[Cite as Wu v. Li, 2026-Ohio-2705.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PICKAWAY COUNTY
HSU CHANG WU, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : CASE NO. 25CA6
v. :
CHENG-HAN LI, : DECISION & JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellee. :
APPEARANCES:
Hsu Chang Wu, Orient, Ohio, pro se.
Jonathan T. Tyack and Kelsey A. Kornblunt, Columbus, Ohio, for appellee.
________________________________________________________________ CIVIL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:7-8-26
ABELE, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Pickaway County Common Pleas
Court Civ.R. 41(B) judgment of dismissal. Hsu Chang Wu,
plaintiff below and appellant herein, raises the following
assignments of error for review:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY DENYING PLAINTIFF’S OCTOBER
30, 2024, MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
AGAINST DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT’S
RULING LACKED A SOUND REASONING PROCESS AND
THE MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.”
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED IT
DISCRETION BY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S JANUARY
Pickaway App. NO. 25CA6 2
15, 2025, CIVIL RULE 26(C)MOTION FOR
PROTECTIVE ORDER.”
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE UNDER CIV.R.
41(B).”
{¶2} On October 2, 2003, appellant filed a complaint and
alleged that appellee sent her threatening messages.
Apparently, appellant provided a Connecticut address for the
service of the complaint. Appellee, however, did not reside in
Connecticut and did not receive a copy of the complaint.
Shortly thereafter, appellant sought and obtained a default
judgment.
{¶3} Subsequently, appellee filed a motion for relief from
the default judgment, along with a motion to stay the execution
of the judgment. At the hearing on the motion, appellee
testified that he never resided in Connecticut, never worked in
Connecticut, never visited Connecticut and never received any
court documents from Connecticut. Consequently, the trial court
determined that appellee had not been properly served and
granted appellee’s request for relief from judgment.
{¶4} Appellant, after several more attempts, apparently
completed service of complaint. In the meantime, appellant
filed a second action against appellee that appellant eventually
voluntarily dismissed.
Pickaway App. NO. 25CA6 3
{¶5} In December 2024, the magistrate conducted a scheduling
conference and instructed appellant to provide the trial court
with her valid address in order to establish her connection with
Pickaway County when the alleged incidents occurred.
Additionally, appellant failed to respond to various requests
for discovery, including a description of the specific content
of the alleged threatening messages, requests for admission, and
inter alia, a proper address. Apparently, appellant eventually
listed an address that resulted in the “return to sender” due to
an insufficient address. Appellant then provided an Orient,
Ohio address for an apartment complex. However, the property
manager for the complex indicated that neither appellant nor her
spouse resided at the complex.
{¶6} In January 2025, appellee filed a motion to dismiss the
action. One month later, the trial court granted appellee’s
request for dismissal and pointed out that appellant “does not,
and never has, lived in Pickaway County. To concede that fact,
she disobeyed the instructions of this Court that she file a
proper residential address with the Clerk.” The court further
indicated that appellant “intentionally misrepresented the fact
that she has never resided in Pickaway County and has
participated in multiple lawsuits under at least three name
variations and four different addresses.” Consequently, the
court dismissed appellant’s complaint with prejudice. Civ.R. Pickaway App. NO. 25CA6 4
41(B). This appeal followed.
{¶7} For ease of discussion, we combine appellant’s
assignments of error and first address the Civ.R. 41(B)
dismissal with prejudice. In her third assignment of error,
appellant asserts that the trial court erred because the “court
may not dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice under
Civ.R. 41(B)(1) because Plaintiff did not fail to prosecute, did
not fail to comply with Civil Rules, and did not fail to comply
with any court order.” Appellant argues that “three issues
warrant a reversal” of the trial court’s judgment: (1) appellant
did not misrepresent her residential address to the court; (2)
the court did not classify her “alleged misrepresentation of her
address as a failure to prosecute, did not identify any rule
that had been violated and did not cite any court order that
appellant violated; and (3) although the trial court stated that
appellant “disobeyed” the court’s instructions to file a proper
address with the Clerk, the court did not cite any court order
that appellant violated.
