Rel: July 17, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
CL-2026-0005
Ex parte Melester Ford
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Janae Mitchell
v.
Melester Ford)
(Dallas Circuit Court: CV-25-900116)
PER CURIAM.
Melester Ford has filed a petition for the writ of mandamus asking
this court to compel the Dallas Circuit Court to vacate certain
interlocutory orders entered against him and to dismiss the underlying
CL-2026-0005
case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. For the reasons stated below,
we grant the petition in part and deny it in part.
Background
On February 19, 2025, Ford filed a three-count complaint against
Janae Mitchell in the Dallas District Court ("the district court"). In the
first count, Ford alleged that Mitchell had breached a contract between
the parties in which Mitchell had "agreed to purchase [a] mobile home
for $7,000 at the rate of $147.12 per month, to pay a lot fee, provide
insurance, and pay the yearly state registration fees for the mobile home
...." In the second count, Ford stated a "replevin" claim seeking return of
the mobile home to him. In the third count, Ford alleged that he was the
owner of the lot upon which the mobile home sat, that Mitchell had failed
to pay the lot-rental fee, and that he had provided Mitchell with written
notice that her right to possession of the lot had been terminated; he
demanded possession of the lot and requested an award of $11,166.12 in
unpaid rent and late fees.
Mitchell did not appear for trial, and, on March 14, 2025, the
district court entered a judgment ("the district-court judgment") in favor
of Ford on all three counts, evicting Mitchell from the lot, awarding
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possession of the mobile home and the mobile-home lot to Ford, and
awarding Ford the requested damages. On March 20, 2025, Mitchell,
acting pro se, filed a postjudgment motion by letter, and, on April 11,
2025, after a hearing, the district court entered an order denying the
motion. On April 25, 2025, Mitchell appealed the district-court judgment
to the Dallas Circuit Court ("the circuit court").
On October 29, 2025, Ford failed to appear for trial, as scheduled
by the circuit court, and the circuit court entered an order in favor of
Mitchell ("the circuit-court order") in which it awarded her possession of
the mobile home and set a hearing to assess damages. On November 24,
2025, Ford filed a motion to vacate the circuit-court order, arguing that
he had failed to appear for the trial because he had not been notified of
the trial setting. On December 2, 2025, Ford filed a motion to dismiss
the case, arguing that the circuit court did not have subject-matter
jurisdiction over the case because Mitchell had not timely appealed the
district-court judgment. On December 3, 2025, the circuit court heard
oral arguments on those motions, and the circuit-court judge indicated
that the motions would be denied. Following the hearing, Ford filed a
motion labeled as a Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to vacate the
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circuit-court order as void.1 Later that day, the circuit court entered
written orders denying all of Ford's pending motions.
On January 7, 2026, Ford filed a petition for the writ of mandamus
in this court.
Issue
In the petition, Ford argues that the circuit court never acquired
subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying case because, he says,
Mitchell did not timely appeal the district-court judgment. Ford
maintains that the circuit-court order is void and that this court should
direct the circuit court to vacate that order and to dismiss the case.
Standard of Review
A petition for the writ of mandamus is a proper vehicle to review an
interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss and a motion to vacate
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Ex parte Johnson, 715 So. 2d
1Because the circuit-court order was not a final judgment, leaving
the case open for further proceedings to assess damages, see Lucky v.
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 46 So. 3d 966, 967 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009),
Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., did not apply. See generally Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Carmichael, 383 So. 2d 539 (Ala. 1980) (holding that Rule
60(b) applies only to final judgments and not to interlocutory orders).
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783 (Ala. 1998). We apply the following standard of review to Ford's
petition:
" 'Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ, to be issued
only where there is (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to
the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent
to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.' "
Ex parte Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So. 2d 307, 309-10 (Ala. 2003)
(quoting Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995)).
Analysis
Ford argues that the time for appealing the district-court judgment
was governed by Ala. Code 1975, § 35-9A-461(d), a part of the Alabama
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act ("the AURLTA"), Ala.
