Supreme Court
No. 2025-83-C.A.
(P2/23-2689AG)
State :
v. :
Noel Ignacio Moronta. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email [email protected], of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2025-83-C.A.
(P2/23-2689AG)
State :
v. :
Noel Ignacio Moronta. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Robinson, Lynch Prata, Long, and Indeglia (ret.), JJ.
OPINION
Justice Long, for the Court. The defendant, Noel Ignacio Moronta
(defendant or Mr. Moronta), appeals from a judgment of conviction and commitment
following a bench trial at which he was found guilty of failing to report a death with
the intention of concealing a crime, to wit, possession with intent to deliver a
controlled substance, and a number of other crimes relating to possession and intent
to deliver fentanyl, xylazine, and cocaine. Before this Court, Mr. Moronta argues
that police officers entered an apartment without a warrant in the absence of exigent
circumstances and that the trial justice erred in denying his motion to suppress the
fruits of the warrantless search. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we conclude
that the trial justice erred in denying Mr. Moronta’s motion to suppress. We
-1-therefore vacate his conviction and remand the case to the Superior Court for a new
trial.
Facts and Procedural History
We glean the following summary of relevant facts from the record of
proceedings in the Superior Court. See State v. Hudgen, 272 A.3d 1069, 1075 (R.I.
2022). In January 2023, Rhode Island State Police Detective Juan Coronado, a
member of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Task Force, learned
from a confidential informant that two individuals known as “Noel” and “Ari” were
selling and distributing drugs. Through his investigation, Det. Coronado discovered
that these individuals were Mr. Moronta and Nelson Reyes (Mr. Reyes). Detective
Coronado established surveillance operations at 113 Sisson Street in Providence
(113 Sisson) and 716 Central Avenue in Johnston (716 Central)—addresses linked
to Mr. Moronta and Mr. Reyes respectively. Detective Coronado also observed Mr.
Moronta going to a third address, 20 Metcalf Avenue in North Providence (20
Metcalf). Detective Coronado subsequently learned that Noelia Moronta Palata (Ms.
Moronta Palata), Mr. Moronta’s sister, lived at 20 Metcalf. He also discovered that
there were utility accounts associated with this address for the first and second floors
of the building but not the third floor.
After maintaining intermittent physical surveillance of 20 Metcalf throughout
February 2023 and observing Mr. Moronta coming and going on several occasions,
-2-Det. Coronado installed a pole camera that allowed him to more closely surveil the
outside of 20 Metcalf remotely via a live feed. Detective Coronado observed Mr.
Moronta visiting 20 Metcalf an average of three times a week; he saw Mr. Reyes
visit as well. As part of this investigation, Det. Coronado also directed his
confidential informant to make two controlled drug buys from Mr. Moronta in
February and early April 2023.
Although not known to detectives at the time, on April 3, 2023, Mr. Moronta
attended a birthday party in Massachusetts with his then-girlfriend, Marien Solano
(Ms. Solano); Ms. Solano had asked Mr. Moronta to invite his sister, but Ms.
Moronta Palata did not answer her phone when he tried to reach her. The next day,
Mr. Moronta called Ms. Solano expressing concern that something had happened to
his sister and later asked her to leave work and meet him at 20 Metcalf. She drove
to 20 Metcalf and found that Mr. Moronta had already arrived, so she proceeded to
the second floor. Upon entering the second-floor apartment, she observed that Mr.
Moronta was upset and saw Ms. Moronta Palata lying unresponsive on the bathroom
floor. Ms. Solano did not have a phone with her, but Mr. Moronta told her that he
would call 911. Ms. Solano left the apartment shortly after this conversation, and
no one called for emergency services.
That same day, Det. Coronado received information from his confidential
informant that “a deceased person was possibly inside” 20 Metcalf. In reviewing
-3-the surveillance footage from the pole camera, Det. Coronado observed Mr.
Moronta, Mr. Reyes, and Ms. Solano coming and going from the building that day.