{¶8} Appellee, however, argues that the trial court properly
dismissed the action with prejudice because “Pickaway County was
not the proper venue and it was impossible to know where venue
would be proper due to [appellant’s] perjurious conduct in this
case and other lawsuits throughout Ohio.” Appellee points out
that appellant misrepresented her address to the trial court, Pickaway App. NO. 25CA6 5
provided “numerous different addresses in filings and
depositions in her various lawsuits,” and, although appellant
claimed to reside in Pickaway County when the alleged misconduct
occurred, the evidence, in fact, reveals that appellant never
resided in Pickaway County. While appellee concedes that courts
should, in general, choose to transfer actions to a proper venue
rather than enter an outright dismissal, appellee points out
that here no clear answer exists as to proper venue because
appellant “(1) misrepresented to the trial court and Li that she
resided at the Ashville address; (2) refused to provide
information regarding her address history to [appellee] in
discovery; (3) lied in her discovery responses that she was not
the party in her other lawsuits when she indeed was; (4) lied in
her discovery responses that she did not live at the locations
she provided in her other lawsuits when she did indeed did (or
at least said she did); and (5) provided multiple different
addresses in her other lawsuits that overlapped with the
relevant time period of this case.” As such, appellee reasons,
the trial court should not guess “whether venue would be proper
in Franklin County, some other county in Ohio, California, or
some other state altogether” because the answer is entirely
unclear in light of appellant’s conduct. Thus, appellee argues
that trial court had no choice but to dismiss the case for
improper venue.
Pickaway App. NO. 25CA6 6
{¶9} In the case sub judice, we recognize that the trial
court expended substantial time and effort in its attempt to
determine whether appellant could establish venue in Pickaway
County. The trial court’s “Decision and Entry” is instructive
and provides in pertinent part:
Should this case be dismissed for lack of venue?
This case was filed by Plaintiff Hsu-Chang Wu on
October 2, 2003. At that time, Plaintiff Wu listed her
address as 800 Long Street, Ashville, Ohio, which is
within this Court’s jurisdiction of Pickaway County,
Ohio. From the date of filing and through December 13,
2024, every piece of correspondence mailed by the
Pickaway County Clerk of Courts was returned for
insufficient address. As noted above, On December 13,
2024, Magistrate Kowalski ordered Plaintiff Wu to file
a proper address with the Pickaway County Clerk of
Courts. The plaintiff protested that she feared the
defendant and did not want him to know where she resided.
At that time, and on the record, Magistriate Kowalski
advised Plaintiff Wu that the Clerk’s office could
redact her address from public records upon her request.
Instead of following these clear instructions,
Plaintiff waited until January 3, 2025, after this Court
ordered the parties to brief venue, to put an address on
the record. The Magistrate had instructed the plaintiff
to file her proper home address and to fill out the
paperwork to have that address redacted from public
records. Instead, the plaintiff obtained a post office
box in Orient, Ohio and filed that address to the record.
The exhibits to the January 17, 2025, motion to
dismiss show that one day after this Complaint in
Pickaway County, Plaintiff filed a document in Lebanon
Municipal Court claiming her name is Albie Wu and listing
her address as 1396 North High Street, Columbus, Ohio.
(Def. 1/17/25 MTD.Exh. X) Roughly two weeks later, on
October 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed a document in the
Franklin County Clerk of Common Pleas claiming her name
is Alby Wu and listing her address as 150 Airport
Pickaway App. NO. 25CA6 7
Boulevard, Apartment 430, San Francisco, California.
(Def. 1/17/25 MTD.Exh. Y.) A week later, Plaintiff was
deposed by Attorney David Goldstein. She identified
herself as Alby Wu and gave an address of 3584 Heywood
Drive, Hilliard, Ohio. (Def. 1/17/25 MTD.Exh. N.) The
list goes on of these different names and addresses being
used, which is well documented in Defendant’s motion to
dismiss and supported by the exhibits therein.
Of particular concern is a statement made by
Plaintiff Wu in a deposition on August 14, 2024. She
was asked about the Ashville address and she responded,
“That’s an apartment that I specifically rent to find
the suit against him [Defendant Li] because I didn’t –
I never want him to know where I lived so he could file
me ***(Def. 1/17/25 MTD. Exh. O.)
