No. 668 July 15, 2026 519
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
Andrew Joseph HELLMAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Miranda Rose TUCKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Lane County Circuit Court
24CN01924; A185876
Clara L. Rigmaiden, Judge.
Argued and submitted April 8, 2026.
Lorena Reynolds argued the cause and filed the brief for
appellant.
No appearance by respondent.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.
O’CONNOR, J.
Reversed and remanded.
520 Hellman v. Tucker
O’CONNOR, J.
Mother appeals from an order denying her motion to
set aside or vacate the judgment of contempt entered against
her.1 Mother raises two assignments of error. In her first
assignment, mother argues that the trial court erred when
it determined that mother’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect was not grounds for relief from the contempt order pursuant to ORCP 71 B and C. In her second
assignment, mother argues that the trial court erred when
it determined that gross inequity was not grounds for relief
from the contempt order. On the first assignment of error,
we conclude that mother’s neglect was excusable pursuant
to ORCP 71 B(1). Because that is dispositive, we do not reach
the second assignment of error. Accordingly, we reverse and
remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion whether
to grant or deny relief from the contempt judgment under
ORCP 71 B(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
ORCP 71 B(1) provides, in relevant part, “On motion
and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party or such party’s legal representative from a judgment
for the following reasons: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect[.]” Whether a party’s conduct
or inaction constitutes mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect presents a question of law. Hoddenpyl v.
Fiskum, 281 Or App 42, 46, 383 P3d 432 (2016). “[W]e review
a trial court’s ultimate decision to grant or deny relief under ORCP 71 B(1) for abuse of discretion[.]” Id. In doing so, “we
set out the undisputed facts in the light most favorable to
the moving party,” in this case, mother, and “we accept the
trial court’s findings of disputed fact, if there is evidence to support those findings.” Union Lumber Co. v. Miller, 360 Or
767, 769, 388 P3d 327 (2017).
FACTS
Mother and father were parties to a domestic relations matter, which included a pending modification of custody and parenting time. We refer to that matter as the
domestic relations matter. Father, through counsel, filed a
1
Father has not made an appearance on appeal.
Cite as 351 Or App 519 (2026) 521
complaint that alleged that mother was in contempt of court
for willfully disobeying terms of a supplemental judgment
issued in the domestic relations matter and requesting
remedial sanctions, a motion for an order requiring mother
to appear and show cause why she should not be found in
contempt, and a declaration in support of that motion. The
complaint, motion, and declaration were filed as a new proceeding with a new case number, different from the domestic relations matter. We refer to that new proceeding as the
contempt matter.2
The complaint asked for an order for mother to show
cause why she should not be held in contempt for willfully
disobeying the provisions of a supplemental judgment in
the domestic relations matter that provided that “[n]either
parent shall move [child, K] from [the Springfield School
District] without a written mutual agreement of the parties
or a Court order.”
Father submitted a declaration with the complaint.
Father identified the pending motion to modify parenting
time in the domestic relations matter and wrote, “My attorney informs me that we will be filing a motion to consolidate both cases.” According to father, the parties agreed
to the relocation provisions in the supplemental judgment
“to address father’s concerns related to the instability for
[K] caused by mother’s frequent relocations and her history
of withholding parenting time.” Mother violated the supplemental judgment by moving to Albany, Oregon, without
father’s agreement or a court order and by failing to provide
her current address to father, according to father.
On May 3, 2024, mother was served with the complaint, motion, declaration, and an order to show cause
signed by the trial court, all of which were filed in the contempt matter. The order to show cause in the contempt
matter stated that “[i]t is hereby ordered that [mother]
appear before the above mentioned court at Lane County
Courthouse * * * at 9:00 a.m. on July 8, 2024.” At the same
time mother was served with that order, she was also served
2
We refer to the parties as mother and father, because that is how mother refers to the parties on appeal and how the trial court referred to the parties below.
522 Hellman v. Tucker
with a separate motion for order to show cause regarding
a motion for modification that father filed in the domestic
relations matter.
Mother failed to appear at the show-cause hearing
on July 8 in the contempt action. At the hearing on July 8,
the trial court and father’s attorney expressed that they had
been surprised to learn that the contempt matter was a separate case from the domestic relations matter. Father presented a prima facie case to show that mother had violated
the supplemental judgment by moving from Springfield to
Albany without father’s agreement and without a court order
permitting her to do so. The trial court found mother in contempt. The court acknowledged that father had a pending
request for modification in the domestic relations matter. As
a remedy for the contempt, the trial court awarded father
more parenting time with K until father’s request for modification in the domestic relations matter was resolved.
On July 10, mother’s attorney filed a motion to
reopen the record or set a new trial in the contempt matter.
On July 12, the trial court entered a judgment of contempt
against mother, finding that she was in default for failing
to appear at the show cause hearing on July 8 and making the changes to the parties’ parenting time that father
had requested in the contempt matter.3 The trial court also
denied mother’s motion to reopen the record or set a new
trial.
