Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 20-AA-0759
ALICIA ECKENRODE, PETITIONER,
V.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA POLICE AND FIREFIGHTERS RETIREMENT
AND RELIEF BOARD, RESPONDENT.
Petition for Review from the District of Columbia Police
and Firefighters Retirement and Relief Board
(PD20-1111)
(Argued March 9, 2023 Decided July 16, 2026)
Paul A. Fenn for petitioner.
Alexandra Lichtenstein, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent. Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia at the time, Loren L. AliKhan, Solicitor General at the time, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Graham E. Phillips, Deputy Solicitor General, Megan D. Browder, Assistant Attorney General at the time, and Marcella Coburn, Assistant Attorney General, were on the briefs for respondent.
Before EASTERLY and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and RUIZ, Senior Judge.
Opinion for the court PER CURIAM.
Dissenting opinion by Senior Judge RUIZ at page 26.
2
PER CURIAM: Petitioner Alicia Eckenrode seeks review of the denial of her
request for enhanced survivor benefits after the death of her husband, who was a
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Sergeant. We hold that we lack jurisdiction,
and we therefore dismiss the petition for review.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Except as noted, the following appears to be undisputed. Sergeant Eckenrode
was an MPD officer for over twenty years. In 2006, he injured his left knee while on
duty. He underwent two knee surgeries as a result of that injury. In 2019, his left
knee buckled while on duty. He underwent a third knee surgery in September 2019.
Shortly thereafter, he felt pain in his left leg that was diagnosed as having been
caused by deep vein thrombosis, i.e., a blood clot in a vein in his leg. Deep vein
thrombosis can be caused by leg surgery.
Sergeant Eckenrode received treatment, and he was informed in January 2020
that his deep vein thrombosis had resolved. In March 2020, Sergeant Eckenrode felt
pain in his right calf. That pain was diagnosed as being caused by a slight muscle
tear. The pain was gone by April 1, 2020.
3
On April 6, 2020, Sergeant Eckenrode, while on duty, suddenly was short of
breath and felt chest pain. He was taken to the hospital, where he passed away
approximately three hours later.
The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner conducted an autopsy and
determined that Sergeant Eckenrode’s death was caused by a pulmonary embolus,
i.e., a blood clot in the lungs, due to deep vein thrombosis. Pulmonary embolism is
a rare complication of deep vein thrombosis. The autopsy listed hypertensive
cardiovascular disease (i.e., chronic high blood pressure) and hepatic steatosis (i.e.,
fatty liver disease) as “other significant conditions.” The autopsy stated that the
manner of death was “NATURAL.”
The director of the Police and Fire Clinic concluded that Sergeant
Eckenrode’s death was in the line of duty.
Respondent, the District of Columbia Police and Firefighters Retirement and
Relief Board (Board), awarded Ms. Eckenrode a survivor annuity pursuant to D.C.
Code § 5-716(b) (providing for annuity of 40% of officer’s pay). MPD then asked
the Board to determine whether Ms. Eckenrode was instead entitled to enhanced
survivor benefits pursuant to D.C. Code § 5-716(a). Such benefits are given to an
eligible surviving spouse if an officer “dies in the performance of duty” and the death
“was the sole and direct result of a personal injury sustained while performing such
4
duty.” D.C. Code § 5-716(a)(1)(A). Enhanced survivor benefits consist of a $50,000
lump-sum payment and an annuity equal to the full amount of the officer’s pay at
the time of death. D.C. Code § 5-716(a)(2), (a-1). To be eligible for enhanced
survivor benefits, the surviving spouse must have received more than half of the
survivor’s support from the officer. D.C. Code § 5-716(a)(2).
After obtaining additional medical records, the Board issued an order
determining that Ms. Eckenrode was not entitled to enhanced survivor benefits. The
Board concluded that there was insufficient evidence that Sergeant Eckenrode’s
death was the sole and direct result of his knee injury. In support of that conclusion,
the Board reasoned, among other things, that (1) death is a “sole and direct result”
of an injury only if there are no “intervening factors”; (2) although a doctor at the
Police and Fire Clinic opined that Sergeant Eckenrode’s death was more likely than
not a complication of Sergeant Eckenrode’s knee injury, the Board determined that
the autopsy report and the conclusions of the deputy medical examiner who
conducted the autopsy were “particularly important”; and (3) the deputy medical
examiner did not believe that Sergeant Eckenrode’s death was the sole and direct
result of the knee injury because there were several other contributing factors—heart
disease, “fatty liver,” and that Sergeant Eckenrode was fairly sedentary after his most
recent knee surgery.
5
Ms. Eckenrode sought reconsideration and provided additional medical
records. The Board denied reconsideration.
II. Analysis
Ms. Eckenrode seeks direct review in this court of the Board’s denial of
enhanced survivor’s benefits. We hold that we lack jurisdiction.
Under the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, this court has
direct jurisdiction to review agency action only in a “contested case.” D.C. Code
§ 2-510(a). A proceeding is a contested case if a party to the proceeding is entitled
by law to an administrative “adjudicative, trial-type hearing to determine the party’s
legal rights, duties, or privileges.” Farrell v. D.C. Police & Firefighters Ret. & Relief
Bd., 151 A.3d 490, 492 (D.C. 2017) (citation modified); see also D.C. Code
§ 2-502(8) (generally defining “contested case” as “a proceeding before the Mayor
or any agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are
required by any law . . . or by constitutional right, to be determined after a hearing
before the Mayor or before an agency”). If an administrative decision is not
reviewable directly in this court, then review, unless precluded altogether, is
available in the first instance in the Superior Court. See, e.g., Nunnally v. D.C. Metro.
Police Dep’t, 80 A.3d 1004, 1008 (D.C. 2013) (“[I]f a claim falls outside of the
definition of a contested case, any party aggrieved by an agency’s decision may
6
initiate an appropriate equitable action in the Superior Court to seek redress.”)
(citation modified).
