FILED
Jul 15 2026, 9:17 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
OJL QRP, LLC,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
IN 123 Rentals LLC,
Appellee-Plaintiff
July 15, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-CE-3217
Appeal from the Lake Superior Court
The Honorable John M. Sedia, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
45D01-2508-CE-59
Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas
Judges Bradford and Felix concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CE-3217 July 15, 2026 Page 1 of 17
Tavitas, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
[1] IN 123 Rentals, LLC (“IN 123”) filed a complaint against OJL QRP, LLC
(“OJL”), seeking specific performance of a lease-to-purchase option agreement
(“Agreement”). OJL’s attorney entered an appearance five days after the
deadline to answer IN 123’s complaint, and IN 123 moved for default
judgment. OJL opposed the motion and sought an enlargement of time,
arguing excusable neglect based on a breakdown in communication. The trial
court granted default judgment to IN 123. OJL appeals, and we reverse and
remand.
Issue
[2] OJL raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its
discretion by granting IN 123’s motion for default judgment and effectively
denying OJL’s motion for enlargement of time. 1
Facts
[3] OJL and IN 123 were parties to the Agreement dated October 20, 2020,
concerning real property located in Gary. Under the Agreement, IN 123 was
1
In its order, the trial court granted only the relief requested by IN 123, including default judgment, and did
not expressly rule on OJL’s motion for enlargement of time. The trial court, however, expressly rejected
OJL’s argument of excusable neglect that the delayed pleading resulted from a breakdown in communication
between OJL and its attorney. We, therefore, construe the order as denying OJL’s motion for enlargement of
time.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CE-3217 July 15, 2026 Page 2 of 17
the lessee with an option to purchase, and OJL was the lessor. On August 20,
2025, IN 123 filed a complaint against OJL seeking specific performance of the
Agreement to purchase the real property. IN 123 served the complaint and
summons on OJL by certified mail on August 26, 2025. A responsive pleading
was due on or before September 18, 2025.
[4] OJL had previously been represented in Indiana real estate litigation by
Attorney Tramel Raggs. At the time of those prior representations, Attorney
Raggs was associated with Harris Law Firm, P.C., and used an email address at
that firm. On August 30, 2025, however, Attorney Raggs separated from Harris
Law Firm, P.C., to begin his own practice. After OJL was served with the
complaint, OJL forwarded correspondence regarding the lawsuit to Attorney
Raggs at the firm email address it had on file, as it had done in prior matters.
That email address, however, was no longer in use or actively monitored. 2 OJL
subsequently made contact with Attorney Raggs and retained him in the
matter, and Attorney Raggs entered his appearance for OJL on September 23,
2025, which was five days after the deadline to file a responsive pleading.
[5] On September 24, 2025, the day after Attorney Raggs entered his appearance,
IN 123 filed a motion for default judgment, asserting that OJL had failed to file
a timely responsive pleading. On October 9, 2025, OJL filed a response in
2
The record does not contain the specific date on which OJL successfully contacted Attorney Raggs and
retained him in this matter. In OJL’s unverified motion in opposition to default judgment, OJL asserted that
its initial contact with Attorney Raggs was made “[p]rior to that [] due date, but after service of the
Complaint.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 22. IN 123 did not dispute this fact.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CE-3217 July 15, 2026 Page 3 of 17
opposition to the motion for default judgment and a motion for enlargement of
time to file a responsive pleading pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 6(C)(2). See
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 3. OJL argued that its failure to timely respond
resulted from “excusable neglect,” namely, a “breakdown in communication”
between OJL and Attorney Raggs after he departed from his prior firm. Tr.
Vol. II pp. 6-7.
[6] On December 11, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the motions, at which
both parties appeared by counsel and presented argument. On December 12,
2025, the trial court entered an order granting IN 123’s motion for default
judgment, which effectively denied OJL’s motion for enlargement of time. The
trial court’s order expressly rejected OJL’s excusable neglect argument, and
stated in its written order, “[i]f being a CPA during tax season and COVID-19
concerns or being a doctor and failing to read email are insufficient to overcome
the burden to demonstrate entitlement to relief from judgment . . . so too is
OJL’s lack of diligence in ascertaining its counsel’s whereabouts and timely
contacting him.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 7. IN 123 did not challenge
Attorney Raggs’s statements regarding the delay at the hearing, and the trial
court accepted those facts as true in its written order. See id. at 3 n.1.
[7] The trial court’s order required OJL to close on the property within ten days,
awarded IN 123 court costs, and preserved IN 123’s ability to seek additional
damages, including attorney fees, after closing. Id. at 7-8. On December 18,
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CE-3217 July 15, 2026 Page 4 of 17
2025, OJL filed a Motion to Stay Judgment Pending Appeal. 3 Id. at 4. OJL
filed its Notice of Appeal on December 19, 2025. Id. IN 123 represents on
appeal that the parties closed on the property on December 22, 2025, within the
ten-day period allowed by the default judgment for completing the transaction,
and that the deed was recorded on January 29, 2026. 4 See Appellee’s Br. p. 13.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[8] The parties dispute the standard of review governing this appeal. OJL argues
that we should review this appeal de novo because the trial court reached its
decision on a paper record and without evidentiary hearing. IN 123 argues that
the trial court held a hearing at which OJL presented its argument and that,
thus, the proper standard is abuse of discretion. We agree with IN 123. “Our
standard of review for a trial court’s decision regarding a default judgment is
well-settled.” Whetstine v. Menard, Inc., 161 N.E.3d 1274, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App.
2020). “We review a trial court’s decision to enter a default judgment for an
abuse of discretion.” Expert Pool Builders, LLC v. Vangundy, 224 N.E.3d 309, 312
(Ind. 2024).
3
The trial court granted OJL’s Motion to Stay the Default Judgment on March 24, 2026, more than three
months after OJL filed its Notice of Appeal.
4
These events are not reflected in the record on appeal. We recount IN 123’s representations only to frame
its mootness argument.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CE-3217 July 15, 2026 Page 5 of 17 [9] Here, the trial court held a hearing at which both parties, through counsel, had
the opportunity to present their arguments. OJL argued that the belated
pleading resulted from a breakdown in communication between OJL and
Attorney Raggs and argued that this breakdown constituted excusable neglect
under Indiana law. OJL explained that Attorney Raggs was associated with his
former firm when the case was filed, he left that firm to start his own practice,
and all subsequent correspondence continued to be sent to his previous firm.
IN 123 did not dispute the facts OJL presented, and the trial court, in its written
order, accepted those asserted facts as true. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 7
n.1.
[10] The trial court did not rule on the motions purely based on a paper record;
instead, it had the opportunity to consider the merits of the parties’ arguments.
As our Supreme Court explained in Expert Pool Builders, “the trial court
evaluates firsthand the relevant facts of each case and is in the best position to
manage its docket, to balance the equities, and to determine the appropriate use
of [default judgment].” 224 N.E.3d at 312. “Under an abuse of discretion
review, ‘[w]e presume that the trial court will act in accord with what is fair and
equitable in each case, and thus we will only reverse if the trial court’s decision
is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court, or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law.’” DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc.
v. Brown, 29 N.E.3d 729, 731-32 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Wright v. Miller, 989
N.E.2d 324, 330 (Ind. 2013)). Thus, we conclude that the proper standard of
review is abuse of discretion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CE-3217 July 15, 2026 Page 6 of 17
I. This appeal is not moot although the underlying property has been
sold.
[11] IN 123 urges the Court to be “mindful” that the property at issue has been sold
to IN 123 and that the Warranty Deed has been recorded in Lake County.
