[Cite as State v. Rucker, 2026-Ohio-2734.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 2026 CA 0003
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Richland County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 2025 CR 474 R
DEMETRIUS L. RUCKER,
Judgment: Affirmed
Defendant - Appellant
Date of Judgment Entry: July 16, 2026
BEFORE: William B. Hoffman; Craig R. Baldwin; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: JODIE SCHUMACHER, Prosecuting Attorney, BRYAN T. DOVE,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee; FELICE HARRIS, for DefendantAppellant.
Baldwin, J.
{¶1} Appellant Demeterius L. Rucker appeals his sentence after pleading guilty to
three counts of trafficking in cocaine, three counts of possession of cocaine, and one count of
possession of a fentanyl-related compound. Appellee is the State of Ohio. For the reasons that
follow we affirm the decision of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} In April of 2025 the Richland County METRICH Enforcement Unit1 utilized
a confidential informant to make two drug purchases from the appellant at 618 Burns Street,
1
The Richland County METRICH Enforcement Unit is a collaborative law enforcement entity consisting of members from the Mansfield Division of Police and the Richland County Sheriff’s Office created to reduce the availability of drugs in Richland County. Mansfield, Ohio. Said drug purchases were submitted for analysis, and the substances were
found to contain cocaine. Based upon this information, METRICH obtained a search warrant
for the Burns Street location. The warrant was executed on June 11, 2025. The appellant fled
from the residence carrying a black Nike backpack with officers in pursuit. The appellant
threw the backpack and another item over a fence while running from officers. The appellant
was apprehended, and the items he attempted to throw away were seized. The evidence
obtained via execution of the search warrant included, inter alia, a large amount of cocaine,
unknown pills, a glass Pyrex bowl, baggies, syringes, drug paraphernalia, a significant amount
of U.S. currency, and several cellular telephones.
{¶3} The appellant was indicted on July 24, 2025, on the following charges:
• Count One: Trafficking in Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and
(C)(4)(g), a felony of the first degree, with forfeiture specifications for cash and
multiple cellular telephones pursuant to R.C. 2941.1417(A);
• Count Two: Possession of Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and
(C)(4)(f), a felony of the first degree, with forfeiture specifications for cash and
multiple cellular telephones pursuant to R.C. 2941.1417(A);
• Count Three: Trafficking in Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and
(C)(4)(f), a felony of the first degree;
• Count Four: Possession of Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and
(C)(4)(e), a felony of the first degree;
• Count Five: Trafficking in Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and
(C)(4)(c), a felony of the fourth degree;
• Count Six: Possession of Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and
(C)(4)(b), a felony of the fourth degree; and,
• Count Seven: Possession of a Fentanyl-Related Compound in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A) and (C)(11)(a), a felony of the fifth degree.
The appellant was appointed counsel, and pleaded not guilty to all charges at his July 31,
2025, arraignment. The matter was set for trial.
{¶4} The appellant thereafter changed his plea, and entered a plea of guilty to all
charges. A Change of Plea hearing was conducted on November 12, 2025, at which time the
trial court engaged in the appropriate Crim.R. 11 colloquy. The parties were initially going to
proceed straight to sentencing upon the appellant’s guilty plea, but the trial court determined
that receipt of the presentence investigation was necessary prior to the imposition of sentence:
THE COURT: All right. So there was discussions [sic] about a
potential sentence, and I think the parties - - there was going to be an argument
for sentence.
Attorney Thompson, you were hoping for somewhere in the range of 13
to whatever. “Whatever” means I have to give you that sentence of 13 to
something. I think the State of Ohio was going to argue for maybe 15 to
something. I was in the area of 17 to something.
What we’re going to do - - I don’t think we’re going to go to sentencing
today, Attorney Thompson.
MR. THOMSON: My understanding, what I communicated to Mr.
Rucker at the conclusion of the final pretrial, is that the presentence
investigation would be had. That way, the Court would have the information it wanted to bolster or compare against any argument made by the State of Ohio
or myself as far as sentencing.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Rucker, as you sit here today, I don’t
know what my sentence is going to be because I haven’t heard your arguments.
I haven’t heard arguments from your attorney. I don’t have a presentence
investigation. I don’t know your background, any of that. But, needless to say,
that I’m in the range of somewhere between 13 to something to 17 to something
or somewhere in between. I don’t know where I’m at right now, but that’s kind
of what I’m thinking. Obviously, if you got in trouble in the jail between now
and sentencing, that might change my mind and make it go up if you got in
trouble over there. So just make sure you’re on your best behavior. I can’t
promise you a particular sentence. I can’t tell you today, Mr. Rucker, this is
what your sentence is going to be. That’s kind of a range. Your lawyer was at
the bottom end, I was at the top end, and the State of Ohio was somewhere in
between. But I’m willing to listen to what everybody has to say before I make
an ultimate decision in the case. Do you understand that?
