Judgment rendered July 15, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,958-KA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
JAMES D. YOUNG Appellant
*****
Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 391,313
Honorable Michael A. Pitman, Judge
*****
LOUISIANA APPEALS AND WRIT SERVICE Counsel for Appellant By: Michael Anthony Mitchell
Remy V. Starns
Annette Fuller Roach
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
MARY JOINER ABLE
VICTORIA T. WASHINGTON
BRIANA SPIVEY
Assistant District Attorneys
*****
Before STONE, THOMPSON, and ROBINSON, JJ.
ROBINSON, J.
Having been adjudicated a second-felony offender, James Young
appeals his nine-year hard labor sentence. After vacating his sentence for
the underlying conviction and amending his habitual offender sentence to
remove the restriction on parole eligibility, we affirm his sentence and
remand to the trial court to correct the minutes to reflect that his sentence for
the underlying offense has been vacated.
FACTS
Young was charged by a bill of information with aggravated flight
from an officer in violation of La. R.S. 14:108.1(C). The crime occurred on
September 13, 2022. A unanimous jury found him guilty as charged on
January 23, 2024.
On February 20, 2024, the state filed a habitual offender bill of
information charging Young as a second-felony offender. He had pled
guilty on August 22, 2016, to the possession of a Schedule II CDS, for
which he had received a suspended sentence of five years at hard labor with
two years of supervised probation. Young had been charged by an amended
bill of information with aggravated assault with a firearm in violation of La.
R.S. 14:37.4, possession of a Schedule II CDS in violation of La. R.S.
40:967(C), illegal carrying of a firearm in violation of La. R.S. 14:95(E), and
domestic abuse with strangulation in violation of La. R.S. 14:35.3(L).
Young was sentenced for the underlying offense on February 18,
2025. The trial court noted that the maximum sentence for aggravated flight
from an officer had subsequently increased, but at the time of the offense,
the maximum sentence was five years. The court found there was an undue risk that Young would commit another crime during a period of suspended
sentence or probation, that Young was in need of correctional treatment or a
custodial environment that could be provided most effectively by his
commitment to an institution, and that a lesser sentence would deprecate the
seriousness of his crime. The court also found that Young knowingly
created the risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person and
that he had a very lengthy criminal history. The court found no mitigating
circumstances. Young was sentenced to five years at hard labor. After
imposing sentence, the court then realized that it had been provided with the
criminal history for a different James Young. Upon reviewing the criminal
history of the correct James Young, the court again concluded that Young
had a lengthy criminal history and that five years at hard labor was still an
appropriate sentence.
A motion for appeal was filed on May 16, 2025. Young’s conviction
and sentence were affirmed. State v. Young, 56,675 (La. App. 2 Cir.
12/17/25), 426 So. 3d 775. While his appeal was pending, Young filed a
motion to supplement the record with the transcripts from the habitual
offender adjudication and sentencing. The motion to supplement the record
was denied because no appeal had been taken from the habitual offender
proceedings.
A habitual offender hearing was held on August 21, 2025. Sergeant
John Madjerick from the Shreveport Police Department testified as an expert
in fingerprint analysis. He compared Young’s right thumbprint taken in
court to the right thumbprint on the fingerprint sheet attached to the bill of
information for the predicate offense and confirmed that they were from the
same person. The court adjudicated Young as a second-felony offender.
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On September 9, 2025, Young filed a motion for new trial of his
habitual offender adjudication. He argued the evidence was insufficient to
show that the cleansing period had not passed and that he had been properly
Boykinized for his prior felony.
A habitual offender sentencing was held on September 17, 2025. The
court first considered Young’s motion for new trial. The court granted the
motion to determine whether Young had been properly Boykinized when he
pled guilty. After reviewing the transcript of the guilty plea, the court
determined that all the Boykin requirements had been met and that Young
was indeed a second-felony offender. Young waived sentencing delays.
Before imposing sentence, the court found the following aggravating factors
to apply: (1) Young knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm
to more than one person; (2) there was an undue risk that during the period
of a suspended sentence or probation that Young would commit another
crime; (3) Young was in need of correctional treatment or a custodial
environment that would be provided most effectively by his commitment to
an institution; and (4) a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of
Young’s crime. The court did not find any mitigating factors. The court
imposed a habitual offender sentence of nine years at hard labor without the
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.
On September 25, 2025, Young filed a motion to reconsider his
habitual offender sentence. He asserted that his sentence was excessive and
unconstitutionally harsh. The motion was denied.
DISCUSSION
Young argues that his near-maximum sentence is excessive, and that
the court improperly considered an element of the underlying offense, the
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risk of harm to others, as an aggravating factor. He also maintains that it
was improper for the court to consider an unadjudicated offense as part of
his criminal history without first considering the validity of the
unadjudicated offense when imposing sentence.
An aggravating factor considered by the trial court when sentencing
Young was that Young “knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily
harm to more than one person.” La. C. Cr. P. 894.1(B)(5). Young argues
that it was improperly considered because it is an element of the underlying
offense. “Aggravated flight from an officer is the intentional refusal of a
driver to bring a vehicle to a stop or of an operator to bring a watercraft to a
stop, under circumstances wherein human life is endangered[.]” La. R.S.
14:108.1(C).
There was no error by the trial court in considering an element of the
underlying offense as an aggravating factor. See State v. Tyler, 50,224 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 182 So. 3d 1029, where this court concluded that the
trial court did not err when considering the age of the victim and the familial
relationship between her and the defendant as aggravating factors, even
though they were elements of the crime of conviction. This argument is
without merit.
The court also properly considered Young’s criminal history when
sentencing him for the underlying conviction and presumably for the
habitual offender conviction. In determining a proper sentence, a trial judge
is not limited to considering only prior convictions and may review all
evidence of prior criminal activity, including arrests. See State v. Dale,
53,736 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 309 So. 3d 1031.
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Young characterizes the underlying and predicate offenses as lowlevel felony offenses. He notes that at the time of the relevant offenses, the
punishment for aggravated flight from an officer was a hard labor sentence
of not more than five years and a possible fine of no more than $2,000, and
the punishment for possession of a Schedule II CDS was imprisonment, with
or without hard labor, for not more than five years and a fine of no more
than $5,000.
Ordinarily, appellate review of sentences for excessiveness is a twostep process, the first being an analysis of the trial court’s compliance with
the sentencing guidelines of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and the second a review
of the sentence for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Johnson, 56,455
(La. App. 2 Cir. 10/1/25), 420 So. 3d 1239. However, because Young’s
motion to reconsider sentence raised only a claim that the sentence imposed
was constitutionally excessive, he is relegated to review of his sentence on
that ground alone. La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.1; State v. Johnson, supra.
A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of
proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a
purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey,
623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Bell, 53,712 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21),
310 So. 3d 307. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when
the crime and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it
shocks the sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So.
2d 166.
The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences
within the statutory limits and such sentences should not be set aside as
excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.
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Trotter, 54,496 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So. 3d 1116. On review, an
appellate court does not determine whether another sentence may have been
more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v.
Bell, supra.
As a general rule, maximum or near-maximum sentences are reserved
for the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v. Cozzetto, 07-2031
(La. 2/15/08), 974 So. 2d 665; State v. Gibson, 54,400 (La. App. 2 Cir.
5/25/22), 338 So. 3d 1260, writ denied, 22-00978 (La. 3/7/23), 356 So. 3d
1053.
La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1) states that “[i]f the second felony is such that
upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable by imprisonment
for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment
shall be for a determinate term not less than one-third the longest term and
not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.”
While Young’s habitual offender sentence is just shy of the
maximum, it is well deserved and not shocking to the sense of justice.
Young drove at speeds well in excess of the speed limits on the involved
roads, which placed the general public as well as the pursuing officer in
danger. Notably, the chase ended when Young’s vehicle ran off the road.
Underlying sentence
Young also argues his habitual offender sentence is null and void
because the trial court did not vacate his sentence for the underlying
conviction before imposing it.
La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(3) states when a defendant has been adjudicated
a habitual offender, “the court shall sentence him to the punishment
prescribed in this Section, and shall vacate the previous sentence if already
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imposed, deducting from the new sentence the time actually served under
the sentence so vacated.” Young’s sentence for the underlying offense was
not vacated before the habitual offender sentence was imposed.
When a defendant’s original sentence on an underlying offense has
not been vacated by the court at the time of defendant’s sentencing as a
habitual offender, the original sentence remains in effect and the subsequent
sentence as a habitual offender is null and void. State v. Clark, 52,256 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So. 3d 1178. However, where it is obvious that
the trial court intended to increase the substantive sentence, and correction
of the illegal sentence does not involve the exercise of sentencing discretion,
the appellate court may amend to correct, without remanding for
resentencing. Id.; State v. Bailey, 49,362 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/19/14), 152
So. 3d 1056, writ denied, 14-2645 (La. 10/2/15), 178 So. 3d 988.
It is clear from the record that the trial court intended to increase the
substantive period of imprisonment from five years to nine years.
Accordingly, we vacate the five-year sentence imposed for the underlying
conviction, and we remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to
amend the minutes of sentencing to correctly reflect that Young’s original
five-year sentence is vacated.
Parole condition
Finally, Young contends his sentence is illegal because it was
imposed without parole eligibility.
There is no restriction of parole eligibility in La. R.S. 15:529.1(G),
which states that “any sentence imposed under the provisions of this Section
shall be at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of
sentence.” Furthermore, there was no parole restriction for the crime of
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aggravated flight from an officer. The restriction on parole eligibility
rendered Young’s sentence illegal, and under La. C. Cr. P. art. 882(A), we
amend Young’s sentence to delete the denial of parole eligibility. See State
v. Gaines, 52,536 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/19), 266 So. 3d 948, writ denied, 19-00773 (La. 9/17/19), 279 So. 3d 379.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Young’s five-year sentence for
his aggravated flight from an officer conviction, amend his habitual offender
sentence to remove the restriction on parole eligibility, and affirm his
habitual offender sentence as amended. We also remand this matter to the
trial court to correct the minutes to reflect that Young’s sentence for the
underlying conviction has been vacated.
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