“[A] trial-type hearing is one that incorporates due-process protections such
as representation by counsel, cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and
fact-finding by an impartial adjudicator.” Mathis v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 124 A.3d
1089, 1099 (D.C. 2015) (citation modified). “The right to obtain pre-hearing
discovery, and to make opening and closing arguments[,] are other accoutrements of
a trial-type hearing.” Id. (citation modified).
Although survivor-benefit proceedings before the Board are adjudicative, we
have already held that persons seeking survivor benefits do not have a statutory or
regulatory right to a trial-type hearing before the Board. Farrell, 151 A.3d at 492-96.
Whether we have jurisdiction to directly review the Board’s decision in this case
thus turns on whether Ms. Eckenrode has a constitutional right to a trial-type hearing
before the Board. We hold that she does not.
Ms. Eckenrode argues that (1) she has a protected property interest in
receiving enhanced survivor benefits, (2) she therefore has a constitutional right to
due process with respect to the Board’s determination of her claim, and (3) due
process entitles her to a trial-type hearing before the Board. The Board appropriately
does not dispute that Ms. Eckenrode has a protected property interest in the enhanced
7
survivor benefits that she seeks and that she therefore is constitutionally entitled to
due process before the Board. See, e.g., Baltimore v. District of Columbia, 10 A.3d
1141, 1154 (D.C. 2011) (“To have a [constitutionally protected] property interest in
a government benefit, a person clearly must . . . have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it. Entitlements derive from an independent source such as state law,
i.e., statutes or regulations that secure certain benefits and that support claims or
entitlements to those benefits.”) (citation modified); D.C. Code § 5-716(a) & (a-1)
(providing that survivor “shall” receive enhanced survivor benefits if statutory
requirements are met); cf. Jackson v. D.C. Police & Firefighters Ret. & Relief Bd.,
717 A.2d 904, 906-07 (D.C. 1998) (for purposes of interpreting separation
agreement, finding that survivor had property interest in annuity because survivor
was “automatically . . . entitled to annuity benefits” “upon the happening of a
contingency”).
We thus must decide whether Ms. Eckenrode was constitutionally entitled to
a trial-type hearing before the Board decided her claim of entitlement to enhanced
survivor benefits. See generally, e.g., Richard Milburn Pub. Charter Alt. High Sch.
v. Cafritz, 798 A.2d 531, 541 (D.C. 2002) (“[I]f [constitutionally] protected interests
are at issue, we must then determine what procedures are required to satisfy due
process.”). “Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). To
8
determine what procedural protections are constitutionally required we must
balance:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
“The ordinary principle, established by Supreme Court decisions, [is] that
something less than a trial-type hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative
action.” Donnelly Assocs. v. D.C. Hist. Pres. Rev. Bd., 520 A.2d 270, 279 (D.C.
1987) (citation modified; quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343); see also, e.g., Rones
v. D.C. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., 500 A.2d 998, 1001 (D.C. 1985) (“A trial-type
hearing is rarely required prior to the termination of governmental benefits. All that
is required is the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner.”) (citation
modified). “The burden is on petitioner to persuade us to depart from” that ordinary
principle. Donnelly, 520 A.2d at 279. We conclude that Ms. Eckenrode has failed to
demonstrate that she had a constitutional right to a trial-type hearing before the
Board ruled as to whether she was entitled to enhanced survivor benefits.
9
A. The Private Interest
As a threshold matter, we note that in assessing the private interest for
purposes of determining what process is constitutionally due, we must focus
generally on the class of people as to whom such determinations would be made, not
on a given claimant. See, e.g., Donnelly, 520 A.2d at 282 (“The Mathews v. Eldridge
test . . . is applied to the generality of cases; the fundamental fairness of a particular
procedure does not turn on the result obtained in any individual case.”) (citation
modified). We therefore consider the private interest of the general class of persons
seeking enhanced survivor benefits, not the private interest of Ms. Eckenrode in
particular given her circumstances. See id.
Persons seeking an enhanced survivor benefit will have already received an
annuity of forty percent of their spouse’s salary, although the precise way of
calculating the relevant salary varies. D.C. Code § 5-716(b). At issue will be whether
they are entitled instead to a lump sum of $50,000 and full replacement of their
spouse’s salary. D.C. Code § 5-716(a)(2), (a-1). The interest in obtaining enhanced
survivor benefits thus is substantial. We conclude, however, that Ms. Eckenrode has
not demonstrated that it is the type of interest that constitutionally requires a
predetermination trial-type hearing.
10
“In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), has the [Supreme]
Court required a full adversarial evidentiary hearing prior to adverse governmental
action.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545 (1985). Goldberg
involved a decision to cut off public-assistance benefits. 397 U.S. at 255. In holding
that a pretermination evidentiary hearing was required, the Supreme Court
emphasized that, “For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain
essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care.” Id. at 264. The Court explained
that the “crucial factor in this context” was that “termination of aid pending
resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the
very means by which to live while [the recipient] waits.” Id. As the Court further
explained, that factor is “not present in the case of the blacklisted government
contractor, the discharged government employee, the taxpayer denied a tax
exemption, or virtually anyone else whose governmental entitlements are ended.”
Id.
This court has also only once held that due process required a
predetermination trial-type hearing. Powell v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 818 A.2d 188 (D.C.
2003). Powell involved termination of housing subsidies under a public housing
program “designed to assist lower income families in obtaining the necessities of
life.” Id. at 194. We concluded that permanent termination from the program based
on an allegation of fraud required a pretermination trial-type hearing. Id. at 194-96.
11
No showing has been made in this case that the Board’s decision to deny
applications for enhanced survivor benefits typically would present a risk that
applicants would be unable to obtain the necessities of life during the pendency of a
post-determination challenge to the denial. To the contrary, eligibility for enhanced
survivor benefits is not limited to persons whose access to the necessities of life is
at stake. An applicant with substantial assets (such as equity in a home or investment
principal) would apparently be eligible, as long as the applicant received more than
half of the applicant’s “support” from the officer. D.C. Code § 5-716(a)(2), (a-1);
cf., e.g., In re Marriage of Pearlstein, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 910, 919 (Ct. App. 2006)
(distinguishing between “support payments,” which “usually are paid from present
earnings,” and assets such as equity in home or investment principal). Moreover,
eligibility does not depend on whether the officer’s “support” was based solely on
the officer’s salary. D.C. Code § 5-716(a)(2) (referring generally to amount of
support from officer, with no limitation as to source of support). Thus, an officer’s
support could be based in part on other sources of income that would survive the
officer’s death (e.g., income from a rental property). In other words, an applicant
could theoretically be eligible even if the officer’s salary contributed less than half
of the overall support the officer had provided to the applicant.