On July 25, mother filed a motion for relief from
default in the contempt matter. In a declaration in support of the motion, mother set forth the following facts that
describe the actions mother took after she was served. On
May 3, mother was served with the show cause orders in the
contempt case and the domestic relations case on the same
day. Father had previously moved for an order to find mother
in contempt in the domestic relations case. Mother thought
that the contempt issue would be handled in the domestic
relations matter, like it had been previously, and she did not
realize that there were now two separate matters.
3
The record suggests that father also had requested the same changes in the pending domestic relations matter.
Cite as 351 Or App 519 (2026) 523
Mother’s declaration also stated that mother had
hired an attorney in response to being served and that
she provided her attorney with case information that she
believed would allow her attorney to access all court-related
documents and dates, although mother in fact provided
only information related to the domestic relations matter.
Mother’s attorney did not search the Oregon eCourt Case
Information (OECI) system for other cases involving mother
because she was only aware of the domestic relations matter. Mother believed that her attorney would notify her when
she needed to attend a hearing.
In the declaration, mother also wrote that, on July
9, she told her attorney that she believed there had been a
court date on July 8. Mother’s attorney could not locate a
July 8 court date in the domestic relations matter. Mother
then sent a copy of the order to show cause in the contempt
matter to her attorney, which finally alerted mother’s attorney to the separate contempt matter.
Mother also explained in her declaration that she
believed she had not violated the prohibition against relocation in the supplemental judgment by moving to Albany.
Mother had moved less than 60 miles from Springfield, and
K had remained enrolled in the Springfield School District.
Mother drove K to and from school when K stayed with
mother, mother explained.
On July 30, the trial court granted father’s motion
to consolidate the domestic relations matters and the contempt matter.
On September 11, at a hearing on mother’s motion
for relief from default the trial court heard arguments but
did not take evidence. The court determined that the summons for the hearing on July 8 on the order to show cause in
the contempt matter was “not confusing” and that mother
did not establish excusable neglect. The court explained
that “most of the case law boils down to * * * that parties
are expected to exercise reasonable care in managing their
legal obligations,” and that reasonable care “means knowing
when court is set when you’re served with paperwork that
tells you very clearly in the first two lines when court is set.” 524 Hellman v. Tucker
Thus, the trial court denied mother’s motion to set aside or
vacate the contempt judgment.
The trial court entered a written order denying mother’s motion to set aside or vacate. In the written
order, the trial court included findings that the order to
show cause was unambiguous and that it was reasonable
to expect mother to read and comprehend the obligation to
appear on July 8. Additionally, the trial court determined
that mother did not meet the standard for “reasonable care”
in managing one’s legal obligations when she failed to thoroughly read the summons. Mother filed this appeal.
ANALYSIS
ORCP 71 permits a trial court to relieve a party
from a judgment when there was a “mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect[.]” ORCP 71 B. “A motion
under ORCP 71 B(1) may be granted if (1) the judgment
was entered by virtue of mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect; (2) the defendant acted with reasonable diligence after learning about the judgment; and (3)
the defendant asserts a meritorious defense to the action.”
Hoddenpyl, 281 Or App at 46. Additionally,
“[w]hen considering a motion for relief from default, ‘it is the
[trial] court’s responsibility to liberally construe ORCP 71
B(1)(a) so as to avoid the harsh result of depriving a party
of its day in court. As an aspect of that liberal construction,
the [trial] court views the facts in the light most favorable
to the party seeking relief from the default.’’’
Id. (quoting Saldivar v. Roberts, 240 Or App 371, 375, 246
P3d 91 (2011)). Here, the trial court determined that mother
had failed to establish excusable neglect, and it did not reach the questions of whether mother acted with reasonable diligence after learning about the judgment or whether mother
asserted a meritorious defense.
As stated above “whether certain conduct or inaction constitutes ‘excusable neglect’ is a question of law, and
we review the trial court’s answer to that question for legal
error.” Johnson v. Sunriver Resort Limited Partnership, 252
Or App 299, 306, 287 P3d 1153 (2012), rev den, 353 Or 280
(2013). “[T]he probative issue” when evaluating whether a
Cite as 351 Or App 519 (2026) 525
party’s negligence was excusable “is whether there were
reasonable steps taken to respond to the complaint, even
if one of those steps was negligently undertaken” and “the
process later broke down.” Hoddenpyl, 281 Or App at 45-46;
see also Johnson, 252 Or App at 306-07. In contrast, “when
a defendant did not take any reasonable steps to respond to
a complaint, we have held, the defendant’s neglect was inexcusable.” Johnson, 252 Or App at 306-07.
We have held that a party’s conduct was excusable neglect when an insurance adjuster who worked for
a defendant’s insurer misread a notice of intent to take a
default judgment that was accompanied by a copy of the
summons and complaint to instead be a courtesy copy of
a summons and complaint that had not been filed. Terlyuk
v. Krasnogorov, 237 Or App 546, 550, 240 P3d 740 (2010),
rev den, 349 Or 603 (2011). As a result of that mistake, the
adjuster did not refer the matter to defense counsel, because
under the insurer’s claims handling process, a file was
referred to litigation only after actual service of the summons. Thus, the insurer did not take action on the defendant’s behalf to timely appear and defend the action and a
default judgment was entered against the defendant. Id. We
explained that “[a]lthough mistaken, the adjuster’s conduct
was neglectful in the sense that she failed to carry out the
responsibilities of her job.” Id. at 546. “Her actions were not a deliberate disregard of plaintiffs’ claim or a failure to act, but a failure to take the correct action.” Id. at 555.
