Judgment rendered July 15, 2026.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.
No. 56,932-KA
COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA
*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee
versus
TRATAVION J. TURNER Appellant
*****
Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 394,716
Honorable Ramona L. Emanuel, Judge
*****
LOUISIANA APPEALS
AND WRIT SERVICE Counsel for Appellant By: Remy V. Starns
Douglas Daniel Brown
JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee District Attorney
FERNANDO GRIDER, JR.
MARGARET RICHIE GASKINS
Assistant District Attorneys
*****
Before PITMAN, ROBINSON, and ELLENDER, JJ.
ELLENDER, J.
Tratavion Turner appeals his conviction of third degree rape (a
responsive verdict to the charge of second degree rape), his adjudication as a
second-felony offender, and his agreed sentence of 30 years at hard labor
without benefits. For the reasons expressed, we affirm the conviction,
vacate the second-felony adjudication and sentence, and remand for further
proceedings.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The offense occurred in March 2023 at a house on West Canal Blvd.,
in Shreveport’s Sunset Acres neighborhood. The house was owned by a
Mrs. Turner, whose children were living there with her; her son, the 24-yearold defendant, was staying there occasionally. Mrs. Turner was dating a man
who moved into the house along with his daughters, including the victim,
16-year-old AA.
On the evening of March 21, according to AA, she was asleep in bed
when Turner came into the bedroom and asked to borrow her cellphone so
he could text somebody. She gave him the phone, he left, and AA went back
to sleep; moments later, he came back in, woke her up, returned the phone,
and asked her how old she was. When she replied asking why he wanted to
know, he responded, “Just tell me,” but he left the room again. He then
came back a third time, started “rubbing on” her and talking to her; he
suddenly pulled her out of bed, and she saw he was already wearing a
condom. AA tried to scream, but Turner placed his hand over her mouth,
muffling her voice. He then began penetrating her. When he got through, he
told her to “shake through” it, so we can “keep it between us,” and
threatened to kill her if she told anyone.
After hearing the threat, AA ran to the bathroom and called her mother,
RA, to come get her; AA also texted a boyfriend to say she’d been raped. RA
hurried to Mrs. Turner’s house, calling the police along the way. When she
arrived, AA told her Mrs. Turner’s son had raped her.
Shreveport Police Department officers soon arrived at the scene; AA
told one of them, Corporal Janice Allen, she had been woken up by Turner,
who pulled her to the floor, covered her mouth, and penetrated her vaginally.
She also said she never consented to any intercourse with Turner, her stomach
and vagina were hurting from the incident, and she had struck her head on the
floor when he pulled her out of bed. Officers questioned the other occupants
of the house, but all of them responded they heard nothing.
AA also told officers Turner was still inside the house, but they entered
and could not find him. Cpl. Allen rode with AA to the hospital.
At the hospital, SPD Detective Rodney Stewart questioned AA. She
told him Turner had come into the room and started touching her as she was
lying in bed; he then grabbed her, threw her to the floor, penetrated her
without her consent, and threatened to kill her if she told anybody. Det.
Stewart later questioned the other occupants of the house, but they again
replied they heard nothing.
AA was then examined by a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner, Katie
Price. Nurse Price found some secretions in AA’s vaginal area and around her
cervix, which she testified could be consistent with an “aggressive consensual
act.” However, she also found abrasions to AA’s right middle finger and
upper right arm, bruising to her left wrist, abrasions on her left elbow, and
redness on her right breast, all of which were consistent with AA’s account of
the incident.
2
The next day, AA was taken to Gingerbread House, a children’s
advocacy center, and interviewed by Meaghan Hughes, a forensic interviewer.
AA told Ms. Hughes Turner raped her and threatened to kill her if she told
anybody about it.
