Supreme Court of Florida
No. SC2024-0380
COREY B. JOHNSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
July 16, 2026
FRANCIS, J.
Does a trial court violate a juvenile’s Eighth Amendment right
against cruel and unusual punishment when it sentences him to
two concurrent life terms for attempted murder, to run
consecutively to a life sentence for murder?
The Fourth District Court of Appeal said no in Johnson v.
State, 384 So. 3d 213 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024), certifying conflict
between its decision and that of the Second District Court of Appeal
in Mack v. State, 313 So. 3d 694 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020), which reached the opposite conclusion. 1
We find no violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. We approve the result in Johnson, disapprove the
reasoning in Mack, and uphold the sentences at issue in this case.
I.
In 2017, then seventeen-year-old Corey B. Johnson converted
to Islam and began planning a “Qital” (meaning “war”) 2 with the
intention to kill someone. On the day of his planned attack in
March 2018, Johnson purchased a six-inch utility knife from
Publix. He then attended a birthday dinner with his best friend
Kyle, Kyle’s mother, Kyle’s brother, and Jovanni, Kyle’s brother’s
friend. After dinner, Johnson and Jovanni joined Kyle and his
family at their home for a sleepover.
Once everyone was asleep, Johnson began his attack, starting
with Jovanni whom he thought easiest to kill given where he was
sleeping. Jovanni’s screaming woke up Kyle’s mother, who ran in
1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
2. “A litany of digital media later extracted from the defendant’s phone included videos of beheadings, other acts of torture, and general ISIS propaganda.” Johnson, 384 So. 3d at 215 n.1.
-2-and saw Johnson standing over Jovanni’s body holding a knife,
covered in blood. She tried grabbing the knife from Johnson, but
he stabbed her in the neck and chest, cut both of her wrists, and
sliced her Achilles tendon. He also lacerated her forehead, chin,
neck, chest, left wrist, and right elbow.
The ongoing attack woke up Kyle’s brother, whom Johnson
stabbed thirty times to prevent him from calling the police.
Johnson finally entered Kyle’s bedroom and explained he had killed
Jovanni and Kyle’s brother but assured Kyle that he would not hurt
him because of their friendship.
Kyle’s mother, in the meantime, was able to escape next door,
and a neighbor called 911. Kyle’s brother also escaped, but
Jovanni succumbed to his injuries and died before police arrived.
Once on the scene, police officers watched Johnson enter a closet
holding a knife. Eventually, a SWAT team used tear gas to force
him out and he surrendered while repeating “Allah” and “Akbar.”3
The State charged Johnson with one count of first-degree
3. As opposed to the correct phraseology, “Allahu Akbar,” which is Arabic for “[G]od is most great.” Johnson, 384 So. 3d at 215 n.2.
-3-murder (count 1) and two counts of attempted first-degree murder
(counts 2 & 3). The jury found him guilty of all charges. Johnson,
384 So. 3d at 215.
Because he was seventeen when he committed these crimes,
Johnson was sentenced as a juvenile. Florida forbids mandatory
life-without-parole (LWOP) sentences for juvenile homicide
offenders. §§ 775.082(1)(b)1., 782.04, Fla. Stat. (2017). So, the
trial court conducted a separate hearing to determine the
appropriateness of imposing LWOP and to consider all the statutory
mitigating factors. See § 921.1401(1), (2), Fla. Stat. (2017).
Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Johnson to LWOP for each
count, ordering his two life sentences for attempted first-degree
murder to run concurrently with each other, but consecutively to
his life sentence for first-degree murder. Johnson, 384 So. 3d at
216. And consistent with section 775.082(1)(b)3., Florida Statutes,
the court orally announced that Johnson would be eligible for
judicial review after serving 25 years on count 1, and again after
serving 25 years on his consecutive life sentences for counts 2 and
3. Id.
Johnson challenged this sentencing structure through a
-4-Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(1) motion pending
direct appeal, arguing in part that his consecutive LWOP sentences
violated the Eighth Amendment under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48 (2010), because they precluded his early release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. The trial court denied
that portion of the motion, and Johnson appealed the decision to
the Fourth District.
