C. Code Ann. § 4-1451.05(a), (b). The General Assembly has been aware

of this gap at least since 2019, when H.B. 167 was introduced to add a Safe Haven surrender

as an independent basis for CINA jurisdiction without a neglect finding. That bill did not

pass, and the General Assembly has left the Department’s regulatory practice undisturbed

for more than two decades. If the General Assembly agrees with Mother that the

Department should have an option to proceed without obtaining a neglect finding, it can

Here, Mother did not present any evidence concretely establishing adverse direct or collateral consequences she suffered because of the CINA neglect finding. As such, we reserve for another day whether the Safe Haven statute’s immunity against civil liability provides an abandoning parent with a defense against downstream adverse regulatory and legal consequences, if any, from a CINA neglect finding.

The Dissent reads the Safe Haven Act to foreclose a neglect finding whenever a parent complies with the statute. That reading is difficult to square with the Dissent’s own premise. The Dissent accepts that the Act “by its plain language does not bar . . . a neglect finding under the CINA subtitle . . . where the definition of neglect is satisfied,” Dissenting Op. at 1, yet concludes that a compliant surrender can never satisfy that definition. For the reasons explained in Part III.D, a surrender that leaves a newborn with no legal custodian and no provision for care does satisfy CJP § 3-801(t)(1). The Dissent’s reliance on emergency shelter care, Dissenting Op. at 4, does not fill the resulting gap, because shelter care is temporary and does not afford the Department with the legal authority to make longterm arrangements for the care of an abandoned newborn. CJP § 3-815(b)(1); Md. Rule 11-204(b)(2).

create a separate path along the lines of the legislation it considered, but did not adopt, in

2019. Unless and until it does, the current statutory framework requires affirmance.

IV.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we hold as follows:

First, a parent’s surrender of a newborn pursuant to the Safe Haven Act may

constitute neglect under CJP § 3-801(t)(1) where the uncontested facts establish that the

surrendered child had no legal custodian and no provision for care upon hospital discharge,

placing the child at substantial risk of harm. The neglect finding must rest on an

individualized assessment of the child’s actual condition—not a categorical legal inference

from the fact of surrender. On the uncontested record before us, the neglect finding is

supported.

Second, immunity from “civil liability” under the Safe Haven Act does not preclude

a finding of “neglect” under the CINA statute. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err

by finding that Mother’s actions constituted “neglect” under CJP § 3-801(t)(1).

We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland.

THE JUDGMENT OF THE

APPELLATE COURT OF

MARYLAND IS AFFIRMED.

COSTS TO BE PAID BY

PETITIONER.

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

Case Nos. C-02-JV-24-000463 & C-02-JV-24-000464

IN THE SUPREME COURT

Argued: March 6, 2026

OF MARYLAND

No. 47

September Term, 2025

IN RE: B.CD. & B.CB.

Fader, C.J.

Watts

Booth

Biran

Gould

Eaves

Killough,

JJ.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Watts,

J., which Eaves, J., joins.

Filed: July 15, 2026

I concur in part and dissent in part from the Majority’s opinion. I agree with the

Majority’s conclusion that the immunity provision of the Safe Haven Act, Md. Code Ann.,

Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJ”) § 5-641, does not bar a neglect finding in a Child in Need of

Assistance (“CINA”) proceeding. See Maj. Slip Op. at 17, 28. In that respect, I concur in

the judgment of the majority opinion. A CINA neglect finding does not constitute “civil

liability” or a “criminal prosecution” from which the Safe Haven statute immunizes a

parent. CJ § 5-641 protects the lawful act of surrender of a child from civil liability or

criminal prosecution but by its plain language does not bar the State from pursuing, or a

juvenile court from making, a neglect finding under the CINA subtitle, CJ §§ 3-801 to 3-837.1, where the statutory definition of neglect is satisfied.

I do not agree, however, that action by a parent in compliance with the Safe Haven

statute alone constitutes neglect under CJ § 3-801, as the Majority holds. See Maj. Slip

Op. at 15-17, 28. Although I do not read the Safe Haven statute to bar a juvenile court

from making a neglect finding when the statutory elements of neglect are established, see

CJ § 5-641(b)(1); CJ § 3-801(f), (t)(1), unlike the Majority, I do not agree with the

Appellate Court’s conclusion that, where a parent surrenders a child to a designated facility

under the Safe Haven Act, “a finding of neglect may be based on a substantial risk of harm

to the child if the Department of Social Services does not take charge of the child[,]” Maj.