On the other hand, the worst-case scenario would be an applicant who had no
assets and no income other than the officer’s salary. In such a case, a standard
12
forty-percent annuity would be a very substantial reduction in household income. It
is certainly at least possible that in some instances such a reduction could create
concerns about an applicant’s ability to maintain access to the necessities of life
while awaiting resolution of a judicial challenge to the Board’s determination. As
previously noted, however, we must assess the nature of the private interest at stake
by considering “the generality of cases,” not a worst-case scenario. Donnelly, 520
A.2d at 282.
We do not minimize the significance of enhanced survivor benefits to
surviving spouses. We also acknowledge this court’s statement in dicta that
although “full procedural protections” have been constitutionally required before
“adverse administrative action” that deprives people of “the very means by which
to live, . . . we do not say that [such] extreme adverse consequences must always be
present.” Donnelly, 520 A.2d at 282 (citation modified). We therefore turn to the
decisions of the Supreme Court, this court, and other courts addressing the private
interest of persons who seem comparably situated to applicants for enhanced
survivor benefits. Those decisions consistently hold that the private interests at issue
did not suffice to confer a constitutional right to a predetermination trial-type
hearing.
13
For example, in Mathews, the Supreme Court held that a person whose
social-security disability benefits were terminated did not have a right to a
pretermination evidentiary hearing. 424 U.S. at 349. In assessing the private interest
at issue, the Supreme Court explained that eligibility for social-security disability
benefits is “not based upon financial need” and instead
is wholly unrelated to the worker’s income or support from
many other sources, such as earnings of other family
members, [workers’] compensation awards, tort claims
awards, savings, private insurance, public or private
pensions, veterans’ benefits, food stamps, public
assistance, or the many other important programs, both
public and private, which contain provisions for disability
payments affecting a substantial portion of the work force.
Id. at 341 (citation modified).
The Court in Mathews therefore concluded that the potential deprivation as a
result of the termination of social-security disability benefits was “generally likely
to be less than” the loss of welfare benefits in Goldberg. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341.
The Court acknowledged that persons are eligible for social-security disability
benefits only if they are “unable to engage in substantial gainful activity.” Id.
(citation modified). Thus, even temporary loss of disability benefits could impose
significant “hardship . . . upon the erroneously terminated disability recipient.” Id.
at 342. The Court emphasized, however, both the possibility of “access to private
resources” and the availability of alternate forms of government assistance if “the
termination of disability benefits places a worker or his family below the subsistence
14
level.” Id. The Court concluded, “In view of these potential sources of temporary
income, there is less reason here than in Goldberg to depart from the ordinary
principle, established by our decisions, that something less than an evidentiary
hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.” Id. at 343.
The disability benefit at issue in Mathews differs in several respects from the
enhanced survivor benefits at issue in the present case. For example, unlike
social-security disability benefits, eligibility for enhanced survivor benefits is not
wholly unrelated to income, given the requirement that the applicant have received
more than half of the applicant’s support from the officer. D.C. Code § 5-716(a)(2).
On the other hand, to be eligible for social-security disability benefits, the claimant
must be unable to supplement income through “substantial gainful activity,”
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341 (citation modified), whereas there is no requirement that
an applicant for enhanced survivor benefits be unable to supplement the lost income
from the officer by increasing the applicant’s income through other means.
Moreover, for reasons already noted, Ms. Eckenrode has failed to show that the
Board’s denial of enhanced survivor benefits is likely to deprive applicants of the
necessities of life pending review of the Board’s decision. On balance, we conclude
that the reasoning and holding of Mathews point strongly against the claim that
applicants for enhanced survivor benefits have a constitutional right to a trial-type
hearing before the Board decides on their applications.
15
Other Supreme Court cases and cases from this court also point against the
conclusion that applicants for enhanced survivor benefits have a private interest of
the kind that constitutionally requires a predetermination trial-type hearing. See
Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 333 (1985) (holding
that veterans applying for service-connected death or disability benefits do not have
due-process right to be represented by counsel; veterans’ interests are “more akin to
the Social Security benefits involved in Mathews than they are to the welfare
payments upon which the recipients in Goldberg depended for their daily
subsistence”); Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545 (holding that full evidentiary hearing not
required before government employee is terminated; distinguishing Goldberg);
Walker v. D.C. Off. of Emp. Appeals, 310 A.3d 597, 604 (D.C. 2024) (same; “While
termination of employment undeniably has a profound effect on someone’s life, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Goldberg was focused on the distinct and dire situation
that someone reliant on public benefits, by definition low-income and often already
without employment, would face if those benefits were unjustly terminated, and the
Court specifically distinguished this scenario from that of the discharged
government employee . . . .”) (citation modified); District of Columbia v. Jones, 442
A.2d 512, 523 (D.C. 1982) (holding that police officer injured in line of duty was
not constitutionally entitled to call witnesses and to cross-examine government
witnesses with respect to determination of claim for paid sick leave).
16
Cases from other jurisdictions overwhelmingly support the conclusion that
applicants for enhanced survivor benefits do not have a private interest of the kind
that constitutionally requires a predetermination trial-type hearing. Most directly on
point are decisions involving police or firefighter disability determinations. See, e.g.,
McDarby v. Dinkins, 907 F.2d 1334, 1337-39 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that police
officer seeking enhanced accident-disability benefits did not have constitutional
due-process right to predetermination trial-type hearing; citing cases); Rosenthal v.
Bd. of Trs. of N.Y.C. Police Pension Fund, 999 F. Supp. 498, 504-06 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (holding that police officer seeking enhanced disability benefits was not
constitutionally entitled to predetermination trial-type hearing; although officer had
“a property interest in receiving a higher monetary pension, this interest is far less
compelling than that of an individual denied by government action the very means
by which to live”) (citation modified).
Many courts have reached the same conclusion with respect to other
administrative decisions that cause loss of income or denial of government benefits
intended to compensate for loss of income. See, e.g., Pagan v. Carey Wiping
Materials Corp., 73 A.3d 784, 790-91 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (holding that workers’
compensation benefits could be terminated without predetermination evidentiary
hearing; “Although there is little possibility that an injured worker will be able to
find even temporary employment to ameliorate the interim loss, a claimant may have
17
other resources to sustain [the claimant] during the post-termination period or may
qualify for public assistance.”) (citation modified); Sauceda v. Dep’t of Lab. &
Indus., 917 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that worker’s compensation
benefits could be suspended without pre-suspension evidentiary hearing;
“[A]ppellants’ desire for uninterrupted disability payments pending final
administrative decision on their cases[] does not require an evidentiary hearing prior
to suspension. While this interest may, in some cases, be significant, disability
claimants do not necessarily live on the very margin of subsistence.”) (citation
modified); Campo v. N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1988)
(holding that spouse of government employee did not have due-process right to
agency evidentiary hearing relating to employee’s retirement benefits, given that
spouse had right of judicial review); Basciano v. Herkimer, 605 F.2d 605, 609-11
(2d Cir. 1978) (holding that public employee seeking accident-disability retirement
benefit did not have constitutional due-process right to predetermination trial-type
hearing; “While [the employee] had a substantial interest in the outcome of the
proceeding, his interest was less compelling than that of an individual denied by
government action the very means by which to live . . . .”) (citation modified);
Graves v. Meystrik, 425 F. Supp. 40, 48 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (holding that
unemployment-compensation claim could be denied without predetermination
evidentiary hearing; “Neither the termination of disability benefits in Mathews nor
18
the termination of unemployment benefits in the case at bar would deprive a claimant
of the very means by which to live while [the claimant] waits for a post-termination
evidentiary hearing. Here, as in the case of disability benefits, there is a possibility
of access to private resources[,] and[] other forms of government assistance will
become available where the termination of disability benefits places a worker or [the
worker’s] family below the subsistence level. Further, eligibility for welfare benefits
is based on financial need, but eligibility for unemployment benefits [is] not. An
individual could have $1,000,000 in a savings account and nonetheless be entitled
to unemployment benefits.”).
In sum, we conclude that the private interest of applicants for enhanced
survivor benefits, although clearly substantial, is not of a nature so as to
constitutionally require a predetermination trial-type hearing before the Board.
B. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation/Additional Procedural Safeguards
To decide on an application for enhanced survivor benefits, the Board must
determine several issues: whether the officer suffered an injury while performing the
officer’s duties, whether the officer’s death “was the sole and direct result of” that
injury, and whether the claimant received more than half of the claimant’s support
from the officer. D.C. Code § 5-716(a), (a-1). We take as a given that a trial-type
hearing would reduce the risk that the Board would resolve those issues incorrectly.
19
In determining whether the absence of a trial-type hearing before the Board creates
a constitutionally unacceptable risk of erroneous deprivation, however, we must
consider the availability of post-determination judicial review. See, e.g., Mathews,
424 U.S. at 349 (in concluding that disability claimant was not entitled to
pretermination trial-type hearing before agency, Court relies in part on availability
of “subsequent judicial review”); Burkhardt v. D.C. Rental Hous. Comm’n, 198 A.3d
183, 192 (D.C. 2018) (in holding that tenants are not entitled to trial-type hearings
before Rent Administrator’s determination of temporary-eviction applications, court
relies on availability of judicial remedies); Campo, 843 F.2d at 100 (in holding that
spouse of government employee did not have due-process right to agency
evidentiary hearing relating to employee’s retirement benefits, court relies in part on
spouse’s right of judicial review); Rosenthal, 999 F. Supp. at 506 (in holding that
police officer seeking enhanced disability benefits was not constitutionally entitled
to predetermination trial-type hearing, court relies in part on availability of
meaningful post-determination judicial review); cf., e.g., Cloutier v. Town of Epping,
714 F.2d 1184, 1192 (1st Cir. 1983) (in context of denial of development permit,
court holds that “prompt, informal proceedings . . . coupled with the judicial review
provided by the state courts satisfied the requirements of the due process clause”).
As noted earlier, supra at 5-6, if applications for enhanced survivor benefits
are not contested cases, then applicants whose claims are denied by the Board have
20
the right to seek judicial review in the Superior Court. See, e.g., Nunnally, 80 A.3d
at 1008. Given the availability of judicial review, we conclude that concerns about
the risk of an erroneous determination do not require that the Board provide a
trial-type proceeding before deciding claims for enhanced survivor benefits. That
was the conclusion of the cases we have just cited in their various contexts, and we
see no adequate basis for reaching a different conclusion in the present case.
In reaching this conclusion, we express no view on two related issues. First,
we have no occasion to decide whether the procedural rights afforded by the Board
are constitutionally adequate in all respects. We decide only that the Due Process
Clause does not compel the Board to provide applicants for enhanced survivor
benefits with a trial-type hearing. Given our conclusion that this is not a contested
case, we lack jurisdiction to address any claim that the procedures before the Board
otherwise fell short of what the Due Process Clause requires. If such a claim is to be
raised, it would need to be presented first to the Superior Court.
Second, we have no occasion to decide what procedural protections applicants
for enhanced survivor benefits are entitled to in Superior Court. For current
purposes, we can assume without deciding that the Due Process Clause entitles
applicants for enhanced survivor benefits to a trial-type hearing as part of
post-determination judicial review in Superior Court. If that is the case, then the
21
Superior Court will necessarily provide such a hearing, which is something that the
Superior Court is obviously well suited to provide given that it is a trial court. “We
therefore can leave for another day,” and in the first instance for another court, “the
question of precisely what protections the Due Process Clause requires in an action”
in Superior Court seeking judicial review of a decision by the Board denying an
application for enhanced survivor benefits. Burkhardt, 198 A.3d at 191.
C. Governmental Interest
Although the Board argues that it would be burdensome to require the Board
to conduct trial-type hearings before deciding applications for enhanced survivor
benefits, we are skeptical of that argument. The Board already provides such
hearings to certain applicants for benefits. See Farrell, 151 A.3d at 493; 7 D.C.M.R.
§ 2505. It appears to be undisputed that the number of applications for enhanced
survivor benefits would likely be rather small. We do not view this factor as favoring
the Board.
D. Balancing
Although we do not believe that a heavy administrative burden would be
imposed if the Board provided trial-type hearings to applicants for enhanced
survivor benefits, we conclude that the Due Process Clause does not require the
22
Board to provide such hearings. Applicants’ interest in obtaining enhanced survivor
benefits, though substantial, is not the kind of immediately critical interest that
constitutionally mandates a predetermination trial-type hearing. Rather, as the cases
we have cited have held, administrative determination of such interests can
permissibly rest on less formal procedures subject to subsequent judicial review,
including post-determination trial-type hearings if those are constitutionally
required. In other words, we hold that this case is governed by “the ordinary
principle . . . that something less than a trial-type hearing is sufficient prior to
adverse administrative action.” Donnelly, 520 A.2d at 279 (citation modified).
We therefore conclude that this is not a contested case and that we lack
jurisdiction to directly review the order of the Board. Ms. Eckenrode instead must
seek review in the Superior Court in the first instance. We note that the Board’s
regulations incorrectly directed Ms. Eckenrode to seek review in this court. 7
D.C.M.R. § 2529.2. The Board therefore appropriately acknowledges that it would
be impermissible for the Board to argue that Ms. Eckenrode is time-barred from
seeking review in Superior Court. See Farrell, 151 A.3d at 496 (noting similar
acknowledgment).
23
E. Response to the Dissenting Opinion
1. The dissenting opinion accurately notes that the availability of
post-determination judicial review was not raised in the Board’s brief. Post at 30
n.1. As the dissenting opinion elsewhere acknowledges, id. at 26, however, we have
a sua sponte duty to determine our jurisdiction. See, e.g., Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r
of Internal Revenue, 596 U.S. 199, 203 (2022) (“Jurisdictional requirements cannot
be waived or forfeited [and] must be raised by courts sua sponte . . . .”).
The dissenting opinion also notes that we have not asked for supplemental
briefing on the significance of post-determination judicial review. Post at 30 n.1. We
see no reason to ask for supplemental briefing on that point. When the point was
raised at oral argument, counsel for Ms. Eckenrode acknowledged that it was her
burden to show that she had a right to a predetermination trial-type hearing, relied
on cases cited in her supplemental brief in support of her argument, did not object
that the point had not been properly raised, and did not request supplemental
briefing.
2. The dissenting opinion takes the view that the Superior Court would be
required by existing law to conduct only limited judicial review of the Board’s
decision. Post at 30-31 & n.2. That suggestion is unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, if the Due Process Clause entitles Ms. Eckenrode to more robust judicial
24
review of the Board’s action, then the non-constitutional principles that the
dissenting opinion relies upon would have to yield to the requirements of the
Constitution. Second, as we have already noted, the Superior Court is obviously well
suited to provide whatever process the Due Process Clause requires, given that it is
a trial court. Third, it is less clear than the dissenting opinion suggests that the
Superior Court’s review of agency decisions must always be limited to the type of
review that is given to agency action in contested cases under the District of
Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, D.C. Code § 2-501 et seq. See, e.g., Am.
Univ. in Dubai v. D.C. Educ. Licensure Comm’n, 930 A.2d 200, 204 (D.C. 2007)
(plaintiff filed declaratory-judgment action one year after agency action and parties
conducted discovery before court granted summary judgment); see generally
District of Columbia v. Sierra Club, 670 A.2d 354, 359 (D.C. 1996) (“The
availability of review by this court of agency decisions in contested cases—those in
which trial-type proceedings are required at the agency level—does not preclude
judicial review in other matters, because any party aggrieved by an agency’s
decision may initiate an appropriate equitable action in the Superior Court to seek
redress.”) (citation modified).
3. The dissenting opinion criticizes the opinion for the court for failing to lay
out precisely what form of post-determination judicial review Ms. Eckenrode is
entitled to in the Superior Court. Post at 30. Our failure to be more specific, however,
25
is dictated by our conclusion that we lack jurisdiction over this case. Given that
conclusion, it is impermissible for us at this time to express views about what Ms.
Eckenrode’s rights are in the Superior Court. See, e.g., Builta v. Guzman, 324 A.3d
269, 293 (D.C. 2024) (“Lacking jurisdiction, we must refrain from addressing the
merits . . . .”). That question would have to be decided in the first instance by the
Superior Court, which would have jurisdiction over the case. Of course, this court
would have appellate jurisdiction to address the question if a party appealed the
ruling of the Superior Court.
4. The dissenting opinion states that enhanced-survivor benefits are
“conditioned on a showing of financial need.” Post at 33-34. We disagree. Eligibility
for enhanced survivor benefits is conditioned on several things, one of which is that
the decedent’s salary constituted more than half of the applicant’s “support.” D.C.
Code § 5-716(a)(2). As we have explained, supra at 11-12, showing a diminution in
support does not necessarily establish financial need.
5. Finally, we note that the dissent does not cite a single case holding that a
claimant seeking comparable government benefits was entitled under the Due
Process Clause to a predetermination trial-type hearing. To the contrary, numerous
decisions have held that claimants seeking similar government benefits intended to
26
address loss of income were not entitled to a predetermination trial-type hearing. See
supra at 13-22.
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Ms. Eckenrode’s petition for review for
lack of jurisdiction.
So ordered.
27
RUIZ, Senior Judge, dissenting: I find myself unable to join the majority
opinion which, in my view, proceeds from a flawed analytical framework that
upends this court’s obligation to determine and exercise its jurisdiction and
misapplies Supreme Court precedent.
This case concerns one of the legal system’s foundational underpinnings,
which is that courts must assure themselves of their jurisdiction. Indeed, subject
matter jurisdiction is so key a requirement that its absence may be raised “at any
stage” of the litigation and cannot be waived by either the conduct or the consent of
the parties. Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 707 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Even if the issue goes unraised by counsel, the Court of Appeals has “an independent
obligation to confirm our own jurisdiction before ruling on the merits of a case.”
D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp. Servs., 308 A.3d 699, 702 (D.C. 2023).
Equally critical is the principle that, once a court determines it has jurisdiction,
it should adjudicate the case in question itself rather than cede it to a court which
lacks such jurisdiction. In the context of administrate review, contested case
jurisdiction lies exclusively with this court. Ne. Neighbors for Responsible Growth,
Inc. v. AppleTree Inst. for Educ. Innovation, Inc., 92 A.3d 1114, 1121 (D.C. 2014).
“It is well-established that [D.C. Code § 2-510] ‘provides for exclusive appellate
review of administrative action in contested cases, and thereby precludes concurrent
28
jurisdiction in the Superior Court.’” Id. at 1122 (quoting Fair Care Found., A.G. v.
D.C. Dep’t of Ins. & Sec. Regul., 716 A.2d 987, 997 (D.C. 1998)).
Accordingly, this court must determine at the outset whether contested case
jurisdiction exists; if it does, we must consider Ms. Eckenrode’s claim, for there is
no other District of Columbia court which is empowered to do so. The majority’s
opinion fails at this critical first step. Although it decides that Ms. Eckenrode is not
entitled to a trial-type hearing before the Board as a matter of due process—the issue
that determines our contested case jurisdiction—the majority effectively defers both
what type of hearing due process requires and its implementation to the Superior
Court. At the second step of the due process analysis, the majority opinion justifies
the lack of a full hearing before the Board by stating that the “availability of judicial
review” in the Superior Court would mitigate the lack of a pre-determination hearing
before the Board. Ante at 20. I can agree with that proposition in theory but, without
specification of the source of the Superior Court’s authority and contours of the
permissible scope of the Superior Court’s review, it does not go as far as the majority
would have it, to deny contested case jurisdiction.
The majority relies on Burkhardt v. District of Columbia Rental Housing
Commission, ante at 19, where we concluded that the Rent Administrator need not
conduct a trial-type hearing before approving temporary eviction applications in
29
light of the settled availability of a judicial trial in Superior Court. Burkhardt, 198
A.3d 183, 191 (D.C. 2018). We could confidently conclude that, as a result, it was
not a contested case and we did not have jurisdiction. But the situation in Burkhardt
was very different because even where temporary eviction applications were
approved by the agency, it was well-established that the tenants “could be physically
evicted” by the landlord “only if the housing provider filed an action for possession
and established in judicial proceedings an entitlement to temporary possession of the
tenants’ units” as our jurisdiction’s bar on self-help evictions guarantees “the
availability of a judicial trial to contest eviction from a rental unit” before the crucial
deprivation (eviction) actually occurred. Id. at 190-91. In other words, existing law
clearly provided for a trial-type hearing in Superior Court separate and apart from
the due process analysis.
That is not the situation here. Unlike in Burkhardt, Ms. Eckenrode does not
have an existing right to full judicial review in Superior Court of the Board’s
determination. The majority “take[s] as a given” that a trial-type hearing “would
reduce the risk that the Board would resolve” Ms. Eckenrode’s case correctly, and
for good reason. Ante at 18. The Board, after being asked to resolve an issue of
medical causation, did not provide Ms. Eckenrode with a forum to effectively
question the written report and cross-examine the Medical Examiner upon which it
relied. Instead, recognizing ambiguities in the report, it sought “clarification” of the
30
report’s conclusion about the cause of Sergeant Eckenrode’s death. It did so through
an ex parte, unrecorded and untranscribed telephone conversation with the Office of
the Chief Medical Examiner and used what it purported to have learned during this
conversation to deny Ms. Eckenrode’s claim. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion,
we cannot gloss over these procedural shortcomings at the Board by asking the
Superior Court to determine the process which Ms. Eckenrode is due and then figure
out how to comply with the demands of due process.
The majority opinion is disturbingly vague about the form that the Superior
Court’s review should take, stating only that if Ms. Eckenrode is entitled to a trialtype hearing, then “the Superior Court will necessarily provide such a hearing” to
her, citing its general equity jurisdiction. Ante at 20-21. 1 But if the Superior Court
determines that a trial-type hearing is required, the majority does not identify the
rule or procedure by which the Superior Court may provide such a hearing itself
separate and apart from the norms we have established for review of administrative
action. Indeed, our case law is to the contrary: when the Superior Court reviews an
1
The government did not make the argument in its brief nor at oral argument that the availability of post-determination judicial review resolved any due process concern and determined the court’s lack of jurisdiction. That suggestion came from the bench during oral argument and government counsel went along, but there was no resolution as to whether and how such judicial review would or could be available in this case. The court did not request supplemental briefing from the parties on this issue.
31
agency determination in a non-contested case, it “must apply the same level of
review that this court uses when reviewing contested cases”—that is to say, it must
review “the administrative record alone and not duplicate agency proceedings or
hear additional evidence.” In re A.T., 10 A.3d 127, 134-35 (D.C. 2010) (citations
omitted). The majority opinion simply says that the Superior Court must do what
due process requires. Ante at 21. If this expansive authority exists, our court’s
jurisprudence appears to have missed it for many years. 2
Instead, any review that the Superior Court conducts should necessarily be
deferential—that is, it is limited to determining whether the Board’s denial was
“arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion or contrary to law.” In re A.T., 10
A.3d at 135 (citations omitted). If the Board failed to follow the demands of due
2
The majority posits that it is “less clear” the Superior Court’s review will necessarily be deferential. Ante at 25. Yet the cases it cites in support of this point are unavailing. Am. Univ. in Dubai v. D.C. Educ. Licensure Comm’n, 930 A.2d 200 (D.C. 2007) concerned a legislative, not an adjudicative, action. Id. at 207. With respect to the nature of the equitable action in Superior Court, we were careful to explain that it was a “complaint . . . to enforce a statutory requirement” and not “a petition for review of a particular agency order.” Id. at 206. District of Columbia v. Sierra Club, 670 A.2d 354 (D.C. 1996), also did not involve a petition for review of an agency adjudication of an individual claim but a complaint for an injunction to compel the District to implement the recycling program created by statute. Id. at 356, 359. Ms. Eckenrode has filed a petition for review of a particular agency order adjudicating her request for an enhanced survivor benefit. This is the type of petition for review we have consistently held is reviewed under the APA’s deferential standards. See, e.g., In re A.T., 10 A.3d at 134-35.
32
process, then the Board’s decision would necessarily be contrary to law. Here lies
the conundrum at the heart of the majority’s analysis. Should the Superior Court
determine that the Board’s decision rested on inadequate factual development and
an unfair process—and that due process requires a trial-type hearing—the Superior
Court, mindful of the constraints on its scope of review of agency action, would, in
the normal course, remand the case to the Board to provide the constitutionally
required hearing. See, e.g., Barry v. Wilson, 448 A.2d 244, 246 (D.C. 1982) (noting
trial court erred where it “essentially retried [the] case and reweighed the evidence,”
and its order “reflects a trial de novo.”). That would mean that this court had
contested case jurisdiction all along, but impermissibly relinquished it to the
Superior Court. However, as this procedural avenue is now precluded by the
majority’s opinion, the Superior Court is left to adjudicate de novo cases that the
statute has committed to the Board’s discretion for decision.
It is our responsibility to determine what due process requires in the first
instance because it is determinative of our jurisdiction. I would not defer this core
issue to the trial court, and would instead conclude that we have jurisdiction over
Ms. Eckenrode’s appeal because due process requires a trial-type hearing before the
Board makes a determination to deny enhanced benefits to the survivor of an officer
who has died in the line of duty from an injury incurred in the performance of that
duty.
33
I. The Mathews three-factor balancing test
The first factor in the Mathews balancing test, the nature and severity of the
private interest involved, is perhaps one as to which reasonable people may have
different views. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). As the majority
opinion notes, we assess this factor by considering the “‘generality of cases[,]’ not a
worst-case scenario.” Ante at 12 (citing Donnelly Assocs. v. D.C. Hist. Pres. Rev.
Bd., 520 A.2d 270, 282 (D.C. 1987)). But that does not mean that Ms. Eckenrode’s
particular case cannot be viewed as illustrative of the financial struggles of the
generality of surviving spouses of police officers. Ms. Eckenrode is a working
mother with three young children. She explained that her household has “always
depended on a 2 [person] salary,” and that the 40% unenhanced survivor annuity the
Board awarded does not even cover their monthly mortgage, much less other basic
expenses. Without at least 85% of Officer Eckenrode’s salary, she “will not be able
to provide for [her] kids.” There is no evidence contradicting these assertions. The
majority cites a number of cases involving disability, social security, pension
benefits, and sick pay for the proposition that they are not comparable to Goldberg
because they do not require a showing of financial need. Ante at 13-17. These cases
are inapt because the enhanced benefit Ms. Eckenrode claims is expressly
conditioned on a showing of financial need: that she was dependent on her deceased
34
spouse for more than half of her support. D.C. Code § 5-716(a)(2). The government
does not dispute that she meets the statutory requirement of financial need.
The numbers support Ms. Eckenrode’s strained finances. The record indicates
Officer Eckenrode’s total pay was $123,111.00. Forty percent of that amount (which
is the amount of his salary that Ms. Eckenrode will receive without the enhanced
annuity) is $49,244.40. This means that when Officer Eckenrode passed away, his
surviving family of four suddenly had a shortfall of $73,866.60 a year less than when
he was alive. Under such circumstances, a recently bereaved family denied a predeprivation hearing may be unable to pay rent, make car payments, or afford school
tuitions and childcare while their appeal is pending. There is no reason in the record
to think that families like Sergeant Eckenrode’s are not representative of the class
which enhanced survivor annuities are meant to benefit—and they are probably
more representative than the majority opinion’s purely hypothetical surviving
spouse with “substantial assets” or “income from a rental property.” Ante at 11. Just
as we cannot assume that members of this class experience the “worst-case”
scenario, ante at 11-12, it is equally inappropriate to assume, without any evidence,
that likely survivors have extra sources of income. Sure, there might be some, but
there is no evidence that the generality of police officers have such comfortable
resources. The evidence that is in the record—Ms. Eckenrode’s actual financial
circumstances—say otherwise.
35
It is true that Ms. Eckenrode will receive a reduced annuity and she might be
able to supplement her family’s income by applying for public assistance if their
circumstances become even more precarious. But we have stated that a claimant
does not have to be utterly destitute for this first factor to weigh in favor of a more
full process. Donnelly, 520 A.2d at 282. This is particularly the case as the Board
makes a one-time permanent determination that defines the level of survivor
benefits, unlike the disability benefits at issue in Mathews and even the welfare
benefits in Goldberg, for which a person can reapply and receive a new
determination as circumstances change. In Powell we considered that the permanent
character of a determination of ineligibility for a housing subsidy tipped the due
process balance and required a trial-type hearing. Powell v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 818
A.2d 188, 194-96 (D.C. 2003).
For these reasons, I believe that the nature of the financial need required to
qualify for an enhanced survivor benefit, coupled with the permanency of the
Board’s adverse determination, cut in favor of a due process entitlement to a more
robust process.
