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In re Jewelyette M.
IN RE JEWELYETTE M.*
(SC 21227)
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker,
Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.
Syllabus
The foster parents of the minor child, J, appealed from, inter alia, the trial court’s denial of their motion to open the court’s decision to appoint the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, as J’s statutory parent. After the parental rights of J’s mother were terminated, and while J’s father was incarcerated, J was placed with the foster parents. Subsequently, J’s father filed a motion to revoke J’s commitment, and the commissioner notified the foster parents of her intention to remove J from their care and to place J in the care of J’s paternal aunt. The foster parents were initially granted intervenor status for the purposes of opposing the commissioner’s plan and challenging the father’s motion to revoke as contrary to J’s best interest. Thereafter, the trial court granted the commissioner’s motion to remove the foster parents as intervenors. This court then reversed the trial court’s order removing the foster parents as intervenors and remanded the case for further proceedings. Shortly after this court remanded the case, the commissioner filed a motion to be appointed as J’s statutory parent, which the trial court granted without objection from the parties. The foster parents then sought visitation with J while the commissioner filed a petition for J’s adoption by J’s paternal aunt and uncle. Prior to a decision by the trial court on the request for visitation and the adoption petition, the foster parents’ attorney filed the motion to open the court’s appointment of the commissioner as J’s statutory parent. The attorney claimed that she had agreed to that appointment under the mistaken belief that there was no other option available. Although the trial court scheduled a hearing on the motion to open, it granted the commissioner’s petition for adoption prior to that hearing. The trial court ultimately denied the motion to open as moot, concluding that it could not grant the foster parents any practical relief insofar as it had already granted the petition for J’s adoption. On appeal, the foster parents claimed, inter alia, that the trial court should have decided their motion to open prior to granting the adoption petition. Held:
The trial court improperly declined to address the merits of the foster parents’ timely filed motion to open prior to granting the petition for adoption, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court’s denial of that motion and remanded the case, directing the trial court on remand to hold a hearing on and to decide the motion to open.
*∗
In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the court.
In re Jewelyette M.
It is well established that, in the absence of an extreme, compelling situation, a trial court that has jurisdiction over an action lacks authority to decline to consider a motion that is properly placed before it.
In the present case, the record revealed that the trial court had jurisdiction to address the foster parents’ motion to open, as it was timely filed pursuant to statute (§ 52-212a), and the foster parents’ attorney succeeded in bringing the existence of that motion to the trial court’s attention prior to the commencement of the hearing on the adoption petition.
The trial court’s decision to proceed with the adoption before holding the hearing on the foster parents’ motion to open was tantamount to a refusal to consider that motion, insofar as the court’s decision ensured that the motion to open would not be addressed on the merits due to it being rendered moot by virtue of the adoption.
In light of the significant effect a ruling on the motion to open could have had on the adoption petition, the circumstances required the trial court to schedule a hearing on and to consider the merits of the motion to open prior to the adoption.
Although this court declined to order the trial court to open the adoption decree, it directed the trial court, on remand, to undertake an analysis of J’s best interest when addressing the merits of, and determining whether it should grant, the foster parents’ motion to open.
Argued April 16—officially released July 15, 2026**
Procedural History
Petition, in the first case, by the Commissioner of
Children and Families to adjudicate the respondents’
minor child neglected, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of New Britain, Juvenile Matters,
and tried to the court, Abery-Wetstone, J.; judgment
adjudicating the minor child neglected and committing
the minor child to the custody of the commissioner; petition, in the second case, by the foster parents of the minor child for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Britain, Juvenile
Matters; thereafter, the court, C. Taylor, J., granted
the foster parents’ motion to intervene in the first case
and their motion to consolidate the cases; subsequently,
the court, C. Taylor, J., granted the commissioner’s
motion for an order that the foster parents be removed
**
July 15, 2026, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
In re Jewelyette M.
as intervenors in the first case and to bifurcate the cases, and the foster parents appealed; thereafter, the foster
parents filed a writ of error relating to, among other
orders, an order of the court, Daniels, J., granting the
commissioner’s motion to revoke the commitment of the
minor child; subsequently, this court reversed the trial
court’s order removing the foster parents as intervenors,
granted in part the foster parents’ writ of error, vacated
the trial court’s revocation order, and remanded the case
for further proceedings; thereafter, the court, Aaron,
J., appointed the commissioner as the statutory parent
of the minor child; subsequently, the court, Aaron, J.,
denied the foster parents’ motion to open, and the foster
parents appealed. Reversed; further proceedings.
Brandon B. Fontaine, for the intervenors (John N.
et al.).
Evan O’Roark, deputy solicitor general, with whom,
on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellee (commissioner).
John R. Weikart, assigned counsel, for the minor child.
Opinion
MULLINS, C. J. This case returns to us for the second
time. In the present appeal, the intervening preadoptive foster parents, John N. and Diana N. (foster parents), raise alleged inadequacies in the proceedings that
occurred in the trial court after we remanded the matter
to that court in In re Jewelyette M., 351 Conn. 511, 332
A.3d 207 (2025). See id., 516, 528–29 n.11, 543–45, 552,
557–58 n.30, 562. Specifically, on remand, the trial court
granted the motion of the petitioner, the Commissioner
of Children and Families (commissioner), to be appointed
as the statutory parent of the minor child, Jewelyette
M. (Jewelyette), without objection. Approximately two
months later, the foster parents filed a timely motion
to open with respect to the appointment of the commissioner as the statutory parent (motion to open) on the
grounds that (1) their trial counsel did not understand
In re Jewelyette M.
the purported legal significance of the statutory parent
appointment and had mistakenly failed to object, and
(2) the trial court’s actions exceeded the scope of the
remand order.
After the foster parents filed the motion to open, but
prior to holding a hearing on it, the trial court granted
the petition for the adoption of Jewelyette. Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing on the foster parents’
motion to open and concluded that it had been rendered
moot by the intervening adoption. On appeal, the foster
parents claim, inter alia, that the trial court should
have held a hearing on their timely filed motion to open
prior to granting the petition for adoption. We agree
and, consequently, remand this case to the trial court
for such a hearing.1
The full factual and procedural history is set forth in
our decision in In re Jewelyette M., supra, 351 Conn.
514–29, which we summarize here by way of background.
Jewelyette was born in 2015. Id., 514. At that time,
Jewelyette and her mother tested positive for opiates
and methadone. Id., 516. Jewelyette was placed in the
temporary custody of the commissioner prior to her
release from the hospital. Id. Subsequently, Jewelyette
was adjudicated neglected and committed to the custody
of the commissioner. Id. In 2016, the commissioner filed
petitions to terminate the parental rights of the respondents, Jewelyette’s mother and father, John M. (John),
alleging that they had failed to rehabilitate. Id., 517. In May 2017, the parental rights of Jewelyette’s mother
were terminated. Id. During this time, and for much of
Jewelyette’s early life, John was incarcerated. See id.,
516; see also id., 517. Shortly after her mother’s parental 1
In this appeal, the foster parents also assert that the trial court exceeded the scope of the remand order by appointing the commissioner as the statutory parent. Because of our conclusion that the case must be remanded for a new hearing and decision on the merits of the motion to open, we do not reach this claim.
In re Jewelyette M.
rights were terminated, Jewelyette was placed with the
foster parents. Id., 517.
From that point until 2020, the commissioner had
a permanency plan that involved terminating John’s
parental rights. See id., 514–15, 517. In 2021, John
filed a motion to revoke Jewelyette’s commitment, and,
shortly thereafter, the commissioner notified the foster
parents that Jewelyette would be removed from their care
within approximately one week and placed with John’s
sister. See id., 518–19.