Detective Coronado relayed this information to the HIDTA team, who dispatched
Detective Justin Andreozzi, another HIDTA task force member, and put 113 Sisson
under surveillance. Detective Andreozzi observed Mr. Moronta and Mr. Reyes
leaving 113 Sisson and followed them to the corner of Fruit Hill Avenue and Metcalf
Avenue (several blocks from 20 Metcalf), where they were stopped by several police
officers. Detective Andreozzi approached the men, who were standing outside the
vehicle, and performed a pat down of Mr. Moronta. Detective Andreozzi felt a hard
object in Mr. Moronta’s pocket, removed that object, and discovered that it was a
set of keys. Detective Andreozzi asked Mr. Moronta where he was going, and Mr.
Moronta gestured towards Metcalf Avenue in the direction of 20 Metcalf. Detective
Andreozzi then took the keys and proceeded to 20 Metcalf.
While the traffic stop was still ongoing, Det. Coronado, in concert with his
HIDTA supervisor, made the decision to enter 20 Metcalf based on what he observed
from the pole camera and the tip from the informant. The officers knocked and
announced their presence before forcibly entering first the building and then the
second-floor apartment. Officers conducted a sweep of the entire apartment and
found an unresponsive person on the floor of the bathroom, who was later identified
as Ms. Moronta Palata. Officers then proceeded to the third floor and forcibly
-4-entered the third-floor apartment to do a sweep. They did not find any people, but
they did see drug paraphernalia and contraband in plain view.
When Det. Andreozzi arrived at 20 Metcalf with the keys, he discovered that
officers had already forcibly entered the second and third floors. He tried the keys
in the door locks of the second- and third-floor apartments and found that they were
a match. Detective Coronado subsequently secured a search warrant for 20 Metcalf,
113 Sisson, and 716 Central, as well as for the vehicles used by Mr. Moronta, Mr.
Reyes, and Ms. Solano.
The state charged Mr. Moronta on August 21, 2023, with failing to report a
death with the intention of concealing a crime, to wit, possession with intent to
deliver a controlled substance, and conspiracy to violate the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 23-4-7 (Count 1); felony drug
conspiracy, in violation of G.L. 1956 § 21-28-4.08 (Count 2); possession of one
ounce to one kilogram of a mixture containing a detectable amount of fentanyl, in
violation of § 21-28-4.01.1(a)(7) (Count 3); possession with intent to deliver
fentanyl, in violation of § 21-28-4.01(a)(4)(i) (Count 4); possession with intent to
deliver xylazine, in violation of § 21-28-4.01(a)(4)(iii) (Count 5); possession of more
than ten grams but less than one ounce of xylazine, in violation of
§ 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(ii) (Count 6); possession of ten grams or less of cocaine, in
-5-violation of § 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(i) (Count 7); and keeping and maintaining a narcotics
nuisance, in violation of § 21-28-4.06(b)(1) (Count 10).
On September 26, 2023, Mr. Moronta moved to suppress all evidence
obtained as a result of his warrantless arrest and the warrantless search of 20 Metcalf,
alleging that both his arrest and the search and seizure were unlawful and violated
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 6 of
the Rhode Island Constitution. On October 2, 2023, the Superior Court held a
hearing on Mr. Moronta’s motion to suppress the fruits of the warrantless search of
his person following his arrest and the evidence found in 20 Metcalf after the
warrantless search of the second and third floors.
At the suppression hearing, the state called Det. Coronado and Det.
Andreozzi. During the state’s questioning of Det. Coronado, he testified that officers
“made entry into the third floor in an attempt to locate any other bodies or anything
else.” On cross-examination, however, Det. Coronado admitted there was no
indication that anyone was in the third-floor apartment:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You had no information about
the third floor or anybody being in the third floor; am I
correct?
“[DET. CORONADO]: No. Sorry, I had no information,
yes.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You had no information from
your informant that there is a dead body in the third floor,
correct?
-6-“[DET. CORONADO]: Correct.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You had no information that
there was anybody in the third floor; am I correct?
“[DET. CORONADO]: Correct. Correct.”