Appellee’s Br. p. 13. IN 123 argues that this “critical fact” renders the current
appeal moot because no meaningful relief remains available to OJL. Id. We
disagree.
[12] Before addressing the legal merits of IN 123’s mootness argument, we note that
certain factual assertions in IN 123’s brief are inconsistent with the record. IN
123 contends that the property “was sold and conveyed to a bona fide thirdparty purchaser before OJL even filed its Notice of Appeal.” Appellee’s Br. p.
13. That contention is inconsistent with the timeline reflected in the record and
the chronological case summary (“CCS”), it also conflicts with IN 123’s own
statement elsewhere in its brief. 5 OJL conveyed the property on December 22,
2025, as IN 123 acknowledges, but OJL filed its Notice of Appeal on December
19, 2025—three days before the conveyance. OJL, moreover, filed its Motion
to Stay the Default Judgment with the trial court on December 18, 2025, prior
to the conveyance.
5
IN 123 states in its appellate brief that OJL conveyed the property to it on “December 22, 2025.”
Appellee’s Br. p. 13. As a party to the pending litigation, IN 123 was on notice of the relevant filing dates,
including that OJL filed its Notice of Appeal on December 19, 2025, before the asserted conveyance date.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CE-3217 July 15, 2026 Page 7 of 17 [13] IN 123 argues that the “sequence of events” is legally significant because it
would be “fatal to any meaningful relief OJL could obtain on appeal.”
Appellee’s Br. p. 13. In other words, IN 123’s mootness argument rests on the
“critical fact” that OJL conveyed the property before filing its appeal, implying
that OJL voluntarily complied with the trial court’s default judgment order. Id.
The record reflects otherwise. OJL filed its Notice of Appeal first and then
conveyed the property on the final day of the ten-day window prescribed by the
default judgment, in compliance with the trial court’s order. That conveyance
was not a voluntary transfer; rather, it was compelled by a standing court order.
The appeal, accordingly, is not necessarily moot. McConnell v. Thomson, 8
N.E.2d 986, 992 (Ind. 1937) (holding that transfer of money or property, as by
executing a deed, in obedience to a judgment does not constitute a waiver of the
right to appeal therefrom); cf. Plan Comm’n for Floyd Cnty. v. Klein, 765 N.E.2d
632, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that an appeal was moot where the
appealing party voluntarily acquiesced in the judgment by acting on it before
challenging it).
[14] Next, IN 123 describes itself as a “bona fide third-party purchaser” of the
underlying property. Appellee’s Br. p. 13. That description contradicts IN
123’s characterization of the transaction. The property was conveyed to IN 123
by OJL in compliance with the trial court’s default judgment order, and IN 123
was the grantee in that conveyance—not a third party. Nor is IN 123 a bona
fide purchaser. To qualify as a bona fide purchaser, one must purchase “in
good faith, for a valuable consideration, and without notice of the outstanding
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CE-3217 July 15, 2026 Page 8 of 17
rights of others.” Pond v. McNellis, 845 N.E.2d 1043, 1058 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)
(quoting Keybank Nat’l Ass’n v. NBD Bank, 699 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998)), trans. denied. The law recognizes both actual and constructive notice.
Id.
[15] IN 123 initiated and litigated this dispute, obtained the judgment under which
the property was conveyed, and took title while OJL’s appeal of that judgment
was pending. A party whose title rests upon a judgment is charged with notice
of the incidents to which the judgment is subject, including a pending appeal.
See Pond, 845 N.E.2d at 1059; Dunnington v. Elston, 101 Ind. 373, 374-75 (1885).
IN 123, therefore, took title with notice of OJL’s outstanding rights and cannot
claim the protected status of a bona fide purchaser. Meaningful relief,
moreover, remained available to OJL. OJL filed its Motion to Stay the Default
Judgment before obeying the trial court’s order.