Code 1975, § 35-9A-101 et seq. The AURLTA applies to residential
landlord-tenant relationships. Ala. Code 1975, § 35-9A-102(c). The
AURLTA recognizes that a residential landlord may maintain an action
against a tenant for eviction in a district court. Ala. Code 1975, § 35-9A461(a) and § 35-9A-141(a)(5). Upon the entry of a final eviction judgment,
any party aggrieved by the judgment may appeal to the appropriate
circuit court. See generally Radcliff v. Hall Hous. Invs., Inc., 47 So. 3d
1258, 1262 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010).
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"Notwithstanding subsection (a) of [Ala. Code 1975, §] 12-12-70, any party may appeal from an eviction judgment entered
by a district court to the circuit court at any time within seven
days after the entry thereof. The filing of a timely postjudgment motion pursuant to the Alabama Rules of Civil
Procedure shall suspend the running of the time for filing a
notice of appeal. In cases where post-judgment motions are
filed, the full time fixed for filing a notice of appeal shall be
computed from the date of the entry in the civil docket of an
order granting or denying such motion, or the date of the
denial of such motion by operation of law pursuant to Rule
59.1 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure."
§ 35-9A-461(d).
Ford notes that Mitchell filed a postjudgment motion within six
days of the entry of the March 14, 2025, district-court judgment, which
the district court adjudicated by entering an order denying the motion on
April 11, 2025. Ford maintains that Mitchell had seven calendar days
from April 11, 2025, to file her notice of appeal. See § 35-9A-141(a)(3)
and Jones v. DeRamus, 199 So. 3d 74, 76 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (explaining
that, under § 35-9A-461(d), a tenant has seven calendar days to appeal
an eviction judgment). Because Mitchell did not file her notice of appeal
until April 25, 2025, Ford argues, Mitchell's appeal was untimely and did
not invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court, thereby rendering the
circuit court's subsequent proceedings void for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. See Boswell v. Lowery, 107 So. 3d 212 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012)
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(holding that residential tenant's failure to file a timely notice of appeal
to the circuit court pursuant to § 35-9A-461(d) was a jurisdictional defect
that prevented the circuit court from acquiring subject-matter
jurisdiction over the appeal and rendered circuit-court proceedings and
judgment void).
I. Does the AURLTA apply?
To ascertain whether § 35-9A-461(d) governs the time to appeal in
this case, we must first determine whether the AURLTA applies. In the
complaint, Ford alleged that he had sold a mobile home to Mitchell in
2019. According to the terms of the purchase agreement, which was
attached to Ford's complaint, the mobile home was located on a lot that
Ford owned. In her answer to the petition for the writ of mandamus,
Mitchell alleges, without contradiction, that she used the mobile home as
her residence. See Ex parte Butts, 355 So. 3d 861, 867 (Ala. Civ. App.
2021) (holding that uncontroverted factual assertions in answer to
petition for the writ of mandamus must be taken as true). In the
complaint, Ford alleged that Mitchell had defaulted on the purchase
agreement, and he sought damages for breach of contract and the return
of the mobile home under the theory of replevin.
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The AURLTA does not apply to an arrangement involving
"occupancy under a contract of sale of a dwelling unit or the property of
which it is a part, if the occupant is the purchaser or a person who
succeeds to the interest of the purchaser." Ala. Code 1975, § 35-9A122(2). A "dwelling unit" means "a structure or the part of a structure,
including a manufactured home, that is rented as a home, residence, or
sleeping place by one or more persons." § 35-9A-141(4). The materials
before this court show that the parties were involved in an arrangement
pursuant to which Mitchell occupied the mobile home as her dwelling
unit under a contract of sale, not pursuant to a rental agreement, cf.
Johnson v. Windham, 415 So. 3d 671 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024) (recognizing
that the AURLTA applies to mobile-home leases), thereby precluding
application of the AURLTA to that arrangement.
Ford also alleged in the complaint that the parties had entered into
a separate agreement pursuant to which Mitchell rented the lot upon
which the mobile home was located for an unspecified fee. That
arrangement did not establish a residential landlord-tenant relationship
that was governed by the AURLTA. See Ala. Code 1975, § 35-9A-102(c).
The AURLTA defines "landlord" to mean "the owner, lessor, or sublessor
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of the dwelling unit or the building of which it is a part, and it also means
a manager of the premises." § 35-9A-141(7). "Tenant" refers to "a person
entitled under a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling unit to the
exclusion of others." § 35-9A-141(16). Ford apparently owned the lot on
which the mobile home was located, but the lot was not a structure that
could be considered a dwelling unit. By entering into the lot agreement,
the parties formed a ground-lease agreement, authorizing Mitchell to use
the lot to park her mobile home, see Stockton v. CKPD Dev. Co., 982 So.
2d 1061, 1066 (Ala. 2007) (recognizing a ground lease as a lease of the
land only and not of the structures appurtenant thereto), not a rental
agreement allowing Mitchell to occupy a dwelling unit.
Because the AURLTA did not apply to the relationship between the
parties, § 35-9A-461(d) did not govern the time for appealing the March
14, 2025, district-court judgment.
II. What law governs the time for appeal?
It remains, however, that a circuit court may exercise jurisdiction
over an appeal from a district-court judgment only upon the timely filing
of a notice of appeal. Put conversely, the failure to file a timely notice of
appeal of a district-court judgment is a jurisdictional defect that prevents
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the circuit court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. See Croskey
v. Crawford, 177 So. 3d 468, 470 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014). Ford argues that
the appeal was not timely filed. Although he relies on § 35-9A-461(d) to
support his argument, we are not constrained by that argument to limit
our jurisdictional inquiry. See Ex parte Merrill, 264 So. 3d 855, 863 n.7
(Ala. 2018) (providing that "[an appellate court] may, in considering a
mandamus petition, raise on its own issues regarding the trial court's
lack of jurisdiction, even if those specific issues are not raised by the
parties"). Thus, we consider whether the appeal was untimely under the
applicable law.
In this case, Ford stated in his complaint breach-of-contract,
detinue, and unlawful-detainer claims. In the first count of the
complaint, Ford alleged that Mitchell had breached their purchase
agreement, and he sought compensatory damages. See Jadick v.
Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 98 So. 3d 5, 11 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)
(describing the elements of a breach-of-contract action). In the second
count of the complaint, Ford claimed a right to repossess the mobile home
as his personal property, which is the essence of a common-law replevin
action, now governed by Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-250 et seq., as a statutory
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detinue action. See Friedman v. Friedman, 971 So. 2d 23 (Ala. 2007)
(explaining that the common-law actions of replevin and detinue have
been combined into a statutory action for detinue under Ala. Code 1975,
§ 6-6-250 et seq.). In the third count of the complaint, Ford alleged that
Mitchell's leasehold interest in his lot had been terminated due to her
failure to pay the lot-rental fees, and he demanded possession of the lot,
along with damages for unpaid rent and late fees. See Ala. Code 1975, §
6-6-310(2) (defining "unlawful detainer" to mean "[w]here one who has
lawfully entered into possession of lands as tenant fails or refuses, after
the termination of the possessory interest of the tenant, to deliver
possession of the premises to anyone lawfully entitled or his or her agent
or attorney").
Section 12-12-70, Ala. Code 1975, provides that "[a]ny party may
appeal from a final judgment of the district court in a civil case by filing
notice of appeal in the district court, within 14 days from the date of the
judgment or the denial of a posttrial motion, whichever is later…."
Section 12-12-70 establishes a 14-day period to appeal a district-court
judgment that is applicable to most civil actions, including breach-ofcontract and detinue actions. See generally Cochran v. Wood, 504 So. 2d
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297 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986). However, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-350, governs
the time for appealing a judgment entered in an unlawful-detainer
action. See Shamburger v. Lambert, 24 So. 3d 1139, 1142 (Ala. Civ. App.
2009). Section 6-6-350 provides:
"Any party may appeal from a judgment entered against
him or her by a district court to the circuit court at any time
within seven days after the entry thereof, and appeal and the
proceedings thereon shall in all respects, except as provided
in [Ala. Code 1975, Title 6, Chapter 6, Article 8], be governed
by this code relating to appeal from district courts."
A party aggrieved by an adverse judgment in an unlawful-detainer action
has seven days to appeal the judgment.
III. The effect of the postjudgment motion
In all civil cases, including unlawful-detainer actions, the timely
filing of a postjudgment motion suspends the running of the time for
appealing a district-court judgment. See Ex parte Brown, 390 So. 3d
1119, 1120 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023). Rule 59(dc), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides
that a party generally has 14 days to file a postjudgment motion in a civil
action commenced in district court, but, for unlawful-detainer actions,
under § 6-6-350, a party must file a postjudgment motion within seven
days. In this case, Mitchell filed her postjudgment motion in the district
court within six days of the entry of the district-court judgment, so her
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postjudgment motion was timely filed as to all counts. The filing of the
postjudgment motion suspended the running of the time for filing a notice
of appeal.
The district court scheduled a hearing on the postjudgment motion
and entered an order purporting to deny the postjudgment motion on
April 11, 2025. However, a postjudgment motion in a district-court action
may remain pending for only 14 days, which, in this case, was until April
3, 2025, unless the time for ruling on the postjudgment motion has been
properly extended. See Rule 59.1(dc). By scheduling a hearing for April
11, 2025, the district court did not extend the time for ruling on the
postjudgment motion. See generally K.R. v. W.L., 238 So. 3d 664 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2017). Because the district court did not rule on the
postjudgment motion before April 3, 2025, and the time for ruling had
not been extended, the postjudgment motion was denied by operation of
law on that date. See Williams v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 192 So.
3d 4 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015). At that point, the time for filing a notice of
appeal commenced. The order entered on April 11, 2025, purporting to
deny the postjudgment motion was a legal nullity that did not extend the
time for filing the notice of appeal. See id.
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IV. Was the notice of appeal timely filed?
A. The appeal deadlines
Mitchell had 7 days from April 3, 2025, to file a notice of appeal
from the district-court judgment entered on Ford's unlawful-detainer
claim and 14 days from April 3, 2025, to file a notice of appeal from the
district-court judgment entered on Ford's other claims. Although Rule
6(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that, when a filing must be accomplished
within 11 days or less, "intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays" shall be excluded in the computation, that rule does not apply
to district-court unlawful-detainer actions. Rule 6(dc), Ala. R. Civ. P.
Thus, Mitchell had until April 10, 2025, to file the notice of appeal from
the judgment entered on Ford's unlawful-detainer claim. Mitchell had
until April 17, 2025, to file the notice of appeal as to the district-court
judgment entered on Ford's other claims.
B. The late filing and the excuse for late filing
Mitchell filed her notice of appeal on April 25, 2025, 22 days after
her postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law. Regardless of
the applicable appeal period, Mitchell did not file her notice of appeal
within the established deadlines.
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However, Mitchell maintains in her answer to the petition for the
writ of mandamus that she was prevented from timely filing her notice
of appeal by the clerk of the circuit court, who, we take judicial notice,
also serves as the clerk of the district court and is authorized to receive
notices of appeal from district-court judgments. See Premier Choice
Realty & Invs., Inc. v. Lumpkin, [Ms. CL-2025-0749, Feb. 27, 2026] ___
So. 3d ___ n.1 (Ala. Civ. App. 2026). Mitchell says:
"Initially, when [Mitchell] took her appeal for filing to the
Dallas County Clerk's Office, the Dallas County Circuit Clerk
would not accept the [a]ppeal for filing because bond in the
amount of $22,000 was not paid. [Mitchell] then filed her
notice of appeal on April 25[, 2025], 14 days later, ... due to
delay caused by the Circuit Clerk's office."
Accepting those uncontroverted averments as true, see Ex parte Butts,
supra, Mitchell attempted to file her notice of appeal on April 11, 2025,
but the clerk would not accept the filing without the posting of a bond in
approximately twice the amount of the district-court judgment.
Section 12-12-73, Ala. Code 1975, provides:
"A supersedeas bond in twice the amount of the judgment
shall be required of the appellant in any civil appeal to the
circuit court. Upon the filing of such supersedeas bond and
the timely filing of a notice of appeal, execution of the
judgment shall be stayed pending final judgment on appeal."
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However, that statute has been superseded by Rule 62(dc), Ala. R. Civ.
P., which removes the requirement of posting a supersedeas bond to
"require only a bond for costs or affidavit of substantial hardship,
approved by the court, in lieu of said bond." See Mitchell v. Dexter
Interiors, 381 So. 2d 90, 91 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980). Furthermore, the
posting of a bond for costs or the filing of an affidavit of substantial
hardship is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for appealing a district-court
judgment to the circuit court. See Penick v. Southpace Mgmt., Inc., 121
So. 3d 1015, 1019 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). Thus, the clerk erred by
assuming that Mitchell had to post a supersedeas bond in twice the
amount of the district-court judgment when filing her notice of appeal to
the circuit court and rejecting her notice of appeal when tendered on April
11, 2025.
In Ex parte G.L.C., 281 So. 3d 401 (Ala. 2018), a mother attempted
to file a notice of appeal of a judgment terminating her parental rights in
the Baldwin Juvenile Court on the last day of the appeal period.
Employees of the court misdirected the mother to the wrong office for
filing the notice, and, by the time she located the correct office, it was
closed for the day. The mother was directed to return the next day, and,
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when she did, her notice of appeal was accepted and filed. An assistant
clerk altered the date to indicate that the notice of appeal had been timely
filed the day before. The Baldwin Juvenile Court dismissed the appeal
as untimely, and this court affirmed the judgment of dismissal. The
Supreme Court of Alabama reversed this court's judgment, holding that
a filer cannot be prejudiced by the failure of the clerk to accept and docket
a notice of appeal that has been properly delivered for filing. The
supreme court held that the mother had been misled by judicial staff as
to the appropriate office for filing, which, the court said, had led to her
failing to place the notice of appeal in the physical possession of the
proper clerk on the due date. Under the circumstances, the supreme
court held that principles of equity required that the notice of appeal be
deemed timely filed. Based on Ex parte G.L.C., "if a party makes a bona
fide attempt in good faith to timely initiate an appeal and during that
process the party is prevented from doing so by an act or the inaction of
an employee of the judiciary, equity requires that the appeal be
considered timely." Johnson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 375 So. 3d 1241, 1254
(Ala. Civ. App. 2022).
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The principles of equity applied in Ex parte G.L.C. do not cure the
untimeliness of the notice of appeal from the district-court judgment
entered on Ford's unlawful-detainer claim. As shown above, Mitchell had
to file her notice of appeal from that judgment by April 10, 2025.
According to Mitchell herself, she did not deliver her notice of appeal to
the clerk until April 11, 2025, one day late. Ex parte G.L.C. applies only
when the party attempts to file the notice of appeal within the appeal
deadline, not afterward. See Ex parte Seibert, 386 So. 3d 781 (Ala. 2023).
Mitchell had already missed the appeal deadline for the judgment
entered on the unlawful-detainer claim, so any error the clerk may have
committed in refusing to accept her notice of appeal on April 11, 2025,
cannot be considered the reason why Mitchell missed the deadline. Ex
parte G.L.C. does not relieve Mitchell of her failure to promptly file a
notice of appeal from the judgment entered on the unlawful-detainer
claim.
On the other hand, the reasoning in Ex parte G.L.C. applies to the
appeal of the district-court judgment on Ford's other claims. According
to the answer to the petition for the writ of mandamus, Mitchell
attempted to file her notice of appeal on April 11, 2025, which would have
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been within the established deadline for filing a notice of appeal of the
judgment on the breach-of-contract and detinue claims, but she was
prevented from filing the notice of appeal by the error committed by the
clerk's office. Cf. T.E.B. v. C.A., 402 So. 3d 240, 247 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024)
(holding that a probate-court clerk had erred in refusing to accept
postjudgment motion for filing because it contained an electronic
signature, so motion would be deemed timely filed). Under these
circumstances, the notice of appeal relating to the district-court judgment
entered on the breach-of-contract and detinue claims is deemed to be
timely filed, even though it was not stamped filed until April 25, 2025.
The circuit court properly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal of the
judgment entered on those claims.
V. The motion to dismiss
Ford filed a motion to dismiss the case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),
Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing that the circuit court had not acquired subjectmatter jurisdiction because, he says, Mitchell had not timely appealed
the district-court judgment.
"The failure to file a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional
defect that prevented the circuit court from acquiring
jurisdiction over the appeal. See Kennedy v. Merriman, 963
So. 2d 86, 88 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007). 'A court must dismiss an
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appeal for lack of jurisdiction if a party does not appeal within
the time prescribed by statute.' Flannigan v. Jordan, 871 So.
2d 767, 770 (Ala. 2003)."
Shamburger, 24 So. 3d at 1142.
Mitchell did not file a timely notice of appeal from the judgment
entered on the unlawful-detainer claim, so the circuit court had a
mandatory duty to dismiss that part of the appeal relating to that claim.
The circuit court erred in denying Ford's motion to dismiss that part of
the appeal. But Mitchell did file a timely notice of appeal of the judgment
entered on the breach-of-contract and detinue claims, so the circuit court
did not err in denying the motion to dismiss those parts of the appeal.
VI. The motion to vacate the circuit-court order
In its order, the circuit court implicitly determined that Mitchell
had not breached the purchase agreement and that she was the rightful
owner of the mobile home. The circuit court awarded Mitchell possession
of the mobile home and scheduled a hearing for damages. The circuit
court had jurisdiction to enter that order because the breach-of-contract
and detinue claims were properly before it, and it acted within its
jurisdiction. See Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-257 (holding that, upon dismissal
of a detinue action, judgment may be entered for recovery of the property
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in dispute and assess damages for the detention of the property).
Because the circuit court acted within its jurisdiction, it did not err in
denying Ford's motion to vacate the circuit-court order.
In reaching that determination, we conclude that the circuit court
did not impermissibly adjudicate the unlawful-detainer claim in the
circuit-court order. The district court determined that Mitchell had
unlawfully detained possession of the mobile-home lot that Ford owned,2
and it evicted Mitchell from the lot and awarded Ford $11,162.11 in
damages. The circuit-court order did not make any determination that
Mitchell had lawfully maintained possession of the mobile-home lot; it
did not permit Mitchell to regain possession of the mobile-home lot; and
it did not vacate the award of damages to Ford on account of the unlawful
detainer. The circuit-court order did not alter the district-court judgment
relating to the unlawful-detainer claim in any respect. It remains that
Mitchell has been evicted from the mobile-home lot; that she, and her
personal property, can no longer occupy that lot; and that she is liable for
2In the complaint, Ford did not claim that he was leasing the mobile
home itself to Mitchell, and he did not state an unlawful-detainer claim
relating to her continued possession of the mobile home. Thus, the
district court did not find that Mitchell had unlawfully detained
possession of the mobile home.
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the unpaid lot-rental fees and late fees. The circuit court did not act
outside its jurisdiction to address the district-court judgment entered on
the unlawful-detainer claim.
Conclusion
We have concluded that, based on the materials before us, the
notice of appeal of the district-court judgment was not timely filed
regarding the unlawful-detainer claim. Accordingly, Ford has shown a
clear legal right to an order directing the circuit court to dismiss the
appeal of the district-court judgment entered on the unlawful-detainer
claim. Ford has not shown a clear legal right to any other requested
relief. We, therefore, grant the petition in part and deny the petition in
part. We direct the circuit court to dismiss the appeal of the district-court
judgment entered on the unlawful-detainer claim, and we deny all other
requested relief.
PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; WRIT
ISSUED.
All the judges concur.
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