Turner was located, arrested, and booked into city jail about two weeks
later. After receiving his Miranda rights, Turner told Det. Stewart he saw AA
lying on his mother’s bed, asked her if she wanted to have sex, and she agreed
to it; they proceeded to engage in sex on the floor. Turner insisted it was not
rape, as the act was consensual.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The state charged Turner by bill of information with second degree rape
of AA, R.S. 14:42.1. The state also filed a notice under La. C.E. arts. 404 (B)
and 412.2 alleging that Turner had, in 2016, committed indecent behavior
with a juvenile, and the state intended to introduce evidence of this to show
his lustful disposition toward children.
The case came to a four-day trial in July 2024, but the jury reported it
was unable to reach a verdict. The state then reset the matter for a second
trial, to take place in June 2025. The state filed an amended 404 (B) and
412.2 notice, this time alleging both the 2016 incident of indecent behavior, to
show Turner’s lustful disposition toward children, and a 2022 incident of
domestic abuse strangulation, to show his violent behavior toward women.1
1
Both the original notice and the amended notice cited La. C.E. art. 412.4 (“Evidence of similar crimes, wrongs, or acts in domestic abuse cases and cruelty against juveniles cases”); however, at trial, the prosecutor correctly referred to Art. 412.2 (“Evidence of similar crimes, wrongs, or acts in sex offense cases”), and both sides have argued the substance of Art. 412.2. We have therefore disregarded the incorrect citation in the state’s motions.
3
The case came to a second, three-day trial in June 2025. The witnesses
testified as outlined above. In addition, AA testified the rape had changed her
mentally, and her mother, RA, testified that, after the rape, AA “distanced
herself” from her siblings, became withdrawn, asked why it happened to her,
and woke up with nightmares.
A DNA analyst, Michael Madere, testified Turner’s DNA was a major
contributor on swabs taken from AA’s body. Three swabs yielded odds that it
was some person other than Turner at one in 49.4 trillion and one in 26.8
sextillion. Madere conceded he found a third DNA contributor, but this was
“minor.”
SPD Officer Derek Snyder testified concerning the predicate offense:
he responded to a call, in June 2016, from a woman who discovered her 14-year-old daughter in bed with Turner. The defense objected to the relevance
and prejudicial effect of this evidence, but the court overruled the objection.
Ofc. Snyder then testified the daughter told him Turner had sexually assaulted
her, and Turner admitted having “consensual” sex with her.
Turner presented no evidence.
The jury returned a responsive verdict of third degree rape.
The state promptly filed a third-felony habitual offender bill. This
alleged Turner’s first felony was a September 2018 guilty plea to domestic
abuse battery strangulation, in the First JDC, for which he received a sentence
of 90 days in parish jail, three years at hard labor, suspended, and two years of
supervised probation. The second was a March 2022 guilty plea to domestic
4
abuse battery strangulation, also in the First JDC, for which he was sentenced
to two years at hard labor.2
Before the habitual offender bill was adjudicated, Turner filed motions
for post verdict judgment of acquittal and for new trial.
ACTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT
On June 23, 2025, the parties appeared for sentencing. At the outset,
defense counsel reminded the court he had filed the posttrial motions; the
court summarily denied them. Without delay, the court stated it “has had an
opportunity to speak with both counsel for the State and defense together.”
Citing the totality of the circumstances, the court stated it “agrees to give Mr.
Turner the recommended sentence of 30 years at hard labor” without benefits,
with credit for time served.
The court then asked Turner if he understood he had to register as a sex
offender, have no contact with the victim, could not own or possess any
firearms, and was to apply for the Steve Hoyle program; he replied “yes” to
all queries.3
The prosecutor then called Turner to be sworn in and admit that
“pursuant to conversation with defense counsel that sentence was agreed and
stipulated to being a second.” Defense counsel asked Turner if he had been
convicted of domestic abuse strangulation on March 21, 2022, and of third
degree rape on June 11, 2025; Turner replied “yes” to both. The prosecutor
then stated that, although the habitual offender bill was for third offense,
2
That guilty plea was March 21, 2022, and resulted in a two-year sentence. The instant offense occurred March 21, 2023, exactly one year later. This court speculates Turner was out early on time served.
3
Steve Hoyle is an intensive substance-abuse treatment program in which eligible inmates can learn life and social skills while completing their sentences. State v. Harris, 55,467 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/24), 380 So. 3d 837. The court likely recommended it for a sex offender like Turner for skills and reentry training.
5
Turner had agreed to be sentenced as a second. The court then reiterated that
it was denying Turner’s posttrial motions.
Turner filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the court
summarily denied on July 23, 2025. Turner then took this appeal. He raised
four assignments of error.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
By his first assignment of error, Turner urges the evidence was
insufficient to establish third degree rape beyond a reasonable doubt. He
concedes the standard of review is that stated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979), and La. C. Cr. P. art. 821 (B), under which the
evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
However, he cites several items which, in his view, undermine the finding of
guilt: (1) His own statement to Det. Stewart maintained AA consented to the
intercourse; (2) Nurse Price’s findings in AA’s genital area were consistent
with consensual intercourse, and, further, were devoid of observations
(scratches, bruises, bumps, or other injuries) to corroborate that AA was
pulled out of bed and thrown to the floor; (3) Nobody in the house heard AA
scream, refuting any corroboration that she resisted; (4) The DNA findings
proved sexual contact but did not show lack of consent; and (5) The first jury
heard essentially the same evidence but could not reach a verdict. Turner
submits these inconsistencies cast enough doubt on AA’s testimony to defeat
the showing of guilt. He asks this court to vacate the conviction.
The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim
is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
6
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, supra; State v.
Stockstill, 19-01235 (La. 10/20/20), 341 So. 3d 502. This standard, now
legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate
court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that
of the factfinder. State v. Bourgeois, 20-00883 (La. 5/13/21), 320 So. 3d
1047; State v. Dotie, 43,819 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 1 So. 3d 833, writ
denied, 09-0310 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 297.
The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may, within the
bounds of rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witness, in whole
or in part. State v. Brown, 18-01999 (La. 9/30/21), 330 So. 3d 199; State v.
Combs, 56,232 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/9/25), 410 So. 3d 405, writ not cons., 25-01108 (La. 2/3/26), 425 So. 3d 838. The appellate court does not assess
credibility or reweigh evidence. State v. Kelly, 15-0484 (La. 6/29/16), 195 So.
3d 449; State v. Combs, supra. In the absence of internal contradiction or
irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if
believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual
conclusion. State v. Reed, 14-1980 (La. 9/7/16), 200 So. 3d 291; State v.
Coffey, 54,729 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/22), 349 So. 3d 647, writ denied, 22-01574 (La. 12/20/22), 352 So. 3d 89. This includes the sole testimony of a
sexual assault victim. State v. Coffey, supra; State v. Coliston, 56,332 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 8/27/25), 420 So. 3d 284.
As it applies to this case, third degree rape is defined as a rape
committed when the vaginal intercourse is deemed to be without the lawful
consent of the victim because it is committed when the offender acts without
the consent of the victim. La. R.S. 14:43 (A)(4); State v. Kirby, 53,661 (La.
7
App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 309 So. 3d 946, writ denied, 21-00254 (La. 5/11/21),
315 So. 3d 868.
On close review, we find the evidence meets the constitutional standard
of Jackson v. Virginia, supra, and La. C. Cr. P. art. 821. AA described Turner
entering her bedroom several times while she was trying to sleep: first to
borrow a cellphone, then to return it and ask her age, and then to get on the
bed, rub her, pull her off the bed, show he was already wearing a condom, and
penetrate her. She testified she never consented to the sexual act. After
having his way with her, he threatened to kill her if she told anyone about it,
an attempt to silence AA that would seem unnecessary had the act been truly
consensual. AA was remarkably consistent in relating her experience, not
only at trial under oath, but in statements to her mother, Cpl. Allen, Det.
Stewart, Nurse Price, and forensic interviewer Hughes. Given the strength
and uniformity of this testimony, the jury did not abuse its discretion in
disregarding Turner’s statement to Det. Stewart that AA consented.
