In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-25-00099-CV
ANNA TEXAS LAND, LTD., AND E. TAYLOR ARMSTRONG, JR., Appellants
V.
ANACAPRI LAGUNA AZURE, LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from the 95th District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court No. DC-25-06901
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an interlocutory appeal from a temporary injunction entered by the Ninety-fifth
Judicial District Court of Dallas County.1 On April 29, 2025, Appellee, Anacapri Laguna Azure,
LLC (Megatel),2 filed a verified petition and application for injunctive relief and temporary
restraining order, alleging a cause of action for breach of contract, and sought a declaratory
judgment that, pursuant to its contract with Appellants, Anna Texas Land, LTD and E. Taylor
Armstrong, Jr. (the Armstrongs),3 Megatel could enter their land to construct a water drainage
channel across it. The trial court granted Megatel’s request for a temporary injunction and
entered an order enjoining the Armstrongs from obstructing Megatel’s access to their property
and from interfering with the completion of Megatel’s construction of the water drainage
channel.
The Armstrongs appeal, maintaining that the trial court erred when it granted Megatel’s
requested injunctive relief.4 In three points of error, the Armstrongs argue that (1) the temporary
injunction must be dissolved because the trial court twice erred by upsetting the status quo and
1
Originally appealed to the Fifth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Supp.). 2
In its appellate brief, Appellee is referred to as “Megatel.” For the purposes of simplification, we will refer to Appellee as “Megatel” in our opinion.
3
We will refer to Appellants collectively as “the Armstrongs.” When referring to E. Taylor Armstrong, Jr., individually, we will identify him as “Taylor.”
4
Section 51.04(a)(4) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows a party to appeal from an interlocutory order that “grants or refuses a temporary injunction or grants or overrules a motion to dissolve a temporary injunction as provided by Chapter 65” of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4) (Supp.).
2
granting relief when Megatel had an adequate remedy at law, (2) there is nothing “temporary”
about the rights granted to Megatel, and (3) there was no contract between the parties.
Because we find that the trial court erred by (1) failing to maintain the status quo of the
subject matter of the underlying lawsuit pending its final disposition; and (2) effectively
determining the merits of Megatel’s breach-of-contract and declaratory-judgment claims, we
dissolve the trial court’s temporary injunction order and remand this case to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Factual Background
Megatel is a land development company engaged in constructing “large-scale, masterplanned [residential] communities.” Megatel purchased a large piece of property in Anna,
Texas, with the intent to develop it into a community consisting of “1,000 single-family and
multi-family homes.” The project, which was known as Anacapri Phase 2, required a floodcontrol channel across a tract of land that is located south of the intended development. That
land is owned by the Armstrongs. In pursuit of its goal, Megatel began discussions with the
Armstrongs toward the end of 2023. In addition, outside companies that were working with or
for Megatel contacted the Armstrongs and also began having discussions with them.
On December 7, 2023, Scott Minnis, the project manager for a company called
“McAdams,” sent Taylor a letter informing him that the City of Anna was reviewing Megatel’s
proposal to begin a single-family residential development in the city. Minnis explained that
there were floodplain and stormwater issues and that managing those issues would be required as
part of the project. “The purpose of th[e] letter [wa]s to provide a preview of the floodplain
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delineation in advance of the formal [Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)]
submittal and answer any questions you may have.” The letter included an acknowledgement,
with a place for Taylor’s signature, stating that he understood that as a part of the construction of
the development, Megatel would “be adjusting the flood plain limits on [the Armstrongs’]
property by constructing a channel to help direct storm water to Rosamond Parkway.” Minnis
further explained,
The proposed floodplain is not a FEMA floodplain, however, the floodplain
accepted by the City of Anna will be submitted to FEMA for conditional
acceptance prior to construction. Once construction activity is complete, the
project will make another submittal to FEMA to formally revise the FEMA Flood
Insurance Rate Map (FIRM).
Minnis informed Taylor that they “look[ed] forward to answering questions [he] may have.”
Minnis attached to his letter copies of survey plans showing the then existing and proposed
floodplains. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Taylor signed the letter at that time.