“The foster parents responded by filing (1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus under General Statutes
§ 52-466 (f), which allows foster parents to seek legal
custody of their foster children, (2) an application for
a temporary injunction barring Jewelyette’s removal
from their home until the court ruled on the habeas
petition, and (3) a motion to intervene. The trial court
granted the temporary injunction, as well as the foster
parents’ motion to intervene for the limited purpose of
opposing the [commissioner’s] permanency plan and
John’s motion to revoke as contrary to Jewelyette’s best
interest. Thereafter, the commissioner filed a motion
to vacate the temporary injunction . . . . The trial court
later consolidated the foster parents’ habeas petition
with John’s motion to revoke and the commissioner’s
motion to vacate the temporary injunction.” (Footnote
omitted.) Id., 519. After a six day trial, the court issued a memorandum of decision in May 2023, denying John’s
motion to revoke commitment. See id., 515, 520–21.
The court summarized its conclusion in these words:
“[Jewelyette’s] stability and her hope for the future lie
in the stable placement that she has [found] with [her]
foster family. To remove her from it would be to blight
her life in perpetuity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 523; see also id., 557 n.30.
One year and six months after the trial court issued
its decision allowing the foster parents to intervene, the
Appellate Court released its decision in In re Ryan C., 220 Conn. App. 507, 299 A.3d 308, cert. denied, 348 Conn.
In re Jewelyette M.
901, 300 A.3d 1166 (2023), which concluded that General Statutes § 46b-129 (p) prohibited a trial court from
granting permissive intervention in the dispositional
phase of a neglect proceeding to a foster parent. See id.,
511, 518, 525–26. “On the basis of that decision, the commissioner filed in the trial court a motion to remove the
foster parents as intervenors and to bifurcate the foster
parents’ habeas petition and the neglect proceeding,
which the trial court granted on December 11, 2023.” In
re Jewelyette M., supra, 351 Conn. 523. The foster parents appealed from the trial court’s decision, “claiming
that the trial court improperly had removed them under
the authority of In re Ryan C., a case they contend[ed]
misconstrued § 46b-129 (p).”2 Id., 515. We agreed with
the foster parents that “In re Ryan C. was incorrectly
decided, and must be overruled, because the legislature
did not intend § 46b-129 (p) to prohibit a trial court from granting permissive intervention to a foster parent when
appropriate.” Id. On the basis of our interpretation of In
re Ryan C., we concluded that the trial court improperly
removed the foster parents as intervenors and that the
foster parents’ status as intervenors must be restored.
Id., 543–44. Accordingly, we reversed the trial court’s
order removing the foster parents as intervenors and
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. See id., 562; see also id., 516, 528–29 n.11, 543–45, 552, 557–58 n.30. Those proceedings on remand are at
the heart of the present appeal.
We released our decision in In re Jewelyette M. on
March 21, 2025. On March 26, 2025, the commissioner
filed a motion for in-court review pursuant to Practice
Book § 34a-1 and General Statutes § 46b-121 (b), requesting that the trial court “schedule an in-court review . . . for purposes of reclaiming the [commissioner’s] motions
for appointment of a statutory parent . . . and [to] modify the disposition . . . and setting any further dates for
hearings thereon.” The court granted the motion and
held an in-court review on April 4, 2025. The proceeding
2
While the first appeal was pending before this court, Jewelyette’s father passed away. See In re Jewelyette M., supra, 351 Conn. 527.
In re Jewelyette M.
was conducted virtually. The foster parents and their
attorney, Jewelyette’s attorney, a social worker from
the Department of Children and Families, and the commissioner’s attorney were all present. The guardian ad
litem was not present but submitted a written statement.
After having all of the parties identify themselves on
the record, the trial court explained: “This is before the
court on the [commissioner’s] motion for an in-court
review. That in-court review motion was filed with the
court on March 26, 2025, in response to the Supreme
Court’s decision that was issued [overruling] the [decision of the] Appellate Court [in In re Ryan C.] and [reversing]
the trial court.