Even if the first factor were a close question, there are two additional Mathews
factors to consider that further weigh in favor of a trial-type hearing: “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation . . . through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
36
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards” and the public interest,
including the burden to the government of providing due process safeguards.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Ms. Eckenrode’s eligibility for the enhanced survivor
benefit she seeks turned on whether Sergeant Eckenrode’s death was the “sole and
direct result” of the injury he incurred in the performance of duty. D.C. Code
§ 5-716(a)(1)(A). Resolution of that question will involve mixed issues of fact and
law that require nuanced assessment of a complete factual record against the proper
legal standard. That assessment will be aided by presentation and cross-examination
of expert witnesses. As the sketchy record of the irregular ex parte proceeding in this
case makes evident, a trial-type hearing would ensure the development of an
appropriate record for sound adjudication at the agency level, one this court can then
meaningfully review on appeal. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271. The majority devotes
little attention to this factor because it relies on the chimera that post-deprivation
judicial review in Superior Court will cure any due process deficiencies. The
supposed availability of judicial review is a significant factor in the majority’s
jurisdictional analysis, even though the majority simultaneously claims that it lacks
jurisdiction to ascertain what rights Ms. Eckenrode can enforce in Superior Court.
Ante at 25.
Finally, “additional or substitute procedural requirement[s]” at the Board level
would not impose significant “fiscal and administrative burdens” or otherwise
37
impinge on the government’s interest. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The Board
acknowledged that claimants for enhanced survivor benefits comprise a “very
narrow and small set of individuals” who die in the line of duty from an injury
incurred in performing that duty, meet the requisite causation requirement, and have
survivors who satisfy the financial need requirement of having been more than 50%
financially dependent on the deceased officer. Ensuring adequate pre-deprivation
procedures for this admittedly small class of people would impose a de minimis
burden on the Board, which already must provide hearings, pursuant to statute, to
the disability retirees who comprise the vast majority of claimants. Farrell v. D.C.
Police & Firefighters Ret. & Relief Bd., 151 A.3d 490, 493 (D.C. 2017).
Just as there is little downside to the government if hearings are provided to
these survivors, there is a clear upside to doing so. In providing benefits for police
officers and their surviving families, the legislature has manifested an intention to
create a separate, more comprehensive safety net for those who risk their lives in the
service of public safety. See Spencer v. Yerace, 155 W.Va. 54, 60 (1971) (“[s]ome
of the purposes of statutes providing for police pensions are to promote efficacy, to
encourage continuity of service, and to protect the employee and his family”);
Phillipson v. Bd. of Admin., 473 P.2d 765, 776 (Cal. 1970) (“[p]ension programs for
public employees serve two objectives: to induce persons to enter and continue in
public service, and to provide subsistence for disabled or retired employees and their
38
dependents”); cf. Ridge v. Police & Firefighters Ret. & Relief Bd., 511 A.2d 418,
426 (D.C. 1986) (“constru[ing] the retirement statute liberally in light of its humane
purpose” when concluding that a disabled police officer was entitled to a retroactive
annuity based on statutory interpretation of the Act). Potential recruits and their
families will make serious decisions about undertaking the risks of police work at
least in part on the expectation that, should the officer die in the performance of that
service, their families will still be taken care of. The public interest in future
recruitment and police corps morale therefore aligns with individual claimants’
interest in a fair process that will enhance the careful consideration and correct
determination of claims. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266 (noting “the primacy of the
public interest in correct eligibility determinations”). Further, safeguarding adequate
process for these claimants at the Board—rather than asking the Superior Court to
cure (or as the majority seems to suggest, even re-do) faulty proceedings after the
fact—supports the efficient adjudication of claims before the administrative forum
that the legislature has charged with their adjudication.
In sum, Ms. Eckenrode, though not destitute, has shown serious financial need
as required; the Board has permanently denied her claim for enhanced survivor
benefits in an irregular proceeding under ad hoc rules that was patently not up to the
task before it; and there is minimal burden to the agency, and indeed a benefit, in
providing a trial-type hearing in these cases. Balancing these factors, as the Supreme
39
Court required in Mathews, leads me to conclude that Ms. Eckenrode was entitled
to a trial-type hearing before she could permanently be deprived of her claim to
enhanced survivor benefits. Thus, we have contested case jurisdiction over
Ms. Eckenrode’s appeal. I would remand to the Board to provide a trial-type
proceeding, including an evidentiary hearing that allows for representation by
counsel, the presentation of witness testimony under oath, and the cross-examination
of witnesses, including medical experts. These are procedural protections which the
Board does not currently provide as of right to survivors but acknowledges it “may”
grant upon request of an applicant for an enhanced annuity, and which it provides as
a matter of course to all officers and former officers seeking disability retirement
benefits. See 7 D.C.M.R. § 2505.
Because the case should be remanded to the Board for further proceedings, I
do not decide at this juncture the merits question of the proper interpretation of the
statutory provision that limits eligibility for enhanced survivor benefits to deaths that
occur in the line of duty and where the death was the “sole and direct result” of an
injury incurred in the performance of duty. D.C. Code § 5-716(a)(1)(A). The
government acknowledges that Sergeant Eckenrode died in the line of duty as a
result of what the government also acknowledges was an injury incurred in the
performance of duty. The critical interpretive issue that remains to be decided is the
type and degree of causation required between the two. The Board appears to have
40
adopted an extremely narrow interpretation of the statutory term “sole and direct
cause” in denying Sergeant Eckenrode’s survivor’s claim because his death was a
“complication” of that injury. The Board relied only on a dictionary definition but
offered no analysis of the text in statutory context, did not review the legislative
history and weigh the humanitarian purpose of the statute, nor did it consider the
possibility of absurd results. I would remand for the Board to conduct a proper
analysis and fully explain its interpretation. See D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. D.C. Dep’t of
Emp. Servs., 281 A.3d 588, 592 (D.C. 2022) (to be considered reasonable, agency’s
interpretation “must reflect the careful legal and policy analysis required in making
choices among several competing statutory interpretations, each of which has
substantial support, and the record must provide evidence that the agency considered
the language, structure, or purpose of the statute when selecting an interpretation.”
(citation modified)). 3
3
A separate question is the degree of deference the court would owe to such an interpretation in light of recent legislation, see D.C. Code § 2-510(c), and the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).