[16] Indiana has long followed the principle that, “if [a] judgment [is] reversed, the
party shall be restored to all that he has lost by occasion of the judgment, and a
writ of restitution shall be awarded.” Martin v. Woodruff, 2 Ind. 237, 238 (1850)
(emphasis in original). Even where the specific property cannot be restored,
Indiana law affords a monetary remedy: a party who received a benefit under a
judgment later reversed must make restitution of the value of what was lost.
Smith v. Zent, 83 Ind. 86, 87-88 (1882) (recognizing that, where property sold
under a reversed judgment has passed beyond reach, the owner may recover its
value as a “money equivalent”). A court of equity may also fashion other relief,
including reformation of the transaction rather than complete rescission where
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CE-3217 July 15, 2026 Page 9 of 17
appropriate. Strong v. Jackson, 777 N.E.2d 1141, 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
(recognizing a court of equity’s authority to reform a deed, rescind a transfer, or
impose a constructive trust to remedy a wrongful conveyance, and affirming
reformation of a recorded deed to grant an equitable life estate), aff’d on reh’g,
781 N.E.2d 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Accordingly, a meaningful remedy
remains available for OJL, and thus this appeal is not moot.
II. The trial court abused its discretion in granting the default
judgment and denying the motion for enlargement of time.
[17] Generally, Indiana Trial Rule 55(C) provides the framework to challenge the
default judgment through filing a motion to set aside the default judgment
under Trial Rule 60(B). Our Supreme Court recently clarified that Rule 60(B)
motion is not required to preserved the party’s right to appeal a default
judgment as long as the party sufficiently preserved its argument for appellate
review. Expert Pool Builders, 224 N.E.3d at 313. A party that opposes a motion
for default judgment before the judgment is entered and obtains a definitive
ruling from the trial court preserves its challenge for appeal and is not required
to file a motion to set aside the default judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)
before seeking appellate review. Id.
[18] OJL opposed IN 123’s motion for default judgment in writing on October 9,
2025, approximately two weeks after the motion was filed. OJL also opposed
default judgment orally at the December 11, 2025, hearing, before the trial court
entered default judgment on December 12, 2025. OJL appeals directly from
that judgment. OJL, thus, preserved its challenge for our review.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CE-3217 July 15, 2026 Page 10 of 17 [19] Indiana Trial Procedure Rule 6(C) provides,
Except for the automatic enlargement of time allowed in
subdivision (B)[6], when an act is required or allowed to be done
at or within a specific time by these rules, the court may upon
motion:
*****
(2) if the request is made after the time has expired, order
the time enlarged where the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect. However, the court may not extend
the time under Rules 50(A), 52(B), 56, 59(C), 59(E), or
60(B), except as stated in those rules.
(emphasis added). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “excusable neglect”
as
A failure — which the law will excuse — to take some proper
step at the proper time (esp. in neglecting to answer a lawsuit)
not because of the party’s own carelessness, inattention, or willful
disregard of the court’s process, but because of some unexpected
or unavoidable hindrance or accident or because of reliance on
the care and vigilance of the party’s counsel or on a promise
made by the adverse party.
6
To qualify for the automatic enlargement of time under Trial Procedure Rule 6(B), the party must file the
motion before the original due date.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CE-3217 July 15, 2026 Page 11 of 17
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Although “Indiana case law
interpreting excusable neglect in the context of [Trial Rule 6(C)][7] is scarce,”
authority construing Trial Rule 60(B) may be instructive because both rules
employ the same term. Bosamia v. Marion Cnty. Assessor, 969 N.E.2d 635, 638
(Ind. T.C. 2012).
[20] Indiana Trial Procedure Rule 60(B) is typically invoked in the context of setting
aside a default judgment after it has been entered. Rule 60(B) provides, “[o]n
motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a judgment, including a judgment by default, for the
following reasons[,]” including “mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect.”
(emphasis added).
[21] There is no general rule in Indiana as to what constitutes excusable neglect.