Contrary to Turner’s argument, Nurse Price found injuries to AA’s right
middle finger and upper arm, and left wrist and elbow, that are compatible
with being forcibly pulled out of bed and onto the floor. Nurse Price also
found a blister to AA’s upper lip, which is compatible with AA’s testimony
that Turner held his hand to her mouth to muffle her cries. The effort to stifle
AA’s screams is compatible with family members’ claims they heard nothing.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, these facts do not
undermine the jury’s findings.
Finally, we place no stock in Turner’s contention that the hung jury in
the prior trial somehow made the evidence in this trial suspect. Obviously, a
hung jury does not activate jeopardy or prohibit retrial. Yeager v. United
8
States, 557 U.S. 110, 129 S. Ct. 2360 (2009); State v. Nall, 439 So. 2d 420
(La. 1983); State v. White, 28,095 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/8/96), 674 So. 2d 1018,
writs denied, 96-1459 (La. 11/15/96), 682 So. 2d 760, and 98-0282 (La.
6/26/98), 719 So. 2d 1048. One court has already rejected the claim that
“every conviction following a hung jury [can be] challenged for insufficiency
of the evidence.” Francis v. Bordelon, 2026 WL 24963 (E.D. La. 2026).
There is no showing that the evidence was identical at both trials, only that
the evidence was sufficient in this trial. This assignment of error lacks merit.
Admission of Other-Crimes Evidence
By his second assignment of error, Turner urges the court erred in
admitting other-crimes evidence of a 2016 incident under La. C.E. art. 412.2,
the prejudicial impact of which substantially outweighed any probative value
and contributed to the conviction. He shows he objected before Ofc. Snyder
related this incident, but the court overruled it. In his testimony, Ofc. Snyder
even admitted the 14-year-old victim in that offense told him she “had invited
him or it was voluntary that he was in the bed with her.” He contends that
incident, resulting in a guilty plea to misdemeanor carnal knowledge, was
strikingly different from this one, in which the prosecutor called him “a
sexual predator.” He submits the only purpose of offering the 2016 incident
was for “prejudicial impact, portraying the defendant * * * as someone with a
pattern of sexual conduct with children.”
Evidence of other acts of misconduct is generally inadmissible because
it creates the risk that the defendant will be convicted of the present offense
simply because the unrelated evidence establishes him as a “bad person.” La.
C.E. art. 404 (B); State v. Jacobs, 99-0991 (La. 5/15/01), 803 So. 2d 933;
State v. Horton, 55,468 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/24), 380 So. 3d 841, writ denied,
9
24-00365 (La. 10/1/24), 393 So. 3d 864. This rule stems from the
“substantial risk of grave prejudice to the defendant” from the introduction of
evidence regarding his unrelated criminal acts. State v. Jacobs, supra; State v.
Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973). However, La. C.E. art. 412.2 creates an
exception to the rule of Art. 404 (B). State v. Layton, 14-1910 (La. 3/17/15),
168 So. 3d 358; State v. Horton, supra. Art. 412.2 (A) provides:
When an accused is charged with a crime involving sexually
assaultive behavior, or with acts that constitute a sex offense involving
a victim who was under the age of seventeen at the time of the offense,
evidence of the accused’s commission of another crime, wrong, or act
involving sexually assaultive behavior or acts which indicate a lustful
disposition toward children may be admissible and may be considered
for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant subject to the
balancing test provided in Article 403.
The admissibility of evidence under Art. 412.2 depends on whether its
“probative value substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay
or waste of time.” La. C.E. art. 403; State v. Horton, supra. The term “unfair
prejudice” in this context refers to the capacity of the evidence to lure the
factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the
offense charged. State v. Jones, 17-00658 (La. 10/22/19), 285 So. 3d 1074;
State v. Horton, supra.
A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of other-crimes evidence
under La. C.E. art. 412.2 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Wright,
11-0141 (La. 12/6/11), 79 So. 3d 309; State v. Horton, supra. Art. 412.2
“does not limit the admissibility of prior acts only to those identical or similar
in nature.” State v. Wright, supra; State v. Johnson, 56,185 (La. App. 2 Cir.
3/5/25), 409 So. 3d 328, writ denied, 25-00429 (La. 6/17/25), 411 So. 3d 631.
There is no requirement of “strict similarity” for admissibility. State v.
10
Wright, supra. Such evidence may be admissible if it shows an “opportunistic
propensity to engage in sexual activity with [a minor] on occasions when he
had unsupervised access to her.” State v. Allen, 54,153 (La. App. 2 Cir.
12/15/21), 331 So. 3d 1101.
On close review, we find no abuse of the district court’s discretion in
admitting Ofc. Snyder’s testimony. Although that incident was consensual
and resulted in only a conviction of indecent behavior with juveniles, it
showed Turner’s propensity to coax his way into bed with a minor when the
opportunity arose through lack of supervision. Even without strict similarity,
the prior incident was relevant to show Turner’s lustful disposition toward
children and substantial enough to outweigh any risk of unfair prejudice. This
assignment of error lacks merit.
Habitual Offender Adjudication
By his third assignment of error, Turner urges the court erred in
adjudicating him a second-felony offender and imposing an enhanced
sentence based on a constitutionally deficient habitual offender colloquy. He
cites the requirement of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709
(1969), whereby the defendant must be advised of his right to a formal
hearing, to remain silent, and to have the state prove both the fact of the prior
conviction and his identity as the person convicted, State v. Johnson, 432 So.
2d 815 (La. 1983); State v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La. 1980). He submits
the district court conducted no independent inquiry: it merely referred to a
“conversation with counsel” that the sentence and second-felony status were
agreed. Then, defense counsel simply asked if Turner had been convicted of
domestic abuse strangulation on March 21, 2022, and of third degree rape on
June 11, 2025, and he admitted both. He contends this is the precise
11
deficiency that Johnson and Bonanno prohibit, and he asks this court to
vacate the adjudication.
The state concedes that, under R.S. 15:529.1 (D)(1)(a), the defendant
must be advised of the specific allegations in the habitual offender bill, State
v. Roland, 49,660 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/15), 162 So. 2d 558, writ denied, 15-0596 (La. 2/19/16), 186 So. 3d 1174. It further concedes no formal Boykin
colloquy occurred in this case. However, it asserts, “it appears” there was an
agreed sentence, and the meeting of the minds was beneficial to Turner, in
that as a third-felony offender, as he was originally charged, he faced a
mandatory life sentence, La. R.S. 15:529.1 (A)(3)(b). The state admits “an
error patent occurred in this case,” but suggests the agreement should be
upheld, to the defendant’s benefit.
Several principles govern the entry of a guilty plea. Under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, the guilty plea must be recorded and show the
defendant was informed of and waived three specific federal constitutional
rights: (1) the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, (2) the right to
a trial by jury, and (3) the right to confront one’s accusers. Boykin v.
Alabama, supra; State v. Guzman, 99-1753 (La. 5/16/00), 769 So. 2d 1158;
State v. Small, 50,388 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/24/16), 189 So. 3d 1129, writ denied,
16-0533 (La. 3/13/17), 212 So. 3d 1158.
Louisiana law has adopted the constitutional requirement. Under La.
C. Cr. P. art. 556.1 (A), a court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first
addressing the defendant personally in open court and informing him of, and
determining that he understands, he has the right to plead not guilty, he has
the right to be tried by a jury, he has the right to assistance of counsel at trial,
he has the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the
12
right not to be compelled to incriminate himself. La. C. Cr. P. art. 556.1
(A)(3). While other rights delineated in Art. 556.1 are subject to harmless
error analysis, the “core Boykin requirements” are strictly observed. State v.
Guzman, supra; State v. Russell, 46,426 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/17/11), 73 So. 3d
991, writ denied, 11-2020 (La. 2/10/12), 82 So. 3d 270.