Slip Op. at 16 (citation modified).1

At the outset, it must be pointed out that concluding that the Safe Haven Act does not bar a finding under the CINA subtitle that a child has been neglected—i.e., a parent does not have immunity from a CINA proceeding resulting in a neglect finding—does not

I would not hold that a parent’s conduct in complying with the provisions of the

Safe Haven Act, by delivering a child to a statutorily designated facility and not returning,

satisfies the definition of neglect under the CINA statute, CJ § 3-801(t)(1). See Maj. Slip

Op. at 28. There are key aspects of the Majority’s holding with which I disagree. First, in

reaching the holding—that “a parent’s surrender of a newborn pursuant to the Safe Haven

Act may constitute neglect under CJP § 3-801(t)(1) where the uncontested facts establish

that the surrendered child had no legal custodian and no provision for care upon hospital

discharge, placing the child at substantial risk of harm[,]” Maj. Slip Op. at 28—the

Majority engages in a faulty statutory construction analysis of CJ §§ 5-641 and 3-801. In

addition, the Majority appears to divine legislative intent concerning a neglect finding

under CJ § 3-801 from a misreading of Doe v. Allegany Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 205

Md. App. 47, 43 A.3d 1071 (2012).

Although the Safe Haven statute does not immunize a parent from a CINA neglect

finding, a compliant Safe Haven surrender, including the anticipated non-return for

discharge, is not by itself enough to satisfy the definition of neglect under CJ § 3-801. The

Safe Haven statute does not foreclose a finding of neglect under CJ § 3-801, but more is

required to establish neglect than a parent’s compliance with the provisions of CJ § 5-641.

mean that the act of safely surrendering a child pursuant to the Safe Haven Act by itself is sufficient to satisfy the definition of neglect under CJ § 3-801(t). Although a neglect finding is not precluded where a child is surrendered under the Safe Haven Act, a finding of neglect is not an automatic outcome of a safe surrender in compliance with the Act. To the contrary, where there is evidence that a child who is surrendered pursuant under the Act “has been neglected” and the definition of neglect set forth in CJ § 3-801(t) has been satisfied, a neglect finding is not precluded.

-2-CJ § 5-641(b)(1) provides that a person who leaves an unharmed newborn with a

responsible adult or at a designated facility within 60 days after birth, and who does not

express an intent to return, “shall be immune from civil liability or criminal prosecution

for the act.” The statute requires the involvement of a local department of social services

after a child is surrendered2 and does not indicate that a finding of neglect under CJ § 3-801 may not be made, where the elements of neglect under the CINA subtitle are satisfied.

In my view, however, merely surrendering a child in compliance with the Act is not

sufficient to constitute a finding of neglect.

Under the CINA subtitle, CJ § 3-801(f) defines a “child in need of assistance” as a

child who requires court intervention because the child “has been abused” or “has been

neglected” and the child’s parents, guardian, or custodian is unable or unwilling to give

proper care and attention to the child and the child’s needs. CJ § 3-801(t)(1) defines

“neglect” as “the leaving of a child unattended or other failure to give proper care and

attention to a child” under circumstances indicating harm or a substantial risk of harm or

that the child has suffered a mental injury or been placed at substantial risk of mental injury.

A fair reading of the text of CJ §§ 5-641 and 3-801 demonstrates that a parent does not

place a child at a substantial risk of harm simply by doing what Maryland’s Safe Haven

statute allows—delivering a child to a hospital without the intent to return.

A designated facility that accepts a newborn must notify the local department of social services within 24 hours, and the Secretary of Human Services must adopt regulations to implement the statute. See CJ § 5-641(c)(2), (f).