“Let me express to folks how I see this, and, then, I’m
interested in counsel and others, if you disagree or if
you see it differently. I have the order from the Supreme
Court, indicating that the December 11, 2023 . . . order
of the trial court removing the foster parents as intervenors is reversed. The [foster parents’ writ] of error is
granted in part, and the trial court’s November 4, 2024
revocation order is vacated. The case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
“So, as I see this, the order, I believe Judge [Carl E.]
Taylor removing the foster parents as intervenors, is
vacated. The transfer of guardianship, temporary or
otherwise, is also vacated. So, Jewelyette, at this point
in time, continues to be committed to the [commissioner].
Is there any disagreement about that?” The commissioner’s attorney, Jewelyette’s attorney, and the foster
parents’ attorney all indicated no disagreement with the
trial court.
The trial court then explained that the motions before
it include “the [commissioner’s] motion to appoint a
statutory parent, date[d] January 22, 2025, [and] filed
with the court on January 23, 2025, as well as . . . the
motion . . . for in-court review, filed on March 26, 2025,
In re Jewelyette M.
seeking to have the [commissioner] appointed [as] the
statutory parent.”
After it described the motions before it, the trial court
asked: “Is there any objection to the court granting that
motion, given that the parental rights of Jewelyette’s
mother were previously terminated on May 18, 2017, and
[John] is deceased as of January of 2025? So, is there any
objection to the court granting the motion to appoint the
[commissioner] as the statutory parent?”
The foster parents’ attorney immediately responded,
“[n]o, Your Honor.” Jewelyette’s attorney also indicated
that she had no objection. The trial court then reviewed
the statement filed by the guardian ad litem, who indicated that Jewelyette was currently placed with her aunt
and that it was in Jewelyette’s “best interest to stay in
that placement, with her aunt being a relative foster
parent, and the [commissioner] being the statutory parent.” The trial court continued: “So, then, if there is no
objection, the court will grant the motion and appoint the
[commissioner] as the statutory parent of Jewelyette. Is
there anything further for today?” The commissioner’s
attorney responded, “[n]ot from the [commissioner],
Your Honor.”
The court clerk then said: “Your Honor, I don’t believe
there is a continuance date for the interested parties’
revocation motion.” In response, the commissioner’s
attorney indicated that, to the extent the clerk was
referring to the commissioner’s motion to open and
modify the disposition of commitment, the attorney
was withdrawing that motion. The trial court allowed
the withdrawal and then stated: “All right. I have just
been reminded that, now that Jewelyette is committed,
we do need permanency dates.” The court ordered the
commissioner to file the permanency plan by May 30,
2025, and scheduled the hearing for July 9, 2025. The
court then inquired: “Does that work for everyone?” The
In re Jewelyette M.
foster parents’ attorney responded, “[y]es, Your Honor,”
and the court concluded the hearing.3
Thereafter, on April 21, 2025, the foster parents filed
a motion asking that the trial court order visitation
between them and Jewelyette. The commissioner objected
to the motion, claiming that it was beyond the scope of the foster parents’ intervention. The trial court scheduled
a hearing on that motion for May 14, 2025.
In the meantime, on May 13, 2025, the commissioner
filed a petition for adoption, asking the court to appoint
the paternal aunt and uncle as Jewelyette’s adoptive
parents. The commissioner attached an adoption data
sheet, an adoption social study, and a written agreement
of adoption to the petition. Neither the foster parents
nor their counsel was served with notice of the petition
and accompanying documents.
On May 14, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the
foster parents’ motion for visitation. At that hearing,
the court, sua sponte, raised the issue of whether it had
the authority to address the foster parents’ motion for
visitation or whether their status as intervenors for the
dispositional phase had ended once the commissioner had
been named the statutory parent. After giving the parties
an opportunity to be heard on the jurisdictional issue, the court ordered a briefing schedule and, at the request of
the foster parents’ attorney, agreed to schedule a hearing for a later date to address the jurisdictional issue.
During the May 14, 2025 hearing, the trial court also
informed the foster parents and their attorney that the
commissioner was “pursuing permanency in the nature of
an adoption . . . .” The foster parents’ attorney informed
3
In light of the fact that the trial court operated with the understanding that the appointment of the commissioner as statutory parent ended the foster parents’ intervention, we recognize that the trial court’s inquiry about the availability of the foster parents and their counsel for further hearings was confusing and even misleading.
In re Jewelyette M.
the court that, prior to the hearing, they were unaware
of the petition for adoption.
On June 2, 2025, approximately twenty minutes prior
to the start of the second hearing on the foster parents’
motion for visitation, the foster parents filed their
motion to open. As grounds for the motion, the foster
parents asserted that the appointment of the commissioner as the statutory parent did not supersede this
court’s remand order, but, to the extent that the trial
court found that it did, they requested that the trial
court remove the commissioner as the statutory parent.
The foster parents’ attorney further asserted that she
had agreed to the appointment of the commissioner as
the statutory parent because she was under the mistaken
belief that there was no other option available.
Although the foster parents’ attorney notified the trial
court and the other parties that she had filed the motion
to open approximately twenty minutes before the start
of the hearing on visitation, the court explained: “So,
for today’s purposes, the only thing before the court
today, and, as I indicated at the status conference, I think everyone was on notice that there is an adoption pending
and [that it] was not going to be continued.” The court
proceeded: “So, why don’t we address the standing issue
for purposes of the current status of the case. I think
I referred . . . everyone to a few of the other decisions
addressing this issue.”
After hearing argument from the parties, the trial
court made the following ruling: “[T]he court is going
to find that the appointment of the [commissioner], by
agreement of all parties, on April [4, 2025], as [the]
statutory parent of Jewelyette by operation of law terminated the neglect proceedings and the purpose for
which the . . . foster parents had moved to intervene, in
accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision, which
was for the limited purpose of opposing the permanency
plan and the revocation of commitment. It was as to the
In re Jewelyette M.
dispositional best interest of [Jewelyette], in the context of that neglect proceeding.
“The court is mindful of the Supreme Court’s decision
and has read the majority opinion a number of times,
including the relevant footnotes, and . . . throughout,
the court was clear that the purpose of the foster parents
being granted intervenor status was pursuant to Practice
Book § 35a-4, which was permissive intervention, that
they should not have been removed, that it was error to
remove them as intervenors in the underlining neglect
proceeding, with regard to the disposition of that proceeding.
“At this time, given the current status of the case,
there is no neglect proceeding pending. There is no basis,
and the . . . foster parents do not have standing to file a motion for visitation now that the [commissioner] has
been named as the statutory parent. So, the objection to
the motion is sustained.”
It is important to note that, during the hearing on
the motion for visitation, the foster parents’ attorney
repeatedly referred to the motion to open. Ultimately,
the foster parents’ attorney explained: “My motion to
[open] notes my mistake in believing that the only next
option was for [the commissioner] to become the statutory parent. Upon my research, I’ve learned that there
could also be motions for guardianship that could’ve been
filed at that point, once [Jewelyette] was recommitted
to the [commissioner], [but] before [the commissioner]
was [appointed] as the statutory parent.
“So, again, that was my mistake and my misunderstanding of the law. I want to make sure I do everything on behalf of my clients to try to rectify it, which
is why I filed the motion [to open] today, once I did more
research, knowing that today—so [that] everyone knows,
I wasn’t trying to trick anybody by filing it twenty minutes before the hearing. We were told on Wednesday that
In re Jewelyette M.
this hearing would be on Monday, and we all made our
schedules work for that to happen.
“So, I wasn’t trying to pull the wool over anybody’s
eyes in doing this at the final hour. I just literally was
pulling everything together in trying to make this all
work. I know there’s an adoption on Thursday that the
court really wants to move forward [with].” Even after
the trial court issued its ruling dismissing the foster parents’ motion for visitation, the foster parents’ attorney
persisted and asked the court to schedule a hearing on
the motion to open.
Thereafter, the trial court scheduled the hearing on
the motion to open for June 18, 2025. Before that hearing, on June 5, 2025, the court granted the petition for
adoption.
At the outset of the hearing on June 18, 2025, the
trial court announced: “Before we go any further, I know
everyone is aware that Jewelyette was adopted on June
5, 2025. Tell me why this matter is not moot at this point
in time.” After allowing the foster parents’ attorney
brief argument on the motion to open, the trial court
explained, “I do think that, at this time, [the motion to
open is] moot. There is no practical relief that the court
can grant at this point.” Although the trial court allowed
the foster parents’ attorney to argue further, consistent
with its initial ruling, the court denied the motion to
open, concluding that it was moot because the court
could not offer the foster parents any practical relief in
light of Jewelyette’s adoption.4 This appeal followed.
On appeal to this court, the foster parents claim, inter
alia, that the trial court failed to properly address the
4
We note that the form of the trial court’s decision on the motion is improper. Because the trial court concluded that the motion to open was moot, the court should have dismissed, rather than denied, the motion. See, e.g., Argent Mortgage Co., LLC v. Huertas, 288 Conn. 568, 581–82, 953 A.2d 868 (2008). Nevertheless, because we remand the case back to the trial court for a hearing on the motion to open, we need not alter the form of the court’s decision.
In re Jewelyette M.
merits of their motion to open. Specifically, the foster
parents assert that their motion to open was timely filed
pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212a5 because it was
filed within four months of the appointment of the commissioner as the statutory parent. The foster parents
further assert that the trial court should have heard
argument on and decided their timely filed motion to
open prior to proceeding with the adoption, particularly
when the trial court determined that the subsequent
adoption rendered the motion to open moot. We agree
with the foster parents.
It is well established that “the general rule [is] that
a trial court must consider and decide on a reasonably
prompt basis all motions properly placed before it . . . .” Ahneman v. Ahneman, 243 Conn. 471, 484, 706 A.2d
960 (1998). Indeed, “in the absence of an extreme, compelling situation, a trial court that has jurisdiction over an action lacks authority to refuse to consider a litigant’s motions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ramin
v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324, 336, 915 A.2d 790 (2007).
“Courts are in the business of ruling on litigants’ contentions, and . . . operate under the rule essential to the efficient administration of justice, that [when] a court
is vested with jurisdiction over the [subject matter] . . . and . . . obtains jurisdiction of the person, it becomes its . . . duty to determine every question which may arise
in the cause . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Ahneman v. Ahneman, supra, 484. “A trial court does
5
General Statutes § 52-212a provides: “Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which the notice of judgment or decree was sent. The continuing jurisdiction conferred on the court in preadoptive proceedings pursuant to subsection (o) of section 17a112 does not confer continuing jurisdiction on the court for purposes of reopening a judgment terminating parental rights. The parties may waive the provisions of this section or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of the court, provided the filing of an amended petition for termination of parental rights does not constitute a waiver of the provisions of this section or a submission to the jurisdiction of the court to reopen a judgment terminating parental rights.”
In re Jewelyette M.
not have discretion, based on notions of judicial efficiency, to decline to exercise its jurisdiction by refusing to consider certain motions.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Hamilton v. Hamilton, 354 Conn. 639, 651–52,
355 A.3d 1090 (2026).
In the present case, the foster parents filed their motion
to open on June 2, 2025, approximately two months after
the trial court granted the commissioner’s motion to
appoint her as Jewelyette’s statutory parent on April 4,
2025. Therefore, the foster parents’ motion to open was
timely filed pursuant to § 52-212a, and, thus, the court
had jurisdiction to address it.
A review of the record and the transcripts of the proceedings in this case indicates that, prior to the adoption, the foster parents, through their attorney, repeatedly
asked the trial court to hear argument on their motion to
open. Indeed, at the June 2, 2025 hearing on the foster
parents’ motion for visitation, their attorney repeatedly
asked the trial court to review the motion to open and
to consider the arguments raised therein. Although we
recognize that the motion to open was filed only approximately twenty minutes before that hearing commenced
and that the trial court and the parties did not plan to
address it at the hearing, the record reveals that the
foster parents’ attorney had met her obligation to bring
the existence of the motion to the trial court’s attention
prior to the adoption. Despite counsel’s repeated efforts,
the trial court did not hold a hearing on the motion to
open until June 18, 2025, thirteen days after the petition
for adoption had been granted.
Ordinarily, we would not consider the scheduling of
a hearing on a motion sixteen days after it was filed
a reversible refusal to rule on a pending motion. The
circumstances here are not ordinary though. The trial
court made clear to the parties on June 2, 2025, that it
was not going to delay the adoption proceeding that was
scheduled for June 5, 2025, so that it could first rule on
the motion to open. Then, when the court held the hearing
on the motion to open on June 18, 2015, it immediately
In re Jewelyette M.
concluded that the motion was moot due to the adoption
it permitted to go forward despite the pending motion
to open. The court thus managed the pending motions
in a way that ensured that the motion to open would not
be addressed on the merits. The court’s handling of the
motion to open was tantamount to a refusal to consider it.
We understand that the trial court was concerned
about postponing the adoption proceeding that was
already scheduled to occur three days after the motion
to open was filed. We also are mindful that “the trial court has broad discretion in managing its docket, but [the
court] still is required to consider and decide all motions properly placed before it. See Kammili v. Kammili, 197
Conn. App. 656, 661, 232 A.3d 102, cert. denied, 335
Conn. 947, 238 A.3d 18 (2020).” Hallock v. Hallock, 228
Conn. App. 81, 91 n.6, 324 A.3d 193 (2024). Nevertheless, given the significant effect a ruling on the motion
to open could have had on the petition for adoption, these
circumstances required the trial court in this matter to
schedule a hearing on the motion to open prior to the
adoption or to briefly postpone the adoption proceeding
to allow the court time to adjudicate the merits of the
motion. Instead, by declining to hold a timely hearing
on the merits of the motion to open prior to the adoption and causing the motion, in the trial court’s view, to
become moot, “the trial court abdicated its fundamental
obligation to decide all matters properly presented to
it.” Ramin v. Ramin, supra, 281 Conn. 338; see also id.
(“In refusing to decide the motion before it by marking it
‘off,’ the trial court abdicated its fundamental obligation to decide all matters properly presented to it. . . . [T]he court had the case and the . . . motion [at issue] properly before it. . . . [I]t was the court’s duty to determine the questions raised by the motion.”).6
Because the trial court declined to hear argument on
the merits of the timely filed motion to open prior to the
6
A related statute, General Statutes § 45a-719, further indicates that it was critical for the trial court to hear argument on the motion to open prior to the adoption proceeding. Section 45a-719 provides in relevant part: “The court may grant a motion to open or set aside a judgment
In re Jewelyette M.
adoption, the foster parents did not get the meaningful hearing or ruling on the merits to which they were
entitled.7 Notwithstanding the fact that Jewelyette has
been adopted, under the circumstances of this case, we
conclude that the foster parents are entitled to a hearing on the merits of their timely filed motion to open.
Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court for a
new hearing and decision addressing the merits of the
timely filed motion to open.
At this juncture, we do not order the trial court to
open the adoption decree because any decision in that
regard would be premature. Cf. In re P. T.-W., 223 Conn.