On March 12, 2024, Minnis sent another letter to Taylor informing him that the City of
Anna was still reviewing Megatel’s proposed residential development plan, and Minnis also
explained the process of making the modifications to the existing floodplain. Much like his
December 7, 2023, letter, Minnis stated, “The purpose of th[e] letter [wa]s to provide a preview
of the floodplain delineation in advance of the formal FEMA submittal and answer any questions
[Taylor] may have.” He also informed Taylor that Greg Peters, the Assistant City Manager, and
Steven Maglisceau5 had corresponded by email on March 8, 2024, and that “the City of Anna
proposed the follow [sic] solutions.” One of the solutions was that “McAdams [would] provide
5
Maglisceau is the Vice President of Land Acquisitions and Development for Megatel.
4
to [Taylor] a revised letter and exhibit for his signature agreeing to the proposed
CLOMR/LOMR [(Letter of Map Revision)],” and “[Taylor] [would] work with members of his
trust to receive authorization to execute the revised agreement.” On May 23, 2024, Taylor
signed Minnis’s March 12, 2024, letter, adding the following language: “Subject to the
appropriate provisions of the attached letter from the City of Anna.” Megatel contends that
Minnis’s March 12, 2024, letter that was signed by Taylor on May 23, 2024, amounted to an
enforceable contract between the Armstrongs and Megatel.
The “attached letter” referenced above was written by Wes Lawson, Engineer for the City
of Anna, and it contained potential resolutions to some of Taylor’s concerns about the project.
[By Taylor:] – “Additionally we would like the City to grant us two curb cuts
along Ferguson Pkwy with corresponding median cuts. We would also like
assurances that at least three curb cuts with corresponding median cuts be
granted along our Rosamond frontage.”
[Lawson’s Response:] Median openings and drive cuts shall be approved by the
City for your property in accordance with City standards for access and driveway
spacing. There are some median openings already planned on Ferguson for the
Woods at Lindsey and Anacpri [sic] developments. The City has provided you
the preliminary plats for both developments to show these locations. There
should be sufficient space to accommodate the number of curb cuts that you are
requesting. Final locations of curb cuts for your property will be based on site
plans at the time of the development.
On May 23, 2024, Taylor also signed a special warranty deed for right of way,
transferring ownership of the Armstrongs’ property to the City of Anna. Again, he added the
language, “[s]ubject to the appropriate provisions of the attached letter from the City of Anna.”
The record shows that sometime around March 2025, Taylor began reconsidering his
position on Megatel’s use of his property. On March 10, 2025, Keith Johansen, Megatel Homes,
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LLC’s land development manager, emailed Taylor and William Armstrong, Taylor’s son, asking
them to meet “to review the documents on th[e] email thread and answer any questions [they
might] have.” Johansen also stated, “We look forward to getting these [two] agreements
executed with you.” Taylor responded that he had questions for a person named Gene Peters and
that he had been unsuccessful in reaching him. Taylor stated, “As soon as we have talked, I will
get back to you.” On March 17, 2025, Taylor sent another email to Johansen, stating that he had
continued to try to speak with Peters but “with no luck.”
On April 4, 2025, Taylor sent Johansen an email, stating,
Keith:
I calked [sic] and talked with Wes last Friday after our call. [In] fact, we ended
our call [when] he saw you were calling him. I explained that we wanted to know
what would be involved in converting the drainage ditch into a culvert with the
approximate cost.
As I was writing this, Wes called me and I got the information I needed. He
estimates the coat [sic] of that conversion at $2 million. Anything you could do to
reduce that would be appreciated. I’ve gotten what I need from Wes.
On April 9, 2025, Derek Borg, Vice President of Commercial Development for Megatel
Homes, sent Taylor an email, which stated,
To follow up on your last question, we can only do the grade to drain that you
originally agreed to by open channel. Megatel is prepared to move forward
on this project immediately. Please let me know if there is any reason we
cannot begin. We need this constructed ASAP to not have delays in the
project. Thanks.
On April 10, 2025, Taylor sent an email to Borg, explaining that he had spoken with his
family and that they were concerned about Megatel’s request for a drainage easement on their
6
property. Taylor concluded his email, declaring, “As we consider our options, we cannot agree
to let you proceed.”
On April 17, 2025, on behalf of the Armstrongs, Taylor sent a letter via certified mail
stating, in part, “While an open channel through our property might solve your drainage
problem, it would significantly diminish the value of our remaining [twenty-seven] acres. We
have been advised by our legal counsel that we are well within our rights to deny your request
for a drainage easement through our property.”
On April 29, 2025, Megatel filed a verified petition and application for injunctive relief
and a temporary restraining order, alleging a breach-of-contract claim based on the May 23,
2024, letter signed by Taylor. Megatel also requested a declaratory judgment that it had the legal
right to access and construct drainage improvements under the agreement.
The trial court held a three-day hearing on Megatel’s petition for a temporary injunction,
beginning on July 16, 2025, continuing on August 7, 2025, and concluding on August 29, 2025.
As in its petition, Megatel maintained that, if the requested relief was not granted, it would suffer
irreparable harm and face continued uncertainty about its rights. The Armstrongs argued that
Megatel’s requested relief was inappropriate because, among other things, a temporary
injunction is only necessary to preserve the status quo and allowing Megatel to access their
property to construct a drainage channel did not preserve the status quo. The Armstrongs also
argued that Megatel had a remedy at law in the form of monetary damages.
The trial court granted Megatel’s petition, and on September 3, 2025, it entered the
following order:
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1. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter and over the parties.
2. The Court hereby finds, for purposes of this Temporary Injunction
only, that [Megatel] has presented evidence sufficient to demonstrate: (1) a valid
cause of action; (2) a probable right to the relief sought (specific performance);
and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive
relief. The Court finds that [Megatel] has satisfied the requirements for a
temporary injunction under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 65.011.
These findings are made solely for purposes of this Temporary Injunction and are
further supported by the record as set forth below.
3. The Court hereby finds, for purposes of this Order only, that [the
Armstrongs] entered into a valid and enforceable agreement on May 23, 2024 (the
“Agreement”) (attached to [Megatel’s] Petition as Exhibit A), authorizing
[Megatel] to access [the Armstrong’s] property and construct flood control and
drainage improvements necessary for the Anacapri Phase 2 development.
[Megatel] substantially relied on this agreement by obtaining City approvals,
completing design and permitting, and mobilizing contractors. [The Armstrongs]
subsequently revoked access without legal justification, which constitutes a
breach of the agreement and threatens the viability of the development. [Megatel]
has demonstrated a probable right to relief on its claims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment.
1.[sic] [Megatel] has shown a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury
absent injunctive relief. [Megatel] faces immediate and irreparable harm,
including:
• The inability to construct a drainage system required to
comply with City ordinances and floodplain management
standards;
• The loss of permits and governmental approvals that are
expressly conditioned on the timely completion of public
infrastructure;
• Exposure to penalties, indemnity claims, and contractual
defaults under agreements with contractors, consultants,
lenders, and development partners;
• The potential collapse of the Anacapri Phase 2
development and loss of all future revenue streams derived
8
from home sales, community amenities, and related
commercial activities—totaling tens of millions of dollars;
• The devaluation of property within the project footprint that
can no longer be permitted, marketed, or developed as
planned;
• The loss of all of [Megatel’s] multi-million dollar
investment in design, entitlement, engineering, and
infrastructure—all of which were made in reliance on the
enforceability of the agreement and all of which become
sunk costs if the project cannot proceed[;]
• Loss and interference with [Megatel’s] use of its property
interests, including critical City permits and approvals;
[and]
• Public interest harm related to delayed infrastructure.
4. The Court further finds, for purposes of this Order only, that the
balance of equities favors [Megatel]. The harm to [Megatel’s]—loss of a
permitted development and massive investment—greatly outweighs any burden to
[the Armstrongs], who previously agreed to the improvements and derive benefit
from the infrastructure. The Court finds, for purposes of this Order only, that the injunction serves the public interest by enabling completion of required drainage
improvements as contractually agreed.
5. The Court further finds, for purposes of this Order only, that
[Megatel] has no adequate remedy at law. Monetary damages cannot fully
redress the consequences of halted construction, regulatory default, and cascading
development failures.
6. Accordingly, to preserve the status quo during the pendency of this
action, [the Armstrongs], and their officers, agents, employees, attorneys, and all persons acting in concert with them, are hereby RESTRAINED AND
ENJOINED from:
• Denying or obstructing [Megatel’s] reasonable access to
the subject property for the purpose of conducting drainage
construction as described in the parties’ May 23, 2024,
agreement;
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• Interfering with or delaying the completion of such
construction;
• Revoking or purporting to revoke the access previously
granted by the Agreement;
• Taking any action to impede, prevent, or delay the
implementation of the agreed drainage improvements
essential to the Anacapri Phase 2 development.[6]
This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
“A reviewing court should reverse an order granting injunctive relief only if the trial
court abused [its] discretion.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). “A
trial court abuses its discretion [when] it acts without reference to guiding rules and principles
such that the ruling is arbitrary or unreasonable.” Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Prods., LLC, 601
S.W.3d 704, 717 (Tex. 2020). “Under this standard, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings
if they are supported by the evidence, but we review legal determinations de novo.” State v. Loe,
692 S.W.3d 215, 226 (Tex. 2024) (citing Haedge v. Cent. Tex. Cattlemen’s Ass’n, 603 S.W.3d
6
The trial court’s temporary restraining order was not as broad as its temporary injunction order.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that [the Armstrongs] and all
of [the Armstrongs’] officers, agents, employees, and any persons acting in concert with [the
Armstrongs], are hereby immediately:
• Restrained from interfering with or obstructing [Megatel’s] access to the property to
survey and view the property. [The Armstrongs] are enjoined from preventing the
[Megatel] from “staking” the subject property. [Megatel] shall not destroy, impair,
conduct any tests, or otherwise physically change the subject property.
10
824, 827 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam)). It is not an abuse of discretion “if some evidence reasonably
supports the trial court’s decision.” Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211.
We confine our review to the evidence presented at the temporary
injunction hearing. A party seeking injunctive relief has the burden of pleading
and proving a probable right to relief. Butnaru[,84 S.W.3d at 204]. A trial court
abuses its discretion if it enters a temporary injunction unsupported by the
evidence. Operation Rescue-Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex.,
Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546, 560 (Tex. 1998).
State v. Zurawski, 690 S.W.3d 644, 654 n.3 (Tex. 2024).
B. Maintaining the Status Quo
“Except in limited circumstances, the law generally does not permit prejudgment
enforcement of a party's claims for relief.” Harley Channelview Props., LLC v. Harley Marine
Gulf, LLC, 690 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2024). “The extraordinary remedy of a temporary
injunction is one of those exceptions, intended to preserve the status quo until final judgment.”
Id.
“To obtain a temporary injunction, [the applicant] must show ‘(1) a cause of action
against the party to be enjoined; (2) a probable right to recover on that claim after a trial on the
merits; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury absent the temporary injunction.’”
Webb Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marshall, No. 24-0339, 2026 WL 1108676, *5 (Tex. Apr. 24,
2026) (quoting Harley Channelview Props., 690 S.W.3d at 37). If even one of these three
requirements is absent, an appellate court must reverse the injunction on appeal. Abbott v.
Harris Cnty., 672 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2023). That said, “[a] temporary injunction’s purpose is to
preserve the status quo of the litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits.” Clint
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538, 555 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at
11
204). “The ‘status quo’ is the ‘last, actual, peaceable, non-contested status which preceded the
pending controversy.’” Id. (quoting In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding) (quoting Janus Films, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 358 S.W.2d 589, 589 (1962)
(per curiam) (orig. proceeding))).
According to the Armstrongs, “The historic and current state of Anna’s acreage is
undisputed by the parties.” They contend that maintaining the status quo means that their
property remains “in its natural state without a drainage channel dividing it into two separate
pieces.” The Armstrongs assert that the trial court’s temporary injunction did not maintain the
status quo because it allowed Megatel to immediately enter their property and make changes to
their land, including constructing the drainage channel and modifying the current floodplain.
The Armstrongs argue that because the trial court’s temporary injunction did not maintain the
status quo but instead changed it, they ask this Court to dissolve the injunction in favor of
Megatel.
According to Megatel, the challenged temporary injunction preserves the status quo
pending trial on the merits of its lawsuit. Megatel contends, “The last peaceable, non-contested
status was the post-agreement relationship, where [the Armstrongs] cooperated for nearly a year
as Megatel proceeded with approvals and related work.” It concluded,
[T]he status quo is the last peaceful act prior to Armstrong’s breach. The status
quo is where Megatel has the right to build the drainage channel; not the alternate
world [the] Armstrong[s] created when [they] repudiated the parties’ agreement.
Otherwise, every party will exercise “self help” and claim the altered universe is
the status quo and can’t be disturbed. This memorializes a party’s “right” to
commit a wrong and avoid temporary relief.
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Courts in this State have consistently held that (1) the sole purpose of a temporary
injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final disposition of the underlying lawsuit, and
(2) when addressing the status quo, a trial court may not decide the merits of the parties’
underlying dispute. Wolfe v. Wolfe Madewell 2019 LLC, No. 05-24-01430-CV, 2025 WL
1994858, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 17, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.); Rios v. Frias, No.01-24-00142-CV, 2024 WL 4594836, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 29, 2024, no pet.)
(mem. op.); In the Matter of Prop. at Meandering Way Dallas, No. 05-21-00979-CV, 2022 WL
2302168, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 27, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); Bright Land & Cattle,
LLC v. PG-M Int’l, LLC, No. 07-16-00336-CV, 2017 WL 986181, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
Mar. 9, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); Patel v. St. Luke’s Sugar Land P’ship, L.L.P., 445 S.W.3d
413, 420 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied); Pharaoh Oil & Gas, Inc. v.
Ranchero Experanza, Ltd., 343 S.W.3d 875, 881 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.).
For instance, in 1957, the Beaumont Court of Appeals reasoned that (1) maintaining the
status quo before entry of a final judgment was so important that it dissolved the trial court’s
temporary injunction, even though it overruled the appellant’s argument that the appellee failed
to prove the three factors necessary to warrant entry of a temporary injunction, and (2) it could
not reach the underlying merits of the lawsuit. Taylor v. Gulf Oil Corp., 303 S.W.2d 541, 542–
43 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1957, no writ).
Taylor was a suit in trespass to try title between Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf Oil) and
Albert Lee Taylor (Albert). Id. at 541. The property at issue was 13.2 acres of a 100-acre tract
alleged to have been conveyed to Gulf Oil in 1915. Id. Albert maintained that he owned the
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13.2 acres under a ten-year statute of limitations. Id. The controversy arose when Gulf Oil
“attempt[ed] to cross a portion of one corner of the said 13.2 acres by burying thereon a saltwater discharge line from a well adjoining it.” Id. The saltwater discharge “line was to flow into
a cavity well on other property” owned by Gulf Oil, which also adjoined the 13.2 acres. Id.
Prior to the final disposition of the lawsuit, Gulf Oil sought a temporary injunction
against Albert that would prevent him from denying Gulf Oil and its agents access to the 13.2
acres for the purpose of laying pipeline and “preventing them from performing any act
appropriate to ownership of same, and from further molesting them or threatening them with
bodily harm if they attempt to do such acts upon said premises.” Id. at 542. At the hearing on
Gulf Oil’s petition, at least one of its agents testified that in October 1955, Albert obstructed Gulf
Oil’s “efforts to build a road across the 13.2 acres to a new well location.” Id.
After the trial court heard from both parties, it granted Gulf Oil’s request for temporary
injunctive relief. Albert appealed, arguing, among other things, that Gulf Oil failed to show
irreparable injury if its petition were denied and that Gulf Oil had an adequate remedy at law. Id.
at 542–43.
In dissolving the temporary injunction, the Beaumont Court of Appeals stated that the
trial court’s order “almost had the effect of determining the merits of the parties’ alleged titles to
the disputed property; of disrupting the status quo of the parties, and depriving [Albert’s], under
threat of contempt, of any use of the property whether consistent, or not, with [Gulf Oil]’s use of
the pipe line.” Id. at 542. The appellate court explained,
Of [Albert]’s six points of error, we overrule those relating to [Gulf Oil]’s failure
to establish an adequate remedy at law, irreparable injury, pressing necessity or
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the insolvency of [Albert], as it appears that these matters are of little, if any,
consequence upon a hearing for a temporary injunction, other matters considered.
We sustain those points, however, relating to the failure of the court to preserve
the status quo of the parties pending trial of the merits and, in effect, transferring
possession of the property to [Gulf Oil].
Id. at 542–43 (emphasis added). The appellate court stated that it was mindful of the trial court’s
broad discretion in determining whether to issue an injunction. Id. at 544. Yet, it concluded,
“Nevertheless, we are presented no authorities, and find none, to the effect that a trial judge
could, without an abuse of discretion, issue a temporary injunction under this like state of facts.”
Id.
Here, Megatel argues that the subject matter of this lawsuit is the May 23, 2024, letter
agreement and that the status quo was fixed the day Taylor allegedly breached its terms. In
support of its position, Megatel emphasizes that it worked with Taylor on Anacapri Phase 2 of
the residential-development project for several months after Taylor signed the May 23 letter.
Then, suddenly, Taylor became uncooperative and breached the parties’ agreement by refusing
to permit Megatel to enter the Armstrongs’ property to construct the water-drainage channel.
According to Megatel, because the contract was in effect at the time of Taylor’s breach,
maintaining the status quo meant that the parties would continue to act in accordance with the
terms of the contract, thereby giving Megatel the right to enter the Armstrongs’ property and
make modifications to it before the disposition of the underlying lawsuit.
The Armstrongs contend that the subject of the lawsuit is also the subject of the May 23
letter, namely, the Armstrongs’ land and Megatel’s ability or inability to alter it. Furthermore,
the Armstrongs maintain that the May 23 letter is not an enforceable contract and, therefore, the
15
trial court should have fixed the status quo at a time before the letter’s execution; that is, when
their land was in its natural state.
The trial court mentioned the status quo only once in its temporary injunction order,
stating,
Accordingly, to preserve the status quo during the pendency of this action,[the
Armstrongs], and their officers, agents, employees, attorneys, and all persons
acting in concert with them, are hereby RESTRAINED AND ENJOINED from:
• Denying or obstructing [Megatel’s] reasonable access to the
subject property for the purpose of conducting drainage
construction as described in the parties’ May 23, 2024[,]
agreement;
• Interfering with or delaying the completion of such
construction;
• Revoking or purporting to revoke the access previously granted
by the Agreement;
• Taking any action to impede, prevent, or delay the
implementation of the agreed drainage improvements essential
to the Anacapri Phase 2 development.
Based on the findings in its order, the trial court seemingly agreed with Megatel and
determined that Megatel and the Armstrongs had been “peaceable” up until the time of Taylor’s
alleged breach. From there, it “fixed” the status quo at a time just before that event occurred,
leaving the terms of the contract intact.
The Tyler Court of Appeals addressed the issue of “fixing” the status quo in Layton v.
Ball, 396 S.W.3d 747 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2013, no pet). In that case, several individuals (“the
range owners”) bought approximately 11.5 acres of land in Smith County, believing that it would
make an ideal shooting range. Id. at 750. In January 2011, the range owners began operating the
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property as a private shooting club. Id. The homeowners, who lived directly east of the gun
range, feared for their safety.7 Id. At least one of them “believed that bullets were leaving the
shooting range and entering his property.” Id. Alleging that the gun range was a nuisance, the
homeowners filed suit and sought a temporary injunction from the trial court that prevented the
range owners from using the property as a gun range.8
The trial court granted the homeowners’ requested injunctive relief. Id. The range
owners appealed, arguing, in part, that the status quo was the continued operation of the gun
range because it was already in operation when the homeowners filed suit to close it. Id. at 754.
The appellate court held that the range owners’ argument erroneously “presupposes that the
activity conducted on the date suit was filed necessarily controls the status quo determination.”
Id. The appellate court explained that “the status quo is the last actual, peaceable, noncontested
status that preceded the controversy.” Id. It noted that merely because some time had passed
“before the danger became apparent” and the homeowners sued the range owners, that passage
of time did “not necessarily fix the status quo on the date suit was filed.” Id. The appellate court
went on to hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that “the last actual,
peaceable, noncontested status that preceded the controversy was prior to the property’s use as a
shooting range.” Id.
7
One of the homes was located approximately twenty yards away from the shooting range. Layton, 396 S.W.3d at 750.
8
In the alternative, the homeowners asked the trial court to order the range owners to abate the nuisance by “making all reasonable improvements to protect the homeowners and their property from the danger presented by the shooting range.” Id.
17
Here, contrary to the trial court’s determination, the subject of the underlying lawsuit is
the enforceability of the May 23, 2024, letter, and this determination directly affects the parties’
rights regarding the Armstrongs’ land. Without the land, there would be no controversy.
Furthermore, the evidence presented during the trial court’s hearing on Megatel’s petition shows
that Megatel had not begun any modifications to the Armstrongs’ land. During oral argument,
Megatel conceded that no work had been done on the property. As such, the Armstrongs’ land
remained untouched (1) during the discussions between the parties prior to the creation of the
purported agreement, (2) after the parties entered into the purported agreement, (3) at the time
Megatel brought suit against the Armstrongs, (4) during the entire existence of the trial court’s
temporary injunction, and (5) during the pendency of this appeal. Simply stated, the
Armstrongs’ land has remained in its natural state since before this suit was filed and should
remain so until a final judgment is entered in this case.
Accordingly, the trial court erred when it granted Megatel temporary injunctive relief
because it altered—rather than preserved—the status quo.
C. Decision on the Merits
Texas courts have held, and continue to hold, that disrupting the status quo prior to the
disposition of the merits in the underlying case is prohibited and that the trial court cannot render
a decision on the merits of the case. See Marshall v. Marshall, No. 14-25-00322-CV, 2026 WL
585157, *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] March 3, 2026, pet. filed); Clint Indep. Sch. Dist.,
487 S.W.3d at 555; Stewart Beach Condo. Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Gili N Prop Invests., LLC,
481 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.); Leighton v. Rebeles, 343
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S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.); Friona Indep. Sch. Dist. v. King, 15 S.W.3d
653, 657 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.); Bright Land & Cattle, LLC, 2017 WL 986181,
at *2; Iranian Muslim Org. v. City of San Antonio, 615 S.W.2d 202, 208 (Tex. 1981); Brooks v.
Expo Chem. Co., 576 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Tex. 1979); Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 861–62
(Tex. 1978).
Here, the trial court’s temporary injunction order was effectively dispositive as to the
merits of Megatel’s breach-of-contract and declaratory-judgment claims (whether there was a
valid, enforceable contract that was breached by the Armstrongs), since it would allow work on
the property to commence. By fixing the status quo at a time just prior to the commencement of
the construction of the drainage channel, the trial court had to determine that the May 23, 2024,
letter constituted an enforceable agreement, which is the main claim in Megatel’s lawsuit. It
then, by allowing the construction of the drainage channel, prematurely awarded Megatel part of
the relief it sought in its underlying lawsuit. As a result, the Armstrongs immediately lost control
of a portion of their property and the opportunity to defend themselves in the underlying lawsuit
before Megatel was granted the right to make substantial changes to the land. See Bright Land &
Cattle, 2017 WL 986181, at *3 (“Finding that such an easement actually existed and specifying
its actual metes and bounds afforded Matra not only part of the declaratory relief it sought but
effectively resolved pivotal issues underlying the claims of tortious interference and promissory
estoppel.”). Thus, for all practical purposes, Megatel’s claims were already adjudicated on their
merits.
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For these reasons, we find that the trial court erred when it effectively determined the
merits of Megatel’s breach-of-contract and declaratory judgment claims.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the temporary injunction. The
temporary injunction is vacated, and we remand this case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Scott E. Stevens
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: March 25, 2026
Date Decided: July 8, 2026
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