Our Supreme Court has explained that it “has not enunciated a general
definition of excusable neglect. Rather, the decisions are made on a case-bycase basis.” In re Marriage of Ransom, 531 N.E.2d 1171, 1172 (Ind. 1988). Our
Supreme Court has also recognized that a breakdown in communication may
constitute excusable neglect. Whittaker v. Dail, 584 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ind.
1992).
7
Effective January 1, 2025, our Supreme Court amended and reorganized Indiana Trial Rule 6. The
provision permitting enlargement of time after expiration upon a showing of excusable neglect, formerly
designated as Trial Rule 6(B)(2), now appears in Trial Rule 6(C)(2). OJL filed its motion asserting excusable
neglect in October 2025; we, therefore, apply and cite the amended version of the rule in effect at that time.
The quoted authority refers to the provision under its prior designation.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CE-3217 July 15, 2026 Page 12 of 17 [22] In Whittaker, the defendant failed to appear for trial after he contacted his
insurance carrier and reasonably believed that the carrier would retain counsel
to defend him; a miscommunication between the carrier and the law firm,
however, resulted in no attorney appearing on his behalf. Id. at 1086-87. Our
Supreme Court held that, where unchallenged and credible testimony
establishes a breakdown in communication that results in a party’s failure to
appear, the grounds for setting aside a default judgment are satisfied. Id. at
1087. The Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
the defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment. Id.
[23] Similarly, in Whelchel v. Community Hospitals of Indiana, Inc., 629 N.E.2d 900
(Ind. Ct. App. 1994), this Court found a breakdown in communication between
a litigant and her counsel to constitute excusable neglect. The defendant was
served with two separate lawsuits on the same day and forwarded the
documents to her attorney; the attorney, however, was alerted to only one of
the two actions, appeared in that matter alone, and a default judgment was
entered against the defendant in the other matter. Id. at 902. This Court
determined that, although the precise source of the breakdown was unclear, the
defendant’s counsel would have promptly appeared in the second matter but for
the misunderstanding, just as he had in the first. Id. at 903. This Court held,
accordingly, that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that the
defendant’s failure to appear was not the result of excusable neglect. Id. at 904.
[24] Our Supreme Court has, by contrast, declined to find excusable neglect where a
party’s failure to respond stemmed from inattention. In Smith v. Johnston, a
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CE-3217 July 15, 2026 Page 13 of 17
physician and his surgical group were sued for medical malpractice, and the
summons was served at the office on January 11, 1996, where a scrub nurse
signed for it. 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1261 (Ind. 1999). The office manager was in
the process of leaving the group and was absent when the summons arrived; the
scrub nurse placed the summons on the physician’s desk, and the physician did
not open it until six days after a default judgment of $750,000 had been entered
against him and his group on March 22, 1996. Id. at 1261-62. Our Supreme
Court characterized this failure as “neglect, but not excusable neglect,”
observing that the physician knew his mail was unattended and accepted the
risk of adverse consequences. Id.
[25] Our Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Huntington National Bank v.
Car-X Associates Corp., 39 N.E.3d 652 (Ind. 2015). There, the employee who
normally received service for the bank was absent, and the employee who
received the complaint in her stead did not refer it to counsel until twenty-eight
days later. The employee based the failure on the volume of his other duties.
Id. at 657-58. Our Supreme Court held that this failure did not constitute
excusable neglect, reasoning that the untimely response was attributable to the
bank’s own inattentiveness. 8 Id.
