Judgment rendered July 15, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,967-KA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
RODRICK RAYMOND HICKS Appellant
*****
Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 401,957
Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge
*****
LOUISIANA APPEALS AND WRIT Counsel for Appellant SERVICE
By: Remy V. Starns
Douglas Daniel Brown
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
ALEX L. PORUBSKY
ASHLIN NICOLE THOMAS
Assistant District Attorneys
*****
Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and THOMPSON, JJ.
PITMAN, C. J.
A jury convicted Defendant Rodrick Raymond Hicks of possession of
a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a convicted felon. The trial
court sentenced him to 20 years at hard labor without benefit of probation,
parole or suspension of sentence and waived the mandatory fine. Defendant
appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
On June 24, 2024, the state filed a bill of information charging
Defendant with possession of a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon by a
convicted felon, in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. The state alleged that on or
about May 14, 2024, Defendant unlawfully possessed a Glock 19, after
having previously been convicted on December 7, 2016, of illegal use of
weapons, in violation of La. R.S. 14:94. Defendant pled not guilty.
A jury trial began on March 27, 2025, and Defendant was present in
the courtroom when the trial commenced. Lieutenant Steve McKenna of the
Shreveport Police Department testified that on May 14, 2024, he and other
officers responded to a complaint that juveniles with firearms were present
at a residence in the 1500 block of Dilg League Drive. He stated that
Defendant answered the door of the residence and allowed the officers to
enter.1 Lt. McKenna observed canisters that appeared to contain marijuana
and a digital scale. He testified that Defendant did not consent to a search of
the residence, so they obtained a search warrant. During the search, the
officers found a firearm under the mattress in the bedroom. Lt. McKenna
1
Footage taken by Lt. McKenna’s body camera during the search was published to the jury. In the recording, Defendant told Lt. McKenna that he and “his woman” were the only two people who stayed at that residence.
stated that Defendant admitted knowing the firearm was there but said it was
fake. The officers determined that it was an actual firearm, i.e., a Glock, and
arrested Defendant for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
Corporal Hunter DeLoach of the Shreveport Police Department
testified that he handled the evidence seized during the execution of the
search warrant. He stated that they seized a Glock 19X, a box of .40-caliber
ammunition, a box of .45-caliber ammunition, two Glock magazines and a
Glock extended magazine. He explained that the .40-caliber and .45-caliber
cartridges would not fit in the Glock 19X or the extended magazine because
they fire and hold 9-millimeter ammunition. He noted that the Glock was
found under a mattress, and the other items were found inside a chest of
drawers in the bedroom.
Detective Jeremy Blanchard of the Shreveport Police Department
testified that he participated in the search. He stated that Defendant told him
there was a firearm under the bed, and he located the firearm under the
mattress toward the foot of the bed, close to the edge.2 He identified the
Glock 19X that was seized from the residence and noted that the back piece
of the firearm was missing but that it could be fired. He stated that no 9-millimeter ammunition, which the Glock 19X fires, was found at the scene.
Sergeant John Madjerick of the Shreveport Police Department was
accepted as an expert in the field of fingerprint examination, comparison and
evaluation. The state introduced into evidence a bill of information,
fingerprint attachment sheet, minutes and transcript in Docket No. 341,588
2
Footage taken from his body camera during the search was published to the jury. In the recording, Defendant admitted to the officers that they would find a firearm and bullets. He told them what side of the bed the firearm was located. He stated that the firearm did not work, that it did not have anything in it and that it was a “decoy.”
2
from the First Judicial District Court in Caddo Parish. Sgt. Madjerick
identified the bill of information, dated May 23, 2016, and stated that
Rodrick Hicks was the defendant in Docket Number 341,588. He read a
portion of the minutes, which stated that on December 7, 2016, the
defendant pled guilty to illegal use of a weapon, in violation of La.
R.S. 14:98(B), and the trial court sentenced him to one year at hard labor.
Sgt. Madjerick then took Defendant’s fingerprints and compared them to the
fingerprint attachment sheet in Docket Number 341,588. He determined that
Defendant is the same person as Rodrick Hicks in Docket Number 341,588.
The court then stated that they would take a one-hour recess for lunch
and return at 1:00 p.m. Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court noted
that “it would be nice” to know if Defendant would testify so that they could
conduct the colloquy. Defense counsel responded that he would discuss it
with Defendant so that the colloquy could be conducted at 1:00 p.m. When
the court and attorneys returned to the courtroom after the recess, the
prosecutor noted that Defendant was not present. Defense counsel
responded that he talked to Defendant’s family members who were attending
the trial, but they had not spoken to Defendant. Defense counsel’s office
also called three telephone numbers provided by Defendant, but he did not
answer. The court noted that it was 1:33 p.m. and that Defendant was
instructed to return at 1:00 p.m. Citing La. C. Cr. P. art. 832, the court
recommenced the trial. The court stated that as Defendant voluntarily
absented himself, he waived his right to have a colloquy about whether he
wished to testify. The jury then entered the courtroom, the state published
the evidence to the jury, the state rested its case and the defense rested its
case. Following closing arguments and the reading of the jury instructions,
3
the jury found Defendant guilty as charged of possession of a firearm or
carrying a concealed weapon by a convicted felon.
On October 8, 2025, Defendant filed a motion for judgment of
acquittal and a motion for new trial. The trial court denied these motions.
A sentencing hearing was held on October 8, 2025. The trial court
noted the sentencing range and found that the three factors in La. C. Cr. P.
art. 894.1(A) were applicable. The court asked Defendant about his personal
history and learned that he earned his GED, that he was previously
employed as a truck driver and that he lived with family members. The
court considered the factors enumerated in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(B) and
found that the following circumstances applied—that the offender
knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one
person and that Defendant used a dangerous weapon in the commission of
the offense. The court noted that the firearm found in Defendant’s
possession had been altered by adding a switch to make it a fully automatic
weapon. The court discussed Defendant’s criminal history, including a 2012
conviction of possession of marijuana, a 2016 conviction of illegal use of a
weapon during a crime of violence and a 2019 conviction for RICOprohibited activities. The court stated that Defendant fled during trial, that
he cut off and destroyed his ankle monitor and that he was arrested five
months later in Dallas, Texas. It determined that these actions showed
Defendant’s disregard for the law and intention to “never come back.” The
court discussed possible mitigating factors and determined that they did not
apply. Noting Defendant’s criminal history and that he fled the jurisdiction
during trial, the court sentenced Defendant to the maximum sentence of
20 years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of
4
sentence. The trial court stated that this sentence would run concurrently
with any other sentence he was serving and waived the mandatory fine.
On October 21, 2025, Defendant filed a motion to reconsider
sentence. The trial court denied this motion.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Right to Testify
In his first assignment of error, Defendant argues that the trial court
erred in finding that his voluntary absence constituted a waiver of his right to
testify. He contends that his absence did not constitute a waiver because a
colloquy was not conducted. He argues that the court incorrectly conflated
the statutory right to be present under La. C. Cr. P. art. 832 with the
constitutional right to testify under Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S. Ct.
2704, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1987). Defendant requests that this court reverse his
conviction and remand for a new trial at which he may exercise or waive his
right to testify through a knowing and intelligent colloquy.
The state argues that the trial court appropriately inferred from
Defendant’s deliberate absence that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his
right to testify. It states that Defendant was present in the courtroom when
the trial court and defense counsel discussed conducting the colloquy after
the recess, so he knew when he fled that he was forfeiting his right to testify.
It contends that Defendant should not be allowed to impede court
proceedings by choosing to abscond midtrial and then demand a retrial on
the grounds that he was prejudiced by his own conduct.
The right to testify on one’s own behalf at a criminal trial has sources
in the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
5
Constitution. Rock v. Arkansas, supra; State v. Turner, 25-00209 (La.
3/6/26), 429 So. 3d 179. The Louisiana Constitution guarantees a defendant
the right to testify in his own defense. La. Const. art. I, § 16.
A criminal defendant’s right to testify is not without limitation. Rock
v. Arkansas, supra; State v. Dauzart, 99-3471 (La. 10/30/00), 769 So. 2d
1206. The right “may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” Rock v. Arkansas, supra,
quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d
297 (1973).
Pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 831(A), a defendant charged with a
felony shall be present at all of the following:
(1) At arraignment.
(2) When a plea of guilty, not guilty, or not guilty and not guilty
by reason of insanity is made.
(3) At the calling, examination, challenging, impaneling, and
swearing of the jury, and at any subsequent proceedings for the
discharge of the jury or of a juror.
(4) At all times during the trial when the court is determining
and ruling on the admissibility of evidence.
(5) In trials by jury, at all proceedings when the jury is present,
and in trials without a jury, at all times when evidence is being
adduced.
(6) At the rendition of the verdict or judgment, unless he
voluntarily absents himself.
La. C. Cr. P. art. 832(A) sets forth exceptions to La. C. Cr. P. art. 831 and
states, in pertinent part:
A defendant initially present for the commencement of trial
shall not prevent the further progress of the trial, including the
return of the verdict, and shall be considered to have waived his
right to be present if his counsel is present or if the right to
counsel has been waived and . . . the following occur[s]:
(1) He voluntarily absents himself after the trial has
commenced, whether or not he has been informed by the court
of his obligation to be present during the trial.
6
This court in State v. Williams, 50,468 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/24/16),
190 So. 3d 737, writ denied, 16-0541 (La. 3/13/17), 216 So. 3d 801, cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 387, 199 L. Ed. 2d 287 (2017), addressed a defendant’s
voluntary absence at trial and stated:
The United States and Louisiana Supreme Courts have been
unequivocal in their holdings that, while a criminal defendant
has the right to be present during his trial, he does not have the
right to use that presence as a means of preventing the
continuation of his trial.
***
A defendant may also waive his right to be present by
voluntarily absenting himself from the trial. La. C. Cr. P.
art. 832. In the case of a defendant who voluntarily absents
himself from trial, the next inquiry is whether the defendant’s
attorney was present at every stage of the proceeding. If so, the
defense attorney’s presence is sufficient to satisfy the due
process requirements of La. C. Cr. P. arts. 831 and 832.
***
La. C. Cr. P. art. 17 provides that a court has the duty to require
that criminal proceedings be conducted with dignity and in an
orderly and expeditious manner and to control the proceedings
so that justice is done. As observed in several other cases
dealing with voluntary absences after trial begins, we will not
allow a defendant to manipulate and frustrate the speedy trial
and prosecution of criminal cases by absenting himself from a
trial which has already commenced whenever he chooses to do
so.
See also State v. Landrum, 35,053 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/26/01),
796 So. 2d 94, writ denied, 03-0493 (La. 2/20/04), 866 So. 2d 823.
Although Louisiana courts have considered cases where the trial court
or defense counsel prevented a defendant from testifying, see State v.
Dauzart, supra, and State v. Turner, supra, these cases are inapplicable to
the case sub judice. Defendant was not prevented from testifying. He
voluntarily absented himself after hearing the trial court and his counsel
agree that the colloquy regarding whether he would testify would be
conducted following a recess. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it determined that Defendant waived his right to testify by
7
voluntarily absenting himself and then recommenced trial pursuant to La. C.
Cr. P. art. 832. Defense counsel remained present at every stage of the
proceeding, which satisfied the due process requirements of La. C. Cr. P.
arts. 831 and 832.
Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
Excessive Sentence
In his second assignment of error, Defendant argues that the trial court
imposed a constitutionally excessive sentence. He states that the trial court
should have considered the mitigating factors that the offense did not
involve the use of violence or threats, that no one was injured and that the
offense was possessory in nature. He contends that this is not the type of
aggravated conduct that warrants the statutory maximum sentence. He
argues that rather than basing this sentence on the seriousness of the crime,
the trial court incorrectly relied on his post-offense flight, a fourth-felony
offender characterization without a habitual offender adjudication and a
weapon modification that was not present at the time of the offense.
The state argues that Defendant’s sentence is constitutionally
appropriate and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. It states that
the trial court carefully weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors when
imposing the maximum sentence. In arguing that the sentence does not
shock the sense of justice, the state notes Defendant’s criminal history, his
lack of interest in rehabilitation and his willful abscondment from trial. It
states that the trial court properly considered Defendant’s midtrial flight as it
reflected his lack of remorse and established that a lesser sentence would
deprecate the serious nature of his actions. It also argues that the trial court
did not, as suggested by Defendant, conduct an informal habitual offender
8
adjudication; rather, it appropriately considered his criminal history, which
included three previous felony convictions.
An appellate court utilizes a two-pronged test in reviewing a sentence
for excessiveness. First, the record must show that the trial court complied
with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983). The
trial judge need not articulate every aggravating and mitigating circumstance
outlined in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, but the record must reflect that he
adequately considered these guidelines in particularizing the sentence to the
defendant. Id. The important elements the trial court should consider are
the defendant’s personal history, prior criminal record, seriousness of
offense and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049
(La. 1981). There is no requirement that specific matters be given any
particular weight at sentencing. State v. DeBerry, 50,501 (La. App. 2 Cir.
4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 657, writ denied, 16-0959 (La. 5/1/17), 219 So. 3d 332.
Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is
constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is
grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more
than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v.
Smith, 01-2574 (La. 1/14/03), 839 So. 2d 1, citing State v. Bonanno,
384 So. 2d 355 (La. 1980).
The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences
within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as
excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Abercrumbia, 412 So. 2d 1027 (La. 1982). As a general rule, maximum or
near-maximum sentences are reserved for the worst offenders and the worst
offenses. State v. Jones, 52,672 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/19), 273 So. 3d 585,
9
writ denied, 19-01075 (La. 10/1/19), 280 So. 3d 160. On review, an
appellate court does not determine whether another sentence may have been
more appropriate but whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v.
Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7.
Whoever is found guilty of possession of a firearm or carrying a
concealed weapon by a convicted felon shall be imprisoned at hard labor for
not less than five nor more than twenty years without the benefit of
probation, parole or suspension of sentence and be fined not less than one
thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars. La.
R.S. 14:95.1(B)(1).
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed
the maximum 20-year sentence. The trial court analyzed the La. C. Cr. P.
art. 894.1 factors and considered Defendant’s personal history, emphasizing
his criminal history. Considering the facts of this case, the sentence imposed
by the trial court is not grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the
offense or nothing more than a purposeless infliction of pain and suffering.
Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence of
Defendant Rodrick Raymond Hicks.
AFFIRMED.
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