Rel: July 17, ,2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704,
CL-2025-0705, and CL-2025-0706
K.W.
v.
B.P., T.S.P., and B.M.P.
Appeals from Lee Juvenile Court
(JU-17-515.02, JU-17-515.03, JU-17-515.04, JU-17-515.05,
and JU-17-515.06)
CL-2025-0901
Ex parte K.W.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Matter of N.R.S.W.)
(Lee Juvenile Court: JU-17-515.07)
CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, CL-2025-0706, and CL-2025-0901
FRIDY, Judge.
These appeals and this petition for a writ of mandamus arise from
a dependency and custody dispute between K.W. ("the mother") and
T.S.P. and B.M.P. ("the custodians") regarding N.R.S.W. ("the child").
The child has lived with the custodians since 2019, and they are
attempting to adopt her. Appellee B.P. is the child's paternal
grandmother ("the grandmother"), who had legal custody of the child
before she went to live with the custodians.
The Lee Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") entered an order of
dependency and custody on August 11, 2025, finding that the child
remained dependent and vesting sole legal and physical custody of the
child in the custodians. Several appeals have been taken as to that order.
Because we conclude that the order was not final, we dismiss each of the
appeals as being from a nonfinal judgment.
The mother's petition for a writ of mandamus involves a separate
action that the custodians initiated in the Lee Probate Court ("the
probate court") to adopt the child; that action was transferred to the
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juvenile court. For the reasons set forth herein, we deny the mother's
petition.
Background
This matter began in December 2017, when the grandmother filed
a dependency petition in the juvenile court. That action was designated
as case no. JU-17-515.01 ("the .01 action"). In her petition, the
grandmother asserted that the child, who was then three years old, and
her older sibling, A.F.W. ("the sibling"), were dependent. On February
12, 2018, after an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court entered an
order in which it found that the child and the sibling had been exposed
to domestic violence and that the mother and H.W. ("the father") had
failed to provide for their material needs and education, among other
things. Based on its findings, the juvenile court determined that the
child and the sibling were dependent, vested legal and physical custody
in the grandmother, and permitted the mother to have supervised
visitation. The grandmother encountered some difficulties caring for the
child and permitted the child to live in Georgia with the custodians
without notifying the juvenile court. The child had remained with the
custodians since going to live with them.
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After the juvenile court entered the judgment in the .01 action,
several individuals initiated actions in the juvenile court, including case
no. JU-17-515.02 ("the .02 action"), in which the custodians asserted that
the child was dependent; case no. JU-17-515.03 ("the .03 action"), which
appears to have involved the Lee County Department of Human
Resources in its supervisory capacity; case no. JU-17-515.04 ("the .04
action"), in which a different member of the child's extended family
asserted the child's dependency; case no. JU-17-515.05 ("the.05 action"),
in which the mother petitioned to modify custody of the child; and case
no. JU-17-515.06 ("the .06 action"), in which the grandmother petitioned
to modify custody of the child. The juvenile court consolidated those
actions and purported to resolve all of them in a single order that it
entered in the .02 action on July 17, 2025. The juvenile court amended
that order on August 11, 2025, to address the issue of child support.1
The petition for a writ of mandamus involves case no. JU-17-515.07,
which is an adoption proceeding that the custodians filed in the probate
court and that that court subsequently transferred to the juvenile court
1For ease of reference, we will refer only to the August 11, 2025,
order throughout this opinion.
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in June 2022 ("the adoption action"). The juvenile court did not
consolidate the adoption action with the dependency and custody
matters, and it has not entered a final judgment in that action although,
in the August 11, 2025, order, it determined "that [the mother's] parental
status should not be completely extinguished."
On May 11, 2026, this court consolidated the appeals and the
mandamus petition ex mero motu.
Analysis
The Appeals
Before this court can address the merits of the mother's appeals, we
must first determine whether the August 11, 2025, order is a final
judgment. "The question whether a judgment is final is a jurisdictional
question, and the reviewing court, on a determination that the judgment
is not final, has a duty to dismiss the case …." Horton v. Horton, 822 So.
2d 431, 434 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001). "[J]urisdictional matters are of such
magnitude that we take notice of them at any time and do so even ex
mero motu." Nunn v. Baker, 518 So. 2d 711, 712 (Ala. 1987).
In the August 11, 2025, order, the juvenile court identified the
various actions that it said had been "consolidated into" the .02 action,
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and it purported to reach resolutions of the claims presented in those
consolidated actions, including purporting to dismiss the .03 and .06
actions. However, the .02 action was the only action identified by case
number in the caption of the order, and it appears from the record on
appeal that the juvenile court entered the order only in that action. In
other words, while the order purported to resolve all the claims asserted
in the .02 through the .06 actions, the juvenile court entered the order
only in the .02 action.
It is well established that, when a trial court consolidates two or
more actions, those actions do not lose their separate identities, and each
action requires the entry of a separate judgment. Lindsey v. Pollard, 376
So. 3d 496, 502 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022) (citing League v. McDonald, 355 So.
2d 695, 697 (Ala. 1978)). See also Rule 42, Ala. R. Civ. P., and Ex parte
Glassmeyer, 204 So. 3d 906, 908-09 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (recognizing
that, in consolidated cases, although a trial court may specify that all
filings be made in only one case, a final judgment must be entered in each
separate case). Because the juvenile court did not enter the August 11,
2025, order in the .03 through .06 actions, that order, even though it
referenced those actions, cannot constitute a final judgment as to those
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CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, CL-2025-0706, and CL-2025-0901
actions, and this court does not have jurisdiction to consider the mother's
appeals from those actions.
We turn now to the question whether the August 11, 2025, order,
entered in the .02 action, was a final judgment sufficient to support an
appeal in that action. In the order, the juvenile court explained that it
had considered a significant amount of evidence in connection with the
actions, and, regarding the mother, it ultimately found that she had made
significant progress during the course of the litigation; that she had
presented "today as a markedly improved individual compared to the
person who first came before this Court"; and that, "[i]n light of her
marked improvement, and her past visitation with the child," it would
not terminate her parental rights.2 The juvenile court continued:
"That being said, [the mother] needs to ensure that she
does not add additional drama or trauma to [the child's]
childhood development in the [custodians'] home. These
circumstances are the natural consequences of [the mother's]
prior actions. She should do everything within her power not
to make things worse. One way she can do this is by being
supportive of [the child, the custodians], and their
2As none of the actions to which the August 11, 2025, order was
addressed involved a claim seeking to terminate the mother's parental
rights, the juvenile court's determination that it would not terminate the
mother's parental rights related to the custodians' adoption action, to
which the mother had objected.
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CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, CL-2025-0706, and CL-2025-0901
relationship with one another. This Order is premised on the
belief that [the mother] has progressed enough to do those
things; to selflessly put [the child's] development and wellbeing above her own desires. If she refuses, it may be grounds
for a reduction of access to [the child] or even adoption. In
other words, as long as [the mother] can be supportive of [the
child's] life with the [custodians], she can likely be a part of
[the child's] life. If she causes more problems for [the child],
access to [the child] may need to be reduced."
(Emphasis in the original.)
Based on its findings, the juvenile court awarded legal and physical
custody of the child to the custodians, permitted the mother and the child
to participate in joint counseling, and awarded the mother visitation with
the child, with the following caveat: "The [juvenile] court also reserves
jurisdiction to adjust visitation based on the circumstances until
February 1, 2026, at which time, unless there is an intervening motion
to reconsider visitation based on occurrences hereafter, this order of
visitation shall be deemed final."
In Trevino v. Blinn, 897 So. 2d 358 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004), this court
considered the finality of an order containing similar language regarding
a parent's visitation with a child. In that case, the trial court's order
provided that "the father's temporary custody will continue … 'until the
matter is brought before the court on motion of either party for an order
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CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, CL-2025-0706, and CL-2025-0901
of permanent custody' and that the mother shall have 'reasonable'
visitation with the child '[p]ending further orders . ' " Id. at 359. This court
characterized the order as leaving "the parties' rights to custody and
visitation for a final determination upon either party's filing a motion
reviving the issue" in the trial court. Id. at 359-60. We then concluded
that the trial court's order allowing the presentation of additional
testimony was an indication that the trial court did not consider the case
to be finally adjudicated on the merits after the entry of its postjudgment
order, and, therefore, we held that the order was not sufficiently final to
support an appeal. Id. at 360.
In this case, the juvenile court also left open the question of the
mother's visitation with the child and invited the parties to file a motion
to reconsider the visitation award within the next six months, indicating
that, like the trial court in Trevino, it did not consider the .02 action to
be finally adjudicated when it entered the August 11, 2025, order.
Therefore, we conclude that the August 11, 2025, order is not final for
purposes of appeal, and the appeal from the .02 action must also be
dismissed. Id.
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CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, CL-2025-0706, and CL-2025-0901
The Petition for a Writ of Mandamus
On August 25, 2025, the mother filed a motion seeking the entry of
a final judgment in the adoption action. She renewed her motion on
October 1, 2025, asserting that the August 11, 2025, order addressing the
dependency and custody actions had resolved the adoption action. On
October 2, 2025, the juvenile court entered an order indicating that the
adoption action was "reserved pending the final outcome of the other
cases," i.e., the dependency and custody actions. That day, the mother
filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this court, asking this court to
direct the juvenile court to enter a final judgment in the adoption action.
"This Court has consistently held that the writ of
mandamus is an extraordinary and drastic writ and that a
party seeking such a writ must meet certain criteria. We will
issue the writ of mandamus only when (1) the petitioner has
a clear legal right to the relief sought; (2) the respondent has
an imperative duty to perform and has refused to do so; (3)
the petitioner has no other adequate remedy; and (4) this
Court's jurisdiction is properly invoked. Ex parte Mercury
Fin. Corp., 715 So. 2d 196, 198 (Ala. 1997). Because
mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, the standard by
which this Court reviews a petition for the writ of mandamus
is to determine whether the trial court has clearly abused its
discretion. See Ex parte Rudolph, 515 So. 2d 704, 706 (Ala.
1987)."
Ex parte Flint Constr. Co., 775 So. 2d 805, 808 (Ala. 2000).
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We have no reason to believe that, once final judgments are entered
in the dependency and custody actions, the juvenile court will not enter
a final judgment in the adoption action, as it indicated it would in its
October 2, 2025, order. In other words, we cannot say that the juvenile
court has refused to perform its duty; instead, it has indicated when it
intends to perform that duty. The mother has failed to demonstrate that
the juvenile court is obligated to perform that duty earlier than it intends
to, particularly given how the adoption action and the dependency and
custody actions are intertwined. Therefore, the mother's petition for a
writ of mandamus is premature and is due to be denied. See Ex parte
Alabama Dep't of Hum. Res., 227 So. 3d 519, 521 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017.)
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed, the mother's appeals from the .02 action,
the .03 action, the .04 action, the .05 action, and the .06 action are
dismissed as being taken from nonfinal judgments. The juvenile court is
instructed to enter judgments consistent with this opinion. The mother's
petition for a writ of mandamus in the .07 action is denied.
The custodians' motion to strike one of the mother's letter briefs is
denied as moot. Their request for an attorney fee is denied.
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CL-2025-0702, CL-2025-0703, CL-2025-0704, CL-2025-0705, CL-2025-0706, and CL-2025-0901
CL-2025-0702 -- APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
CL-2025-0703 -- APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
CL-2025-0704 -- APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
CL-2025-0705 -- APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
CL-2025-0706 -- APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
CL-2025-0901 -- PETITION DENIED.
Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Bowden, JJ., concur.
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