On redirect, the prosecutor asked Det. Coronado about whether he saw
extension cords leading from the second floor to the third floor of 20 Metcalf; he
responded in the affirmative and explained that he knew that there were no active
utility accounts tied to the third-floor apartment. When pressed on recross, though,
Det. Coronado confirmed that he did not mention the extension cords in the affidavit
he submitted as part of the search warrant application or mention them to the judge
who signed the warrant, nor did he make any notes about the extension cords or take
any pictures of them.
After the detectives testified, the state defended the officers’ warrantless entry
of the second- and third-floor apartments of 20 Metcalf by asserting that the ongoing
emergency—namely, the report of a dead body—justified the warrantless entry.
Alternatively, it argued, the possibility of destruction of evidence also supported
entry into the third-floor apartment. The defense responded that the information
received from the confidential informant contradicted the idea that any exigency
extended to justify entry of the third-floor apartment. Defense counsel also
emphasized that the detectives’ actions undermined the notion of an exigency and
that, in particular, the suppression hearing was the “very first time [that] anyone is
-7-ever hearing about these extension cords [and that] in an information package that is
over 300 pages long, with over 300 pictures, there is ten search warrants, multiple
police reports, there is absolutely not one shred of evidence or any mention of these
extension cords * * *.” The trial justice then reserved his decision and adjourned
the proceeding.
The next day, the trial justice announced his decision regarding the motion to
suppress. He concluded that both the seizure of the keys found on Mr. Moronta’s
person in the course of the warrantless arrest and the warrantless search of both the
second- and third-floor apartments at 20 Metcalf were justified because “these police
officers were responding to a sudden emergency involving a possible death of a
person related to an individual who had been under investigation and surveillance
for approximately four months.” The trial justice found that “the police officer acted
rationally and properly in the interest of protecting citizens from harm and
destruction of property.” He then denied defendant’s motion to suppress the keys
and evidence seized from the third floor of 20 Metcalf.
The trial justice then began the trial. During the trial, the state called four
witnesses: Det. Coronado; Alexander Chirkov, M.D., the acting chief medical
examiner for the Rhode Island Department of Health; Ms. Solano; and Det.
Andreozzi. Detective Coronado testified again at trial, beginning with his
involvement in the drug trafficking task force, and detailing in depth the events of
-8-April 4. Doctor Chirkov explained that he assisted another member of the Medical
Examiner’s Office in performing the autopsy of Ms. Moronta Palata and summarized
the results of this examination. Doctor Chirkov testified that the autopsy of Ms.
Moronta Palata revealed that she likely died of a drug overdose in the evening of
April 2 or sometime afterwards. Ms. Solano recounted wanting to invite Ms.
Moronta Palata to a birthday party and being unable to reach her, as well as her visit
to 20 Metcalf with Mr. Moronta the following day. On cross-examination, Ms.
Solano acknowledged that she had never visited the third floor of 20 Metcalf, never
observed defendant go up to the third floor, and never saw defendant sell drugs to
anyone. Detective Andreozzi testified to his involvement in the surveillance
operation, his pat down of Mr. Moronta, and what he observed when he arrived at
20 Metcalf.
On November 11, 2023, the trial justice announced his decision. He found
the defendant guilty on all charges. The trial justice sentenced Mr. Moronta on
February 19, 2024, to twenty-five years at the Adult Correctional Institutions with
twenty years to serve and the balance of five years suspended with twenty years of
probation. Mr. Moronta then appealed to this Court.
Standard of Review
In reviewing a trial justice’s denial of a motion to suppress on Fourth
Amendment grounds, this Court “review[s] the record to determine, based on the
-9-totality of the circumstances, whether the evidence sought to be suppressed was
obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches
and seizures.” State v. Sinapi, 295 A.3d 787, 799 (R.I. 2023) (quoting State v.
Terzian, 162 A.3d 1230, 1238 (R.I. 2017)). As part of this review, “this Court gives
deference to a trial justice’s factual findings, and those historical ‘findings shall not
be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.’” State v. Quinlan, 921 A.2d 96, 105
(R.I. 2007) (quoting State v. Verrecchia, 766 A.2d 377, 382 (R.I. 2001)). “However,
when this Court reviews ‘an alleged violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights,
this Court must make an independent examination of the record to determine if the
defendant’s rights have been violated.’” State v. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d 1131, 1145
(R.I. 2016) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Harrison, 66 A.3d 432, 441 (R.I.
2013)).
Discussion
On appeal, Mr. Moronta argues that officers entered the third-floor apartment
without a warrant or exigent circumstances in violation of the Fourth Amendment
and article 1, section 6, and that therefore the fruits of this search must be
suppressed.1 We agree with Mr. Moronta that Det. Coronado and his team had no
constitutionally permissible reason to enter the third-floor apartment after finding
1
Mr. Moronta does not challenge the entry into the second-floor apartment on appeal. We assume without deciding that defendant has standing to challenge the entry into the third-floor apartment, as this has not been disputed by the parties.
- 10 -Ms. Moronta Palata’s body in the second-floor apartment and that the trial justice
therefore erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
The Fourth Amendment and article 1, section 6 protect the right of the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures. “It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)
(quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78 (1971)); see also State
v. Werner, 615 A.2d 1010, 1011 (R.I. 1992) (recognizing the same under article 1,
section 6). The United States Supreme Court has also held “that this presumption
may be overcome in some circumstances because ‘the ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011)
(quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). However, establishing
an exception to the warrant requirement requires clearing a high bar: “In
demonstrating a compelling and urgent necessity sufficient to circumvent the
constitutional mandate of a warrant, the police ‘bear a heavy burden.’” Terzian, 162
A.3d at 1241 (brackets omitted) (quoting Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1151).
One such exception to the warrant requirement exists when “‘the exigencies
of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey
- 11 -v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451, 456 (1948)). This Court has applied this exigent-circumstances exception when
“evidence is likely to be lost, destroyed, or removed during
the time required to obtain a warrant and when, because of
the circumstances, it is difficult to secure a warrant, a
warrantless entry and search may be justified. This
exception also encompasses the situation in which police
believe a person within requires immediate assistance or
other victims or intruders may still be present. ‘The need
to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is
justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an
exigency or emergency.’” State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d 361,
366 (R.I. 1983) (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392).
In order to justify circumventing the warrant requirement in the case of exigent
circumstances, “[t]he police must have an objective, reasonable belief that a crisis
can only be avoided by swift and immediate action.” State v. Gonsalves, 553 A.2d
1073, 1075 (R.I. 1989) (brackets omitted) (quoting Duquette v. Godbout, 471 A.2d
1359, 1363 (R.I. 1984)). However, “facts that were not known to the officer at the
time of the warrantless entry can never support a finding of exigent circumstances.”
Terzian, 162 A.3d at 1241.
Mr. Moronta stresses that at the time of their entry into the third-floor
apartment, officers had already found Ms. Moronta Palata’s body in the second-floor
apartment as the tip had suggested they would, and they perceived nothing that
would have indicated that anyone was in the third-floor apartment. Moreover, he
notes, police had already detained both Mr. Moronta and Mr. Reyes, further
- 12 -undermining the notion that there was a risk of someone destroying evidence in that
apartment. Mr. Moronta also disputes the state’s characterization of the warrantless
entry of the third-floor apartment as a “protective sweep” since there were no facts
to suggest that officers were in danger, citing Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990),
and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
The state argues before us that the warrantless entry into the third-floor
apartment was justified because, as the trial justice found, the situation constituted
an “all hands on deck” emergency, which was reinforced by the discovery of keys
on Mr. Moronta’s person during the traffic stop and the presence of the extension
cords leading to the third floor; the state also avers that what was found in the
third-floor apartment would have been inevitably discovered. However, the first
justification directly contradicts the information that officers possessed at the time
of the entry into the third-floor apartment, and the latter, as Mr. Moronta notes, was
not raised at any point during the proceedings below and is therefore waived.
The United States Supreme Court recently clarified its conception of the
emergency-aid exception in Case v. Montana, 607 U.S. 107 (2026), in which police
made a warrantless entry into the house of an individual credibly believed to be in
the midst of a mental health crisis who had possibly harmed himself (or who was at
- 13 -risk of doing so).2 Case, 607 U.S. at 110-11. The Supreme Court held that “an
emergency-aid entry provides no basis to search the premises beyond what is
reasonably needed to deal with the emergency while maintaining the officers’
safety.” Id. at 117. The state quotes this exact language to support the notion that
“while defendant and Reyes had already been detained, the police had no idea if
someone else was already in the home, possibly lying in wait or possibly clinging to
life.” However, as Mr. Moronta correctly notes, “the exigency that justified a
warrantless entry * * * evaporated once officers found [Ms. Moronta Palata’s]
body,” and there was no evidence to suggest that there was anyone on the third floor
in danger or anyone who could have endangered officers. The state’s reliance on
Case is therefore misplaced.
The trial justice erred in finding that an ongoing emergency justified entry into
the third-floor apartment—either for the sake of a full search or a protective sweep.
Although the state suggests that there could have been other people in the third-floor
apartment in need of assistance, there were no objective facts known to police at the
time of their entry to support this contention. In fact, Det. Coronado testified that he
“had no information that there were occupants in the third floor at the time.” When
2
Specifically, Mr. Case’s ex-girlfriend contacted police after he called her threatening suicide. Case v. Montana, 607 U.S. 107, 110 (2026). During the call, Mr. Case explained in detail a plan for how he would harm himself, and she heard a sound like the cocking of a gun and a subsequent “pop,” followed by silence on the line. Id. It was at this point that she called 911. Id.
- 14 -asked whether he heard anything “[o]n the third floor * * * that made [him] believe
there was anybody in the third floor [apartment],” he answered in the negative. The
state acknowledges that “there was no trail of blood, smells, or sounds inside the
house” but contends that “there was a dead body that had not been reported despite
many comings and goings that afternoon” and that “[t]here were also connections
between the second[-] and third-floor apartment and with fentanyl.”
The state’s argument overlooks the fact that the information Det. Coronado
received from the confidential informant, that Ms. Moronta Palata was possibly
deceased, was verified the moment officers found her body in the second-floor
apartment. This was the emergency justifying the warrantless entry for which
officers were administering aid. The informant provided nothing to suggest that
there was an emergency beyond Ms. Moronta Palata’s possible death, and Det.
Coronado failed to articulate anything he observed once inside 20 Metcalf alerting
him that an emergency was still ongoing.
The state offers two additional factors that it claims supports the warrantless
entry into the third-floor apartment beyond what the trial justice cited in his decision
denying the motion to suppress: (1) the traffic stop of Mr. Moronta in which officers
found keys to both the second- and third-floor apartments on his person 3 and (2)
3
The state contends that during the traffic stop, “defendant was found to possess keys to the second and third floor apartments,” but Det. Andreozzi did not testify
- 15 -officers’ on-scene observation of extension cords running from the second floor and
under the door to the third-floor apartment. It emphasizes that, by contrast, officers
did not attempt to enter or sweep the first-floor apartment, since its occupants had
no connection to Mr. Moronta, as evidence that officers did not exceed the scope of
what the exigency required. But, as Mr. Moronta notes, Det. Andreozzi did not
testify that he communicated about the existence of the keys to any of the officers
on the scene at 20 Metcalf before they entered the apartments, so this cannot support
Det. Coronado’s warrantless entry. Terzian, 162 A.3d at 1241. Further, the presence
of the extension cords cannot sustain the weight of the state’s argument here. Police
simply did not have an objectively reasonable basis to think that the extension cord
could, without more, suggest that anyone was in need of immediate aid in the
third-floor apartment, or that anyone posed a threat to officers’ safety. See Michigan
v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009).
Indeed, no cases support the state’s argument as to these factors as
justification. In Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), police made a
warrantless entry into a home after responding to a noise complaint because they
observed a fistfight occurring inside the house through the windows and that one of
the participants had been injured. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 400-01. In Case, upon
either during the suppression hearing or during the trial itself that he knew that those keys were to those apartments when he discovered them on defendant’s person.
- 16 -arriving at the defendant’s house, officers could see through the window an empty
handgun holster and a notepad with writing on it, which they interpreted to be a
suicide note, corroborating the report that preceded their arrival. Case, 607 U.S. at
110-11. In each case, police observed articulable indicia of harm to individuals.
Here, by contrast, Det. Coronado admitted that his officers did not perceive anything
to suggest that anyone was in danger on the third floor. Therefore, it was objectively
unreasonable for police to rely on the emergency-aid exception to justify their
warrantless entry to the third-floor apartment, and the trial justice erred in relying on
the emergency-aid exception to deny Mr. Moronta’s motion to suppress.
Moreover, the state does not offer any compelling reason why the warrantless
entry into the third-floor apartment was necessary to prevent the destruction of
evidence. Just like the emergency-aid exception, there must be an objectively
reasonable basis to support a fear that evidence could be at imminent risk of
destruction. See, e.g., King, 563 U.S. at 456, 462 (warrantless entry into apartment
could be justified based on noises heard by police that sounded like the destruction
of evidence). But here, there was no indication that anyone was in the third-floor
apartment, and with the knowledge that Mr. Moronta and Mr. Reyes were already in
custody and with police surrounding 20 Metcalf, there was objectively no risk of the
destruction of evidence in the third-floor apartment. Moreover, Det. Coronado
observed via the pole camera Ms. Solano leaving 20 Metcalf and did not identify
- 17 -anyone else that he feared could have been in the apartment. Therefore, the state’s
assertion that the warrantless entry was necessary to prevent the destruction of
evidence was unfounded, and the trial justice erred in relying on this justification in
denying Mr. Moronta’s motion to suppress.
Finally, the state argues that “the drug paraphernalia on the third floor would
have been inevitably discovered even without being observed in plain view during
the cursory search attendant to the exigent circumstances.” However, the state did
not raise this argument below, either at the motion to suppress stage or at trial.
Therefore, it is waived. See State v. Tavares, 312 A.3d 449, 458 (R.I. 2024) (“As we
have said on innumerable occasions, a litigant cannot raise an objection or advance
a new theory on appeal if it was not raised before the trial court.” (quoting State v.
Barros, 148 A.3d 168, 172 (R.I. 2016))).
The next question, then, is whether the trial justice’s failure to suppress the
evidence seized from the third-floor apartment was harmless. See Gonzalez, 136
A.3d at 1156 (noting that the harmless error principle applies to the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights). We
conclude that it was not. A harmless error is one that “in the setting of a particular
case is so unimportant and insignificant that it may, consistent with the Federal
Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the
conviction.” State v. Lopez, 943 A.2d 1035, 1043 (R.I. 2008) (brackets omitted)
- 18 -(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967)). “[W]hether or not an
error is harmless turns on whether it is reasonably possible that the error contributed
to the conviction.” Id. “When evaluating improperly admitted evidence, this Court
reviews the remainder of the evidence introduced to discern whether the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Ramirez, 936 A.2d 1254, 1267 (R.I.
2007).
Given the large volume of drugs and contraband seized from the third-floor
apartment, it is reasonable for us to infer that all of the counts with which Mr.
Moronta was charged (each containing an element related to drug possession) would
have been affected had the state been unable to rely on what was found within the
third-floor apartment. It would have also affected what evidence Det. Coronado had
to include in his warrant application, and therefore the subsequent searches of 113
Sisson and 716 Central. Therefore, we conclude without hesitation that this error
was not harmless.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial justice erred in denying the
motion to suppress the evidence seized from the third-floor apartment. The
defendant’s conviction is vacated, and we remand this case to the Superior Court for
a new trial.
- 19 -STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Title of Case State v. Noel Ignacio Moronta.
No. 2025-83-C.A.
Case Number
(P2/23-2689AG)
Date Opinion Filed July 15, 2026
Suttell, C.J., Robinson, Lynch Prata, Long, and
Justices
Indeglia (ret.), JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Melissa A. Long
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Daniel A. Procaccini
For State:
Brendan P. Sullivan
Department of Attorney General
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:
Piper Pehrson
Rhode Island Public Defender
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)