MR. RUCKER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Any questions about any of this?
MR. RUCKER: No.
THE COURT: So let me ask you, Mr. Rucker, how you plead
[sic] to these charges. It’s going to be the first-degree felony trafficking in
cocaine with all the forfeiture specs and for the money, all the cell phones.
That’s the one with the mandatory 11 to 16 and a half years in prison. That’s
that count.
Count 2 is the possession for the same amount of drugs.
3 and 4 are the first-degree felony trafficking in cocaine. That relates to
the purchase. One is a first-degree felony, but it’s a required maximum sentence
for those two counts.
And 5 and 6 are for the trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine.
And, finally, Count 7 for the possession of fentanyl.
So, it’s trafficking in cocaine with a forfeiture specification, F-1;
possession of cocaine, same amount of drugs with the forfeiture specification;
trafficking in cocaine, first-degree felony; possession of cocaine, first-degree
felony; trafficking in cocaine, fourth-degree felony; possession of cocaine,
fourth-degree felony; possession of fentanyl, fifth-degree felony.
How do you plead to all those?
MR. RUCKER: Guilty, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. I accept your guilty pleas, Mr. Rucker, and
find those pleas to be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Continue
the bond. Order a presentence investigation.
The trial court filed an Admission of Guilt/Judgment Entry on November 18, 2025,
memorializing the change of plea proceedings.
{¶5} The Sentencing Hearing proceeded on December 10, 2025. The trial court
noted that the appellant pleaded as charged; and that Count 2 merged with Count 1, Count 4 merged with Count 3, and Count 6 merged with Count 5. The court determined that it would
sentence the appellant on Counts 1, 3, 5, and 7.
{¶6} The trial court heard arguments on sentencing from the parties, and
summarized the appellant’s case as follows:
THE COURT: Thank you.
So, yeah, the underlying facts are, there was a search warrant back on
June 11th, 2025, on Burns Street by Mansfield Police Department and
METRICH Drug Task Force. Mr. Rucker ran out of the residence with a black
Nike bookbag and a large amount of cocaine. He had $4,125 on his person and
$22,000 in the house. They also located some fentanyl at that time. They had
made purchases from him on April 22nd of 2025 with a confidential informant
and on April 23rd, 2025. One of those was a first-degree felony amount of
cocaine. The other one was a fourth-degree felony amount of cocaine. That’s
how you get the trafficking in cocaine, first-degree felony, major drug offender;
first-degree felony; and then the fourth-degree felony and the fifth-degree
felony.
The court acknowledged receipt of several letters submitted on the appellant’s behalf. The
court summarized the appellant’s presentence investigation report, noting past convictions for
possession of cocaine, some CCW charges, and drug possession, as well as a past prison
sentence in connection with a 2005 case. The court noted further that the appellant scored a
24 on the Ohio Risk Assessment, which was considered a high risk.
{¶7} The trial court sentenced the appellant as follows:
THE COURT: What I think is appropriate is, I have to do 11 to
16 and a half years in prison mandatory time on Count 1. I’m required to do
that under Ohio law.
Count 5 is 18 months in prison run concurrent [sic] to Count 1 and the
other counts. Count 7 is 12 months in prison concurrent to the other counts.
* * *
For Count 3, I’m going to run that consecutive for that count. That’s the
other first-degree felony. That was the sale that happened on April 23rd, 2025.
That sentence will be six years in prison. That’s mandatory time.
To add all that up - - like I said, I already merged 2, 4, and 6 with 1, 3,
5. And I ran 5 and 7 concurrent with the 1 and 3 consecutive.
The reason for consecutive sentences is I think it’s necessary to protect
the public, punish the offender, it’s not disproportionate to the conduct or the
danger posed, and these are multiple offenses committed as part of a criminal
course of conduct and the harm caused by the multiple offenses was so great or
unusual that no single prison term adequately reflects the seriousness. He does
have a criminal history. He had a trafficking before back in 2005 that he did go
to prison on in that case. I think it’s necessary, again, based on the criminal
history, to protect the public from future crime.
That total sentence then is going to be an aggregate of 17 years to a
maximum of 22 and one half years maximum.
The court issued a Sentencing Entry on December 16, 2025, memorializing the sentence
imposed.
{¶8} The appellant filed a timely appeal in which he sets forth the following sole
assignment of error:
{¶9} “I. DEMETRIUS RUCKER WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. (PLEA TR. P. 33-35, SENT.TR. P 49-52.)”
{¶10} The appellant submits that the trial court had a predetermined sentence in mind
indicating prejudgment, a lack of impartiality, and a lack of meaningful consideration of
mitigation in violation of the appellant’s Constitutional rights to due process. We disagree.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶11} An appellate court may vacate or modify any sentence that is not clearly and
convincingly contrary to law only if the appellate court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that the record does not support the sentence. State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 23. “Clear
and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere
‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond
a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts
a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio
St. 469, paragraph three of the syllabus (1954). Thus, we may vacate or modify the appellant’s
sentence only if we find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the record does not support
it.
{¶12} The Ohio Supreme Court addressed the issue of consecutive sentences in State
v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177:
On appeals involving the imposition of consecutive sentences, R.C.
2953.08(G)(2)(a) directs the appellate court “to review the record, including the
findings underlying the sentence” and to modify or vacate the sentence “if it
clearly and convincingly finds * * * [t]hat the record does not support the
sentencing court's findings under division * * * (C)(4) of section 2929.14 * * *
of the Revised Code.” But that statute does not specify where the findings are
to be made. Thus, the record must contain a basis upon which a reviewing court
can determine that the trial court made the findings required by R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) before it imposed consecutive sentences.
Id. at ¶ 28. The issue was subsequently addressed by this Court in State v. Corbett, 2023-Ohio556 (5th Dist.):
We review felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in
R.C. 2953.08. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d
1231, ¶ 22. In State v. Gwynne, a plurality of the Supreme Court of Ohio held
that an appellate court may only review individual felony sentences under R.C.
2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12, while R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) is the exclusive means of
appellate review of consecutive felony sentences. 158 Ohio St.3d 279, 2019-Ohio-4761, 141 N.E.3d 169, ¶ 16-18.
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either increase, reduce, modify, or
vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing where we clearly and
convincingly find that either the record does not support the sentencing court's
findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or
2929.20(I), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. See, also, State v. Bonnell,
140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.2d 659, ¶ 28; Gwynne, supra, ¶
16.
Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence “which will provide in
the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to
be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954),
paragraph three of the syllabus. “Where the degree of proof required to sustain
an issue must be clear and convincing, a reviewing court will examine the
record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it
to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” Cross, 161 Ohio St. at 477, 120 N.E.2d
118.
Id. at ¶24-26.
ANALYSIS
{¶13} The appellant was sentenced on two first-degree felonies (Counts 1 and 3); a
fourth-degree felony (Count 5); and, a fifth-degree felony (Count 7). Counts 2, 4, and 6 were
merged with other counts for purposes of sentencing.
{¶14} R.C. 2929.13(D) provides in pertinent part that “. . . for a felony of the first or
second degree, for a felony drug offense that is a violation of any provision of Chapter 2925,
3719, or 4729 of the Revised Code for which a presumption in favor of a prison term is
specified as being applicable . . . it is presumed that a prison term is necessary in order to
comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing under section 2929.11 of the Revised
Code.” R.C. 2929.13(E) provides further that “[e]xcept as provided in division (F) of this
section, for any drug offense that is a violation of any provision of Chapter 2925 of the Revised
Code and that is a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree, the applicability of a presumption
under division (D) of this section in favor of a prison term or of division (B) or (C) of this
section in determining whether to impose a prison term for the offense shall be determined as specified in section 2925.02, 2925.03, 2925.04, 2925.05, 2925.06, 2925.11, 2925.13, 2925.22,
2925.23, 2925.36, or 2925.37 of the Revised Code, whichever is applicable regarding the
violation.”
{¶15} R.C. 2929.11(F)(5) provides that “[a] first, second, or third degree felony drug
offense for which section 2925.02, 2925.03, 2925.04, 2925.05, 2925.06, 2925.11, 2925.13,
2925.22, 2925.23, 2925.36, 2925.37, 3719.99, or 4729.99 of the Revised Code, whichever is
applicable regarding the violation, requires the imposition of a mandatory prison term.” Thus,
the appellant was subject to the imposition of a mandatory prison term on Counts 1 and 3.
{¶16} R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) provides in pertinent part that “[f]or a felony of the first
degree committed on or after March 22, 2019, the prison term shall be an indefinite prison
term with a stated minimum term selected by the court of three, four, five, six, seven, eight,
nine, ten, or eleven years and a maximum term that is determined pursuant to section
2929.144 of the Revised Code…” R.C. 2929.144 provides that “[i]f the offender is being
sentenced for one felony and the felony is a qualifying felony of the first or second degree, the
maximum prison term shall be equal to the minimum term imposed on the offender under
division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code plus fifty per cent of that
term.”
{¶17} R.C. 2929.14(A)(4) provides that “[f]or a felony of the fourth degree, the prison
term shall be a definite term of six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen,
fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen months.” R.C. 2929.14(A)(5) provides that “[f]or a
felony of the fifth degree, the prison term shall be a definite term of six, seven, eight, nine,
ten, eleven, or twelve months.”
{¶18} The trial court sentenced the appellant to 11 to 16 and one-half years on Count
1 - Trafficking in Cocaine; and, 6 years on Count 3 Trafficking in Cocaine, and ordered that
said sentences be served consecutively. It sentenced the appellant to 18 months on Count 5;
and, 12 months on Count 7, and ordered that said sentences be served concurrently with each
other and Counts 1 and 3. These prison terms are all within statutory parameters.
{¶19} R.C. 2929.11 provides in pertinent part:
(A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by
the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes of felony
sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and
others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the
offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish
those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local
government resources. To achieve those purposes, the sentencing court shall
consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and
others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to
the victim of the offense, the public, or both.
(B) A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated
to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in
division (A) of this section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the
seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and
consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar
offenders.
The trial court specifically stated during the sentencing hearing that it found the sentences
imposed were necessary to protect the public from future crime by the appellant and to punish
him, and were not disproportionate to the seriousness of the appellant’s conduct and the
danger he posed to the public.
{¶20} R.C. 2929.12 provides in pertinent part:
(A) Unless otherwise required by section 2929.13 or 2929.14 of the
Revised Code, a court that imposes a sentence under this chapter upon an
offender for a felony has discretion to determine the most effective way to
comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section
2929.11 of the Revised Code. In exercising that discretion, the court shall
consider the factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) of this section relating to
the seriousness of the conduct, the factors provided in divisions (D) and (E) of
this section relating to the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism, ***
(B) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply
regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any other relevant factors,
as indicating that the offender’s conduct is more serious than conduct normally
constituting the offense:
* * *
(C) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply
regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any other relevant factors,
as indicating that the offender’s conduct is less serious than conduct normally
constituting the offense:
* * *
(4) There are substantial grounds to mitigate the offender’s conduct,
although the grounds are not enough to constitute a defense.
(D) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply
regarding the offender, and any other relevant factors, as factors indicating that
the offender is likely to commit future crimes:
* * *
(2) The offender previously was adjudicated a delinquent child
pursuant to Chapter 2151 of the Revised Code prior to January 1, 2002, or
pursuant to Chapter 2152 of the Revised Code, or the offender has a history of
criminal convictions.
(3) The offender has not been rehabilitated to a satisfactory degree
after previously being adjudicated a delinquent child pursuant to Chapter 2151
of the Revised Code prior to January 1, 2002, or pursuant to Chapter 2152 of
the Revised Code, or the offender has not responded favorably to sanctions
previously imposed for criminal convictions.
(4) The offender has demonstrated a pattern of drug or alcohol abuse
that is related to the offense, and the offender refuses to acknowledge that the
offender has demonstrated that pattern, or the offender refuses treatment for
the drug or alcohol abuse.
(5) The offender shows no genuine remorse for the offense.
(E) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply
regarding the offender, and any other relevant factors, as factors indicating that
the offender is not likely to commit future crimes:
(1) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had not been
adjudicated a delinquent child.
(2) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had not been
convicted of or pleaded guilty to a criminal offense.
(3) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had led a lawabiding life for a significant number of years.
(4) The offense was committed under circumstances not likely to
recur.
(5) Except as provided in division (G) of this section, the offender
shows genuine remorse for the offense.
{¶21} The imposition of a maximum sentence was discussed by this Court in Ohio v.
Walsh, 2022-Ohio-3883, (5th Dist.) as follows:
Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(A)(1), Walsh is entitled to appeal as of right
the maximum sentence imposed on his conviction. Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2),
we may either increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a sentence and remand for
resentencing if we clearly and convincingly find that either the record does not
support the sentencing court's findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D),
2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(I), or the sentence is otherwise contrary
to law. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231;
State v. Howell, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2015CA00004, 2015-Ohio-4049.
"Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which
is more than a mere 'preponderance of the evidence,' but not to the extent of
such certainty as is required 'beyond a reasonable doubt' in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction
as to the facts sought to be established." Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120
N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
As noted by this court in State v. Taylor, 5th Dist. Richland No. 17CA29,
2017-Ohio-8996, ¶ 16:
A trial court's imposition of a maximum prison term for a felony
conviction is not contrary to law as long as the sentence is within the
statutory range for the offense, and the court considers both the purposes
and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the
seriousness and recidivism factors set forth [in] R.C. 2929.12. State v.
Keith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 103413 and 103414, 2016-Ohio-5234, ¶
10, 16.
R.C. 2929.11 governs overriding purposes of felony sentencing and
states the trial court "shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender,
deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender,
and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both."
R.C. 2929.12 governs factors to consider in felony sentencing.
Subsection (A) states the trial court "shall consider the factors set forth in
divisions (B) and (C) of this section relating to the seriousness of the conduct,
[and] the factors provided in divisions (D) and (E) of this section relating to the
likelihood of the offender's recidivism."
In State v. Webb, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2018-0069, 2019-Ohio4195, ¶ 17 we found that:
Although a trial court must consider the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and
2929.12, there is no requirement that the court state its reasons for
imposing a maximum sentence, or for imposing a particular sentence
within the statutory range. There is no requirement in R.C. 2929.12 that
the trial court states on the record that it has considered the statutory
criteria concerning seriousness and recidivism or even discussed them.
(Citations omitted.)
"Nothing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits an appellate court to independently
weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11
and 2929.12." State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d
649, ¶ 42.
Id. at ¶¶ 9-15.
{¶22} In this case, two of the Counts to which the appellant pleaded guilty and for
which he was sentenced were first-degree felony drug trafficking offenses. The appellant was
sentenced on Count 1 to a minimum of 11 years in prison and a maximum of 16 and one-half
years in prison. The appellant was sentenced on Count 3, also a first-degree drug trafficking
offense, to 6 years in prison. These sentences were clearly within the parameters established
by R.C. 2929.14. The sentences imposed for Counts 5 and 7 were also within statutory
parameters.
{¶23} The court ordered that the sentences for Counts 1 and 3 be served
consecutively. R.C. 2929.14 specifically addresses the imposition of consecutive sentences at
section (C)(4):
If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of
multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms
consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to
protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that
consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the
offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the
court also finds any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction
imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code,
or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison
term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct
adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by
the offender.
This language was applied in Corbett, supra, in which this Court stated:
“In order to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court is
required to make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the
sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry, but it
has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings.” State v. Newman, 5th
Dist. Fairfield No. 20-CA-44, 2021-Ohio-2124, 2021 WL 2628079, ¶ 100, citing
State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, syllabus.
In other words, the sentencing court does not have to perform “a word-forword recitation of the language of the statute.” Id. at ¶ 29. Therefore, “as long
as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct
analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to support the
findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.” Id. If a sentencing court fails
to make the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a consecutive sentence
imposed is contrary to law. Id. at ¶ 34. The trial court is not required “to give a
talismanic incantation of the words of the statute, provided that the necessary
findings can be found in the record and are incorporated into the sentencing
entry.” Id. at ¶ 37.
Id. at ¶28.
{¶24} Our review of the record establishes that the trial court made the findings
required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before it imposed consecutive sentences. The trial court
specifically found that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public and punish
the appellant, and were not disproportionate to the seriousness of the appellant’s conduct and
the danger he posed to the public.
{¶25} We are unpersuaded by the appellant’s argument that the trial court exhibited
judicial bias against him by stating during the change of plea hearing that the sentence it
anticipated imposing was “in the range of somewhere between 13 to something to 17 to
something or somewhere in between. I don’t know where I’m at right now, but that’s kind of what I’m thinking.” He submits that these comments constitute judicial bias that rise to the
level of a violation of his “due process and fair trial rights.” We disagree.
{¶26} The issue of judicial bias was discussed by this Court in State v. Baker, 2024-Ohio-906 (5th Dist.):
“The inquiry [for judicial bias] is an objective one. The court asks not
whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge
in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional
‘potential for bias.’ ” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 881,
129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009). Moreover, “judicial rulings alone
almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion,” but instead,
“[a]lmost invariably are proper grounds for appeal, not recusal.” Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). Likewise,
“opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events
occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do
not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deepseated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”
Id. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147. See, State v. Morrow, 5th Dist. Muskingum No.
CT2021-0053, 2022-Ohio-1089, ¶43.
Judicial bias is demonstrated by “a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will or
undue friendship or favoritism toward one of the litigants or his attorney, with
the formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as
contradistinguished from an open state of mind which will be governed by the
law and [the] facts.” State v. Jackson, 149 Ohio St.3d 55, 2016-Ohio-5488, ¶ 33, 73 N.E.3d 414, quoting State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463, 132
N.E.2d 191 (1956), paragraph four of the syllabus. “A judge is presumed to
follow the law and not to be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice
must be compelling to overcome these presumptions.” In re Disqualification of
George, 100 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2003-Ohio-5489, ¶ 5, 798 N.E.2d 23. Moreover,
a party that seeks to establish bias bears the burden of overcoming that
presumption. Coley v. Bagley, 706 F.3d 741, 751 (6th Cir. 2013).
* * *
Baker does not cite to any statement made by the trial judge during the
sentencing hearing or the hearing on her petition for postconviction relief to
demonstrate bias. Mere evidence of distain for the defendant is not enough,
The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of the evidence,
be exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant, who has been shown
to be a thoroughly reprehensible person. But the judge is not thereby
recusable for bias or prejudice, since his knowledge and the opinion it
produced were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the
proceedings, and are indeed sometimes (as in a bench trial) necessary to
completion of the judge's task. As Judge Jerome Frank pithily put it:
“Impartiality is not gullibility. Disinterestedness does not mean childlike innocence. If the judge did not form judgments of the actors in those
court-house dramas called trials, he could never render decisions.” In re
J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654 (C.A. 2 1943).
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. at 550-551, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474
(1994).
As we have found in our disposition of Baker's First Assignment of
Error, the trial judge did listen to and consider Dr. Stinson's testimony. We do
not find evidence in the record which would overcome the strong presumption
that the trial judge was free of bias or prejudice against Baker or that establishes
the trial judge's conduct denied Baker her right to due process.
Id. at ¶¶ 73-76. The Baker Court found that the appellant had failed to point to compelling
evidence in the record that the trial judge was biased or “that there was an unconstitutional
‘potential for bias’ that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
sentencing hearing or the hearing on her petition for postconviction relief.” Id. at ¶77.
{¶27} So, too, has the appellant failed to make such a showing in this case. First, the
appellant did not submit his guilty plea until after the allegedly biased comments. He was
present at the change of plea hearing with counsel, heard the trial court’s statements, declined
to ask any questions, made no objections, and pleaded guilty. Second, the record does not
reflect that the trial court had a definite “predetermined” sentence indicating “prejudgment,
lack of impartiality, and lack of meaningful consideration of mitigation;” in fact, it reveals
quite the opposite. The record reveals that the trial court engaged in meaningful consideration
of the facts during sentencing. With regard to mitigation, the trial court read the letters
submitted by the appellant’s family, and heard statements during the sentencing hearing from
two of the appellant’s family members regarding how family oriented the appellant was and
how he was trying to care for his family and leave them a legacy. The court also reviewed the
appellant’s presentence investigation, heard the parties’ arguments. It simply found that the family members’ statements, and other mitigating factors, did not outweigh the fact that the
appellant was engaged in the crime of trafficking in cocaine; possessed large amounts cocaine,
and fentanyl, at the time of his arrest; and, possessed not only the aforementioned drugs, but
also several cell phones and nearly $25,000 in cash at the time of his arrest. The appellant was
a drug dealer, selling drugs to members of his community. The court found that the fact that
the appellant was “a family man” who was loved by his family did not outweigh the fact that
he was actively engaged in drug trafficking in his community, and had a drug-related criminal
history. This determination is clearly within the discretion of the trial court, and does not rise
to the level of judicial bias or reversible error.
{¶28} “[A]s long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the
correct analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to support the findings,
consecutive sentences should be upheld.” Bonnell, supra, at ¶ 29. In the case sub judice, the
record establishes that the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 in imposing
sentence upon the appellant, made the necessary findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at
the sentencing hearing, and incorporated its findings into its sentencing entry. The record
supports the findings of the trial court, and the appellant’s sentences should be upheld. We
therefore find the appellant’s sole assignment of error to be wholly without merit.
CONCLUSION
{¶29} Based upon the foregoing, the appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled,
and the decision of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed.
{¶30} Costs to appellant.
By: Baldwin, J.
Hoffman, P.J. and
Gormley, J. concur.