In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00342-CR
HOANG THANH TRINH, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 181st District Court
Randall County, Texas
Trial Court No. 33060B, Honorable Titiana D. Frausto, Presiding
July 13, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
Appellant Hoang Thanh Trinh appeals from his convictions for aggravated sexual
assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child by sexual contact. 1 By his two
issues, he challenges the trial court judgments by arguing: (1) the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the judgment should be modified to delete
provisions related to attorneys’ fees and time payment fees. We affirm as modified.
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 22.021(a)(2)(B), 21.11(a)(1).
BACKGROUND
Complainant in this cause is D.P., who was ten years old at the time of the offense,
occurring sometime around New Year’s Day of 2021. Appellant was a family friend
referred to as an “uncle” living with D.P.’s grandmother in Amarillo. The grandmother
hosted a 2021 New Year’s celebration at her house, attended by D.P., her three brothers,
their father, and Appellant. D.P.’s mother did not attend the celebration.
During the evening, the adults enjoyed alcoholic beverages and karaoke; the four
siblings spent a good portion of the night playing games on their tablets. After the
grandmother had left for the night shift at work and D.P.’s father left to join her mother at
a hotel, Appellant was left alone at the house with D.P. and her three brothers. The two
older brothers shared a room, and D.P. and her younger brother went to sleep in their
grandmother’s room in her absence.
Sometime after the children went to bed, Appellant entered the grandmother’s
room and used the attached restroom. He then went to lie down on the bed next to D.P.
She testified that he hugged her and pulled her close to him, wrapping his leg over her.
Feeling uncomfortable, she told him she had to use the restroom and got up from the bed.
When she returned, she lay down on the other side of her brother, positioning herself
away from Appellant on the bed. However, Appellant pulled her over and across her
brother and placed her next to him. He then proceeded to lift her shirt and fondle, lick,
and tug at her breasts. At some point, Appellant climbed on top of D.P., pulled down
D.P.’s shorts and underwear, and began to lick her private area and manipulate her
genitals with his fingers. He attempted to force D.P.’s hand into his pants, but she
maintained a fist and refused to touch his genital area, noting that the only back of her
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closed fist touched the area. Appellant also tried to place his tongue in D.P.’s mouth,
during which time, she recalled, she smelled a strong odor of alcohol on his breath.
Eventually, D.P. was able to push Appellant away from her and run to the room
where her older brothers were. Her eldest brother was still awake and heard D.P.’s
account of Appellant’s touching her. He responded by explaining that Appellant was
intoxicated. D.P. slept in the room with her older brothers that night. The next morning,
she reported the incident to her grandmother who was very upset upon hearing it.
However, fearing that she and Appellant would be put in jail, she advised D.P. to refrain
from telling anyone else. When the family returned to their home in Dallas, D.P.
eventually told both her father and mother about what Appellant had done. However, the
matter was not reported to authorities until D.P. chose to tell a friend about what happened
and that friend told others who reported the incident to CPS.
Appellant was indicted on three counts—aggravated sexual assault of a child and
two counts of indecency with a child by sexual contact. He pleaded not guilty, but a jury
convicted him on all three counts. Appellant opted for the jury to assess punishment. He
was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment for aggravated sexual assault of a child and
five years’ imprisonment for each count of indecency with a child. The trial court ordered
the sentences in Counts 2 and 3 to be served concurrently with each other, but
consecutive to the sentence in Count 1.
ISSUE ONE—SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
In his first issue, Appellant claims the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions. We disagree.
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The only standard recognized by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence necessary to support each element of a criminal offense
the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard set forth in
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). See
Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Turner v. State, 573
S.W.3d 455, 458 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.).
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; see also Reese v. State,
No. 07-19-00253-CR, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 3771, at *15 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 4,
2020, pet. ref’d) (citing Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)).
We then determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Turner, 573 S.W.3d at 458. The factfinder is the sole
judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimonies,
and a reviewing court must defer to those determinations and not usurp the factfinder’s
role by substituting its judgment for that of the jury. Id. We defer to the responsibility of
the factfinder to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id. (citing Jenkins v. State, 493
S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)).
The uncorroborated testimony of a child sexual abuse victim alone is sufficient to
support a conviction for either the offense of continuous sexual abuse or the underlying
predicate offenses of indecency with a child or sexual assault. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 38.07(a), (b)(1); Turner, 573 S.W.3d at 459. Corroboration of the child victim’s
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testimony by medical or physical evidence is not required. Turner, 573 S.W.3d at 459.
The mens rea and requisite specific intent of the accused can be inferred from the
defendant’s conduct, his remarks, and the circumstances surrounding the commission of
the offense. Id. Additionally, Texas courts will give wide latitude to testimony given by
child victims of sexual abuse. Ryder v. State, 514 S.W.3d 391, 396 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2017, pet. ref’d) (citing Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en
banc)). The victim’s description of what happened need not be precise, and the child is
not expected to communicate with the same level of sophistication as would an adult.