-3-As authorized under CJ § 5-641(f), the Secretary of Human Services has

promulgated regulations to assist in implementing the statute. Although the Majority

correctly states that the regulations “require local departments to file CINA neglect

petitions following Safe Haven surrenders[,]” Maj. Slip Op. at 21, the regulations do not

contemplate that the act of surrendering a child itself shall satisfy the definition of neglect

under CJ § 3-801(t). The plain language of Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”)

07.02.27.03(D) provides that, once the newborn is medically ready for discharge, the Local

Department of Social Service (“LDSS”) “in the jurisdiction where the hospital is located

shall take responsibility of the newborn” under an order for shelter care (“OSC”). The

regulation requires the LDSS to file “a CINA petition . . . on behalf of the abandoned

newborn . . . in conjunction with the request for an OSC.” COMAR 07.02.27.03(E). And

if a mother, father, or relative later comes forward seeking placement, “[a] Child Protective

Services investigation shall be initiated” while “[t]he child [] remain[s] in the care of the

LDSS under an OSC with a CINA finding and commitment to the LDSS pending the

outcome of the investigation.” COMAR 07.02.27.03(F), (G). The regulation authorizes

the use of CINA proceedings in connection with a child surrendered under the Safe Haven

Act, but, read properly, COMAR 07.02.27.03(G) contains a requirement that a child shall

remain in the care of a local department under an order of shelter care, with a CINA finding

and commitment to the local department pending the outcome of an investigation. The

only mandatory or “per se” requirement imposed by the regulation is that a child shall

remain in the care of the local department under an order of shelter care, which does not

require a finding of neglect under CJ § 3-801(t)(1).

-4-COMAR 07.02.27.03(C)-(G) do not mandate a finding of neglect as a disposition

under CJ § 3-819 (the CINA statute governing disposition hearings). If that were the case,

the language in COMAR 07.02.27.03(G) that the child shall remain in the care of a local

department under an order of shelter care, with a CINA finding and commitment pending

the outcome of the investigation, would be meaningless. Under the plain language of the

regulation, a CINA finding and commitment depends upon the outcome of an investigation,

not the circumstance that a hospital or other designated facility accepted the child under

the Safe Haven Act and the parent did not return.

COMAR 07.02.27.03(C) through (G) reflect the Secretary’s determination that a

CINA proceeding is the mechanism to be used when a local department of social services

assumes care of a newborn surrendered under the Safe Haven law, but nothing in the plain

language of the regulation leads to the conclusion that a CINA finding of neglect is a per

se or an automatic outcome of the surrender of a child under the Safe Haven Act where a

parent appears at a disposition hearing and is unwilling or unable to provide care and

attention to a child.

Where a parent is unwilling or unable to provide care for a child at a CINA

disposition hearing, with or without having surrendered a child under the Safe Haven Act,

a parent may be subject to a neglect finding under CJ § 3-801. Such a parent may be subject

to a neglect finding because a parent who at a CINA disposition hearing is unwilling or

unable to provide proper care and attention to a child generally acknowledges a

circumstance—a failure to provide proper care and attention to a child—which in and of

-5-itself is a circumstance indicating a substantial risk of harm to the child, warranting a

finding of neglect under CJ § 3-801.

A parent does not necessarily place a child at a substantial risk of harm by leaving

an unharmed newborn at a designated facility without expressing an intent to return, which

is exactly what Maryland’s Safe Haven statute authorizes. The statute expressly

contemplates that the surrendering parent may leave the child and not come back. See CJ

§ 5-641(b)(1). The Majority’s conclusion that the definition of neglect is satisfied because

“there was no parent available, no legal custodian, no provision for [the twins’] ongoing

care, and no one legally obligated to feed, shelter, provide medical care for, or make

decisions for them in the long-term[,]” Maj. Slip Op. at 16, is at odds with the plain

language and purpose of the Safe Haven statute and fails to satisfy the definition of neglect

under CJ § 3-801.

The Majority’s attempt to ground a finding of neglect under CJ § 3-80(t)(1) on a

child who is surrendered under the Safe Haven statute having “no legal custodian” at the

time of discharge— because as the Majority puts it, there was “no legal custodian” and “no

one legally obligated to feed, shelter, provide medical care for, or make decisions for [the

twins] in the long-term”—is contrary to the plain language of both CJ § 5-641(b)(1) and

CJ § 3-801(t)(1). Maj. Slip Op. at 16. Under the Safe Haven statute’s plain language, the

parent’s nonreturn is not a separate, unexpected act of abandonment; it is the very

circumstance the Safe Haven statute anticipates and in fact requires—that the parent have

no intent to return. See CJ § 5-641(b)(1). Under CJ § 3-801(t)(1), the CINA statute setting

forth the definition of neglect, to establish neglect, a local department must prove that a

-6-parent left a child unattended or that a parent failed to give proper care and attention to a

child under circumstances that indicate “[t]hat the child’s health or welfare is harmed or

placed at substantial risk of harm[.]” CJ § 3-801(t)(1)(i).