On direct appeal, Johnson contended that his consecutive life
sentences violated the Eighth Amendment because they precluded
his release from incarceration after his first twenty-five-year judicial
review. Johnson, 384 So. 3d at 216. The State countered that the
consecutive sentences are constitutional because Johnson received
individualized sentencing proceedings and will receive judicial
review for each life sentence. Id.
The Fourth District agreed with the State, holding that “a
defendant sentenced to [LWOP] for one homicide offense,
consecutively followed by two concurrent [LWOP] sentences for
related nonhomicide offenses, is constitutional because the
defendant has an opportunity for ‘meaningful review.’ ” Id. The
Fourth District explained that the prohibition in Graham was “not
-5-against the life sentence itself, but rather against ‘making the
judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to
reenter society’ for committing a nonhomicide offense.” Id. at 218
(quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75). In this context, “[t]he
Constitution requires ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ and
[that] the sentence serve a penological purpose.” Id. (quoting
Graham, 560 U.S. at 75).
The Fourth District concluded that Johnson will have “[a]
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on his
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” because he “will have a
meaningful review of his first life sentence after [25] years and a
second meaningful review of his consecutive life sentences [25]
years later.” Id. at 218-19. Since Johnson “could . . . be released
after [serving] fifty years,” the Fourth District concluded that “[h]is
sentence d[id] not violate the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 219.
In so ruling, the Fourth District certified that its decision
directly conflicts with the Second District’s decision in Mack.
In Mack, a juvenile offender was convicted in 1980 of firstdegree murder, burglary with an assault, and sexual battery, all
-6-committed within the same criminal episode. 313 So. 3d at 695.
The trial court sentenced Mack to concurrent life sentences on the
murder and burglary convictions, and to a consecutive life sentence
on the sexual battery conviction. Id.
Thirty-six years later, Mack filed a rule 3.800(a) motion
alleging his sentences violated the Eighth Amendment as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Graham and Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460 (2012). Mack, 313 So. 3d at 695. The postconviction
court granted the motion but, following a new sentencing hearing
under section 921.1401, reimposed the same sentences for Mack’s
convictions. Id. Based on this resentencing, under sections
921.1402(2)(a) and 775.082(1)(b), Mack was entitled to sentencing
review after serving 25 years of his murder sentence. Id. Further,
under sections 775.082(3)(c) and 921.1402(2)(d), he was entitled to
review after serving 20 years of his burglary and sexual battery
sentences, respectively. Id. And if he wasn’t resentenced as to
convictions in his initial review proceedings, he was entitled to
review ten years thereafter. Id.
Mack appealed the new sentencing order and also filed a rule
3.800(b) motion to correct the sentence. Id. Specifically, he
-7-contended that the sentencing scheme precluded his release based
on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation in any review of his
murder and burglary sentences, because even if he were found
entitled to release from incarceration from those sentences, he had
to first begin serving his consecutive life sentence for the sexual
battery. Id. at 695-96. Review of that sentence wouldn’t occur for
another 20 years. Id. at 696.
Mack further argued that it was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment to have consecutive life sentences imposed for the
sexual battery offense that was committed in the same episode as
the other two crimes. Id.
The Second District agreed for two reasons. First, based on
this Court’s plurality opinion in Purdy v. State, 252 So. 3d 723 (Fla.
2018), “when conducting the first review of Mack’s murder and
burglary sentences a court would have no statutory authority to
consider all three of his sentences in the aggregate.” Mack, 313 So.
3d at 696 (citing Purdy, 252 So. 3d at 728-29). Thus, as to the
consecutive sentence for sexual battery, the Second District
reasoned that the mandated opportunity for release in another 20
years would be wholly illusory. Id. At best, even if a reviewing
-8-court modified his life sentences for murder and burglary so they
were immediately completed, the Second District reasoned that the
consecutive life sentence for sexual battery would render Mack
ineligible to seek release from incarceration for another two
decades. Id. Consequently, review of the murder and burglary
sentences could not satisfy Graham’s requirement that Mack be
afforded a meaningful opportunity to obtain release by
demonstrating his maturity and rehabilitation. Id.
Second, citing Justice Pariente’s dissent in Purdy, that “a
‘sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its
nature disproportionate to the offense,’ ” the Second District
reasoned that Mack’s consecutive life sentence for an offense
arising from the same criminal episode as the others advanced no
penological purpose. Id. (quoting Purdy, 252 So. 3d at 731
(Pariente, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted)).
As a practical matter, the Second District reasoned, “its only
effect [was] to eliminate any meaningful opportunity for [Mack] to
gain release from incarceration under the murder and burglary
sentences.” Id. So, the consecutive life sentence for the sexual
battery conviction violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. Based on
-9-those conclusions, the Second District “reverse[d] the sentence on
the sexual battery conviction and remand[ed] to the [sentencing]
court with instructions to reimpose it to run concurrently with the
sentences on the other two offenses.” Id.
II.
For the reasons explained below, we hold that the structure of
Johnson’s consecutive life sentences does not violate the Eighth
Amendment because, as a juvenile homicide offender, Johnson is
not constitutionally entitled to a meaningful opportunity for release
for his nonhomicide offenses under Graham; rather, Johnson’s
individualized sentencing only had to be consistent with Miller and
Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98 (2021). And because it was, we
approve the result in Johnson and disapprove the reasoning in
Mack.
A.
Florida construes the State’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment in conformity with decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. Art. I, § 17, Fla. Const. Because “the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is both
the floor and the ceiling for protection from cruel and unusual
- 10 -punishment in Florida,” Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785, 794 (Fla.
2023), a discussion of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence is necessary.
Here, the relevant cases from the United States Supreme
Court are Graham, Miller, and Jones.
In Graham, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Amendment categorically forbids a sentence of LWOP for
juvenile nonhomicide offenders. 560 U.S. at 74 (“This Court now
holds that for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the
Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole.”).
Instead, the Graham Court explained that “a juvenile nonhomicide
offender must be given ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ before
the end of that offender’s sentence and during the offender’s natural
life.” Id. at 75.
Just two years later, the United States Supreme Court
expanded Graham’s reach in Miller, by holding that the Eighth
Amendment also prohibits mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile
homicide offenders. 567 U.S. at 479 (“We therefore hold that the
Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life
- 11 -in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” (citing
Graham, 560 U.S. at 75)).
While mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide
offenders are no longer constitutionally permissible, Miller left intact
discretionary LWOP sentences as long as the “sentencer follow[s] a
certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant
characteristics—before imposing” an LWOP sentence. Id. at 483.
Emphasizing that discretionary rather than mandatory
sentencing schemes was the point in Miller, in Jones, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the argument that “Miller requires
more than just a discretionary sentencing procedure.” Id. at 106.
Rather, explained the Court, “[u]nder Miller . . . , an individual who
commits a homicide when he or she is under 18 may be sentenced
to life without parole . . . if the sentence is not mandatory and the
sentencer therefore has discretion to impose a lesser punishment.”
Id. at 100. The Court reiterated that “Miller mandated ‘only that a
sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth
and attendant characteristics—before imposing’ a life-withoutparole sentence.” Id. at 106 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 483).
In response to Graham and Miller, the Florida Legislature
- 12 -created procedures for evaluating whether a juvenile could be
sentenced to LWOP, and a review process for juveniles to
demonstrate their rehabilitation and fitness for release. See ch.
2014-220, §§ 2-3, Laws of Fla. (creating §§ 921.1401-.1402, Fla.
Stat.).
B.
Despite Johnson’s claim to the contrary, his sentences do not
violate the Eighth Amendment. To be sure, Johnson argues that
his “consecutive life sentences for offenses he committed in a single
criminal episode violate the Eighth Amendment because they
preclude his release from prison based on demonstrated maturity
and rehabilitation in any review of his murder sentence.” But by its
express terms, Graham does not apply to his case. See 560 U.S. at
63 (“Juvenile offenders who committed both homicide and
nonhomicide crimes present a different situation for a sentencing
judge than juvenile offenders who committed no homicide. . . . The
instant case concerns only those juvenile offenders sentenced to life
without parole solely for a nonhomicide offense.”); see also Miller,
567 U.S. at 473 (“Graham’s flat ban on [LWOP] applied only to
nonhomicide crimes, and the Court took care to distinguish those
- 13 -offenses from murder, based on both moral culpability and
consequential harm.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). That
lands Johnson’s case squarely in the Miller and Jones category. 4,5
As a juvenile homicide offender, Johnson is entitled only to the
4. See also Veal v. State, 810 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ga. 2018) (supporting this reading of Graham and Miller, whereby the Georgia Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s claim that consecutive life sentences for nonhomicide offenses—in conjunction with a life sentence for a homicide offense—resulted in an “unconstitutional aggregate sentence” in violation of Graham); accord Arredondo v. State, 406 S.W.3d 300, 306 (Tex. App. 2013) (“In sum, Graham prevented the imposition of life without parole for juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide offenses. Miller prevented the mandatory imposition of life without parole for juvenile offenders but specifically allowed a discretionary sentence of life without parole when the circumstances justify it. Therefore, even assuming for purposes of argument that two consecutive life sentences amount to a sentence of ‘life without parole,’ we conclude nothing prevents such a discretionary sentence when, as here, appellant has been found guilty of both a homicide offense and nonhomicide offenses in a particularly heinous crime.”). But see Budder v. Addison, 851 F.3d 1047, 1059 (10th Cir. 2017) (applying Graham to vacate a defendant’s three consecutive life sentences for nonhomicide offenses where he would have been required to serve 131.75 years in prison before being eligible for parole because he was a “juvenile” and “did not commit homicide”).
5. Johnson also argues that the Fourth District was incorrect for concluding that his judicial review after serving at least fifty years in prison constitutes a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on his demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. At this stage of review, we need not address this argument because we hold that Johnson, as a juvenile homicide offender, is not entitled to a meaningful opportunity for release under Graham at all.
- 14 -constitutional protections afforded under those cases whereby the
sentencing court must consider the “offender’s youth and attendant
characteristics.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 483. That’s exactly what
happened here when prior to exercising its discretion to sentence
Johnson to LWOP, the trial court held a separate sentencing
hearing and considered “each and every factor” required by section
921.1401(2), including Johnson’s “youth and attendant
circumstances,” “the effect of immaturity or the failure to appreciate
the risk and consequences,” and the “possibility of rehabilitating
the defendant.” See § 921.1401(1)-(2)(e), (j), Fla. Stat. (providing
that a sentencing court may “conduct a separate sentencing
hearing” to determine “whether life imprisonment” is “an
appropriate sentence”).
Thus, Johnson was afforded all the protections to which he
was entitled under Miller and Jones. The structure of his
consecutive sentences, therefore, comport with constitutional
requirements.
III.
In sum, we hold that Graham’s opportunity-for-meaningfulreview requirement does not apply to juveniles who commit
- 15 -homicide offenses. 6 Instead, Miller and Jones control. And because
the trial court here complied with those precedents by utilizing
section 921.1401’s discretionary, individualized process, Johnson’s
resulting sentences do not run afoul of the Eighth Amendment.
Accordingly, we approve the result reached by the Fourth District in
Johnson, and disapprove the reasoning in Mack.
It is so ordered.
COURIEL, C.J., and LABARGA, MUÑIZ, GROSSHANS, and
SASSO, JJ., concur.
TANENBAUM, J., did not participate.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal
Constitutional Construction & Direct Conflict of Decisions
Fourth District - Case No. 4D2022-0876
(Palm Beach County)
Daniel Eisinger, Public Defender, and Benjamin Eisenberg, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm
6. Since the Fourth District decided Johnson, the First District Court of Appeal has also ruled that a life sentence for a homicide offense, followed by consecutive sentences for nonhomicide offenses, does not violate the Eighth Amendment because “Graham’s ‘meaningful opportunity for release’ parameter does not apply to juvenile offenders who commit homicide offenses.” Bonifay v. State, 413 So. 3d 892, 896 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025). We also agree with Bonifay’s reasoning.
- 16 -Beach, Florida,
for Petitioner
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, David M.S. Dewhirst, Solicitor General, Jeffrey Paul DeSousa, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Nathan A. Forrester, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, and Allen L. Huang, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Respondent
- 17 -