NUMBER 13-25-00231-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
JOSE ANDRES LEON, Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI, Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE 347TH DISTRICT COURT
OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca
Appellant Jose Andres Leon appeals arguing the trial court improperly granted
appellee City of Corpus Christi’s (Corpus Christi) plea to the jurisdiction because he cured
the defects in his pleading. We hold Leon’s original petition failed to show a waiver of
immunity as to certain claims but that he effectively alleged a negligence claim against Corpus Christi for which the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) waives immunity because we
look at the nature of pleadings rather than a plaintiff’s labels. Accordingly, we reverse the
trial court’s judgment in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
This appeal arises from a car accident that occurred on September 29, 2022. Leon
alleged he was traveling west on FM 2444 in Nueces County when Ruben Rene Lopez,
driving in the scope and course of his employment with Corpus Christi, attempted to turn
left at an intersection as the traffic light turned red. The vehicles collided at the
intersection, allegedly causing injuries to Leon.
Leon filed suit on August 7, 2024. His original petition asserted causes of action
for negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence, identifying Lopez as a
“defendant” though he was not named as a party or served. Leon also alleged negligent
entrustment and gross negligence claims against Corpus Christi directly. Corpus Christi
filed its original answer asserting governmental immunity and other affirmative defenses.
No citation was ever issued for Lopez, and he did not make an appearance.
Corpus Christi then filed its plea to the jurisdiction arguing Leon failed to plead any
waiver of immunity in his petition and that there is no waiver of immunity for negligent
entrustment, gross negligence, or exemplary damages. Leon amended his petition on
February 3, 2025, removing the negligent entrustment and gross negligence claims
against Corpus Christi and instead asserting, more directly, that the negligence and
negligence per se claims were against Corpus Christi, the only listed defendant in the
style and identification of parties in the pleading. Leon’s recitation of the facts in his
original pleading made clear Lopez “was driving in the course and scope of his
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employment of [Corpus Christi].” In response, Corpus Christi amended its plea to the
jurisdiction to argue the statute of limitations had passed on September 29, 2024, and,
because Leon did not amend his petition to bring claims for negligence related to use of
a motor vehicle against Corpus Christi until after that date, such claims were barred by
limitations. Leon responded by arguing his amended pleadings were merely a
“clarification of the prior claims” and should relate back to the original filing date in August
2024 because they arose out of the same transaction or occurrence.
On February 7, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the amended plea to the
jurisdiction. At the hearing, Corpus Christi reiterated Leon’s failure to reference any waiver
of immunity in his original petition and argued Leon failed to assert any claims for which
there was a statutory waiver until after the statute of limitations passed. Because of this,
Corpus Christi asserted there was a jurisdictional defect at the time limitations passed
and that the relation-back doctrine cannot cure a jurisdictional defect present at the suit’s
inception.
Leon responded that Corpus Christi was the only defendant named in the caption
of his original petition and Lopez was not a party to the suit. He further argued he sent a
pre-suit letter to Corpus Christi putting it on notice of the negligence claims and that Lopez
was never intended to be a party. Further, under the relation-back doctrine, Leon
contended his claims arose out of the same occurrence and he amended his petition
merely “to make things clearer.” Corpus Christi responded that Leon’s original petition
clearly identified Lopez as a separate defendant with separate causes of action. The trial
court granted Corpus Christi’s plea on February 11, 2025.
Leon filed a motion for reconsideration arguing he should be allowed to amend to
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correct pleading defects unless the defect is incurable. He argued that he cured the
defects regarding parties and his case should be allowed to proceed. Corpus Christi
responded that Leon failed to raise any new legal argument meriting reconsideration. The
trial court held a hearing on this motion on March 21, 2025, where Leon argued he had
simply added a different cause of action against the same defendant already in the suit.
The trial court denied Leon’s motion on March 25, 2025. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
The parties do not dispute Leon’s suit as currently pled contains causes of action
for which the Texas Legislature waived Corpus Christi’s sovereign immunity. Instead, the
parties dispute whether Leon’s original petition only asserted valid causes of action
against Lopez and whether Leon’s amendments after the statute of limitations to assert
these causes against Corpus Christi can relate back to the original filing date.
A. Standard of Review
“A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of subject matter jurisdiction;
that is, the court’s power to decide the case.” Herrera v. Mata, 702 S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex.
2024) (per curiam) (citing Suarez v. City of Texas City, 465 S.W.3d 623, 632 (Tex. 2015)).
“The trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo.”
Id. (citing Hou. Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. City of Houston, 487 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Tex.