Under the principles of statutory construction, the Safe Haven statute and CJ § 3-801(t)(1) must be read together, not in a way that causes one statute to nullify the provisions

of the other. See, e.g., Andrews & Lawrence Pro. Servs., LLC v. Mills, 467 Md. 126, 149,

223 A.3d 947, 960 (2020) (“When the statute to be interpreted is part of a statutory scheme,

it must be interpreted in that context. . . . [T]he statute as a whole must be construed,

interpreting each provision . . . in the context of the entire statutory scheme. Thus, statutes

on the same subject are to be read together and harmonized to the extent possible, reading

them so as to avoid rendering either of them, or any portion, meaningless, surplusage,

superfluous or nugatory.” (Citation modified)); Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 276,

987 A.2d 18, 29 (2010) (“We presume that the [General Assembly] intends its enactments

to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to

reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the

statute’s object and scope.” (Citations omitted)).

Yet, the Majority identifies a parent not retrieving a child from a designated facility,

after a surrender under the Safe Haven statute, as a circumstance that may constitute a

finding of neglect under the CINA statute because the child’s health or welfare is placed at

substantial risk of harm and “there is no parent or legal guardian who can make decisions

on their behalf.” See Maj. Slip Op. at 16 (citation omitted). The Majority identifies the

alleged neglect as Mother dropping the twins off at a designated facility and not appearing

-7-when the twins were medically ready for discharge because, according to the Majority,

there may be a substantial risk of harm to the children if the Department did not take charge

of the children. See Maj. Slip Op. at 16-17. But those circumstances do not satisfy the

statutory definition of neglect under CJ § 3-801(t)(1)(i), which requires circumstances

indicating that the child’s health or welfare “is harmed or placed at substantial risk of

harm.” Despite what the Majority says, at discharge, the twins were not left unattended or

without care. They remained well and cared for under the Safe Haven statutory process,

which contemplates that responsibility for a surrendered child will pass to a local

department of social services rather than back to the surrendering parent, who under the

statute must have no intent to return.

The Majority’s substantial risk conclusion rests on the false premise that the

Department’s involvement was akin to an independent rescue of the sort necessary to avert

the harm of an abandoned child having no legal custodian and provision for ongoing care.

See Maj. Slip Op. at 15-17. In the event of the surrender of a child under the Safe Haven

statute, however, the child’s transfer from hospital care to a local department of social

services is the statutory mandate. Maryland law requires a designated facility that accepts

an unharmed newborn to notify the local department within 24 hours, see CJ § 5-641(c)(2),

and the implementing regulations require the local department to assume responsibility

when the newborn is medically ready for discharge, see COMAR 07.02.27.03(D). The

twins therefore were not left with “no one to provide for [their] basic health or welfare

needs” at discharge. Maj. Slip Op. at 16.

-8-Under the Safe Haven statute, a surrendered child has legally prescribed sources of

care, first the hospital, then the local department. The Majority’s statement that the twins

were left with “no legal custodian, no provision for their ongoing care, and no one legally

obligated to feed, shelter, provide medical care for, or make decisions for them in the longterm[,]” Maj. Slip Op. at 16, treats the Department’s involvement as an unexpected

occurrence, when in fact it was the statutorily ordained legal consequence of compliance

with the Safe Haven Act. Because the intervention of a local department of social services

is what the Safe Haven statute contemplates and requires, a parent’s nonappearance at a

child’s discharge from a designated facility does not constitute a circumstance indicating

that the child’s health or welfare was harmed or placed at substantial risk of harm within

the meaning of CJ § 3-801(t)(1)(i). To hold otherwise is to convert the very process the

General Assembly enacted for the safe, anonymous relinquishment of a newborn into the

basis for an automatic neglect finding.

The Majority’s use of the Appellate Court’s holding in Doe, 205 Md. App. 47, 43

A.3d 1071, in its analysis of circumstances indicating a substantial risk of harm under CJ

§ 3-801(t)(1) in the context of the Safe Haven statute is flawed. See Maj. Slip Op. at 16-17. The Appellate Court’s holding in Doe stemmed from a materially different factual and

legal setting. In Doe, 205 Md. App. at 58-59, 43 A.3d at 1078, the caregivers of a teenaged

minor, M.C., had already engaged in conduct alleged to be neglectful before the

intervention of a local department of social services. The caregivers refused to permit the

minor, M.C., to return home, even though he was under eighteen, had medical needs, and

had nowhere else to go. See id. at 58-59, 43 A.3d at 1078. The Appellate Court held that

-9-this refusal itself placed M.C. at a substantial risk of harm, and that the local department of

social service’s prompt assumption of custody did not negate that risk. See id. at 60-61,

43 A.3d at 1079. As such, the parent or caregiver in Doe could not defeat a neglect finding

by asserting that, because the local department took over quickly, their conduct did not

create a substantial risk of harm at the time they refused to provide care for M.C. and that

no neglect occurred. See id. at 62, 43 A.3d at 1080.