8
The Court, however, remanded for the trial court to consider whether equitable relief was warranted under
Trial Rule 60(B)(8), in light of the bank’s meritorious defense, the substantial sum at issue, and the absence of
prejudice. Huntington National Bank, 39 N.E.3d at 658-59.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CE-3217 July 15, 2026 Page 14 of 17 [26] These cases are distinguishable from the case at hand because Smith and
Huntington involved a party’s internal neglect, whereas this case involves a
breakdown of communication between OJL and the attorney on whom OJL
reasonably relied. Here, OJL did not simply ignore the complaint, neglect to
read its mail, or allow service to sit unattended within its own office. OJL
forwarded its correspondence regarding the pending litigation to Attorney
Raggs without knowledge that Attorney Raggs was in the process of leaving
Harris Law Firm, P.C. OJL sent the correspondence to Attorney Raggs’s
former firm email address, which Attorney Raggs no longer monitored. The
record does not demonstrate how Attorney Raggs’s former firm handled the
summons or how the firm communicated with Attorney Raggs. The precise
mechanism of the miscommunication is unclear.
[27] Attorney Raggs had also previously represented OJL in other legal matters, and
OJL reasonably relied upon that past experience in concluding that forwarding
the litigation correspondence to the email address OJL had on file would suffice
and that Attorney Raggs would proceed from there. OJL, moreover, exercised
reasonable diligence by contacting Attorney Raggs rather than remaining
inactive or inattentive. After OJL successfully contacted Attorney Raggs,
Attorney Raggs entered his appearance on September 23, 2025, only five days
after the September 18, 2025, deadline for a responsive pleading. IN 123
moved for default judgment the following day, and OJL later filed its response
in opposition and motion for enlargement of time.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CE-3217 July 15, 2026 Page 15 of 17 [28] Even though the trial court accepted the facts presented by Attorney Raggs at
the hearing as true, it found that the breakdown in communication did not
constitute excusable neglect. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 7. “Indiana law
strongly prefers disposition of cases on their merits.” Front Row Motors, LLC v.
Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Coslett v. Weddle Bros. Const. Co.,
798 N.E.2d 859, 861 (Ind. 2003)). 9 Any doubt of the propriety of a default
judgment should be resolved in favor of the defaulted party. Id. The brief
length of the delay, the prompt entry of appearance, and the sequence of the
parties’ filings weigh in OJL’s favor and demonstrate that neither OJL nor
Attorney Raggs sought to prolong the proceedings. We conclude, therefore,
that the breakdown in communication between OJL and Attorney Raggs
constitutes excusable neglect and that the trial court abused its discretion by
concluding otherwise. 10
9
Both the trial court and IN 123 cited our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Automotive Finance Corp. v. Liu,
250 N.E.3d 406 (Ind. 2025), and its judicial-economy reasoning as a reason that we should affirm the trial
court’s default judgment. As much as we admire the reasoning in Automotive Finance Corp. regarding the
efficient use of the judiciary’s “limited resources” to better serve the public in Indiana, that case is materially
distinguishable here. Despite arising in the context of Trial Rule 60(B), that case involved a significant
delay—approximately six months—in filing a motion to set aside the judgment. Id. at 409. Here, Attorney
Raggs entered his appearance five days after the original responsive-pleading deadline, and OJL later asked
for an enlargement of time under Trial Rule 6(C).
10
IN 123 further contends that OJL was required to assert a meritorious defense to the underlying contract
dispute, that OJL failed to do so, and that this Court should affirm the default judgment on that basis.
Appellee's Br. p. 9. That argument, however, derives from the framework governing a motion to set aside an
entered default under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). Here, OJL opposed the motion for default judgment before
any default was entered and sought an enlargement of time under Indiana Trial Rule 6(C), which does not
require a party to assert a meritorious defense.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CE-3217 July 15, 2026 Page 16 of 17
Conclusion
[29] We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting default
judgment and denying OJL’s motion for enlargement of time. We,
accordingly, reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court set aside
the default judgment and afford the parties relief consistent with this opinion.
[30] Reversed and remanded.
Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Tramel R. Raggs
Raggs Law, P.C.
Crown Point, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Greg A. Bouwer
Dylan A. Sears
Koransky Bouwer, P.C.
Dyer, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-CE-3217 July 15, 2026 Page 17 of 17