2016)). In de novo review, we give no deference to the trial court’s decision. In re Est. of
Slaughter, 305 S.W.3d 804, 808 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (citing Quick v.
City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1998)).
Leon bore the initial burden to plead facts affirmatively demonstrating the trial
court’s jurisdiction. See Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex.
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2019). Jurisdiction can then be challenged based either on the pleadings or on the
existence of jurisdictional facts. Jones v. Turner, 646 S.W.3d 319, 325 (Tex. 2022). We
construe pleadings liberally in favor of the pleader and Leon “should be afforded the
opportunity to amend” if the challenged jurisdictional defect may be cured with further
factual allegations. Tex. Tech Univ. Sys. v. Martinez, 691 S.W.3d 415, 419 (Tex. 2024).
We cannot sustain a plea to the jurisdiction if the pleadings generate a fact question.
Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette County, 453 S.W.3d 922, 927 (Tex. 2015) (per
curiam); City of Corpus Christi v. Muller, No. 13-18-00443-CV, 2019 WL 2384162, at *1
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg June 6, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
However, it is foundational that the “party suing the governmental entity bears the
burden of affirmatively showing waiver of immunity.” City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640
S.W.3d 523, 528 (Tex. 2022). This can be shown “either by reference to a statute or to
express legislative permission.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.
1999) (per curiam). Thus, Leon can only survive a plea to the jurisdiction “by showing that
the statute ‘clearly and affirmatively waive[s] immunity’ and by also ‘negating any
provisions that create exceptions to, and thus withdraw, that waiver.’” City of Austin v.
Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437, 447 (Tex. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Rattray v. City
of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 867 (Tex. 2023)). “If the pleadings affirmatively negate
the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing
[Leon] an opportunity to amend.” Tex. Dept. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
217, 227 (Tex. 2004).
B. Applicable Law
“Sovereign immunity includes two distinct principles, immunity from suit and
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immunity from liability.” Id. at 224. “[I]mmunity from suit deprives a court of subject matter
jurisdiction.” Id. Corpus Christi, as a political subdivision of the State, is generally immune
from suit unless immunity has been clearly and unambiguously waived by the Legislature.
See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034; City of Houston v. Hou. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 549
S.W.3d 566, 576 (Tex. 2018). The TTCA establishes governmental units such as Corpus
Christi are liable for harm proximately caused by “the wrongful act or omission or the
negligence of an employee acting within his scope of employment if” arising from the
operation or use of a motor vehicle. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.021(1)(A), .025.
It is important to note “the [TTCA] does not create a cause of action; it merely waives
sovereign immunity as a bar to a suit that would otherwise exist.” City of Tyler v. Likes,
962 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Tex. 1997).
This Court previously concluded that limitations “is a jurisdictional requirement for
claims brought against a governmental entity.” Tucker v. City of Corpus Christi, 622
S.W.3d 404, 407 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2020, pet. denied) (citing Prairie
View A & M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 515 (Tex. 2012)). Personal injury
negligence claims have a two-year limitations period. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 16.003. “The two-year limitations period is a statutory requirement that must be met
before suit is filed.” Tucker, 622 S.W.3d at 407. However,
[i]f a filed pleading relates to a cause of action . . . that is not subject to a
plea of limitation when the pleading is filed, a subsequent amendment or
supplement to the pleading that changes the facts or grounds of liability or
defense is not subject to a plea of limitation unless the amendment or
supplement is wholly based on a new, distinct, or different transaction or
occurrence.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.068.
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C. Discussion
The primary consideration in this matter is the effect of Leon’s original petition filed
prior to limitations running. In his original petition, Corpus Christi is the only named
defendant in the caption, the only served defendant, and the factual background
described Lopez as “driving in the course and scope of his employment.” Meanwhile, the
petition refers to Lopez as a defendant and alleges negligence as a cause of action
against him, but Lopez is not otherwise named as a party to the suit.
As an initial matter, it is clear the Texas Legislature did not waive immunity for
negligent entrustment claims. See Campos v. Nueces County, 162 S.W.3d 778, 787–88
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, pet. denied); Waldon v. City of Longview, 855
S.W.2d 875, 880 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, no pet.). Further, the TTCA expressly bars the
recovery of exemplary damages. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.024. Therefore,
Leon failed to affirmatively show a valid waiver of immunity as to these claims on the face
of his pleading. See Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 528; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 101.021(1)(A). The trial court’s dismissal of these claims for lack of jurisdiction is
therefore affirmed.
The crux of this appeal is whether Leon’s original petition sued a governmental
entity when it asserted negligence on part of the governmental employee in the course
and scope of his employment—which would grant subject-matter jurisdiction—or if the
original petition only directed that claim against Lopez, creating a nullity and precluding
the attempted cure of pleading deficiencies. See Dallas County v. Lewis, No. 05-25-00271-CV, 2025 WL 2783559, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 5, 2025, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (noting “[t]he relation-back doctrine cannot be used to create jurisdiction where none
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existed”); Goss v. City of Houston, 391 S.W.3d 168, 175 (Tex. App.—Houston 2012, no
pet.) (noting that if the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the original suit, the “original
petition was a nullity and could neither toll limitations nor create subject matter jurisdiction”
over the amended petition). Leon appeared to concede his pleadings were mistaken
because he amended his petition in February 2025 to clarify his negligence claims were
specifically against Corpus Christi. But Leon argues the relation-back doctrine renders
his amended petition timely. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.068. Conversely,
Corpus Christi contends this amendment was untimely because limitations had run and
the original petition never created proper jurisdiction to which Leon could relate back. See
Tucker, 622 S.W.3d at 407; Goss, 391 S.W.3d at 175.
The Texas Supreme Court has consistently directed courts to “look not merely to
the labels chosen by the plaintiff but instead to the gravamen of the facts alleged to
determine how to treat the claim.” Pitts v. Rivas, 709 S.W.3d 517, 523 (Tex. 2025); see
B.C. v. Steak N Shake Operations, Inc., 512 S.W.3d 276, 283 (Tex. 2017) (“The
gravamen of a claim is its true nature, as opposed to what is simply alleged or artfully
pled, allowing courts to determine the rights and liabilities of the involved parties.”). While
this rule is typically applied in instances where a plaintiff uses artful pleading “to avoid a
litigation hurdle such as the statute of limitations,” we apply it here to discern the nature
of Leon’s claims and “determine the rights and liabilities of the involved parties.” Steak N
Shake Operations, Inc., 512 S.W.3d at 283; see also CHRISTUS Health Gulf Coast v.
Carswell, 505 S.W.3d 528 (Tex. 2016) (holding same in health care liability context); City
of Watagua v. Gordon, 434 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. 2014) (holding same in excessive force
context); Coe v. DNOW LP, 718 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025)
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(holding same in preemption context). Therefore, we review the facts Leon alleged to
determine how to treat his claims.
Despite labeling his negligence claim against Lopez as a “defendant,” Leon did not
name Lopez as a defendant in the caption or attempt to serve him with the petition.
Examining “the gravamen of the facts” as we must do, we note Leon alleged that Lopez
was “driving in the course and scope of his employment” for Corpus Christi and committed
a negligent act while doing so. Pitts, 709 S.W.3d at 523. Additionally, we observe the
record shows a citation was requested and issued only for Corpus Christi, supporting
such a reading of Leon’s original petition. The allegation that a governmental unit’s
employee committed a negligent act using a motor vehicle waives immunity from suit
against that governmental unit. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(1)(A).
Further, the Texas Supreme Court has held “all tort theories alleged against a
governmental unit, whether it is sued alone or together with its employees, are assumed
to be ‘under [the TTCA]’ for purposes of section 101.106.”1 Mission Consol. Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex. 2008) (quoting Newman v. Obersteller, 960
S.W.2d 621, 622 (Tex. 1997)). Therefore, alleging Corpus Christi’s employee was
negligent while driving for Corpus Christi is treated as under the purview of the TTCA.
See id. The Texas Supreme Court has also already held in the inverse of this case, where
a governmental unit is substituted as defendant for a claim against its employee, that
“there was no change in the real party in interest” and the unit accordingly “cannot prevail
on its defense of limitations.” Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at S.A. v. Bailey, 332 S.W.3d
395, 402 (Tex. 2011).
1 Section 101.106 bars relief against a governmental unit if suit is filed against the employee only,
and vice versa. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.106(a), (b).
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While there is a clear preference that a plaintiff’s original petition explicitly
reference the basis for waiver, this rule does not bar a claim if the plaintiff eventually
makes the proper reference. See Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638. Leon’s amended petition
subsequently referred to the proper statutory waiver in response to the plea to the
jurisdiction, as he is permitted to do. See Martinez, 691 S.W.3d at 419. Accordingly,
despite the labeling, and construing the pleadings liberally for Leon as we are required to
do, we treat the negligence claim in Leon’s original petition as a negligence claim against
Corpus Christi. See id.; Pitts, 709 S.W.3d at 523.
Further, in a case where a plaintiff mistakenly filed suit directly against a
governmental unit’s agent for service of process instead of the unit, our sister court of
appeals held the suit was not barred by limitations because the unit had notice of the suit
and was not disadvantaged. See Wright v. Tex. Dept. of Crim. Just.-Institutional Div., 68
S.W.3d 788, 791 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). While that matter was
a misidentification case, we still find this reasoning persuasive in consideration of how to
construe Leon’s pleading. Here, Corpus Christi had notice of the suit and the factual
nature of the claims, was a party from the beginning of litigation, and, thus, was not
disadvantaged. See id.
Having determined Leon’s original petition effectively asserted a negligence claim
against Corpus Christi, we review the relation-back doctrine. “Texas courts apply a twopronged test to determine whether an amended pleading relates back to an earlier
pleading for purposes of limitations.” Goss, 391 S.W.3d at 174–75. The original cause of
action must not have been time-barred when filed and the amended grounds of liability
cannot be “based on a new, distinct, or different transaction or occurrence.” Id. at 175.
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However, “[t]he relation-back doctrine cannot be used to create jurisdiction where none
existed.” Lewis, 2025 WL 2783559, at *7. If the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the
original suit, the “original petition was a nullity and could neither toll limitations nor create
subject matter jurisdiction” over the amended petition. Goss, 391 S.W.3d at 175.
Applying this test, we determine Leon’s original petition established the trial court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction and was not a nullity. See id. Leon’s amended petition is valid
under the relation-back doctrine because the original negligence claim was not timebarred when filed and is not based on a different occurrence, as all of Leon’s claims are
based on the September 2022 car accident. See id.; Lewis, 2025 WL 2783559, at *7.
Leon clarifying the only valid party he could sue was the subject of his claims does not
defeat his earlier factual allegations that Lopez was acting in the scope of Lopez’s
employment with Corpus Christi when Lopez committed the alleged negligent act—
bringing this case squarely within the waiver of immunity under the TTCA.
While limitations is jurisdictional in the plea to the jurisdiction context, our
determination that the original petition timely established the subject-matter jurisdiction of
the trial court resolves this issue. See Tucker, 622 S.W.3d at 407. The relation-back
doctrine is not creating jurisdiction here because Leon timely filed his suit prior to
limitations running and put Corpus Christi on notice of the nature of his claims that Lopez
was negligent while driving in the course of his employment with Corpus Christi. See id.;
see also Lewis, 2025 WL 2783559, at *7. Leon met the statutory prerequisite to suit when
he timely filed his negligence claim alleging specific facts establishing a waiver of
governmental immunity. See Tucker, 622 S.W.3d at 407; Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638; City of
Mission v. Cantu, 89 S.W.3d 795, 803 n.9 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, no
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pet.) (“[A] party seeking to establish jurisdiction may not simply plead a general waiver of
sovereign immunity under this section but must state a claim for which liability is created
under section 101.021.”).
Our determination affirms the purpose of statutes of limitations, which is to require
“a person to bring suit within a specified time after the cause of action accrues,” Ferrer v.
Almanza, 667 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. 2025), and “to advise the defendant of the claims
against him in a timely fashion so that he may prepare his defense and preserve evidence
before the lapse of time has rendered this process, difficult, if not impossible.” Broom v.
MacMaster, 992 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.). Here, Leon brought
his suit within the specified two-year period and the original petition advised of the factual
basis of the claim: the negligence of Corpus Christi’s employee Lopez while driving in the
scope of his employment. See Ferrer, 667 S.W.3d at 738; Broom, 992 S.W.2d at 664.
Limitations should not enable a party to “lay behind the log” and “wait until a statute runs
before disclaiming responsibility and pointing a finger at a related entity that is actually
responsible.” Brinker Tex., L.P. v. Looney, 135 S.W.3d 280, 285 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2004, no pet.) (quoting Craft v. Prestige Furniture, Inc., No. 05-98-00380-CV, 2000 WL
566877, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 26, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication)).
To be clear, these equitable concerns do not control the day because limitations is a
jurisdictional matter in this context, but the equitable concerns surrounding statutes of
limitations further support why Leon’s suit should not be barred by limitations under these
facts. See Tucker, 622 S.W.3d at 407; see also Brinker Tex., 135 S.W.3d at 285; Goss,
391 S.W.3d at 174 (holding equitable tolling doctrine does not apply to claims against
governmental units).
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We sustain Leon’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s grant of the amended plea to the jurisdiction as it relates
to the negligence claim only, affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the remaining claims, and
remand for further proceedings.
YSMAEL D. FONSECA
Justice
Delivered and filed on the
16th day of July, 2026.
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