Ryder, 514 S.W.3d at 396.
In Count 1, the State alleged that Appellant committed the offense of aggravated
sexual assault of a child by causing “the sexual organ of [the victim], a child who was then
and there younger than 14 years of age, to contact the mouth of the defendant.” D.P.
testified in detail that Appellant positioned himself near her private area and started licking
her private area. While Appellant cites inconsistencies in D.P.’s account, the jury was
free to consider those perceived inconsistencies, and, by its findings, it resolved any
inconsistencies in favor of D.P.’s testimony. See Gonzalez v. State, 522 S.W.3d 48, 57
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (“The jury could resolve any contradictions
between the girls’ live testimony and earlier forensic interviews in favor of the girls’
account.”).
In Count 2, the State alleged that Appellant committed the offense of indecency
with a child by “touching the genitals of [the victim].” Here, again, D.P. detailed how
Appellant used his hands to spread open her genital area by “moving his fingers and
opening it wider.” Her testimony alone is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilt for
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indecency with a child by sexual contact. Similarly, in Count 3, the State alleged that
Appellant committed the offense of indecency with a child by “touching the breast of [the
victim].” D.P. testified consistently with her earlier accounts that Appellant began
grabbing her breasts under her clothing. She also testified that Appellant licked her
breasts. Clearly, the jury found her testimony to be credible and consistent. We will not
disturb the jury’s finding on this record. The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s
finding that Appellant was guilty of a second count of indecency with a child by sexual
contact.
To the extent Appellant also challenges the evidence of the mens rea elements,
Appellant’s conduct and circumstances surrounding the commission of the offenses
provide sufficient evidence. Appellant waited to interact with D.P. until the grandmother
had gone to work, her father had left the house, and the two older brothers were in a
separate room. He kept all the lights off and stayed quiet. When D.P. attempted to
distance herself after going to the bathroom, he renewed his efforts and pulled her back
to him. He also engaged in several different methods of touching. He also grabbed her
when she attempted to leave the room.
Notwithstanding, Appellant cites the lack of corroborating evidence in his
sufficiency arguments. However, medical corroboration is not needed. See Turner, 573
S.W.3d at 459. Further, the investigating detective testified that, during their interviews,
D.P.’s brothers confirmed D.P.’s initial outcry, stating D.P. came into the room crying and
describing that “their uncle had gotten touchy-feely.” Appellant also attempts to highlight
inconsistencies in D.P.’s account concerning body positioning and timing to highlight the
need for corroborating evidence. However, we fail to discern these same inconsistences.
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Given D.P.’s young age, we give wide latitude to her account of the experience and her
description of the acts performed. See Ryder, 514 S.W.3d at 396.
The record evidence is such that a rational juror could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt each element of the charged offenses. Accordingly, we overrule
Appellant’s first issue challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.
ISSUE TWO—BILL OF COSTS
By his second issue, Appellant seeks modification of the judgment to delete any
assessment of attorney’s fees against him and the time payment fee. Appellant requests
that we modify the trial court’s judgment and Bill of Costs to delete the assessment of
attorney’s fees. The State agrees that such a modification is appropriate in this case. We
agree.
The trial court determined Appellant to be indigent, and the record does not reflect
that Appellant’s indigency status changed. Nonetheless, included in the record before us
is a Bill of Costs which reflects a charge of $10,350 for court-appointed attorney’s fees.
The amount is consistent with the Randall County Attorney Fee Voucher also included in
the clerk’s record.
A trial court errs if it orders the reimbursement of court-appointed attorney’s fees
in the absence of record evidence demonstrating a defendant’s financial resources to
offset the costs of legal services. Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.05(g). Here, nothing in the record shows that
the trial court found Appellant had the financial resources to pay as required by article
26.05(g). Consequently, we will reform the judgment to delete the reference to
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assessment of attorney’s fees and reform the Bill of Costs to delete the assessment of
attorney’s fees against Appellant. See Fugett v. State, 721 S.W.3d 120, 123 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2025, no pet.) (reforming judgment under similar circumstances).
Appellant also argues, and the State likewise concedes, that the judgment should
also be reformed to remove, as premature, the time payment fee assessed against him
in the Bill of Costs. See Barrera v. State, No. 07-25-00109-CR, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS
8214, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 23, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (quoting Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), and holding
that the assessment of a time payment fee is premature while the appeal pends and must
be deleted). The State’s concession on this issue is well-taken. Therefore, we modify
the trial court’s written judgments and the Bill of Costs to delete the following items: (1)
the assessment of $10,350 in attorney’s fees against Appellant and (2) the assessment
of a $15 time payment fee
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Appellant’s first issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgments of
conviction so modified.
Laura A.W. Pratt
Justice
Do not publish.
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