[Cite as KeyBank, N.A., v. Troutman, 2026-Ohio-2721.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
KEYBANK, N.A., :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 115872
v. :
HOLDEN TROUTMAN, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 16, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-24-108811
Appearances:
Weltman, Weinberg and Reis and Denise M. Leskovec, for
appellee.
Holden Troutman, pro se.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:
Defendant-appellant Holden Troutman (“Troutman”), pro se,
appeals the trial court’s decision granting default judgment in favor of plaintiffappellee KeyBank, N.A. (“KeyBank”) and denying his motions to dismiss the complaint and set aside the default judgment under Civ.R. 60(B). Upon review, we
affirm the trial court’s decisions.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In December 2024, KeyBank filed a complaint against Troutman for
his failure to make payments according to the terms of a line-of-credit agreement.
KeyBank sought a money judgment against Troutman for the principal sum and
accrued interest. KeyBank attached the line-of-credit agreement and Troutman’s
account statement to the complaint.
Troutman was served with a copy of the complaint on December 23,
2024, and a case-management conference was scheduled. Troutman did not answer
or respond to the complaint. In March 2025, the case-management conference was
cancelled and rescheduled as a default hearing. KeyBank was ordered to file a
motion for default judgment along with an affidavit of damages and Troutman’s
military-service status, a proposed judgment entry, and a copy of the
correspondence sent by KeyBank notifying Troutman of the date and time of the
hearing via certified mail (collectively, “default-judgment documents”).
KeyBank filed a motion for default judgment and a notice of filing,
which included the following: a letter sent via ordinary and certified mail from
KeyBank’s counsel to Troutman informing him of the default hearing (“hearing
letter”); an affidavit executed by KeyBank’s counsel regarding the perfection of
service upon Troutman (“service affidavit”); an affidavit executed by KeyBank’s
senior litigation specialist attesting to the amount due (“damages affidavit”); and an affidavit executed by KeyBank’s counsel establishing that Troutman was not in the
military (“military affidavit”).
Troutman appeared for the default hearing, and a case-management
conference was scheduled. The conference was held in June 2025, and Troutman
was ordered to answer or respond to the complaint prior to the next default hearing,
which was set for July 2025. Troutman was warned that judgment may be entered
against him if he failed to comply, and KeyBank was again ordered to file the defaultjudgment documents. The trial court’s journal entry noted that notice was issued.
In July 2025, KeyBank filed another notice of filing and attached an
updated hearing letter, damages and military affidavits, and a proposed judgment
entry. Troutman did not answer or respond to the complaint, and the default
hearing was held. The trial court issued a final judgment entry on July 30, 2025,
awarding judgment to KeyBank and against Troutman in the amount of “the
principal sum of $75,806.90, plus accrued interest in the amount of $4,843.01, and
its costs herein.” Therein, the trial court noted “that defendant was given prior
notice and an opportunity for a judicial hearing at which [Troutman] could assert
defenses to [KeyBank’s] claim.”
In August 2025, Troutman filed a motion to set aside the default
judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)1 Therein, Troutman argued that he was never
1 Civ.R. 6(B) provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: properly served with notice of the July 2025 default hearing. Troutman further
asserted that the amount KeyBank claimed was owed was inaccurate and/or
unsupported by admissible evidence, KeyBank’s claims were barred by the statute
of limitations, and there was a lack of contractual privity. Troutman filed an affidavit
in support of his motion, attesting that a hearing notice was not mailed, delivered,
or served upon him and he did not receive telephone communications, emails, or
follow-ups from the trial court or KeyBank’s counsel. Troutman further attested
that he was not present at the July 2025 default hearing because of the lack of service
and was unaware that a default could or would be entered. Troutman stated that he
would have appeared and presented his defenses had he received proper notice.
The trial court scheduled another default hearing in September 2025.
Prior to the hearing, Troutman filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
Civ.R. 12(B)(5) and (6) or for a more definite statement, and KeyBank filed an
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
(2) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial . . . ;
(3) Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) The judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated,
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or
(5) Any other reason justifying relief from the judgment.
The motion shall be made with a reasonable time . . . .
additional notice of filing the default-judgment documents. It is unclear whether
this hearing was held.
In October 2025, KeyBank filed a brief in opposition to Troutman’s
motions. KeyBank countered that the complaint was properly served upon
Troutman and discussed Troutman’s participation in the case. KeyBank
emphasized that the trial court gave Troutman “more than enough” notice,
deference, and time to comply with its rules and orders — including holding a casemanagement conference in June 2025 and permitting him to file an answer prior to
the July 2025 default hearing — however, Troutman failed to comply.
On November 3, 2025, the trial court denied Troutman’s Civ.R. 12(B)
motion to dismiss the complaint and his Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from
judgment.
On December 1, 2025, Troutman filed a notice of appeal. Troutman
indicated that he would be filing an App.R. 9(C) statement of evidence or
proceedings.2 After Troutman failed to file the App.R. 9(C) statement by the
deadline, this court sua sponte converted the appeal into an App.R. 9(A) record.
Troutman filed his appellate brief, raising four assignments of error for review.
2 App.R. 9(C)(1) provides: “If no recording of the proceedings was made, if a
transcript is unavailable, or if a recording was made but is no longer available for transcription, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including the appellant's recollection.”
Assignment of Error No. 1
The trial court erred and abused its discretion by entering default
judgment when [KeyBank] failed to comply with the court’s prehearing order and the requirements of Civ.R. 41(B) and Civ.R. 55(A).
Assignment of Error No. 2
The trial court erred in denying [Troutman’s] motion to set aside the
default judgment under Civ.R. 60(B), even though [Troutman] showed
a meritorious defense, grounds for relief, and timeliness under GTE
Automatic Electric v. ARC Industries.
Assignment of Error No. 3
The trial court erred in accepting and enforcing a complaint and
unauthenticated exhibits that did not meet the requirements of Civ.R.
10(D)(1) and Evid.R. 901 because they did not provide a complete,
itemized, and verified account of the alleged debt.
Assignment of Error No. 4
The trial court abused its discretion by not affording reasonable
latitude to a pro se litigant and by denying relief in a manner
inconsistent with due process under the Ohio Constitution and Ohio
case law.
II. Law and Analysis
As an initial matter, we note that Troutman acted pro se in the
proceedings below and is acting pro se in the instant appeal. “‘It is well established
that pro se litigants are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures
and that they are held to the same standards as litigants who are represented by
counsel.’” State ex rel. Fuller v. Mengel, 2003-Ohio-6448, ¶ 10, quoting Sabouri v.
Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 145 Ohio App.3d 651, 654 (10th Dist. 2001).
Indeed, “‘[p]ro se litigants are not entitled to greater rights, and they must accept
the results of their own mistakes.’” Fazio v. Gruttadauria, 2008-Ohio-4586, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), quoting Williams v. Lo, 2008-Ohio-2804, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). With these
concepts in mind, we turn to Troutman’s assignments of error.
A. Jurisdictional Issues
Since “[t]his court has a duty to examine, sua sponte, potential
deficiencies in jurisdiction,” we begin our analysis with the jurisdictional issues
presented by Troutman’s first and third assignments of error. Cooney v. Radostitz,
2021-Ohio-2521, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).
An order is considered final when it “affects a substantial right in an
action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment.”
R.C. 2505.02(B)(1). An order “determines the action and prevents a judgment”
when it “‘dispose[s] of the whole merits of the cause or some separate and distinct
branch thereof and leave[s] nothing for the determination of the [trial] court.’” Natl.
City Commercial Capital Corp. v. AAAA At Your Serv., Inc., 2007-Ohio-2942, ¶ 7,
quoting Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities v.
Professionals Guild of Ohio, 46 Ohio St.3d 147, 153 (1989).
Generally, a trial court loses jurisdiction over the substantive merits
of a case after entering a final judgment. Miles v. Cleveland Clinic Health Sys.-E.
Region, 2026-Ohio-190, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Mather v. Oda, 2023-Ohio-3907, ¶ 1; Phoenix Lighting Group, L.L.C. v. Genlyte Thomas Group, L.L.C.,
2024-Ohio-5729, ¶ 20 (“A trial court’s jurisdiction over a matter is limited once
proceedings are complete.”). Absent specific authority prescribed by the Ohio Rules
of Civil Procedure, a trial court may not continue to act after a case has ended; any ruling issued outside the scope of recognized post-judgment motions is void.
Benedict Firelands Platt, LLC v. FTFT Supercomputing, Inc., 2026-Ohio-678, ¶ 16
(6th Dist.). Civ.R. 60(B) is one such avenue, providing that “[o]n motion and upon
such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order
or proceeding” under certain grounds. A Civ.R. 60(B) order is “clearly within the
express language of R.C. 2505.02” and is considered a final, appealable order. GTE
Automatic Electric v. ARC Industries, 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 150 (1976).
An appeal from a final order must be filed within 30 days of its entry.
App.R. 4(A)(1). “Without the timely filing of a notice of appeal, an appellate court is
without jurisdiction to hear the appeal.” Cleveland v. Damato, 2026-Ohio-356, ¶ 11
(8th Dist.), citing State v. White, 2004-Ohio-5200, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), citing Bosco v.
Euclid, 38 Ohio App.2d 40 (8th Dist. 1974).
Here, the July 30, 2025 journal entry is a final order: it disposed of
“the whole merits of the cause” by (1) rendering a default judgment against
Troutman and in favor of KeyBank on its complaint and (2) determining the amount
of damages. Therefore, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case’s substantive
merits; it could not adjudicate the complaint again by holding a subsequent default
hearing or ruling on Troutman’s Civ.R. 12(B) motion to dismiss. However, the trial
court retained authority to rule on Troutman’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion. The November
3, 2025 journal entry denying Troutman’s motion for relief from judgment is also a
final order. Troutman filed an appeal on December 1, 2025, within App.R. 4(A)(1)’s 30-day deadline for appealing the November 3, 2025 Civ.R. 60(B) denial but wellbeyond it for the July 30, 2025 final judgment.
“Bootstrapping” occurs when an error is assigned “‘from a final order
that was not the subject of a timely notice of appeal’ in an ‘otherwise timely appeal.’”
Plaza v. Roberts, 2024-Ohio-3021, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), quoting Basit v. Chapman, 2016
Ohio App. LEXIS 2399, *2-3 (8th Dist. June 23, 2016). “This court has ‘consistently
refused’ to address ‘bootstrapped’ assignments of error” since the practice “is
procedurally anomalous and inconsistent with the appellate rules which
contemplate a direct relationship between the order from which the appeal is taken
and the error assigned as a result of that order.” (Cleaned up.) Id., citing Basit and
Chapon v. Std. Contracting & Eng., 2007-Ohio-4306, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.).
Moreover, it “has been long-accepted by Ohio courts” that a party may
not utilize a Civ.R. 60(B) motion as a substitute for an appeal. Kung v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 2026-Ohio-1565, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.) (explaining that “res judicata bars
a party from relitigating a matter that was raised or could have been raised on direct
appeal when a final, appealable order was issued”), citing Doe v. Trumbull Cty.
Children Servs. Bd., 28 Ohio St.3d 128, 131 (1986) (referring to this concept as
“axiomatic”); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 16 (“It is well
established that a Civ.R. 60(B) motion cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal
and that the doctrine of res judicata applies to such a motion.”). When an appellant
bootstraps a prior final order that was not properly appealed by challenging the trial
court’s subsequent denial of Civ.R. 60(B) motion, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the bootstrapped order. In re A.P., 2026-Ohio-743, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.),
citing Issa v. Cleveland Metro. School Dist., 2025-Ohio-4848, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing
Bukovec v. Keger, 2024-Ohio-1162 (8th Dist.).
Here, Troutman’s appeal from the denial of his Civ.R. 60(B) motion
is timely, but the substance of his first and third assignments of error address only
the merits of the July 30, 2025 final default judgment. Consequently, Troutman is
attempting to bootstrap time-barred arguments and improperly seeks review of
alleged errors that he failed to timely appeal. We lack jurisdiction to consider those
arguments and disregard Troutman’s first and third assignments of error.
B. Civ.R. 60(B) Denial and Due Process for Pro Se Litigants
Next, we turn to Troutman’s second and fourth assignments of error.
In his second assignment of error Troutman challenges the trial court’s denial of his
Civ.R. 60(B) motion. In his fourth assignment of error, Troutman claims that the
trial court “abused its discretion by failing to afford reasonable latitude to a pro se
litigant” and denied relief in a way that violated his right to due process.
After reviewing his appellate brief, we acknowledge that Troutman
cites rules, case law, and Ohio Const., art. I, § 16 to establish general legal principles.
However, Troutman does not provide any authority to support his case-specific
arguments or refute the authority set forth by KeyBank.
For example, Troutman cites GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC
Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146 (1976), to recite the three elements a movant
must establish to be entitled to Civ.R 60(B) relief. However, Troutman does not provide any authority to support his claims that he raised meritorious defenses, was
entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) and (5), and filed the motion within a
reasonable time.
Troutman also cites Ohio Const., art. I, § 16 for its mandate “that every
person . . . shall have a remedy by due course of law” and Saeed v. Greater Cleveland
Regional Transit Auth., 2017-Ohio-935 (8th Dist.), for the proposition that “Ohio
courts recognize that [pro se litigants] may be afforded reasonable latitude.”
However, this court qualified that statement in Saeed, noting that “there are limits
to a court’s leniency.” Id. at ¶ 7. Therein, we also reiterated that “[p]ro se litigants
are presumed to have knowledge of the law and legal procedures and are held to the
same standard as litigants who are represented by counsel.” Id. Apart from these
references, Troutman does not cite any authority to support his conclusion that the
trial court’s alleged “procedural irregularities and lack of consideration” — namely,
entering default judgment, denying his Civ.R. 60(B) motion, and failing to hold a
hearing or “meaningfully addressing the evidentiary and procedural concerns
raised” in that motion — violated his right to due process.
App.R. 16(A)(7) requires appellants to include “[a]n argument
containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error
presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.” When
appellants fail to cite any legal authority in support of their claims, this court is
allowed to disregard them. Lewicki v. Grange Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-4544, ¶ 41 (8th Dist.), citing Pinkney v. Salett, 2011-Ohio-4121, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.), citing
App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16(A)(7); Siemientkowski v. State Farm Ins., 2005-Ohio4295, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.).
Indeed, it is well settled that appellate courts are not advocates, and
appellants bear the burden of constructing the legal arguments necessary to support
their assignments of error. Id., citing Taylor-Stephens v. Rite Aid of Ohio, 2018-Ohio-4714, ¶ 121 (8th Dist.), and Doe v. Cuyahoga Cty. Community College, 2022-Ohio-527, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.). “‘If an argument exists that can support [an] assigned
error, it is not this court’s duty to root it out.’” Strauss v. Strauss, 2011-Ohio-3831,
¶ 72 (8th Dist.), quoting Cardone v. Cardone, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2028, *22 (9th
Dist. May 6, 1998).
The burden rests with Troutman to establish the validity of his
assignments of error; yet he provides this court with minimal guidance or support
for his positions. Therefore, we decline to review Troutman’s second and fourth
assignments of error.
However, we note that even if we were to address the merits of
Troutman’s appeal, we would find that the trial court properly denied his Civ.R.
60(B) motion. In his Civ.R. 60(B) motion, Troutman does not offer any explanation
as to why he did not file an answer to KeyBank’s complaint — either after the
complaint was served or in compliance with the trial court’s subsequent order. After
failing to file a timely answer, Troutman was present at a June 2025 casemanagement conference. Troutman was ordered to answer or respond to the complaint prior to the next default hearing, which was set for July 2025. Troutman
was warned that judgment may be entered against him if he failed to comply.
Nonetheless, Troutman failed to file an answer or response prior to the July 2025
default hearing.
Nor does Troutman offer any explanation as to why he was unable to
apprise himself of deadlines and court dates by checking the docket; rather he shifts
blame to the trial court and KeyBank, claiming that he was not properly served with
notice of the default hearing. However, in addition to the court’s own notification
system, KeyBank filed default-judgment documents — which included hearing
letters — in compliance with the trial court’s orders on several occasions. Even on
appeal, Troutman’s contentions regarding the grounds entitling him to relief do not
contemplate his own neglectful acts or mistakes; rather, he focuses solely on
KeyBank’s purported failures. Consequently, we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion when it denied Troutman’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from
judgment.
Accordingly — and in the absence of any authority cited to the
contrary — we overrule his second and fourth assignments of error and affirm the
trial court’s decision.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE
LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR