[Cite as State v. Jones, 2026-Ohio-2778.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PORTAGE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2026-P-0005
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
LYNDEN A. JONES,
Trial Court No. 2021 CR 00453
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: July 20, 2026
Judgment: Affirmed
Connie J. Lewandowski, Portage County Prosecutor, and Timothy P. Bogner, Assistant Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Wesley C. Buchanan, 50 South Main Street, Suite 625, Akron, OH 44308 (For Defendant-Appellant).
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Lynden A. Jones, appeals the judgment denying his request for
jail-time credit. We affirm.
{¶2} In 2021, Jones was convicted of reckless homicide with a firearm
specification and tampering with evidence. The trial court sentenced Jones to 36 months
in prison on each charge and the specification, to be served consecutively, for a total of
nine years in prison. In the sentencing entry, the trial court ordered that Jones “shall
receive credit for the 115 days he has spent in the Portage County Jail in the above styled
offense(s), as stipulated to on the record. This credit includes jail time up to the date of sentencing and does not include any subsequent time awaiting conveyance to the
reception facility.” There is no indication as to where in the record a stipulation of jail-time
credit may be located.
{¶3} Jones filed a direct appeal, and this court affirmed his convictions. State v.
Jones, 2022-Ohio-3978, ¶ 2 (11th Dist.). He did not raise the issue of jail-time credit in
his appeal.
{¶4} Thereafter, in 2024, Jones filed a motion for jail-time credit, stating, in
relevant part:
In this case, Defendant was arrested by the United States
Marshal Service, in the State of Texas, on February 8, 2021,
pursuant to a warrant issued by the Portage County Court of
Common Pleas. Defendant was held at the Lake Travis
County Jail, Lake Travis County, Texas and remained in the
custody of the Lake Travis County Jail Sheriff for 94 days; until
May 12, 2021, when he was extradited to Portage County,
Ohio. Defendant was held at the Portage County Jail for 115
days, through all pretrial, plea and sentencing hearings; until
September 4, 2021, when he was transported to the reception
center to begin serving his sentence in this case. Upon
arriving to the reception center, Defendant discovered the
[Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction] credited
him with only 141 days of jail-time credit.
{¶5} The trial court denied the motion in an entry dated January 25, 2024,
stating:
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant’s pro se
motion for additional jail[-]time credit.
Said motion is hereby denied. Defendant has received credit
for all days he is entitled to from time spent in the Portage
County Jail. He is not entitled to receive credit for time spent
in Texas where he was arrested on the charges in the above
case, prior to extradition.
{¶6} Jones did not appeal the January 25, 2024 judgment.
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Case No. 2026-P-0005
{¶7} In 2025, Jones again filed a motion for jail-time credit, to which he attached
a supporting affidavit. In his motion and affidavit, Jones stated that he received only 141
days of jail-time credit, but he was held for 92 days in Texas before extradition to Ohio,
where he spent another 145 days in custody as of October 3, 2021. Jones averred that
he had made efforts to obtain records of confinement from the institutions where he was
held, but he had not received a response. The trial court denied the motion in an entry
dated July 31, 2025, stating:
The Court finds this matter is before the Court on Defendant’s
pro se request for jail[-]time credit from Texas.
Said motion is not well taken and is hereby denied. This
request was ruled on by this court previously.
{¶8} Thereafter, Jones filed a delayed notice of appeal of the July 31, 2025 entry
with leave of this court.
{¶9} In his sole assigned error, Jones argues:
{¶10} “The trial court erred as a matter of law by not giving Lynden the proper jail[-]time credit.”
{¶11} R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i) requires a sentencing court that imposes a prison
term on an offender to:
Determine, notify the offender of, and include in the
sentencing entry the total number of days, including the
sentencing date but excluding conveyance time, that the
offender has been confined for any reason arising out of the
offense for which the offender is being sentenced and by
which the department of rehabilitation and correction must
reduce the definite prison term imposed on the offender as the
offender’s stated prison term or, if the offense is an offense
for which a non-life felony indefinite prison term is imposed
under division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the
Revised Code, the minimum and maximum prison terms
imposed on the offender as part of that non-life felony
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Case No. 2026-P-0005
indefinite prison term, under section 2967.191 of the Revised
Code. The court’s calculation shall not include the number of
days, if any, that the offender served in the custody of the
department of rehabilitation and correction arising out of any
prior offense for which the prisoner was convicted and
sentenced.
{¶12} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii):
The sentencing court retains continuing jurisdiction to correct
any error not previously raised at sentencing in making a
determination under division (B)(2)(g)(i) of this section. The
offender may, at any time after sentencing, file a motion in the
sentencing court to correct any error made in making a
determination under division (B)(2)(g)(i) of this section, and
the court may in its discretion grant or deny that motion. If the
court changes the number of days in its determination or
redetermination, the court shall cause the entry granting that
change to be delivered to the department of rehabilitation and
correction without delay. Sections 2931.15 and 2953.21 of the
Revised Code do not apply to a motion made under this
section.
(Emphasis added.) “It appears to be well-settled that credit is to be given for time spent
awaiting extradition on the subject offense.” State v. Painter, 2009-Ohio-4929, ¶ 28 (11th
Dist.).
{¶13} “Although R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) ‘allows a defendant to raise an issue
regarding his jail-time credit in a post-conviction motion,’ he can do so ‘only when the
issue was not considered during the sentencing hearing. If an issue was raised and
considered at the time the trial court rendered its original credit ruling, it cannot be
asserted again in a motion for additional credit.’” State v. Lacy, 2021-Ohio-1776, ¶ 10
(11th Dist.), quoting State v. Guiterres, 2016-Ohio-5572, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.), citing State v.
Smith, 2015-Ohio-4465, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). “‘Moreover, in moving for an additional credit,
the defendant has the burden of demonstrating that their argument was not previously
considered at sentencing.’” Lacy at ¶ 10 Guiterres at ¶ 15, citing Smith at ¶ 10.
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Case No. 2026-P-0005
{¶14} Because R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii) provides the trial court with discretion to
grant or deny a motion to correct jail-time credit, the court’s ruling on the motion is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. McClafferty, 2020-Ohio-3238, ¶ 32 (11th
Dist.). “An abuse of discretion is the trial court’s ‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable,
and legal decision-making.’” Id., quoting State v. Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62 (2d
Dist.), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.Rev. 2004).
{¶15} Here, Jones argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to
credit him for the time he spent in pretrial confinement in Texas. However, Jones fails to
recognize the provision in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii), which states that the sentencing
court has jurisdiction to correct a jail-time credit error “not previously raised at sentencing.”
{¶16} Although Jones has made no attempt to meet his burden of demonstrating
that this issue was not raised at sentencing, the record contains the sentencing transcript.
Therein, during defense counsel’s remarks, he acknowledged that charges were brought
against Jones in Texas, but those charges were dismissed after further investigation and
had not been refiled against him. Defense counsel then stated:
[Jones] has been incarcerated for 211 days now on this
matter.
Obviously, not all of it in Ohio. As we were waiting for Texas
to conduct their hearings and transport him back to Ohio -- or
allow Ohio to come pick him up for those hearings.
And he knows that there's going to be more days to follow,
we’re not saying that 211 days should satisfy everything.
{¶17} After announcing sentence, the trial court stated that it would credit Jones
for the jail time he had served but did not specifically state the number of days of credit
he would receive. As discussed above, in the sentencing entry, the trial court credited
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Case No. 2026-P-0005
Jones with 115 days as of the date of sentencing, and the issue of jail-time credit was not
raised on direct appeal.
{¶18} Assuming, without deciding, that the reference to Jones’ jail time in Texas
was insufficient to constitute “rais[ing]” the issue at sentencing pursuant to R.C.
2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii), we note that the trial court denied the motion for jail-time credit
because it had previously ruled on the request. Thus, the trial court effectively denied the
motion based on the doctrine of res judicata.
{¶19} “Prior to the enactment of R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii), an offender was able
to seek correction of an error made in determining jail-time credit only on direct appeal.”
State v. Smith, 2017-Ohio-4124, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Rankin v. Ohio Adult
Parole Auth., 2003-Ohio-2061, ¶ 10. “Motions to correct errors made in determining jailtime credit filed outside the time allowed for direct appeal were barred by the doctrine of
res judicata.” Smith at ¶ 11, citing State v. Spillan, 2006-Ohio-4788, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.). See
also State v. Ketterer, 2010-Ohio-3831, ¶ 59 (Generally, “[r]es judicata bars the assertion
of claims against a valid, final judgment of conviction that have been raised or could have
been raised on appeal.” (Citing State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175 (1967), paragraph nine
of the syllabus.)).
{¶20} Since the enactment of “R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii), res judicata will not bar
a motion to correct errors in jail-time credit filed after the time for appeal has passed; this,
however, does not imply that res judicata is never applicable to such motions.” Smith at
¶ 11. Instead, this court has applied the doctrine in instances where an appellant has filed
successive motions for jail-time credit. State v. Cretella, 2018-Ohio-3245, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.);
State v. Watson, 2017-Ohio-8631, ¶ 8 (11th Dist.).
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{¶21} Here, as in Watson at ¶ 9, “[a]fter the trial court denied [Jones]’s first motion
for additional jail-time credit, he had the opportunity to fully contest that decision in an
appeal to this court. Therefore, res judicata bars him from raising the same issue in
successive motions or in an appeal from one of those motions.”
{¶22} Accordingly, Jones’s assigned error lacks merit.
{¶23} The judgment is affirmed.
MATT LYNCH, P.J.,
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,
concur.
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Case No. 2026-P-0005
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignment of error
lacks merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Portage
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI
PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH,
concurs
JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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