Additionally, we have held that there was excusable
neglect when a defendant’s attorney attempted to respond
to a complaint but sent the response to the wrong address.
Mailing the response, albeit to the wrong address, constituted a reasonable step to respond to the complaint and thus
was excusable neglect. Hoddenpyl, 281 Or App at 46.
Applying those principles here, we conclude that
mother took reasonable steps to respond to the contempt
complaint and, therefore, mother’s conduct constituted
excusable neglect.
When mother was served with the show cause orders
in the contempt and domestic relations matters, mother hired
526 Hellman v. Tucker
an attorney to respond. Mother mistakenly assumed that
all the documents related to the same matter. That mistake
was reasonable. The contempt matter arose from a supplemental judgment in the domestic relations matter, and the
show cause order in the domestic relations matter involved
the same underlying facts—mother’s move from Springfield
to Albany. Previously, when a dispute arose about mother
moving, father had asked the trial court to hold mother in
contempt in the domestic relations matter. Indeed, the trial
court and father’s attorney expressed that they had been
surprised that the contempt matter was separate from the
domestic relations matter at the start of the July 8 hearing.4
The trial court consolidated the contempt and domestic relations matters after entering the default contempt judgment
against mother, while the request for modification was still
pending in the domestic relations matter. For those reasons,
mother’s mistaken belief that the contempt had been filed in
the domestic relations matter was reasonable.
Mother also mistakenly believed that her attorney would access and see all relevant case information and
appearances on OECI. Mother’s attorney’s failure to access
the case information for the contempt action was a “breakdown in the process” that stemmed from mother’s failure to
provide all of her case documents or case information to her
attorney. Mother’s failure was negligent. She should have
carefully reviewed the documents, provided all the documents to her lawyer, and checked in with her lawyer about
the July 8 court date listed on the summons. The question is
whether her negligence was excusable. And, like sending a
response to the wrong address in Hoddenpyl or misreading
the notice of intent to take a default judgment in Terlyuk,
mother’s mistaken belief that she did not need to provide
4
The Uniform Trial Court Rules (UTCRs) in effect at the time that father initiated the contempt matter provided that “[i]f a party is initiating a contempt proceeding under ORS 33.055 (remedial) and a related circuit court case exists, the party must initiate the contempt proceeding by filing a motion in the related case.” UTCR 19.020(2) (effective Aug 1, 2023). That provision was removed from the version of the UTCRs that went into effect on August 1, 2024, shortly after the trial court entered the default judgment against mother. It does not appear that father initiated the contempt proceeding by filing a motion in the domestic relations case. Mother, however, does not rely on the UTCR, and we thus do not rely on it when evaluating whether her failure to appear on July 8 was excusable neglect.
Cite as 351 Or App 519 (2026) 527
her lawyer with more information because there was only
one case—the domestic relations case—and that her lawyer
would notify her of upcoming court appearances because her
lawyer knew of the domestic relations case was excusable
neglect.
In finding that mother did not take reasonable steps
to respond to the contempt action, the trial court focused on
the fact that mother had read that there was a hearing on
July 8 and failed to attend that hearing, and it determined
that that was not excusable. However, as we held in Terlyuk,
a party’s negligent misunderstanding of the significance of
a pleading may constitute excusable neglect when the party
took reasonable steps based on their misunderstanding. In
this case, mother held the mistaken belief that there was only
one matter, and she hired an attorney to represent her and
respond in that matter, which was a reasonable step. Mother,
through counsel, responded in the domestic relations matter
to the same allegation underlying the contempt matter, at the
same time as the contempt matter proceeded without her or
her attorney’s knowledge. This is not a case where the party
seeking relief from default simply ignored the court. Like the
excusable neglect in Terlyuk, mother’s “actions were not a
deliberate disregard of [father’s] claim or a failure to act, but a failure to take the correct action.” Id. at 555.
Therefore, we reverse and remand for the trial
court. On remand, the trial court should determine whether
mother satisfied the other two requirements of ORCP 71 B(1).
See Hoddenpyl, 281 Or App at 46 (setting out requirements
for ORCP 71 B(1) motion). If mother did so, the court should
decide whether to exercise its discretion to grant relief from
the contempt order under ORCP 71 B(1).5 Thus, we reverse
and remand for the further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
5
Based on the record before us, there does not appear to be a reason for the trial court to exercise its discretion to deny relief. See Hoddenpyl, 281 Or App at 46 n 3 (noting that under the circumstances of that case, “if [the] defendant established excusable neglect, there was no reason for the [trial] court to exercise its discretion to deny relief”). But we are mindful that the trial court did not have an opportunity to exercise its discretion and thus the record before us may not reflect the entire range of circumstances relevant to the trial court’s exercise of discretion.