App. 571, 573, 579, 583–84, 589–90, 309 A.3d 394
(2024) (remanding case to trial court for new hearing
on motion to open judgment terminating respondent
father’s parental rights without ordering court to open
adoption decree when motion was filed before child was
adopted). Nevertheless, as this court has explained,
terminating parental rights pursuant to section 52-212 or 52-212a or pursuant to common law or may grant a petition for a new trial on the issue of the termination of parental rights, provided the court shall consider the best interest of the child, except that no such motion or petition may be granted if a final decree of adoption has been issued prior to the filing of any such motion or petition. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
Although this statute is not directly applicable to the present case, it is instructive on two points. First, § 45a-719 provides that the trial court may grant a motion to open a judgment terminating parental rights only if it is filed prior to the issuance of a final decree of adoption. This indicates that the legislature recognized that a trial court should consider a motion to open that is filed prior to an adoption. Second, § 45a-719 provides that, in considering whether to grant a motion to open a judgment terminating parental rights, the trial court must consider the best interest of the child. Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that the trial court should have considered the motion to open filed by the foster parents because it was filed prior to the issuance of the final decree of adoption, and, in considering whether to grant such motion, the court should have considered the best interest of Jewelyette.
7
After repeatedly concluding that the motion to open was moot because Jewelyette had been adopted, the trial court continued: “Even on the merit[s], the court would deny the motion. There is no basis to [open].” Nevertheless, on the basis of this record, we do not conclude that the merits of the motion to open were actually litigated by the parties and adjudicated by the court.
In re Jewelyette M.
§ 52-212a is “a remedial statute that is grounded in a
continuing commitment to [common-law] principles of
fairness and justice . . . .” In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 285, 618 A.2d 1 (1992); see also id., 284–85 and
n.16 (noting that discretion to open judgment conferred
on trial court by § 52-212a is not necessarily limited
by requirement in General Statutes § 52-212 (a) that
moving party show that good defense was not raised
when adverse judgment was rendered by reason of “ ‘mistake, accident or other reasonable cause’ ”). Therefore,
in light of the unique and prolonged history of the present case, and to avoid further delay in the resolution of
this proceeding, we direct the trial court on remand to
undertake an analysis of the best interest of Jewelyette
when considering the motion to open. In fact, what is in
Jewelyette’s best interest is likely the most significant
factor in determining, in this particular case, whether
the motion to open should be granted.8 This best interest analysis would necessarily involve hearing from the
foster parents and the commissioner on Jewelyette’s
current status. This approach makes particular sense
in this case given that the attorneys for Jewelyette and
the foster parents have apprised us that she is no longer
residing with her adoptive parents and that she now lives
with her maternal aunt and cousins in a different town,
where she is enrolled in a public school. These new circumstances may be relevant to the best interest analysis and
could impact the trial court’s resolution of the motion to
open. Paramount to the process is identification of the
best path for Jewelyette moving forward.
In light of our conclusions that the foster parents are
entitled to a hearing and decision on the merits of the
motion to open and that the best interest determination
must be conducted as part of the hearing on the motion
to open, we need not address the foster parents’ claims
that the trial court exceeded the scope of this court’s
remand order in In re Jewelyette M., supra, 351 Conn.
8
Considering the best interest of the child when deciding whether to grant a motion to open is also consistent with the legislative mandate of General Statutes § 45a-719. See footnote 6 of this opinion.
In re Jewelyette M.
516, 528–29 n.11, 543–45, 552, 557–58 n.30, 562, and
that the appointment of the commissioner as the statutory parent should be reversed at this juncture because of
a mistake by the foster parents’ attorney.9 Both of those
issues are raised in the motion to open, and the merits of
that motion will be litigated at a new hearing on remand.
Our decision, therefore, in no way reflects an opinion by
this court concerning the merits of the motion to open.10
The trial court’s decision denying the foster parents’
motion to open is reversed and the case is remanded for
a hearing on the merits of the motion, including consideration of Jewelyette’s best interest, and for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
9
In their brief to this court, the foster parents assert that “appointing [the commissioner] as statutory parent was a formality at the start of the proceeding[s] [on remand] and that the trial court was still able to fulfill the appellate mandate with a hearing on [Jewelyette’s] best interest, which it should have done.” Because we remand the case to the trial court for a hearing on the motion to open and order that the trial court conduct a best interest analysis at that hearing, we need not address whether the trial court could have held a hearing on the best interest of Jewelyette after appointing the commissioner as statutory parent.
10
See footnote 1 of this opinion.