To be sure, in Doe, id. at 61, 43 A.3d at 1079, the Appellate Court stated that “the

fact that the local department took charge of M.C. after he was found to be a child in need

of assistance cannot possibly relieve [the caregivers] of responsibility for neglect.” In

describing the risk of harm, however, the Appellate Court stated that “[t]he focus was the

risk of harm to the child at the time the child was not allowed to return home. By not

allowing the child to return home, the child . . . was legally placed at substantial risk of

harm.” Id. at 62, 43 A.3d at 1080 (footnote omitted). In Doe, id. at 58-59, 43 A.3d at 1078,

the caregivers created the risk of harm by barring the child from returning home, without

knowing where or how M.C. would receive care. The Appellate Court concluded that the

caregivers in Doe barred M.C. from the home with no provision for care, thereby creating

a risk of harm that resulted in a neglect finding. See id. at 60-61, 43 A.3d at 1079. By

contrast, in a Safe Haven surrender, the parent does not leave a child to uncertainty,

homelessness, or a lack of care. Instead, the parent delivers the child directly to a statutorily

designated facility that is obligated and prepared to accept the child and provide immediate

care with the understanding that the local department of social services will intervene.

- 10 -That distinction matters. In Doe, id. at 60-61, 43 A.3d at 1079, the Appellate Court

concluded that the State’s intervention did not erase the caregivers’ earlier misconduct.

Under the Safe Haven statute, however, the surrender itself is an act contemplated by

statute, and a designated facility’s acceptance of a child ensures that there is no lack of care

or risk of harm as defined by CJ § 3-801(t)(1). In Doe, 205 Md. App. at 61, 43 A.3d at

1079, the local department stepped in only after wrongful conduct of the caregivers had

already created the asserted risk of harm that the Appellate Court determined to be neglect.

Under the Safe Haven statute, the care provided by a designated facility and local

department are built into the lawful surrender process from the outset. Unless there is

evidence of earlier or existing neglect, before a parent surrenders a child in compliance

with the Safe Have statute, the Appellate Court’s holding in Doe is not applicable. The

Majority has failed to establish any basis for concluding that surrendering a child under the

statute, under circumstances in which care will be provided first by a designated facility

and next by a local department of social services, is a circumstance that indicates that the

child’s health or welfare is harmed or placed at substantial risk of harm.

The Majority equates the act of surrendering a child to a designated facility in

compliance with the Safe Haven statute with the act of abandoning a child. It appears that

the Majority sees no distinction between a mother abandoning a child or safely

surrendering a child to a designated facility under the Safe Haven statute because,

according to the Majority, the mother is leaving the child without a legal custodian. See

Maj. Slip Op. at 16 (“The act of abandoning the child at the designated facility places the

child at ‘substantial risk of harm[,]’ CJP § 3-801(t)(1)(i), because without intervention by

- 11 -the local department, there is no one to provide for the child’s basic health or welfare

needs.” (Alteration in original)). But the Safe Haven statute was enacted precisely for a

parent to safely leave a child in the care of others without the intent to return. In both

situations, a mother relinquishes a child. The difference, however, is what happens to the

child. In a Safe Haven surrender, the child is placed directly with people who can provide

immediate protection and care, while in a non-Safe Haven abandonment, a child may be

exposed to a risk of harm. So, the law has every reason to treat the situations differently.