In the context of an habitual offender bill of information, the court
“shall cause the person * * * to be brought before it and shall inform him of
the allegation contained in the information and of his right to be tried as to the
truth thereof according to law[.]” La. R.S. 15:529.1 (D)(1)(a). Implicit in this
requirement is the additional requirement that the defendant be advised of his
constitutional right to remain silent. Notably, a multiple offender hearing is a
status rather than a criminal proceeding, so the right to a jury trial does not
apply as a matter of state or federal constitutional law. State v. McAllister,
366 So. 2d 1340 (La. 1978); State v. Leblanc, 04-1032 (La. App. 1 Cir.
12/17/04), 897 So. 2d 736, writ denied, 05-0150 (La. 4/29/05), 901 So. 2d
1063, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 905, 126 S. Ct. 254 (2005). A trial court’s failure
to properly advise the defendant of his rights under R.S. 15:529.1 constitutes
error patent on the face of the record and requires that the habitual offender’s
adjudication and sentence be vacated. State v. Taylor, 53,934 (La. App. 2 Cir.
5/5/21), 321 So. 3d 486; State v. Nobles, 53,453 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/20), 296
So. 3d 1192, and citations therein.
Even a cursory review of this record shows that the Boykin colloquy
failed to meet the constitutional and statutory requirements. At the hearing,
the court stated:
The Court has had an opportunity to speak with both the counsel
for the State and defense together. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the Court agrees to give Mr. Turner the recommended
13
sentence of 30 years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole,
or suspension of sentence, with credit for time served.
The court further advised Turner he may not own or possess any
firearms, he must comply with a protective order for 30 years, he must
register as a sex offender, he should pursue sex offender and any other
counseling (including the Steve Hoyle program), and he had the right to
pursue postconviction relief.
The prosecutor then called Turner to be sworn “pursuant to
conversation with defense counsel that sentence was agreed and stipulated to
being a second.” Turner admitted he was convicted of domestic abuse battery
strangulation on March 21, 2022, and of the instant offense on June 11, 2025.
The court then stated:
Based on those statements, the Court finds that Mr. Turner so
admits, and the Court so finds that he is a second felony habitual
offender. And all of that that has been said today regarding all of this is
duly made part of the record herein.
The prosecutor then added the state “did file the felony habitual
offender bill as a third,” but was “agreeing to stipulate that he is a second as
he has admitted here in Open Court.” The court responded, “Duly noted.”
In short, there was no attempt to advise Turner and obtain his waiver of
his rights under the Constitution and Boykin v. Alabama, supra. There was no
effort to advise him of the allegation contained in the information and of his
right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law, with the implicit
advice about remaining silent, as provided by La. R.S. 15:529.1 (D)(1)(a).
This comes nowhere near the “minimal compliance” sanctioned by the
court in State v. Anderson, 98-2977 (La. 3/19/99), 732 So. 2d 517. A
defective Boykin hearing may be considered harmless, when the defendant’s
“habitual offender statue is established by competent evidence offered by the
14
state at a hearing rather than by the admission of the defendant.” State v.
Nobles, supra; State v. Bell, 03-217 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/28/03), 848 So. 3d 87.
On close examination, we are unable to find any other competent evidence at
the hearing to establish Turner’s habitual offender status. On this record, we
are constrained to vacate the adjudication and remand the case for further
proceedings.
We also recognize the state’s suggestion that the plea agreement was
fundamentally beneficial to Turner: as a third-felony offender, he faced a
mandatory life sentence, La. R.S. 15:529.1 (A)(3)(b). However, having
asserted his constitutional rights under Boykin and his statutory rights under
La. C. Cr. P. art. 556.1 and R.S. 15:529.1, Turner is entitled to a hearing with
a proper disclosure and waiver of his rights. The adjudication is therefore
vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
In light of this decision, we pretermit any consideration of Turner’s
fourth assignment of error, which contended his 30-year sentence was
constitutionally excessive.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed, Turner’s conviction of third degree rape is
affirmed. His adjudication as a second-felony offender, and his sentence as
such, are vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; REMANDED.
15