Defendant Li subpoenaed the Ashville apartment
complex where Plaintiff Wu claimed to have lived. The
address previously given by the plaintiff, 800 Long
Street, Ashville, Ohio is an apartment complex called
The Lakes at Ashton Village. The property manager of
The Lakes at Ashton Village searched the records from
January 1, 2017, to the present and swore out an
affidavit attesting that no individual under the names
used by Plaintiff Wu, or many other possible variants of
that name, has rented an apartment at the complex in
that time frame. (Def. 1/17/25 MTF. Exh. J.)
The evidence before this Court shows that Plaintiff
Wu has never resided in Pickaway County. A review of
Civ.R. 3 confirms that being a resident of Pickaway
County is the only possible way Plaintiff Wu would have
venue for this matter.
Civ.R. 3(D)(1) instructs: “When an action has been
commenced in a county other than stated to be proper in
division (C) of this rule, upon timely assertion of the
defense of improper venue as provided in Civ.R. 12,the
court shall transfer the action to a county stated to be
proper in division (C) of this rule.” However, a review
of the record here shows that there is no way for this
Court to determine where venue might be proper.
Should this case be dismissed under Civ.R. 41(B)?
Civ. R. 41(B)(1) instructs: “Where the plaintiff
fails to prosecute, or comply with these rules or any
court order, the court upon motion of a defendant or on
its own motion may, after notice to the plaintiff’s
counsel, dismiss an action or claim.”
Pickaway App. NO. 25CA6 8
As noted above, Plaintiff Wu was ordered to put her
full Ashville address on the record on December 13, 2025,
Magistrate Kowalski clearly explained that the plaintiff
needed to show that she lived in Pickaway County or risk
dismissal and directed the plaintiff to “stop at the
Clerk’s office and talk about how to get a proper address
on the record and have it redacted.” (Dec. 13 conference
at 5:22 & 28:50.)
The plaintiff responded on January 3, 2025, with a
Post Office Box address in Orient, Ohio. In that filing,
Plaintiff claimed that she had spoken to the “court
staff/employees” “on that same day” as the December 13,
2024, hearing. However, the Magistrate had checked with
the Clerk’s office employees roughly one hour after the
hearing to obtain the correct address and the staff
informed her that plaintiff had not spoken to them and
had not provided a proper address. Affidavit of Loribeth
Kowalski. ¶ 7. Attached as Exh.A. The magistrate asked
the staff to inform her if an address was put on the
record. Id. at ¶ 8. No address was submitted until
January 3, 2025.
Plaintiff claims that January 3, 2025, filing that
“the court staff advised that Plaintiff get a P.O. Box
and not let Defendant know her physical address.” After
receiving that filing, Magistrate Kowalski again spoke
to the Clerk’s office. Id. at ¶ 10. The staff assured
her that they do not advise litigants to get P.O. Boxes
but instead offer a procedure to redact the residential
address. Id. at ¶ 11. The staff further confirmed that
they had not had such an interaction or conversation
with Plaintiff Wu. Id.
The evidence before this Court is convincing.
Plaintiff has concurrently participated in multiple
lawsuits under at least three name variations and four
different addresses.1 Plaintiff does not, and never has,
lived in Pickaway County. To conceal that fact, she
disobeyed the instructions of this Court that she file
a proper residential address with the Clerk.
In conclusion this Court finds that venue is not
proper in Pickaway County, Ohio. While the usual
practice is the transfer a case to the court of proper
venue, this Court cannot determine what court that would
1 “Inaddition, the record reflects that Plaintiff obtained a Civil Protection Order in Union County days before filing the suit at hand. The records before the Court do not reflect what address she used to obtain that Civil Protection Order, but Civ.R.3 (C)(10) requires that a petitioner reside within the county where they apply for a Civil Protection Order.” Pickaway App. NO. 25CA6 9
be. Further, this case is being DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
under Civ.R. 41(B). The Court notes that the record
reflects that Plaintiff has never lived in Pickaway
County and that she intentionally misrepresented this
fact to the Court. IT IS SO ORDERED. (emphasis in the
original)
{¶10} We recognize that a dismissal with prejudice is
severe and permanent and should be applied with great
caution. Nevertheless, in the case sub judice we believe
that this sanction is appropriate in view of the fact that
appellant, inter alia, failed to provide truthful and
complete discovery, failed to provide a valid address,
proceeded in a dilatory fashion and failed to establish any
connection whatsoever with Pickaway County. See,
generally, James v. Hartranft (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 368,
678 N.E.2d 530.
{¶11} In Carter v. Univ. Park Dev. Corp., 2017-Ohio5795 (9th Dist.) at ¶ 19, the court wrote:
“Civ.R. 41 governs the dismissal of actions. Civ.R.
41(B)(1) provides that “[w]here the plaintiff fails to
prosecute, or comply with these rules or any court order,
the court upon motion of a defendant or on its own motion
may, after notice to the plaintiff’s counsel, dismiss an
action or claim.” A dismissal under this section is an
adjudication of the merits of the dispute unless
otherwise provided by the trial court. Civ.R. 41(B)(3).
The notice requirement in Civ.R. 41(B)(1) supports “the
fundamental tenet of judicial review in Ohio [] that
courts should decide cases on their merits.” See State
ex rel. Becker v. Eastlake, 93 Ohio St.3d 502, 505
(2001). Although this Court reviews the trial court’s
dismissal of an action for an abuse of discretion,
“dismissals with prejudice are subject to heightened
scrutiny.” Esser v. Murphy, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25945,
Pickaway App. NO. 25CA6 10
2012-Ohio-1168, ¶ 9, citing Quonset Hut, Inc. v. Ford
Motor Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 46, 47-48 (1997). The Supreme
Court elaborated:
The extremely harsh sanction of dismissal
should be reserved for cases when an
attorney’s conduct falls substantially below
what is reasonable under the circumstances
evidencing a complete disregard for the
judicial system or the rights of the opposing
party. In other words, dismissal is reserved
for those cases in which the conduct of a party
is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious,
or dilatory as to provide substantial grounds
for a dismissal with prejudice for failure to
prosecute or obey a court order. Absent such
extreme circumstances, a court should first
consider lesser sanctions before dismissing a
case with prejudice.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted) Sazima v.
Chalko, 86 Ohio St.3d 151, 158 (1999). “Proper factors
for the consideration in a Civ.R. 41(B)(1) dismissal
with prejudice include the drawn-out history of the
litigation * * * and other evidence that a plaintiff is
deliberately proceeding in dilatory fashion or has done
so in a previously filed, and voluntarily dismissed,
action.” Jones v. Hartranft, 78 Ohio St.3d 368, 372
(1997), citing Link v. Wabash RR. Co., 370 U.S. 626,
633-635 (1962) and Indus. Risk Insurers v. Lorenz Equip.
Co., 69 Ohio St.3d 576 (1994), syllabus.”
{¶12} After our review of this matter, we agree with the
trial court that, rather than use the legal process to seek
accountability and redress for an alleged wrong, appellant,
instead, engaged in an alarming number of instances of
misrepresentation, deception and dilatory conduct. Appellant
engaged in a pattern of filing multiple lawsuits against
multiple defendants in multiple jurisdictions using multiple
variations of appellant’s name and address. The term “forum Pickaway App. NO. 25CA6 11
shopping” does not begin to describe appellant’s conduct in
seeking to bring an action in a county that has no connection
whatsoever to the parties or to the alleged underlying claim.
Appellant’s conduct is inexplicable and unacceptable.
{¶13} Consequently, even when viewed under the heightened
level of scrutiny expressed in Carter, we agree with the trial
court that appellant’s conduct exhibited a complete disregard
for the judicial system and the rights of the opposing party.
Moreover, with respect to appellant’s assertion that the trial
court erred in deciding the request for a default judgment and
the request for a protective order, we find no error.
{¶14} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we
hereby affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Pickaway App. NO. 25CA6 12
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that
appellant shall pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this
appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this
Court directing the Pickaway County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Hess, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY:__________________________
Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.