Otherwise, the Safe Haven statute would be meaningless; the General Assembly would

have created a protected way to surrender a child, while at the same time treating the

surrender no differently from an unsafe abandonment.3

The General Assembly enacted the Safe Haven statute on the premise that a parent

may relinquish a child safely, anonymously, and without any expectation of returning, so

that the child would be protected rather than endangered. It is difficult to conceive that the

General Assembly would have created a statutory scheme under which a parent who took

In fact, under the Majority’s holding that the neglect finding rests on the circumstances that “there was no parent available, no legal custodian, no provision for [the twins’] ongoing care, and no one legally obligated to feed, shelter, provide medical care for, or make decisions for them in the long-term[,]” and that the twins “had been left without permanent provision for their care, placing them at substantial risk of harm[,]” Maj. Slip Op. at 16-17, a voluntary legally arranged adoption by a birth parent could result in a finding of neglect, if there were a time period during the process in which there was no legally identified custodian, e.g., the down time between a voluntary termination of parental rights and the finalization of the adoption. Moreover, the timeframe in which there is no legal custodian available in a Safe Haven surrender is extremely brief in that a local department of social services is required to immediately petition for a shelter care order for a child with limited guardianship granted to the department.

- 12 -the authorized action would be deemed to place any surrendered child at a substantial risk

of harm as required for a finding of neglect under CJ § 3-801.

In the event of a surrender under the Safe Haven statute, a determination of neglect

should be made on a case-by-case basis. Using a Safe Haven designated facility and not

returning, which is what is anticipated by the statute, should not automatically result in a

finding that a parent has neglected a child. The Majority’s holding that “a parent’s

surrender of a newborn pursuant to the Safe Haven Act may constitute neglect under CJP

§ 3-801(t)(1) where the uncontested facts establish that the surrendered child had no legal

custodian and no provision for care upon hospital discharge, placing the child at substantial

risk of harm[,]” Maj. Slip Op. at 28, amounts to an automatic finding of neglect under CJ

§ 3-801. Where a child is surrendered anonymously under the Safe Haven Act, as

contemplated, the wording of the Majority’s holding will almost always be satisfied.

Holding that a parent’s compliant Safe Haven surrender and not being available at the time

that a child is discharged from a hospital places a child at substantial risk of harm and

results in a neglect finding under CJ § 3-801(t)(1) will have a chilling effect on a parent’s

willingness to surrender a child pursuant to the Act and will inhibit a parent’s ability to be

reunited with a child after a surrender.

I understand the practical concern. If neglect is not established under the CINA

statute, the question becomes how will a local department obtain the authority necessary

to provide long-term care for a child? I do not think that the solution is to stretch a neglect

finding to cover conduct that the Safe Haven statute was specifically meant to allow. That

would involve the juvenile court making a neglect finding not because neglect actually

- 13 -occurred, but because a local department needs some legal authority for limited

guardianship, e.g., the Majority states: “We are aware that our holding requires us to attach

the label of ‘neglect’ to an act the General Assembly has affirmatively encouraged and

sought to protect. That cannot be helped.” Maj. Slip Op. at 26.

If, absent a neglect finding, the Safe Haven Act and provisions of the Courts and

Judicial Proceedings Article concerning CINA proceedings result in a potential gap in care

where a child is surrendered under the Act, this is a matter for the General Assembly to

address rather than for this Court to do so by contorting the definition of the term “neglect”

to include surrendering a child under the Act. The better course is clarification by the

General Assembly, not judicially redefining protected conduct as neglect under the CINA

statute. The Safe Haven statute could be amended to provide that, upon a compliant

surrender under the Safe Haven Act, the juvenile court may place a child in a local

department’s custody and grant limited guardianship to the local department of social

services, without the requirement of a neglect finding under CJ § 3-801. If the current

statutory scheme does not clearly provide a local department with the ability to obtain

guardianship of a child after a surrender without a finding of neglect, the gap should be

addressed directly by the General Assembly rather than by the Majority treating conduct

the statute was designed to permit as neglect.

A compliant Safe Haven surrender does not, by itself, under the plain language of

CJ § 5-641 or CJ § 3-801 constitute neglect or serve as the automatic basis for a neglect

finding. In the event that a parent surrenders a child under the Safe Haven Act, a finding

of neglect under the CINA statute should rest on conduct that fits the definition of neglect

- 14 -under CJ § 3-801(t)(1), such as evidence of abuse or neglect that occurred before or during

the surrender of the child under the Act, a parent’s continued absence and failure to

participate in CINA adjudication and disposition proceedings, or other post-surrender

conduct showing an actual unwillingness or inability to provide proper care at the time of

such proceedings.

For all of the reasons set forth above, I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate

Court.

Justice Eaves has authorized me to state that she joins in this opinion.

- 15 -

IN re: B.Cd. & B.Cb.

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain