Adena Health Sys. v. Cohen

[Cite as Adena Health Sys. v. Cohen, 2026-Ohio-2697.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ROSS COUNTY

Adena Health System, :

Adena Medical Group, LLC, : Case No. 23CA18

:

Plaintiffs-Appellees, :

:

v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT

: ENTRY

Brian S. Cohen, M.D., et al., :

:

Defendants-Counterclaim :

Plaintiffs-Third Party :

Complainants-Appellants, :

:

v. :

: RELEASED: 07/08/2026

Jeffrey J. Graham, et al., :

:

Third-Party Defendants- :

Appellees. :

APPEARANCES:

Jeffrey A. Lipps, Jennifer A. L. Battle, and David A. Beck, Carpenter Lipps LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for appellants.

Robert G. Cohen, Robert G. Schuler, and Loriann E. Fuhrer, Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter Co., L.P.A., Columbus, Ohio, for appellees.

Wilkin, J.

{¶1} Adena Health System and Adena Medical Group, LLC (hereinafter

“Adena”) owns Adena Bone and Joint Group in which Appellants, Doctors Brian

S. Cohen, J. Troy Thompson, and Aaron Roberts (hereinafter “Doctors”) were

employed as physicians. The Doctors and Adena had signed an employment

agreement. Doctors Cohen, Thompson, and Roberts all submitted their

resignation on the same day and provided a 120-day notice pursuant to the Ross App. No. 23CA18 2

employment agreement. However, within weeks of submitting their resignation,

Adena terminated the Doctors’ employment and Doctor Cohen, who was present

at the medical facility that day, was personally informed of the termination and

escorted out of the facility. On the same day, Adena filed a complaint against the

Doctors alleging breach of contract, breach of the duty of loyalty, tortious

interference, trade secret violations, and civil conspiracy.

{¶2} The Doctors answered and filed a counterclaim alleging multiple

claims and also filed a third-party complaint against Adena’s board members,

third-party defendants, presenting several claims.1

{¶3} Adena and third-party defendants filed motions for summary

judgment. The trial court granted Adena and third-party defendant’s request for

summary judgment on several of the Doctors claims, including: wrongful

termination; declaratory judgment that the non-compete provision in their

employment agreement was unreasonable and resulted in damages for

complying with it; the board’s failure to supervise Adena’s Chief Executive Officer

(“CEO”) Jeffrey J. Graham and Chief Operating Officer (“COO”) Katherine J.

1

The third-party defendants were board members at the time the Doctors were fired from employment and are: Jeff J. Graham – Chief Executive Officer of Adena Health System; Katherine J. Edrington (“Kathi”) – Chief Operating Officer of Adena; Joseph J. Watson – Chair of the Adena Board of Trustees; Jennifer McKell – vice chair of Adena Board of Trustee; Stephen F. Hirsch – treasurer of Adena Board of Trustees; Carvel E. Simmons – secretary of Adena Board of Trustees; Ronald W. Coffey – member of Adena Board of Trustees; Anthony C. Fish – member of Adena Board of Trustees; Robert N. French – member of Adena Board of Trustees; Sheilah Gray – member of Adena Board of Trustees; Bartow Henshaw – member of Adena Board of Trustees; Dr. Anthony Lattavo – member of Adena Board of Trustees; Evan J. Phillips Jr. (“Jerry”) – member of Adena Board of Trustees; Kevin Shoemaker – member of Adena Board of Trustees; Beth A. Workman – member of Adena Board of Trustees; and Dr. Reggina Yandila – member of Adena Board of Trustees.

Ross App. No. 23CA18 3

Edrington; tortious interference with the Doctors’ future employment ventures;

and Defamation.

{¶4} In two assignments of error, the Doctors challenge the trial court’s

decision granting Adena and the third-party Defendant’s motions for summary

judgment. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand the matter to the trial

court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶5} In February 2000, Dr. Cohen entered into an employment agreement

with Adena. The agreement was modified several times, with the last amended

physician employment agreement signed in January 2018. Dr. Sever joined

Adena in February 2005, and he also signed amended physician employment

agreements over the years. In 2010, Dr. Roberts and Dr. Thompson began their

employment with Adena, signing similar amended physician employment

agreements, with Dr. Roberts signing an agreement like Dr. Cohen’s in January

2018.

{¶6} The Doctors became dissatisfied with Graham’s appointment as the

new CEO, the implementation of new policies, and Dr. Cohen’s demotion as

medical director, among other changes. The Doctors felt that the changes were

not for the benefit of the patients. The Doctors vocalized their unhappiness with

the changes. This culminated with the Doctors submitting their resignation on

March 15, 2021, with a 120-day notice as required by their employment

agreements.

{¶7} Prior to their 120-day notice period ending, the Doctors were

Ross App. No. 23CA18 4

terminated on April 12, 2021, effective immediately. Dr. Cohen was at the

medical facility when he was notified of his employment termination and was

escorted out. On the same day, Adena filed a complaint with five separate

claims against the Doctors. The first and second claims alleged breach of

contract and breach of loyalty, claiming, among other allegations, that the

Doctors violated their employment agreements by soliciting, contacting and/or

inducing other employees to leave Adena and joining a competitor. The third

claim was tortious interference alleging, among other violations, that the Doctors

solicited other Adena employees to leave and interfered with Adena’s

relationship with its staff. The fourth claim alleged violation of Adena’s

confidential information and trade secrets. The final claim was civil conspiracy

alleging, among other violations, that the Doctors engaged in a malicious

combination to injure Adena.

{¶8} The Doctors answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim and a

third-party complaint, naming Adena’s board of trustees as defendants. The

counterclaim included 11 claims, and the third-party complaint included 3 claims.

Several of the Doctors’ claims are before us for review because the trial court

granted Adena’s motion for partial summary judgment and the third-party

defendant’s motion for summary judgment, respectively.

{¶9} In count two of the counterclaim, the Doctors maintain that they were

wrongfully terminated. The Doctors asserted that they were wrongfully

terminated because their termination violated several public policies and was not

pursuant to Adena’s amended code of regulations. The trial court granted

Ross App. No. 23CA18 5

Adena’s motion for partial summary judgment finding that the Doctors were not

employees-at-will, and, therefore, could not raise a public policy violation. The

trial court accordingly applied the terms of the contractual agreement and stated

that the contract provides that the amended code of regulations were not

applicable.

{¶10} In count three of the counterclaim, the Doctors sought a declaratory

judgment, asserting that the non-compete clause in their employment agreement

was overly restrictive and unreasonable, causing them monetary damage. The

trial court granted Adena’s motion for partial summary judgment with regard to

the Doctors’ request for monetary damages, finding no legal basis for recovery.

{¶11} In counts four and five of the counterclaim, the Doctors maintained

that Adena committed business defamation and disparagement. The Doctors

contend that Adena published false statements to patients, Adena’s staff, the

press, and the Board regarding, among other things, that the Doctors abruptly left

with no reason, Dr. Cohen committed billing fraud, and informed the press about

the lawsuit against the Doctors.

{¶12} Finally, in count six of the counterclaim, the Doctors maintained that

Adena committed tortious interference with the Doctors’ actual and prospective

business relationships. One of the Doctors’ tortious interference claims was that

Adena purchased land known as Prairie Run North to prevent them from

practicing at an orthopedic center that OhioHealth planned to build there. Within

this argument, the Doctors also contend that Adena’s enforcement of the invalid

non-compete provision, also interfered with their future business. In summary, Ross App. No. 23CA18 6

the Doctors reiterate and contend that Adena published false information about

the Doctors to patients, staff, and the public, and filed the baseless lawsuit. The

Doctors assert that all these actions by Adena constitute intentional interference

with their business relationships with patients, OhioHealth, and other participants

in the purchase of the land.

{¶13} Another tortious interference claim was that Adena in the summer of

2021, as part of its lease renewal for its urgent care clinic in Circleville, added a

clause that no other urgent care or orthopedic center could be established at the

same shopping center. The Doctors also claimed that Adena’s trial tactics of

pursuing baseless discovery from OhioHealth caused OhioHealth to no longer

want to partner with the Doctors. This resulted in the dissolution of a future

venture where OhioHealth would build an ambulatory surgery center with the

Doctors working there.

{¶14} According to the Doctors, Adena’s tortious interference did not end

there; it further extended when the Doctors contacted the consulting firm Sunday

Creek Horizons to assist with their planned ambulatory surgery center project

with OhioHealth. According to the Doctors, Adena advised Sunday Creek

Horizons not to collaborate with them. Additionally, Dr. Cohen alleges that

Adena’s wrongful termination and the filing of the complaint against him

interfered with his ability to gain employment at Holzer Medical Center.

{¶15} In the Doctor’s third-party complaint filed against the Board, they

allege in their first count (failure to supervise) that the Board as a whole failed to

supervise CEO Graham and COO Edrington. The failure to supervise led to the Ross App. No. 23CA18 7

Doctors’ termination, the filing of a lawsuit against them, and the purchase of

Prairie Run North.

{¶16} The second count (defamation) in the third-party complaint was

against Board Member Watson, CEO Graham and COO Edrington. In the

defamation count, the Doctors claimed that CEO Graham and COO Edrington

published false statements about the Doctors. These included statements made

to other staff members, patients, and to Board members. As to Board Member

Watson, the Doctors contend that he communicated with Ed Kunzelman and

informed him that the Doctors violated their employment agreements. The

Doctors assert that these false statements damaged the Doctors’ reputation,

dissuaded Board members from supervising and investigating the decision to fire

the Doctors, and damaged their business reputation.

{¶17} In the third count (tortious interference) of the third-party complaint,

the Doctors claim CEO Graham and COO Edrington and the Board interfered

with the Doctors’ future ventures. Specifically, the Doctors maintain that CEO

Graham and COO Edrington baselessly initiated a lawsuit against the Doctors

and began harassing OhioHealth, whom they “knew or strongly suspected” that

the Doctors were in discussions with. Additionally, the Doctors contend that the

Board and CEO Graham purchased Prairie Run North to prevent OhioHealth

from purchasing the land to build a medical facility where the Doctors were going

to work. In the final count (negligence), the Doctors claim that CEO Graham,

COO Edrington, and the Board were negligent in forwarding the Doctors’ and the Ross App. No. 23CA18 8

Doctors’ family members’ private identification and medical information to a third

party, which was then leaked due to a ransomware attack.

{¶18} Adena and third-party defendants responded to the Doctors'

counterclaim and third-party complaint. Additionally, Adena filed a motion for

partial summary judgment requesting dismissal of the Doctors’ wrongful

termination claim because it failed as a matter of law. Adena asserted that the

Doctors’ argument that they were wrongfully terminated in violation of public

policy cannot apply because they were not employees-at-will, and legally, public

policy violation arguments only apply to at-will-employees. Within this argument,

Adena also asserted that the Doctors have no standing to challenge whether the

Board violated Adena’s amended code of regulations.

{¶19} Adena also requested dismissal of the Doctors’ tortious interference

claim on all four arguments: purchase of Prairie Run North, inability to compete

at the shopping center in Circleville, interference with consulting firm Sunday

Creek Horizons, and potential employment with Holzer Medical Center. Adena

presented several arguments including the Doctors’ failure to identify a particular

company or individual with whom the Doctors had a business relationship that

Adena allegedly interfered with. Second, with the Prairie Run North property, the

Doctors were not the potential purchasers of the land, and Adena was not the

buyer, rather it was Maximum Properties, LLC.

{¶20} Adena also argued that the Doctors failed to present evidence that

Adena had actual knowledge of the venture between the Doctors and OhioHealth

to build a facility on Prairie Run North. And finally, Adena maintains that the Ross App. No. 23CA18 9

Doctors cannot demonstrate tortious conduct by Adena’s purchase of the Prairie

Run North through their wholly owned Maximum Property, LLC. This is because

Adena does not own the real estate market in Ross County and did not prevent

the Doctors from purchasing property in Ross County.2

{¶21} Regarding the Doctors’ claim of tortious interference with Adena’s

lease renegotiations at the Circleville Commercial Center, Adena maintains that

the Doctors failed to present any evidence of their own negotiations with the

same landlord for similar services. Without such evidence, the Doctors cannot

satisfy the first element of tortious interference. The Doctors, additionally, cannot

meet the second and third elements, as there is no evidence that Adena had

actual knowledge of the Doctors’ plans to establish a medical facility at the

shopping center, and Adena’s request for a restrictive clause in their lease

agreement is not tortious conduct.

{¶22} Adena maintained that Dr. Cohen failed to demonstrate that there

was a prospective relationship with Holzer Medical Center, and that Adena had

actual knowledge of that business relationship, and finally, that Adena’s firing and

initiating this lawsuit is not tortious conduct. Thus, Adena requested dismissal of

Dr. Cohen’s claim. As to the final tortious claim, Adena maintains that the

Doctors failed to present evidence to support the second and third elements of

tortious interference; that is, Adena did not have actual knowledge that the

Doctors were in discussion with Sunday Creek Horizons, and Adena did not

direct or ask Sunday Creek not to do business with the Doctors.

2

Adena in support of its argument included a real estate exhibit demonstrating a company associated with Dr. Cohen purchasing real estate across from Adena’s main hospital campus. Ross App. No. 23CA18 10

{¶23} Adena also requested for the dismissal of the Doctors’ defamation

and slander counts in its motion for partial summary judgment claiming they all

fail as a matter of law. Adena contends the patient-scripted statement “I’m not

sure, he didn’t give a reason” was substantially true, less harmful than stating the

doctors were fired, and thus nonactionable under truth and incremental harm

doctrine. Adena argues these patient communications are also protected by

qualified privilege, with no clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. It

further asserts seven recorded operator calls do not contain the challenged

statement, are privileged, and show no direction or malice by Adena.

Furthermore, new allegations about the CEO and COO statements to the Board

before or on March 22, 2021, are time-barred by the one-year statute and, in any

event, are privileged board communications lacking actual malice and supported

only by references to suspicions and ongoing investigation. Lastly, claims based

on “publicizing” the lawsuit are barred by Ohio’s absolute litigation privilege and,

alternatively, constitute protected opinion in the context of ongoing litigation.

Therefore, Adena requested dismissal of Counts Four and Five with prejudice.

{¶24} The Board also filed a motion for summary judgment requesting the

dismissal of all counts in the Doctors’ third-party complaint. The Board first

argues that the Doctors lack standing for the “failure to supervise” claim, as

directors owe duties to the corporation, not employees. They assert the

defamation claim fails due to the truth of the statement, lack of malice, and

privilege. Further, the new defamation allegations are time-barred and lack

falsity. As to the tortious interference claims, the Board contends the Doctors’ Ross App. No. 23CA18 11

claims fail because they did not identify any specific prospective business

relationship with which the Board allegedly interfered. Therefore, the Board

requested dismissal of all claims.

{¶25} The trial court, in two separate entries, granted the Board’s motion

for summary judgment and Adena’s motion for partial summary judgment. In

granting the Board’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court outlined in

detail the procedural history of the case and the arguments presented by each

party. With regard to the Doctors’ failure to supervise claim against the Board,

the trial court identified three distinct allegations: the Board allegedly “turned a

blind eye” to the conduct of CEO Graham and COO Edrington’s leadership and

unilateral decision to terminate the Doctors; the Board failed to supervise the

finance committee concerning the purchase of Prairie Run North; and the Board

allowed the publication of defamatory statements due to lack of supervision. The

trial court granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that

there is no genuine issue of material fact. The trial court determined that “the

Doctors present no evidence that the board members were acting other than in

their official capacities during the times relevant to this action.”

{¶26} As for the second claim, defamation, the trial court first considered

the Doctors’ argument that CEO Graham, COO Edrington, and Board Member

Watson defamed them by using scripts prepared by a public relations consultant.

The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. In affirming the

Board’s motion, the trial court found that the script shared by Adena’s staff with

the patients was substantially truthful and less damaging than the truth that the Ross App. No. 23CA18 12

Doctors were terminated. Additionally, the trial court held that Adena’s

employees had a qualified privilege to inform patients that the Doctors had left.

{¶27} For the Doctors’ second defamation argument, the Doctors claimed

that CEO Graham and COO Edrington defamed them by making false

statements to the local press and health industry about the pending lawsuit. The

trial court found the statements to be truthful as they accurately reflected the

allegations in the complaint.

{¶28} The Doctors’ third defamation argument involved statements made

by CEO Graham and COO Edrington to the Board members during or before the

meeting on March 22, 2021. The trial court granted the motion for summary

judgment because the Doctors raised this claim in the amended counterclaim,

which, pursuant to precedent from this court and R.C. 2305.11(A), is barred by

the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court also determined that the claim

is precluded because the communication is protected by qualified privilege, and

the Doctors failed to establish evidence of actual malice.

{¶29} The trial court also granted the Board’s motion for summary

judgment as to the Doctors’ claim that the Board committed tortious interference

with the Doctors’ business relationships. The trial court held that Adena’s

purchase of the Prairie Run North had no relation with the Doctors as the Doctors

did not have any direct ties to the land. The Doctors failed to present any

evidence that they were intending to buy the property. Rather, the evidence is

that OhioHealth was considering purchasing that property in order to build a

facility. Thus, there was no evidence of a relationship between the Doctors and Ross App. No. 23CA18 13

the seller of the property. The trial court also held that Adena had a legal right to

file a lawsuit and to conduct discovery as permitted by civil rules.

{¶30} Approximately a month after granting the Board’s motion for

summary judgment, the trial court granted Adena’s motion for partial summary

judgment. In its decision, the trial court granted Adena’s request for summary

judgment as to the Doctors wrongful termination claim, declaratory judgment

regarding damages related to the non-compete provision within the Doctors

employment agreement, defamation and slander claims, and, finally, tortious

interference with business relationships claim.

{¶31} The trial court in granting Adena’s request, held that the Doctors

were contractual employees, and, thus, are not employees-at-will who can

pursue claims that termination violated public policy. The trial court also

concluded that the terms of the Doctors’ employment agreements expressly

stated that Adena’s rules and regulations do not apply in the event of

employment termination. Therefore, the Doctors’ second count in their amended

counterclaim fails.

{¶32} Regarding the Doctors’ request for a declaratory judgment that their

non-compete provision in their employment agreement is unreasonable and they

are entitled to damages, Adena’s motion for summary judgment only challenges

their request for damages. The trial court noted that it “again finds that there are

genuine issues of material fact with regard to the declaratory judgment count[,]”

but agreed with Adena that the one-year non-compete provision expired, and,

additionally, that there is no legal authority for a party to “obtain damages to Ross App. No. 23CA18 14

compensate them for their own compliance with a non-compete clause in their

employment contract.”

{¶33} The trial court in addressing the defamation and slander claims, first

outlined the statements that the Doctors contend were defamatory and were

published to the staff, patients, local press, health industry outlets, and board

members. The trial court also noted that the Doctors made similar claims in their

amended third-party complaint, which the trial court previously held lacked merit.

The trial court determined that the statements were substantially true, and the

complete truth would have been worse for the Doctors’ reputation. Further, the

trial court held that Adena’s publicization of the lawsuit was protected by the

litigation privilege. Moreover, the statements to Adena’s staff met the qualified

privilege elements, and the statute of limitations barred the defamation claim of

the statements to the board members. In conclusion, the trial court held that

there is some documentary evidence “showing that some issues of fact are in

dispute, those issues of fact do not rise to the level of genuine issues of material

fact[.]”

{¶34} For the final claim, tortious interference, the trial court reiterated that

it previously granted summary judgment to the Board regarding the Doctors’

assertions involving tortious interference by wrongfully terminating them;

spreading false information to patients, staff and the public; deliberately

purchasing Prairie Run North; publicizing the initiation of this baseless lawsuit;

and intentionally interfering with the Doctors’ relationships with the patients and

OhioHealth. The trial court also granted Adena’s motion for partial summary Ross App. No. 23CA18 15

judgment as to the Doctors’ new claim that Adena tortiously interfered with the

Doctors’ potential business relationship with a consulting firm, Holzer. The trial

court concluded that the Doctors failed to present sufficient evidence that Adena

knew that the Doctors had a relationship with the consulting firm, that Adena

made the statement with the intention to interfere, and that the Doctors suffered

any damage.

{¶35} It is from these judgment entries that the Doctors are appealing.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I. The Trial Court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of the

Third-Party Defendants on Counts 1, 2, 3, and 43 of the Third-Party

Claimants’ Amended Third-Party Complaint in its Judgment Entry on Third

Party Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgments entered on

June 28, 2023 (“Third-Party J.E.”). (Emphasis in original.)

II. The Trial Court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of

Plaintiffs on Counts 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs’

Amended Counterclaim in its Judgment Entry on Plaintiffs Adena Health

System and Adena Medical Group’s Renewed Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment as To Defendants’ Counterclaims for Wrongful Termination

(Based on Public Policy and/or Adena’s Code of Regulations), Tortious

Interference, Defamation and Slander, Declaratory Judgment (Damages

Claim Only), and Frivolous Conduct entered on July 19, 2023

(“Counterclaim J.E.”). (Emphasis in original.)4

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶36} “Cases decided on summary judgment are reviewed de novo under

the standard set forth in Civ.R. 56. Huntington Nat’l Bank v. Schneider, 2025-Ohio-2920, ¶ 13, citing Comer v. Risko, 2005-Ohio-4559, ¶ 8. And “ ‘[s]ummary

3

The Doctors did not present any argument as to the fourth count, a negligence claim related to the dissemination of their personal information following a cyber attack on the Board’s law firm. 4

The identified Count numbers in the Doctors’ second assignment of error, specifically Counts 2, 4, 5, and 6, do not align with the arguments presented. We will address the Doctors’ challenge to the counts as they are presented in their brief.

Ross App. No. 23CA18 16

judgment may be granted when “(1) [n]o genuine issue as to any material fact

remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but

one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party

against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is

adverse to that party.” ’ ” Id., quoting M.H. v. Cuyahoga Falls, 2012-Ohio-5336, ¶

12, quoting Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977), citing

Civ.R. 56(C).

{¶37} Civ.R. 56(C) provides that

Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written

admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written

stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation

may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary

judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence

or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that

reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that

conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for

summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the

evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.

A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on

the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the

amount of damages.

LAW AND ANALYSIS5

I. Wrongful termination

{¶38} The Doctors maintain that the trial court erred when it granted

Adena’s motion for partial summary judgment as to the Doctors’ counterclaim of

5

The Doctors do not separate their arguments by assignment of error; rather, they address the relevant counts from each assignment of error together. We will follow the Doctors’ arguments as to each count as presented.

Ross App. No. 23CA18 17

wrongful termination. The Doctors assert that they presented evidence that they

were “at-will” employees and Adena’s termination of their employment violated

several public policies and Adena’s own amended code of regulations.

{¶39} In support of their assertion that the trial court erred in granting

Adena’s motion for partial summary judgment, the Doctors cite to several cases

in support of their claim that the presence of a written agreement does not

automatically invalidate any claim that the employment was at-will. Additionally,

the employment agreement may contain a specified notice requirement and still

be considered an at-will employment. And in the matter at bar, the Doctors’

employment agreement was an at-will arrangement, where the duration of the

initial agreement terminated and the parties were currently under a renewal term

that could be terminated at any time without cause. However, the termination

cannot violate any public policy. Finally, the Doctors maintain that their

termination was not pursuant to Adena’s amended code of regulations.

{¶40} In response, Adena contends that the Doctors were not at-will

employees and, as a result, cannot assert a public policy wrongful termination

claim. Adena maintains that this is because the Doctors’ employment agreement

was for a specific duration of time, five years, which renewed automatically for

consecutive one-year terms. Further, Adena contends that although either party

may terminate the agreement after one year with 120-day notice, any termination

during this notice period must be for cause, indicating that it is not at-will

employment. In conclusion, Adena differentiates the cases cited by the Doctors,

arguing that since the Doctors had employment agreements with a specified Ross App. No. 23CA18 18

term, their claim of being at-will employees is invalid.

{¶41} The Doctors disagree and contend that Adena’s argument that the

employment agreement contained an initial term of employment was not raised

below. Thus, the Doctors assert that Adena waived this argument. However,

even if we consider Adena’s argument, the Doctors maintain that the initial

specified duration for the employment expired a long time ago and is no longer

applicable. Therefore, at the time the Doctors’ employment terminated, either

party could terminate the employment without cause by providing a 120-day

notice.

{¶42} We agree with the Doctors and hold that they are at-will employees.

As a general rule, Ohio follows the doctrine of employment at-will. See Mers v.

Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St.3d 100, 103 (1985). But in Greeley v. Miami

Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc., the Supreme Court of Ohio carved out a public

policy exception to this rule: “Public policy warrants an exception to the

employment-at-will doctrine when an employee is discharged or disciplined for a

reason which is prohibited by statute.” 49 Ohio St.3d 228 (1990), paragraph one

of the syllabus.

Under Ohio law, an employment relationship with no fixed

duration is deemed to be at-will employment. Snedigar v. Miami

Univ., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-8, 2011-Ohio-4365, 2011 WL

3843939, ¶ 10. The identifying characteristic of an employee-at-will

is that either the employer or the employee can terminate

employment for any reason which is not contrary to law. Haynes v.

Zoological Soc. of Cincinnati, 73 Ohio St.3d 254, 258, 652 N.E.2d

948 (1995).

Underwood v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 2023-Ohio-4180, ¶ 59 (11th Dist.).

{¶43} In the matter at bar, as part of the exhibits submitted, is the

Ross App. No. 23CA18 19

employment agreement between Adena and the Doctors. The employment

agreement includes the following language:

8. Termination of Agreement.

(d) By Either Party. Upon completion of Physician’s first

(1st) full year of Employment with System, either System or Physician

may terminate this Agreement at any time upon One Hundred

Twenty (120) days prior written notice to the other party.

{¶44} The Doctors completed the first full year of employment by the time

they submitted their termination notice. Accordingly, the provision quoted above

from their employment agreement applies. Therefore, either party can terminate

the employment with a 120-day notice. Nothing further is required. So, there is

no reason needed for the termination. We, thus, conclude that the Doctors were

employees-at-will and their termination notice providing Adena with 120-day

notice was pursuant to their agreement.

{¶45} Adena, however, did not honor the agreement and elected to

terminate the Doctors prior to the completion of the 120-day period. The early

termination of the Doctors’ employment is the basis for their claim that Adena

violated public policy by failing to honor the 120-day termination notice. It has

been “held that employment terminated on the giving of a specified notice is still

employment at-will, and not employment for a specified term.” Roberts v. Hayes,

2003-Ohio-5903, ¶ 24 (9th Dist.), citing La France Electrical Construction &

Supply Co. v. Interntl. Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local No. 8, 108 Ohio St. 61,

88 (1923). The Ninth District continued and stated that this is “[s]pecifically,

where an employment agreement requires a written notice of the employee’s

intention to terminate employment, such a notice provision does not ‘establish a Ross App. No. 23CA18 20

term for the duration of [a] contract, but merely a period of convenient notice[,]’

and the relationship between the employer and the employee remains at-will.”

Id. See also Cramer v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 182 Ohio App.3d 653 (5th Dist. 2009)

(employment terminated upon giving specified notice remains employment atwill, not employment for a specified term.).

{¶46} While the Doctors’ employment could be terminated during the 120-day period for cause, this issue remains before the trial court. This is because

two of Adena’s counts in the complaint filed against the Doctors assert that the

Doctors breached their employment agreement and duty of loyalty and good

faith, which may demonstrate termination for cause.

{¶47} The Doctors also argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their

claim that they were terminated in violation of Adena’s amended code of

regulations. The trial court granted Adena’s motion for partial summary judgment

concluding that since the Doctors were not employees-at-will, the terms of the

employment contractual agreement prevail. And the trial court found that the

terms of the employment agreement “expressly state that Adena rules and

regulations do not apply in the event of termination of those contracts.”

{¶48} With our finding that the Doctors are employees-at-will, we reverse

and remand the Doctors’ argument relating to the code of regulations to provide

the trial court with the opportunity to address whether the Doctors being at-willemployees impacts the finding that the agreement terms apply. As a reviewing

court, the trial court should be the first to address issues. See Murphy v.

Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 360 (1992) (recognizing that “the trial court’s Ross App. No. 23CA18 21

function cannot be replaced by an ‘independent’ review of an appellate court.”).

{¶49} The trial court erred by granting Adena’s motion for partial summary

judgment precluding the Doctors from pursuing their wrongful termination claim.

Based on our conclusion that the Doctors were employees-at-will, we must

reverse the trial court’s decision and remand the matter.

II. Declaratory Judgment / Damages

{¶50} The Doctors next argue that the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment in favor of Adena as to the Doctors’ monetary relief request

on their declaratory judgment claim. In the Doctors’ initial counterclaim, they

sought a declaratory judgment that their one-year non-compete restriction in their

employment agreement was unenforceable. Two months into the non-compete

period, the Doctors filed for partial summary judgment on the claim. When their

motion was heard, their non-compete time had expired, but the trial court, at that

time, acknowledged that the claim was not moot and that damages could be

available if the Doctors suffered losses by adhering to the non-compete

covenants. But that order was superseded by Adena’s filing of an amended

complaint.

{¶51} After the filing of the amended complaint, the Doctors filed an

amended counterclaim in which they reasserted the declaratory judgment claim

and expressly requested monetary damages. Adena filed its partial summary

judgment motion, asserting that damages could not be recovered for the Doctor’s

compliance. The trial court agreed with “Adena that the Doctors cite no legal

theory under which a party, as part of a declaratory judgment claim, can obtain Ross App. No. 23CA18 22

damages to compensate them for their own compliance with a non-compete

clause in their employment contract.”

{¶52} The Doctors contend that this conclusion is incorrect because Ohio

law allows for monetary damages in declaratory judgment actions when

specifically requested and supported by proof. They cite to several cases in

support of their claim that the law permits the recovery of damages in declaratory

judgment requests.

{¶53} Adena disagrees with the Doctors and maintains that the Doctors

voluntarily complied with the one-year non-compete covenant in their

employment clause. Further, the Doctors requested monetary damages when

they filed the amended counterclaim, which was filed after the expiration of the

one-year non-compete covenant, but even then, the Doctors failed to present a

theory in support of their damages request. The Doctors’ claim for damages for

voluntarily complying with the one-year non-compete covenant has no legal

standing. Thus, the trial court’s decision was correct and should be affirmed.

Finally, Adena contends that the cases cited by the Doctors are distinguishable

and do not support the Doctors’ claim.

{¶54} The Doctors in response assert that Adena is disregarding the

Doctors’ amended complaint for damages also included a claim that the noncompete covenant was void, unreasonable, and contrary to Ohio law. The

Doctors maintain they did not voluntarily comply since they challenged the

validity of the non-compete covenant. And despite Adena’s attempt to

distinguish the Supreme Court of Ohio’s case in Dooley v. Barberton Citizens Ross App. No. 23CA18 23

Hosp., 11 Ohio St.3d 216 (1984), the case is applicable and supports the

Doctors’ request for damages.

{¶55} We begin with Civ.R. 15(A), which permits the amendment of

pleadings by leave of court. This occurred in the matter at hand when the trial

court permitted Adena to file an amended complaint. In response, the Doctors

filed an amended counterclaim.

“It is well settled that an amended pleading supersedes the

original pleading.’ Abram & Tracy, Inc. v. Smith (1993), 88 Ohio

App.3d 253, 263, 623 N.E.2d 704; Carlock v. Coleman (Aug. 22,

1990), 7th Dist. No. 89 C.A. 121, 1990 WL 121874, quoting 75 Ohio

Jurisprudence Pleading, 343, Section 469 (“ ‘it is hornbook law that

an amended pleading supersedes the original, the latter being

[treated] thereafter as nonexistent[.]’ ”).

Morris v. Morris, 2010-Ohio-4750, ¶ 32 (10th Dist.); See also Dibert v. Carpenter,

2017-Ohio-689, ¶ 78 (2d Dist.) (“Cynthia’s amended counterclaim, filed with the

court’s permission pursuant to Civ.R. 15(A), superseded her prior counterclaim.”)

{¶56} The Doctors filed their amended counterclaim on January 10, 2023,

asserting in the third count that the non-compete and non-diversion provisions in

their employment agreement prevented fair and open competition and are not

enforceable under Ohio law. The Doctors asserted that the provisions are

unreasonable in scope. The Doctors concluded their claim for declaratory

judgment by stating that “[b]y requiring the Doctors to sign and abide by noncompete restrictions in violation of Ohio law, Adena caused the Doctors to suffer

damages in excess of $25,000 and in an amount to be proven at trial due to their

inability to see patients in the restricted geographic area[.]”

{¶57} The relevant terms of the employment agreement between Adena

Ross App. No. 23CA18 24

and the Doctors include:

9. Non-competition and Confidentiality.

(a) Non-competition. During the Term of this Agreement,

and for a period of one (1) year following expiration or termination of

this Agreement, Physician shall not directly or indirectly, on his or her

own behalf or on behalf of any other person, organization or entity,

individually or collectively, in any fashion, for or manner, within Ross

County, Ohio, or any county contiguous to Ross County, Ohio,

engage in the practice of medicine or surgery or provide any other

services substantially similar to those required to be provided by

Physician under this Agreement. . . .

(b) Non-diversion. During any Term of this Agreement,

and for one year following the expiration or termination of this

Agreement, Physician shall not make any attempt to solicit, by any

means whatsoever, directly or indirectly, patients of the Practice or

System, in order to induce them to seek medical services at any

health care organization other than the Practice of System, their

assignees or successors. . . .

During the Term and for one year after the expiration or

termination of this Agreement, Physician shall not, directly or

indirectly, on Physician’s own behalf or on behalf of any other person,

organization or entity, individually or collectively, in any fashion, form

or manner, employ, engage, or contract in any manner for services

of, induce or solicit, verbally or through direct-mailings, the services

of any of the System’s employees to work for Physician or any

person, corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, governmental

agency, organization, joint venture or other entity with whom or which

Physician is associated.

(d) Establishment of Medical Practice. Nothing in this

§9 shall be construed to prohibit Physician, upon the expiration or

termination for any reason whatsoever of this Agreement, from

establishing a medical practice in a manner and location which does

not conflict with any of the provisions of this Section.

{¶58} The Doctors are correct in that “[o]nly reasonable noncompetition

agreements are enforceable.” Lake Land Emp. Group of Akron, LLC v.

Columbus, 2004-Ohio-786, ¶ 22. The parties agree that in the matter at bar, the

one-year non-compete provision began when the Doctors were terminated from

employment back in April 2021. And the Doctors did not file a request for Ross App. No. 23CA18 25

injunctive relief from the enforcement of the non-compete provision, but, instead,

filed a request for declaratory judgment maintaining that the non-compete

provision was unreasonable in their initial counterclaim back in May 2021. In

June 2021, the Doctors filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to their

declaratory judgment claim. In December 2022, the trial court denied the

Doctors’ motion for partial summary judgment finding:

there are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether or not

the non-compete covenants are enforceable.

Because Defendants’ June 25, 2021, Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment and all related memoranda were filed prior to

the expiration of the one-year period in the non-compete covenant,

the parties did not raise the mootness issue.

{¶59} Even after the filing of Adena’s amended complaint and the Doctors’

amended counterclaim, the trial court, in partially denying Adena’s motion for

partial summary judgment, again reiterated in July 2023:

For the reasons stated in December 20, 2022, Judgment

Entry, this Court once again finds that there are genuine issues of

material fact with regard to the declaratory judgment count.

As noted above, the instant motion does not seek a summary

judgment on the entire declaratory judgment count, but rather seeks

summary judgment on the request for damages that the Doctors

added to their declaratory judgment count when they filed the

Amended Counterclaim.

{¶60} In granting Adena’s motion for partial summary judgment on the

Doctors’ request for damages, the trial court held:

In the instant case, the one-year non-compete period in the

employment agreements between Adena and the Doctors expired

over a year ago.

This Court agrees with Adena that the Doctors cite no legal

theory under which a party, as part of a declaratory judgment claim,

can obtain damages to compensate them for their own compliance

Ross App. No. 23CA18 26

with a non-compete clause in their employment contract. Thus,

Adena’s May 4, 2023, Renewed Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment is GRANTED with respect to the damages request in

Count Three of the Doctors’ Amended Counterclaim.

{¶61} The Doctors disagree with the trial court’s decision, and one case

they rely upon is Dooley, 11 Ohio St.3d 216 (1984). We hold that the case is

distinguishable and does not support the Doctors’ argument. In Dooley, the

issue was whether the hospital, through its by-laws, discriminated against Dr.

Dooley because of his practice as a podiatrist. Id. at 217. The hospitals’ by-laws

contained a section that subjected podiatrists to limitations and did not grant him

surgical privileges. Id. at 217-218. In addressing the issue, the Supreme Court

noted the 1978 enactment of R.C. 3107.342, renumbered to R.C. 3701.351,

which states: “ ‘[t]he governing body of any hospital, in considering and acting

upon applications for staff membership or professional privileges within the scope

of the applicants’ respective licensures, shall not discriminate against a qualified

person[.]’ ” Id. at 219.

{¶62} As is clear, Dooley did not involve the application of non-compete

provisions within an employment agreement, as is the issue in the case at bar.

Similarly, the Doctors’ reliance on Professional Investigations & Consulting

Agency, Inc., d.b.a. PICA v. Kingsland, et al., d.b.a. Owens Enterprises, 69 Ohio

App.3d 753 (10th Dist.), is also misplaced.

{¶63} In PICA, Kingsland was first hired as an independent contractor,

then transitioned into a part-time employee, and two years later became a fulltime employee. Id. at 1267. For each employment opportunity, the agreement

between Kingsland and PICA included a two-year non-compete provision. Id. Ross App. No. 23CA18 27

Kingsland resigned from PICA in November 1986, agreeing to adhere to the noncompetition provision, and was rehired in April 1987, under an oral agreement to

abide by the previous contract terms. Id. He resigned again in August 1987, and

began working for Owens Enterprises. Id.

{¶64} Because Kingsland was violating the terms of the non-compete

provision of his employment contract, PICA in August 1988, requested a

temporary restraining order (“TRO”), which was granted the same day by the trial

court with a bond set at $50. Id. The parties agreed to several extensions of the

TRO, which converted it to a preliminary injunction. Id. And the final extension

entry, included a list of clients that Kingsland and Owens were prohibited from

soliciting. Kingsland challenged the issuance of the temporary restraining order

arguing that the non-compete provision was unenforceable. The trial court

agreed with Kingsland, and on appeal, the Tenth District Court of Appeals upheld

the decision, because “[t]he agreement places no temporal or geographic

limitations on the covenant.” Id. at 1269.

{¶65} In addressing what damages Kingsland was entitled to, the Tenth

District cited Civ.R. 65(C), which governs injunction proceedings. PICA, 69 Ohio

App.3d 75, at 1270. And, as is typical, the temporary restraining order was

granted ex parte. Id. However, after hearing arguments from Kingsland and

PICA, the trial court determined that the injunction had been wrongfully issued.

Id. This, the Tenth District held “does not automatically vest Kingsland with a

right to damages.” Id. Therefore, the Tenth District

remanded to the trial court for a determination on the merits of

Kingsland’s right to damages for wrongful issuance of the temporary

Ross App. No. 23CA18 28

restraining order if the court finds that the temporary restraining order

was, in fact, wrongfully issued.

Upon remand, Kingsland’s damages, contrary to his

contentions, are to be limited to the amount of the bond. (Emphasis

added).

Id. at 1271.

{¶66} In the matter at bar, the Doctors did not file an injunction request;

rather, they filed a motion for declaratory judgment. We decline to extend the

Tenth District’s application of Civ.R. 65 to grant bond damages to allow the

Doctors’ request for unlimited damages for abiding by the non-compete

provision.

{¶67} We are mindful that the Supreme Court has emphasized that the

primary purpose of a non-compete provision is to protect employers. The undue

hardship to an employee is a defense to overcome the employer’s protection. In

Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, the Supreme Court held that “a covenant not to

compete which imposes unreasonable restrictions upon an employee will be

enforced to the extent necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interests.”

42 Ohio St. 2d 21 (1975), paragraph one of the syllabus. And in Acordia of Ohio,

L.L.C. v. Fishel, the Supreme Court outlined the standard in evaluating a noncompete provision:

Furthermore, “[a] covenant restraining an employee from

competing with his former employer upon termination of employment

is reasonable if the restraint is no greater than is required for the

protection of the employer, does not impose undue hardship on the

employee, and is not injurious to the public.” Id., paragraph two of

the syllabus. In determining the reasonableness of a noncompete

agreement, we have stated that courts must determine whether the

restraints and resultant hardships on the employee exceed what is

reasonable to protect the employer’s legitimate business interests.

Ross App. No. 23CA18 29

Rogers v. Runfola & Assoc., Inc., 57 Ohio St.3d 5, 8, 565 N.E.2d 540

(1991).

2012-Ohio-4648, ¶ 10.

{¶68} We, accordingly, hold that the Doctors’ request for damages for

complying with the non-compete provision of their employment agreement is not

supported by legal authority. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s decision as to

this claim.

III. Failure to Supervise

{¶69} The Doctors thirdly argue that the trial court erred in denying their

third-party claim against the Board for failing to supervise CEO Graham and

COO Edrington. The Doctors maintain that the Board neglected their

responsibilities by failing to abide with Adena’s amended code of regulations and

statutory provision in R.C. 1702.30, by allowing CEO Graham to terminate the

Doctors and initiate a lawsuit against the Doctors.

{¶70} The Doctors argue that the trial court incorrectly applied a standard

requiring conscious, deliberate intent for failure to supervise, which is not

applicable outside workers’ compensation cases. They maintain that negligence

suffices for such claims and that the Board’s acquiescence to management’s

actions does not shield them from liability. The Doctors emphasize that Ohio law

allows failure to supervise claims against those with supervisory authority, not

just direct employers, and that the Board can be liable for failing to intervene in

misconduct, even if they ratified management’s proposals without independent

review. In conclusion, the Doctors maintain that they presented sufficient

evidence and have legal grounds to pursue their claim against the Board for Ross App. No. 23CA18 30

failing to supervise the actions of the CEO and COO.

{¶71} In response, the Board maintains that the trial court’s decision

should be affirmed for several reasons. First, the Board’s duty is to the

corporation and the shareholders of the corporation; not the Doctors or other

third parties. Second, they cannot be held responsible for tortious acts that they

did not participate in; evidence established that the Board did not formally

approve or participate in the decision to terminate the Doctors or bring suit

against the Doctors. Third, pursuant to R.C. 1702.30(E)(1), the Board can only

be held liable when their conduct was committed with deliberate intent to cause

injury to the corporation. Finally, the Board maintains that the law for negligent

supervision requires that there must be an employer/employee relationship,

which does not exist here between the Board and the Doctors.

{¶72} In their reply, the Doctors disagree with the Board’s statement that

they cannot be held liable to third-parties, as that applies to fiduciary duties within

for-profit corporations. Adena is a non-profit organization and the claim here is

failure to supervise. Thus, the claim is based on the Board’s failure to fulfill an

obligation to act, and the Doctors maintain, citing to Mills v. Deehr, 2004-Ohio2338 (8th Dist.), Ohio law recognizes that an individual who has supervisory

power in non-profits can be personally sued for failure to supervise.

{¶73} We begin our de novo review by outlining the relevant statutory

provisions and the applicable Adena amended code of regulations. The Board is

vested with the authority to conduct the affairs of the non-profit Adena

corporation, and the members are generally referred to as directors. See R.C. Ross App. No. 23CA18 31

1702.01(K). The Board’s authority and duties are stated in R.C. 1702.30 which

in relevant part, provides:

(B) A director shall perform the director’s duties as a director,

including the duties as a member of any committee of the directors

upon which the director may serve, in good faith, in a manner the

director reasonably believes to be in or not opposed to the best

interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily

prudent person in a like position would use under similar

circumstances. A director serving on a committee of directors is

acting as a director.

(E) A director shall be liable in damages for any action that the

director takes or fails to take as a director only if it is proved by clear

and convincing evidence in a court of competent jurisdiction that the

director’s action or failure to act involved an act or omission

undertaken with deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation or

undertaken with a reckless disregard for the best interests of the

corporation.

R.C. 1702.30(B) and (E).

{¶74} Adena’s amended code of regulations in Article VII titled medical

staff, in sections 7.01, 7.02, 7.03 and 7.04, respectively, provide:

Section 7.01. Relationship to the Board: The Board has the

overall responsibility for the organization and operation of the

Medical Staff. The Board shall delegate to the Medical Staff the

responsibility for the organization and operation of the Medical Staff.

The Medical Staff shall assist the Board in performing these functions

in accordance with the Medical Staff Bylaws and Policies. The

Medical Staff is accountable to the Board and all actions of the

Medical Staff are subject to the ultimate authority of the Board. In the

event of a conflict between the Medical Staff and the Board, the Joint

Conference Committee will be convened to assist in conflict

resolution and to make recommendations to the Board as

appropriate.

Section 7.02 Medical Staff Appointment and Clinical

Privileges: The Board has the ultimate authority and responsibility

to grant or deny Medical Staff appointments and clinical privileges.

The Board of Trustees shall have the ultimate authority and

responsibility to appoint a Medical Staff composed of physicians,

podiatrists, dentists, psychologists, and such other healthcare

Ross App. No. 23CA18 32

providers, if any, as set forth in the Medical Staff Bylaws approved

by the Board (hereinafter “Practitioners”) who have met the

qualifications for Medical Staff appointment, as detailed in the

Medical Staff Bylaws and Policies, and shall see that such Medical

Staff is organized into a responsible administrative unit. The Board

shall also have the ultimate authority and responsibility to delineate

and grant clinical privileges to Practitioners and Advanced Practice

Providers, as such term is defined in the Medical Staff Bylaws, who

meet the qualifications for clinical privileges as set forth in the

Medical Staff Bylaws and Policies. Procedures for credentialing,

appointment/reappointment, and grant/regrant of clinical privileges

shall be set forth in the Medical staff Bylaws and Policies.

Section 7.03 Responsibilities: The organized Medical Staff

shall be responsible to the Board of Trustees for:

a. Ensuring the medical care rendered to inpatients and

outpatients meets the standards consistent with current

standards of care.

b. Advising the Board regarding the Medical Staff’s structure.

c. Advising the Board of Trustees in regard to professional and

ethical qualifications of applicants for Medical Staff

appointment and/or clinical privileges; and, recommending to

the Board the scope of privileges to be granted to Practitioners

and Advanced Practice Providers.

d. Maintaining such Medical Staff Bylaws and Policies as are

necessary for assuring appropriate standards of patient care

and maintaining ethical professional practices.

e. Providing leadership and input with respect to the delivery of

clinical care.

f. Fulfilling the duties and responsibilities set forth in the Medical

Staff Bylaws and Policies and as may otherwise be requested

by the Board from time to time.

Section 7.04 Limitation, Suspension, or Termination of

Medical Staff Appointment and/or Clinical Privileges: The Board has

the ultimate authority and responsibility to limit, suspend, terminate,

or otherwise take appropriate action with respect to Medical Staff

appointments and/or clinical privileges. The Board may exercise this

authority based upon Medical Staff recommendation or on the

Board’s own initiative as provided in the Medical Staff Bylaws and

Policies. This authority includes, but is not limited to, the authority to

summarily suspend Medical Staff appointment and/or Privileges in

accordance with the Medical Staff Bylaws. The procedures for

corrective action, summary suspension, automatic suspension, and

automatic termination of Medical Staff appointments and/or clinical

privileges in addition to procedural rights for Practitioners and

Advanced Practice Providers shall be set forth in the Medical Staff

Bylaws and/or Policies, as

Ross App. No. 23CA18 33

applicable.

{¶75} In the matter at bar, the Doctors are not appointed medical staff,

rather, they had contractual employment agreements with Adena. The Board’s

duty pursuant to the statutory provisions and the amended code of regulations is

to carry out the mission of Adena, which is to provide quality patient care. See

Article 1, Sections 1.01 and 1.02.

{¶76} The Doctors are requesting that we extend the Board’s duty to

supervise the daily operations of the Bone and Joint Group where they were

employed. However, we find no legal support for the Doctor’s third-party claim of

failure to supervise CEO Graham and COO Edrington.

{¶77} The Doctors rely on the Eighth District Court of Appeals’ decision in

Mills v. Deehr, 2004-Ohio-2338 (8th Dist.), but their reliance is misplaced. We

agree with the Board that the Mills case is distinguishable as it involved a claim

of an employer failing to supervise an employee who sexually abused the plaintiff

under the theory of respondeat superior. Id., ¶ 19.

{¶78} We find the Board’s reliance on Berman v. Physical Medicine

Associates, Ltd., 225 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2000), applicable and find the decision

persuasive. Berman was not solely a doctor employed at Physical Medicine

Associates but was also a stockholder and one of the six directors. Id. at 430-431. Berman submitted his resignation effective nine months later, but within 30

days of submitting his resignation letter, the board of directors terminated his

employment. Id. at 431-432. Berman initiated litigation for breach of fiduciary

duty and for breach of employment agreement. Id.

Ross App. No. 23CA18 34

{¶79} The breach of fiduciary claim was based on Berman’s status as an

employee in which he maintained that the remaining directors failed to provide

him sufficient notice and conduct a reasonable investigation prior to terminating

him. Id. at 433. Based on that, the Fourth Circuit found in favor of the remaining

directors and held:

And any injury caused by the termination decision itself would

be an injury to his interests as an employee, not as a stockholder.

Any injury to his interests as an employee would arise from breach

of contractual duties by the corporation, not from breach of any

fiduciary duties by the directors. Berman's contractual claims for

breach of the employment agreement and breach of the severance

benefit agreement were submitted to the jury, which found for

Berman and awarded him damages.

Moreover, as to Berman’s claims under the employment

agreement and severance benefit agreement, only the corporation

owed Berman a contractual duty; the directors individually owed

Berman no contractual duty. Nor did the directors owe Berman as an

employee a fiduciary duty; directors cannot act as fiduciaries in their

relationship with employees and at the same time discharge their

fiduciary duties to the corporation of which they are directors.

Id.

{¶80} Here, the Doctors are not employees of the Board, but rather, had a

contractual agreement with Adena as a corporation. Moreover, the Doctors did

not submit evidence to support a claim of deliberate intent by the Board to cause

injury to Adena as a corporation. See R.C. 1702.30(E). The Doctors are

individuals, and the Board is not answerable to individuals for negligence in the

performance of its official duties unless malice or corruption is imputable. See

Wierzbicki v. Carmichael, 118 Ohio App. 239, 243, (8th Dist. 1963). And the

Doctors did not submit any evidence to support a claim of deliberate intent by the

Board. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court and affirm its decision granting Ross App. No. 23CA18 35

the Board’s motion for summary judgment.

IV. Tortious Interference6

{¶81} Under this argument, the Doctors maintain that the trial court erred

in granting Adena’s motion for summary judgment on their four claims of tortious

interference: Adena’s purchase of the Prairie Run North property, its overbroad

discovery requests to OhioHealth, disrupting the Doctors relationships with their

patients, and negatively impacting the Doctors re-entry into Ross County. The

Doctors contend that the trial court misconstrued and improperly weighed the

evidence and erred in granting Adena’s motion for partial summary judgment.

{¶82} Adena in response maintains that the Doctors failed to present

evidence supporting the elements of tortious interference and the trial court’s

decision to grant their motion for partial summary judgment should be upheld.

Adena asserts that several of the Doctors’ assertions involve uninterested third

parties.

A. Law and analysis

{¶83} “The elements of the tort of tortious interference with contract are (1)

the existence of a contract, (2) the wrongdoer’s knowledge of the contract, (3) the

wrongdoer’s intentional procurement of the contract’s breach, (4) lack of

justification, and (5) resulting damages.” Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. Arter &

Hadden, 1999-Ohio-260, paragraph one of the syllabus, citing Kenty v.

Transamerica Premium Ins. Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 415 (1995). And

6

This section addresses the trial court’s decision in granting Adena’s motion for partial summary judgment and the Board’s motion for summary judgment. In granting the motion for partial summary judgment, the trial court referenced and partially incorporated its decision granting the Board’s motion for summary judgment.

Ross App. No. 23CA18 36

In determining whether an actor has acted improperly in

intentionally interfering with a contract or prospective contract of

another, consideration should be given to the following factors: (a)

the nature of the actor’s conduct, (b) the actor’s motive, (c) the

interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes, (d) the

interests sought to be advanced by the actor, (e) the social interests

in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual

interests of the other, (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s

conduct to the interference, and (g) the relations between the parties.

Id., at paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶84} “The knowledge required is actual knowledge; constructive

knowledge is not sufficient to sustain a cause of action for tortious interference

with contract, actual knowledge is required.” Gentile v. Turkoly, 2017-Ohio-1018,

¶ 29 (7th Dist.), citing Norris v. Philander Chase Co., 2010-Ohio-5297, ¶ 26 (5th

Dist.).

{¶85} “Tortious interference with a business relationship is similar to

tortious interference with a contract, but the result of the interference does not

require the breach of contract. It is sufficient to prove that a third party does not

enter into or continue a business relationship with the plaintiff.” Emanuel’s LLC

v. Restore Marietta, Inc., 2023-Ohio-147, ¶ 22, (4th Dist.). And “[a] vague

assertion that a party interfered with certain unspecified business relationships is

insufficient to state a claim for tortious interference with a business relationship.”

Id. at ¶ 23, citing Wilkey v. Hull, 366 Fed.Appx. 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2010).

{¶86} “It is proper for the court to reject a tortious-interference claim ‘on

the grounds that the defendant was privileged to protect its own business

relationships or that the plaintiff presented no evidence of the defendant’s intent

to interfere.’ ” Couzens v. Union Bank & Tr. Co., 2024-Ohio-306, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.), Ross App. No. 23CA18 37

quoting Alexander v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 2012-Ohio-3911, ¶ 31 (1st Dist.).

Additionally, “[t]he failure to demonstrate one out of the five elements bars

recovery for tortious interference with a contract.” Andrews v. Carmody, 145

Ohio App. 3d 27, 35 (11th Dist. 2001).

{¶87} Moreover, “[a]lthough we must review a summary judgment decision

de novo, ‘that standard does not supersede our settled practice of not addressing

issues raised for the first time on appeal.’ ” Davis v. Diley Ridge Med. Ctr., 2025-Ohio-1940, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.), appeal not allowed, 2025-Ohio-3300, quoting,

Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Stone, 2021-Ohio-3007, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.).

i. Prairie Run North property

{¶88} The Doctors assert that Adena purchased the Prairie Run North

property above market price to prevent the Doctors’ future venture with

OhioHealth. The Doctors maintain that they planned a business joint venture

with OhioHealth to develop a new ambulatory surgery center. The venture could

not proceed because Adena bought the future location of the new surgery center.

Adena had no intention of purchasing the property until learning about the

Doctors’ future venture with OhioHealth. CEO Graham and Board Member

Watson called an emergency Board meeting, which approved the purchase of

the property. According to the Doctors, this hasty move by Adena demonstrates

their intentional interference with the Doctors’ future business venture with

OhioHealth. They assert that this evidence would allow a jury to find intentional, Ross App. No. 23CA18 38

improper interference with the Doctors’ prospective business relationship with

OhioHealth, and the trial court erred by focusing on the lack of a relationship with

the land seller.

{¶89} Adena presents several arguments in response, contending that the

Doctors fail to establish three of the tortious interference elements: lack of

relationship between the Doctors and the seller of the property, actual knowledge

that Adena knew of the future venture between the Doctors and OhioHealth to

purchase this property and build a medical facility on it, and finally, that Adena’s

conduct of purchasing the property is not in and of itself tortious conduct.

{¶90} We first begin by addressing standing. “ ‘Standing’ is defined at its

most basic as ‘[a] party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement

of a duty or right.’ ” Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dep’t of Com., 2007-Ohio-5024, ¶ 27,

citing Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 1442. “Before an Ohio court can

consider the merits of a legal claim, the person or entity seeking relief must

establish standing to sue.” Id., quoting Ohio Contrs. Assn. v. Bicking, 71 Ohio

St.3d 318, 320 (1994).

{¶91} “Whether a party has established standing to bring an action before

the court is a question of law, which we review de novo.” State ex rel. Teamsters

Loc. Union 436 v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. Of Commrs., 2012-Ohio-1861, ¶ 10, citing

Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. State, 2006-Ohio-6499, ¶ 23. “Under

common-law standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) an injury; (2) that is fairly

traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct; and (3) is likely to be Ross App. No. 23CA18 39

redressed by the requested relief.” Hoover v. Pfeifer, 2025-Ohio-4909, ¶ 87 (3d

Dist.), citing Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Columbus, 2020-Ohio-6724, ¶

12.

{¶92} We agree with Adena that the Doctors failed to present any

evidence that they had a relationship with the seller of the Prairie North Run

property. No evidence was presented that the Doctors were planning on

purchasing the property. This finding alone is sufficient to warrant affirming the

trial court’s decision to grant Adena’s motion for partial summary judgment, but

the Doctors also fail to meet other elements for recovery.

{¶93} The Doctors are correct that CEO Graham suspected that a facility

would be built at that location to compete with Adena, however, suspicion alone

is not sufficient to meet the higher burden of actual knowledge. Finally, Adena is

free to conduct its business as it deems appropriate. The Doctors fail to present

legal authority establishing that the purchase of real estate is tortious conduct.

Adena7 purchased the property from a seller with no evidentiary connection to

the Doctors. Whether the purchase was a wise business decision, the Doctors

have no standing to challenge it. Accordingly, we overrule this argument.

ii. Discovery request from OhioHealth

{¶94} The Doctors assert that they presented sufficient evidence that

Adena abused the discovery process and harassed OhioHealth in order to

destroy the potential venture between OhioHealth and the Doctors. And that

Adena’s harassing discovery tactics constituted tortious interference.

7

We are aware that Maximum Property LLC purchased the property, but this is a company wholly owned by Adena.

Ross App. No. 23CA18 40

{¶95} The Board and Adena maintain that the Doctors failed to present

evidence demonstrating the existence of a relationship between them and

OhioHealth and that Adena had actual knowledge of this relationship.

Additionally, the Board and Adena contend that the discovery requests were

relevant to address the Doctors’ antitrust counterclaim. Further, there was no

evidence that OhioHealth did not establish a relationship with the Doctors

because of Adena’s discovery requests.

{¶96} We affirm the trial court’s decision granting the motions for summary

judgment because the Doctors failed to present evidence establishing the

elements of tortious interference. The Doctors did not present evidence that they

had a business relationship with OhioHealth and that Adena had actual

knowledge of a business relationship between them. Moreover, the Doctors’

evidence that OhioHealth ended any discussions with the Doctors for future

ventures is based on hearsay. And “in those instances where the nonconforming

summary judgment evidence is hearsay and is not based on personal

knowledge, this court has found that an appellate court should disregard the

evidence on its de novo review of summary judgment.” Auto Recyclers of

Middletown, Inc. v. Stein, LLC, 2025-Ohio-414, ¶ 39 (12th Dist.).

iii. Patient Relationships

{¶97} The Doctors contend that the trial court did not consider this

argument and simply granted Adena’s motion for summary judgment on all of the

Doctors’ tortious interference claims. The Doctors argue that they presented

sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Adena intentionally interfered with their Ross App. No. 23CA18 41

existing patient relationships, causing the Doctors harm. The Doctors maintain

that after the Doctors’ employment was terminated, Adena defamed the Doctors

to the patients and refused to provide the patients with the Doctors’ contact

information nor provide the Doctors with the patient’s information.

{¶98} We disagree with the Doctors. After reviewing both the Doctors

counterclaim and the third-party complaint, we find that the Doctors did not assert

a separate claim that Adena and/or the Board interfered with their relationship

with patients. “A complaint must ‘contain (1) a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the party is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment

for the relief to which the party claims to be entitled.’ ” Walker v. JPMorgan

Chase Bank, 2026-Ohio-813, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), citing Civ.R. 8(A). “This is known as

notice pleading. One of the basic purposes of notice pleading is to insure, ‘that

the adverse party will receive fair notice of the claim and an opportunity to

prepare his response thereto.’ ” Scassa v. Dye, 2003-Ohio-3480, ¶ 26 (7th Dist.),

quoting Fancher v. Fancher, 8 Ohio App.3d 79, 83 (1st Dist. 1982). And “[a]

plaintiff cannot fulfill [their] burden under Civ.R. 56 merely by asserting new

claims in response to a properly supported motion for summary judgment.”

Bradley v. Sprenger Enters., Inc., 2008-Ohio-1988, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.), citing White v.

Mt. Carmel Med. Ctr., 2002-Ohio-6446, ¶ 29 (10th Dist.).

{¶99} In their amended counterclaim, the Doctors claim to have asserted a

separate claim for interference with patients; however, we find they have merely

made conclusionary statements combined with their four specific tortious

interference claims, which is insufficient. See Weiler v. DLR Grp., 2023-OhioRoss App. No. 23CA18 42

1221, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.) (“vague and conclusory allegation is insufficient to establish

a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relationships.”). What

is more, Adena is correct in that the Doctors failed to identify any individual

patients that they had a relationship with outside of their employment with

Adena.8 See Allen Nichol v. Am. Health Network, 2016-Ohio-8346, ¶16 (10th

Dist.) (“None of the affidavits demonstrate that appellant and the patients entered

into contracts with definite or discrete terms, or that they mutually agreed upon

contract terms. As such, we do not find the conclusory allegations, without any

further evidence or explanation, to be competent evidence of a contractual

relationship.”).

{¶100} Moreover, Adena’s motion for partial summary judgment and the

Board’s motion for summary judgment did not address any claim regarding an

interference with the Doctors’ patient relationship. As we previously outlined, the

Doctors presented four specific tortious interference claims, none of which was

interference with patients.

“ ‘An appellant cannot change the theory of [its] case and

present new arguments for the first time on appeal.’ ” State ex rel.

S.Y.C. v. Floyd, 2024-Ohio-1387, ¶ 18, quoting During v. Quoico,

2012-Ohio-2990, ¶ 43 (10th Dist.); see also Miller v. Cardinal Care

Mgmt., 2019-Ohio-2826, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.) (a party cannot raise new

arguments and legal issues for the first time on appeal; failure to

raise an issue in the trial court waives that issue for appellate

purposes), citing Cleveland Town Ctr. L.L.C. v. Fin. Exchange Co. of

Ohio, Inc., 2017-Ohio-384, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.); Wolk v. Paino, 2011-Ohio-1065, ¶ 36 (8th Dist.) (“Generally, a plaintiff cannot enlarge [its]

8

Doctor Cohen stated that two former patients filed complaints against him with the Medical Board. The trial court found this evidence to be inadmissible, and the Doctors did not object to the admissibility findings of the trial court. Therefore, this evidence is not before us. See Copley Mini Mart, Inc. v. Copley Props., LLC, 2019-Ohio-33, ¶ 22 (9th Dist.) (although a trial court conducts a de novo review of summary judgment, it is “nonetheless a review that is confined to the trial court record.”) (Emphasis sic.).

Ross App. No. 23CA18 43

claims during a defense to a summary judgment motion and is limited

to the allegations of [its] pleading.”).

Yeckley Enters., Inc. v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 2024-Ohio-5812, ¶ 50 (8th Dist.).

{¶101} The trial court’s entries correctly did not include any judgment on

an argument that was not presented, that is, an interference with the Doctors’

patients. “A trial court is not permitted to base its decision to grant summary

judgment upon an argument which was not asserted in the summary judgment

motion.” See Murray v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 2003-Ohio-3365, ¶ 7 (5th Dist.),

citing Battin v. Trumbull Cty., 2002-Ohio-5162 (11th Dist.). Accordingly, this

claim is similarly not before us for review.

iv. Sunday Creek Horizon

{¶102} The Doctors under this claim maintain that Adena interfered with

the Doctors’ prospective business relationship with the consulting firm Sunday

Creek Horizons. The interference, according to the Doctors, came from Adena’s

administration advising Sunday Creek Horizons that Adena would “rather” they

not work with the Doctors. And based on that response, the Doctors assert that

Sunday Creek Horizons, whom the Doctors contend has business relationships

with Adena, then ended any discussions with the Doctors.

{¶103} We agree with Adena that the Doctors fail to meet the elements of

tortious interference, as their claim is based on speculation with no supporting

evidence that Adena’s statement is the reason that Sunday Creek Horizons did

not finalize a contractual agreement with them. See Harris v. Univ. Hosps. of

Cleveland, 2002-Ohio-983, * 17 (8th Dist.) (“Additionally, while a plaintiff can

recover damages from a defendant’s tortious interference with a contract, the Ross App. No. 23CA18 44

measure of those damages is the actual loss sustained by the plaintiff, and not

the benefits or profits that flowed to a defendant because of the tortious

interference.”). Moreover, the Doctors were negotiating with Sunday Creek

Horizons to assist them with the future medical facility that OhioHealth was

supposedly going to build on Prairie Run North. Thus, it was a project that the

Doctors were not even a party to—the seller and supposedly OhioHealth were in

negotiations.

{¶104} Accordingly, we agree with the trial court’s decision granting

Adena’s motion for partial summary judgment on this claim.

V. Defamation

{¶105} The Doctors argue that the trial court erred in granting Adena’s

motion for partial summary judgment and the Board’s motion for summary

judgment as they demonstrated sufficient facts that Adena and the Board

defamed the Doctors. The Doctors present three separate categories of

defamation: statements to patients, statements to the media, and statements

made to the Board by CEO Graham and COO Edrington.

{¶106} The Doctors contend that the trial court minimized the gravity of

the false statements Adena published to the patients when it informed the

patients that the Doctors abruptly left with no notice, that they just “went ahead

and left,” “just kind of sprung it on us”, and “disappeared.” The Doctors also

assert that the trial court erred when it found that the Doctors conceded that they

were not claiming defamation per se. Further, the Doctors contend that the trial Ross App. No. 23CA18 45

court misapplied the incremental harm doctrine and heightened the actual malice

element that is required.

{¶107} With regard to the media statements that some of the Doctors

were actively soliciting other employees to leave, the Doctors argue that the trial

court erred in finding these statements to be true since they were made after

Adena’s complaint was filed. The Doctors also assert that the trial court applied

the litigation privilege, and this was an overbroad application of the privilege and

wrongfully applied.

{¶108} The Doctors maintain that the trial court erred in applying the

statute of limitations as to the false statements made to the Board because the

Doctors were not able to discover these statements until after discovery was

conducted. The statements were made in March 2021, by CEO Graham with a

slide presentation prepared by COO Edrington that included, among other

statements, that the Doctors took Adena’s trade secrets and solicited other

employees to leave.

{¶109} Adena disagrees with the Doctors’ assertions and argues that first,

the Doctors’ defamation claim was defamation per quod and not per se. Second,

that the scripted statements to the patients were substantially truthful, were not

more harmful than the truth, and that Adena met its burden in establishing

qualified privilege, which the Doctors failed to rebut by demonstrating actual

malice. Third, Adena contends that the Doctors’ defamation claim regarding the

statements made to the Board back in March 2021, are barred by the one-year

statute of limitation.

Ross App. No. 23CA18 46

A. Law and analysis

{¶110} “Defamation is a false publication that injures a person’s

reputation.” Gosden v. Louis, 116 Ohio App. 3d 195, 206 (9th Dist. 1996), citing

Dale v. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emp. Assn., 57 Ohio St.3d 112, 117 (1991). “Written

defamation is known as libel; spoken defamation is known as slander.” Id., citing

Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1977) 177, Section 568.

To prevail in a defamation case, a plaintiff must demonstrate

five elements: (1) that a false statement of fact was made, (2) that

the statement was defamatory, (3) that the statement was published,

(4) that the plaintiff suffered injury as a proximate result of the

publication, and (5) that the defendant acted with the requisite

degree of fault in publishing the statement. Am. Chem. Soc. v.

Leadscope, Inc., 133 Ohio St.3d 366, 2012-Ohio-4193, 978 N.E.2d

832, ¶ 77. To establish the requisite degree of fault, the plaintiff must

show fault of at least negligence on the part of the defendant, though

stricter burdens of proof apply in certain circumstances. Northeast

Ohio Elite Gymnastics Training Ctr., Inc. v. Osborne, 183 Ohio

App.3d 104, 2009-Ohio-2612, 916 N.E.2d 484, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.).

Fisher v. Ahmed, 2020-Ohio-1196, ¶ 32 (9th Dist.).

{¶111} And failure to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to any of

the defamation elements renders summary judgment appropriate. Wampler v.

Higgins, 2000 WL 730218, *4 (4th Dist. May 31, 2000), affirmed, 2001-Ohio1293.

{¶112} There are two kinds of defamation; defamation per se occurs when

material is defamatory on its face; defamation per quod occurs when material is

defamatory through interpretation or innuendo. Id. citing Gosden v. Louis, 116

Ohio App.3d 195 (9th Dist. 1996).

The distinction between defamation per se and per quod is

important because it has ramifications upon a plaintiff’s burden of

pleading and proof on the issue of damages. Notably, when a plaintiff

Ross App. No. 23CA18 47

pleads and establishes defamation per se, the plaintiff need not

allege or prove any special damages. In fact, general damages are

presumed and nominal damages are available in any event.

Shoemaker v. Cmty. Action Org. of Scioto Cty., Inc., 2007-Ohio-3708, ¶ 13 (4th

Dist.), citing McCartney v. Oblates of St. Francis of DeSales, 80 Ohio App.3d

345, 353 (6th Dist. 1992).

{¶113} “A court must consider the allegedly defamatory statement in the

totality of the circumstances, including ‘reading an alleged defamatory statement

in the context of the entire publication to determine whether a reasonable reader

would deem the statement defamatory.’ ” Hoffman v. Gunawan, 2025-Ohio5697, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.), quoting Fisher at ¶ 50. To prevail, the Doctors must

prove falsity as an essential element of a defamation claim and,

because falsity is an essential element, a true statement cannot

provide the basis for such an action. Natl. Medic Servs. Corp. v. E.

W. Scripps Co., 61 Ohio App.3d 752, 755, 573 N.E.2d 1148 (1st Dist.

1989). Therefore, “[i]n Ohio, truth is a complete defense to a claim

for defamation.” Montgomery v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit

Auth., 2021-Ohio-1198, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.), citing Ed Schory & Sons v.

Francis, 75 Ohio St.3d 433, 445, 662 N.E.2d 1074 (1996); see also

Swoope v. Osagie, 2016-Ohio-8046, ¶ 33, 76 N.E.3d 686 (8th Dist.)

(noting that while a plaintiff must prove falsity as an element of a

defamation claim, a publisher may also “completely defend” a

defamation action by showing substantial truth). “ ‘It is sufficient [in

defending against a defamation action] to show that the imputation

is substantially true, or as it is often put, to justify the “gist,” the “sting,”

or the substantial truth of the defamation.’ ” Krems v. Univ. Hosps. of

Cleveland, 133 Ohio App.3d 6, 9, 726 N.E.2d 1016 (8th Dist. 1999),

quoting Prosser, The Law of Torts, 798-799 (4th Ed. 1971).

W.A. Smith Fin., LLC v. Doe, 2026-Ohio-184, ¶ 53 (8th Dist.).

{¶114} There are several defenses to a defamation claim. One such

complete defense is the truth of the statement. R.C. 2739.02. For this defense, Ross App. No. 23CA18 48

Adena and the Board must demonstrate “that the gist, or imputation, of the

statement is substantially true, and, hence, the statement is not false.” Sweitzer

v. Outlet Commc’ns, Inc., 133 Ohio App. 3d 102, 110 (10th Dist. 1999), citing

Natl. Medic Serv. Corp. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 61 Ohio App.3d 752, (1st Dist.

1989). “Whether a defamatory statement is substantially true is a question of

fact.” Id.

{¶115} Another defense is qualified privilege, which is “an affirmative

defense to a claim of defamation.” Hill v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. and Corr., 2021-Ohio-561, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.).

A qualified privilege is recognized in many cases where the

publisher and the recipient have a common interest, and the

communication is of a kind reasonably calculated to protect or further

it. Frequently, in such cases, there is a legal, as well as a moral,

obligation to speak. This is most obvious in the case of those who

have entered upon or are considering business dealings with one

another.

Hahn v. Kotten, 43 Ohio St.2d 237, 244 (1975).

{¶116} The essential elements to establish qualified privilege are “ ‘good

faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a

proper occasion, and publication in a proper manner and to proper parties only.’ ”

Hahn v. Kotten, 43 Ohio St.2d 237, 246 (1975), quoting 33 American

Jurisprudence, Libel and Slander, Section 126, at 124-125 (1941). And

A defendant moving for summary judgment on the basis of

qualified privilege must present sufficient evidence to demonstrate

that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to each of the

elements of the affirmative defense. * * * If the defendant can

establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact on each

element, then the plaintiff can only overcome qualified privilege by

establishing with convincing clarity that defendant acted with actual

Ross App. No. 23CA18 49

malice. In a summary judgment motion claiming an affirmative

defense, however, the nonmoving plaintiff does not have to present

any evidence unless the defendant first satisfies her burden.

McCoy v. Maxwell, 2002-Ohio-7157, ¶ 30 (11th Dist.).

{¶117} But, “[a] qualified privilege protecting the making of defamatory

statements is exceeded when the statements are made with ‘actual malice,’ that

is, with knowledge that the statements are false or with reckless disregard of

whether they were false or not.” Id. at 237. The Doctors’ “ ‘burden of

establishing actual malice must be sustained with convincing clarity even when

the plaintiff's case is being tested by a defendant’s motion for summary

judgment.’ ” Jenkins v. Sullivan Twp. Trs., 2023-Ohio-2345, ¶ 32 (5th Dist.),

quoting Varanese v. Gall, 35 Ohio St.3d 78, 81 (1988).

{¶118} Another legal principle we must take into consideration is the

incremental harm doctrine, which “ ‘measures the incremental reputational harm

inflicted by the challenged statements beyond the harm imposed by the

nonactionable remainder of the publication.’ ” Sullins v. Raycom Media, Inc.,

2013-Ohio-3530, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.), quoting Ferreri v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,

142 Ohio App.3d 629, 642–643 (8th Dist. 2001). Moreover, the Eighth District

Court of Appeals continued that “[e]ven if a statement is false, if the incremental

harm caused by the false statement is determined to be ‘nominal or nonexistent,’

i.e., causes no more harm to the plaintiff than the truth, the false statement is not

actionable.” Id., quoting Ferreri at 643.

i. Statements to patients

Ross App. No. 23CA18 50

{¶119} The Doctors contend that several of the scripted and unscripted

statements made by Adena’s staff to the patients were defamatory. The Doctors

outlined several of the statements, including that the Doctors “went ahead and

left,” “basically” “disappeared,” “just up and took off,” and “[W]e knew [Dr. Cohen]

was leaving in July, but then…he just kind of sprung it on us.” And in response

to three patients, one of whom stated that “He must have quit suddenly” Adena’s

staff member responded “This morning,” and to another patient’s statement that

“they called me and told me [Dr. Roberts] disappeared[,]” Adena’s staff

responded “Kind of basically, yeah[,]” and finally, another regarding Dr.

Thompson, staff members stated that “something changed and they had decided

to leave sooner.”

{¶120} The Doctors maintain first that the trial court erred in finding that

they conceded they did not assert a defamation per se claim. We agree with the

Doctors. The Doctors in the amended counterclaim and in response to Adena’s

motion for partial summary judgment, presented a claim that the statements on

their face were defamatory. Thus, they preserved the issue for our review. We

nonetheless, affirm the trial court’s decision to grant Adena’s motion for partial

summary judgment. This is because the statements are substantially truthful in

that the Doctors submitted their resignations in March without providing a reason.

{¶121} As to the defamation per quod claim, we similarly find that the

statements were substantially truthful, and additionally, find that the trial court

properly applied the incremental harm doctrine, because a complete truthful Ross App. No. 23CA18 51

statement would be more harmful. The complete truthful statement is that the

Doctors were fired and immediately lost their privileges at the medical facility.

{¶122} Moreover, Adena met its burden in establishing the affirmative

defense elements of qualified privilege in its communication with the patients.

The patients and Adena have a business relationship and Adena was required to

reach out to the patients in order to continue to provide medical services. With

the departure of the Doctors, Adena had to reschedule appointments with the

patients and set them up with new medical staff. And the Doctors failed to rebut

the qualified privilege defense by demonstrating actual malice, especially when

the statements are substantially truthful. See McCoy v. Maxwell, 2002-Ohio7157, ¶ 30 (11th Dist.) (actual malice is “with knowledge that the statements are

false or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.”).

{¶123} Accordingly, we overrule the Doctors argument and affirm the trial

court’s decision granting Adena’s motion for partial summary judgment as to this

claim.

ii. Statements to media

{¶124} The Doctors maintain that Adena’s press statement in response to

an inquiry by Chillicothe Gazette that “Brian Cohen, Aaron Roberts and J.T.

Thompson also resigned in March but after their resignations, Adena discovered

the three were actively soliciting Adena employees to leave with them. As a

result, Adena terminated the three on April 12 and decided to file the lawsuit[,]” is

defamatory. (Brief page 41) Adena argues that the trial court correctly sustained Ross App. No. 23CA18 52

Adena’s request for summary judgment because the defense of litigation

privilege applies and the statement is an opinion of pending litigation.

{¶125} We begin by outlining the defense of litigation privilege which

is designed to protect “the integrity of the judicial process” by

affording participants in litigation with immunity from future

lawsuits over relevant statements made during judicial

proceedings. Willitzer, 6 Ohio St.3d at 449, 453 N.E.2d 693. By

removing the fear of future consequences, the litigation privilege

facilitates the disclosure of “pertinent information” and helps to

“ascertain the truth.” Id. The litigation privilege is therefore

applicable to statements that bear “some reasonable relation to

the judicial proceeding in which” they appear. Surace, 25 Ohio

St.3d 229, 495 N.E.2d 939, at syllabus. It is not applicable,

however, to conduct that is simply connected in some way to

litigation.

Reister v. Gardner, 2020-Ohio-5484, ¶ 14.

{¶126} The statement made in the matter at bar was not made in a judicial

proceeding, but rather, was a press statement in response to an inquiry by a

news outlet. We acknowledge that “[w]ithin strict limitations, the privilege has

been extended to extrajudicial communications, including communications

between attorneys.” Morrison v. Gugle, 142 Ohio App. 3d 244, 259 (10th Dist.

2001). One such extension was the Second District Court of Appeals’ decision in

Horenstein, Nicholson & Blumenthal, L.P.A. v. Hilgeman, in which the Second

District held:

Considering the totality of the circumstances and reading the

statements in the context of the publication and how a reasonable

reader would interpret them, we conclude that the article was not

defamatory as a matter of law. First, almost every sentence in the

article either quotes the complaint or uses the word “alleged” or

similar terms to describe what the complaint was about. The

statements of HNB’s counsel (Matthews) pertained to HNB’s intent

Ross App. No. 23CA18 53

in filing the lawsuit. Reasonable readers, therefore, would

understand that the statements summarized the case and HNB’s

allegations.

2021-Ohio-3049, ¶ 134 (2d Dist.).

{¶127} Similar to the statements made in Horenstein, Adena’s press

statement essentially mirrors the language in Adena’s amended complaint,

stating that “Cohen Roberts, Thompson and Sever have violated the terms of

their Employment Agreements by recruiting, contacting, soliciting and /or

including employees of [Adena.]” The press statement concludes by noting that

a lawsuit has been filed. Thus, considering the totality of the circumstances and

how a reasonable reader would interpret the statements, we conclude that the

article is not defamatory as a matter of law. We, accordingly, agree with the trial

court.

iii. Statements to the Board

{¶128} Under this claim, the Doctors maintain that the trial court erred in

applying the one-year statute of limitation to their defamation claim relating to

CEO Graham and COO Edrington’s statements and presentation at the March

21, 2021, board meeting, among other statements to the Board. The Doctors

presented this claim in the amended complaint after they discovered the

defamatory statements through the discovery process. The Doctors argue that

the discovery rules should apply and extend the one-year statute of limitation not

from the date of publication, but from the date the Doctors discovered the

statements.

Ross App. No. 23CA18 54

{¶129} The trial court rejected the Doctors’ argument by following

precedent from this court that did not carve out a discovery exception. See

Glass v. Glass, 2003-Ohio-4477 (4th Dist.). In Glass, we held that the one-year

statute of limitation began when the statement was published. Id. at ¶ 18; R.C.

2305.11. The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, carved out an exception.

Weidman v. Hildebrant, 2024-Ohio-2931. In Weidman, the Supreme Court held

that “the discovery rule applies to claims of libel based on reputational injuries

when the publication of the libelous statements was secretive, concealed, or

otherwise inherently unknowable to the plaintiff due to the nature of the

publication.” Id. at ¶ 28. The Supreme Court’s decision, however, was decided

after the trial court’s decision was issued in the matter at bar.

{¶130} The trial court’s analysis, however, did not end there and it denied

the Doctors’ claim on the merits. The trial court rejected this claim concluding

that Adena and the Board presented evidence demonstrating that the qualified

privilege applied. And that the Doctors failed to rebut the privilege by

demonstrating actual malice, with the trial court characterizing the relationship

between the Doctors and CEO Graham and COO Edrington, as a personal

conflict and nothing more.

{¶131} We agree with the trial court’s decision finding the qualified

privilege applies and the Doctors failed to demonstrate actual malice. In order to

demonstrate a qualified privilege of the communication, Adena and the Board

had to prove all these elements: “good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement

limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occasion, and publication in a proper Ross App. No. 23CA18 55

manner and to proper parties only.” Hahn v. Kotten, 43 Ohio St.2d 237, 246

(1975).

{¶132} The following are the statements that the Doctors maintain were

defamatory:

• Board member Jennifer McKell stated that at the meeting they were

informed that propriety information was downloaded. Suspicion that

confidential information was downloaded and there was consensus

that if that was the case, a lawsuit should be filed.

• Kevin Shoemaker similarly stated that they were informed that

information is being reviewed of confidential information being

transferred to outside the organization. And that the law firm Bricker

and Eckler are looking into it. His memory is that both CEO Graham

and COO Edrington talked about it. He continued and stated that the

violation was that the law firm’s investigation is to determine what was

downloaded by doctors (did not name the doctors, but he did hint that

it was about the doctors who resigned and others).

• CEO Graham contacted Board member Watson directly “Doctors

were soliciting other employees” and that they were recruiting for

OhioHealth.

• A text message from CEO Graham to Dr. Jack Berno, at the time

Chief of Staff: “We will and I am surprised too at Chamberlin. Jim [Dr.

Fleming] called him and he said that they have not signed with

anyone. They are working with two organizations. One is with

ownership. He said that Cohen recruited them. He is not upset with

Adena or us. Just seemed like an opportunity he could not pass on.”

• The slides prepared by COO Edrington with the heading “Rumors”

and “speculation” that Dr. Cohen is potentially withholding billings

from the Adena system. And that it is being investigated.

• CEO Graham stating that Dr. Cohen engaged in billing fraud.

{¶133} The statements were made in an executive session and the

subject related to the operations of Adena’s business. Although the text

message to Board Member Watson occurred outside the executive session, it

was merely a reiteration of information already conveyed to the Board and Ross App. No. 23CA18 56

included in one of the claims in Adena’s complaint, which the Board approved for

filing.

{¶134} We also conclude that the Doctors fail to demonstrate an issue of

material fact in demonstrating actual malice. There is no evidence supporting

actual malice to rebut the application of qualified privilege as to the statements to

the Board.

{¶135} Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision as to the Doctors’

defamation claims.

CONCLUSION

{¶136} We sustain the Doctors wrongful termination claim but overrule all

other claims, affirming the trial court’s decision on those matters. Thus, we affirm

in part, reverse in part, and remand the matter to the trial court.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND THE CAUSE IS

REMANDED.

Ross App. No. 23CA18 57

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND

REVERSED IN PART and the CAUSE IS REMANDED. Appellant and appellee

shall split the costs equally.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the

date of this entry.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

BY: ________________________________

Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

Ross App. No. 23CA18 58

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the

date of filing with the clerk.