[Cite as State v. Weddle, 2026-Ohio-2766.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-L-085
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
ROBERT F. WEDDLE,
Trial Court No. 2024 CR 000879
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: July 20, 2026
Judgment: Affirmed
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Jennifer A. McGee, Assistant Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Eric M. Levy, The Law Office of Schlachet and Levy, Terminal Tower, Suite 2200, 50 Public Square, Cleveland, OH 44113 (For Defendant-Appellant).
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Robert F. Weddle (“Weddle”), appeals from the
judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to an indefinite
prison term of five to seven-and-a-half years in prison following his plea of guilty to one
count of felonious assault, a felony of the second degree, in violation of R.C.
2903.11(A)(1).
{¶2} On appeal, Weddle alleges that his sentence, imposed as mandatory time,
is contrary to law because the prior offense was based on a Michigan statute, and the
court did not make oral findings that the Michigan conviction was “substantially equivalent” to trigger R.C. 2929.13(F)(6). Weddle, acknowledging that he failed to object,
argues alternatively that his counsel was ineffective. Second, Weddle challenges the trial
court’s imposition of restitution in the amount of $290. Finally, Weddle asserts that the
trial court failed to pay attention to his witness or consider his testimony at sentencing
because the judge inquired regarding a poster of David Bowie visible in the witness’s
camera.
{¶3} Upon review, we conclude that our review is confined to plain error as
Weddle failed to lodge any objections at the trial court level with respect to these issues.
Each of these contentions are made for the first time on appeal. Further, we conclude
that Weddle’s sentence was proper pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F)(6). We find no plain error
in the trial court’s order of restitution, and the record indicates that the trial judge was
attentive during the mitigation witness’s testimony.
{¶4} Accordingly, the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed.
Substantive and Procedural Facts
{¶5} In December 2024, a Lake County Grand Jury indicted Weddle on four
counts: one count of felonious assault, a felony of the second degree, in violation of R.C.
2903.11(A)(1) (“Count 1”); one count of domestic violence, a misdemeanor of the first
degree, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A) (“Count 2”); one count of unauthorized use of
vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first degree, in violation of R.C. 2913.03(A) (“Count 3”);
and one count of unlawful restraint, a misdemeanor of the third degree, in violation of
R.C. 2905.03 (“Count 4”). Weddle originally pleaded not guilty to the charges.
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{¶6} A pretrial hearing was held on February 6, 2025, where the parties placed
a potential plea resolution on the record. The State offered to dismiss Counts 2, 3, and 4
of the indictment in exchange for Weddle’s guilty plea on Count 1. No agreed sentencing
recommendation was made. However, the parties noted on the record that as Weddle
has a prior second-degree felony conviction in the State of Michigan, sentencing would
include a mandatory prison term.
{¶7} On March 6, 2025, Weddle accepted the offer and changed his plea to guilty
on Count 1. Prior to accepting his guilty plea, the trial court reminded Weddle that a guilty
plea would result in a mandatory prison sentence. Weddle indicated he understood. The
trial court ordered a presentence investigation and requested a victim impact statement
from the victim, B.S.
{¶8} On April 10, 2025, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. Weddle
presented mitigation testimony via a representative from the Toxic Abusive Relationships
Anonymous program. After making the required considerations, referred to by Weddle as
“buzzwords,” the trial court sentenced Weddle to a prison term of five to seven-and-a-half
years, noting that because it was a mandatory term, he would be ineligible for judicial
release. The trial court also ordered restitution to the victim in the amount of $290.
{¶9} Weddle, acting pro se, requested leave to file a delayed appeal pursuant to
App.R. 5(A). This court granted leave, but Weddle failed to file an appellate brief. This
court, sua sponte, issued an order requiring Weddle to file a brief or show cause why the
appeal should not be dismissed. In response, Weddle requested appointed counsel,
which this court granted.
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Case No. 2025-L-085
The Appeal
{¶10} Weddle raises the following three assignments of error for review:
[1.] The trial court erred in imposing a mandatory prison
sentence without sufficient evidence or findings on the record
that [Weddle’s] prior out-of-state conviction was a qualifying
“substantially equivalent” offense.
[2.] The trial court committed plain error by ordering restitution
without establishing a competent and credible evidentiary
basis for the specific amount on the record.
[3.] The trial court’s conduct during the sentencing hearing
deprived [Weddle] of a full and fair opportunity to present
mitigation evidence, violating his right to due process as well
as the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Plain Error
{¶11} As a preliminary matter, we note that Weddle failed to object to any of these
alleged errors in the trial court, and each argument is made for the first time on appeal.
As such, Weddle has forfeited all but plain error. “Plain errors or defects affecting
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
court.” Crim.R. 52(B). However, “[n]otice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken
with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest
miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of the
syllabus.
{¶12} The Supreme Court of Ohio set forth limitations on what constitutes plain
error. “First, there must be an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule. Second, the error
must be plain, i.e., the error must be an ‘obvious’ defect in the proceedings. Third, the
error must have affected ‘substantial rights.’ This means that the trial court's error must
have affected the outcome of the trial or prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Dundics,
2016-Ohio-1368, ¶ 19 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Barnes, 2002-Ohio-68, ¶ 20.
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Mandatory Prison Sentence
{¶13} In his first assignment of error, Weddle argues that the trial court erred by
imposing a mandatory sentence under R.C. 2929.13(F)(6) because it did not place
findings on the record that Michigan’s home invasion statute is “substantially equivalent”
to that of Ohio’s burglary statute. Specifically, Weddle argues that had the court placed
its analysis on the oral record, it would have discovered that Michigan’s statute contains
some differing elements than that of Ohio’s. We disagree.
{¶14} “[A] trial court is required to sentence a defendant to a mandatory prison
term for Felonious Assault if R.C. 2929.13(F)(6) applies.” State v. Flitcraft, 2024-Ohio3146, ¶ 52 (11th Dist.); accord State v. Paskins, 2022-Ohio-4024 (5th Dist.); State v.
Spaulding, 2017-Ohio-7993 (6th Dist.). “R.C. 2929.13(F)(6) provides for the imposition of
a mandatory prison term upon a conviction for a first or second degree felony that is not
otherwise set forth in R.C. 2929.13(F) if the offender previously was convicted of or
pleaded guilty to any first or second degree felony.” State v. Watson, 2025-Ohio-515, ¶
15 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Kinney, 2018-Ohio-404, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.). Any first or second
degree felony includes “an offense under an existing or former law of this state, another
state, or the United States that is or was substantially equivalent to one of those offenses.”
R.C. 2929.13(F)(6).
{¶15} Weddle argues that because the Michigan home invasion statute contains
two elements that differ from Ohio’s burglary statute, the statutes are not substantially
equivalent and do not trigger R.C. 2929.13(F)(6). Weddle notes that Michigan’s home
invasion statute requires entry “without permission,” whereas Ohio’s burglary statute
requires entry by “force, stealth, or deception.” Mich.Comp.Laws Ann., Ch. 750.110a(3);
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R.C. 2911.12(A). Additionally, Michigan’s statute requires “intent” to commit a felony,
larceny, or assault, whereas Ohio requires the “purpose” to commit a criminal offense. Id.
{¶16} The Ohio Supreme Court has defined “substantially equivalent” as “being
largely but not wholly that which is specified,” with “substantially” being the operative
word. State v. Lloyd, 2012-Ohio-2015, ¶ 28; Swan Creek Twp. v. Wylie & Sons
Landscaping, 2006-Ohio-584, ¶ 28 (6th Dist.), quoting Merriam Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary 1174 (10th Ed.1996). Thus, “[b]y the phrase's plain and ordinary meaning,
‘substantial equivalence’ does not contemplate identical or even strict equivalence and
presumes potential differences.” Miller v. Cordray, 2009-Ohio-3617, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.).
Therefore, “substantially equivalent” permits non-material statutory differences.
{¶17} Michigan courts have rejected Weddle’s argument concluding “the element
of breaking and entering or entering without permission clearly corresponds to the Ohio
element requiring trespass by force, stealth, or deception . . . we conclude that Ohio Rev
Code Ann 2911.12(A)(2) corresponds to second-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(3).” People v. Crews, 299 Mich.App. 381, 393-396 (2013). We agree with this
holding and find the distinctions between the statutes insignificant. Indeed, the statutes
are substantially equivalent. Neither elemental difference meaningfully changes the
gravamen of the conduct the statutes are designed to criminalize. R.C. 2929.13(F)(6)
presumes that states will have elemental differences between statutes and does not
require “strict equivalence.” Cordray at ¶ 15. Accordingly, this component of Weddle’s first
assignment of error is not well taken.
{¶18} Weddle next argues, in the alternative, that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to challenge the imposition of a mandatory prison term. We disagree.
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{¶19} “To obtain a reversal of a conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance
of counsel, the defendant must prove (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome of the
proceeding.” State v. Madrigal, 2000-Ohio-448, ¶ 49, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984). However, in a case where the defendant pleaded guilty, the
defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,
he would not have pleaded guilty.” State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 524 (1992), quoting
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
{¶20} Counsel’s performance was not deficient. The Sixth District addressed a
similar argument in State v. Bursley, 2021-Ohio-1613 (6th Dist.). There, the court
acknowledged that trial counsel failed to raise the issue of whether a prison term should
be mandatory but observed that counsel negotiated a highly favorable plea agreement
where several counts would be dismissed. Id. at ¶ 23. Like in Bursley, Weddle’s counsel
negotiated a favorable plea deal where Weddle pled guilty to Count 1 in exchange for the
State’s dismissal of Counts 2, 3, and 4. This does not fall “below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Madrigal at ¶ 49, citing Strickland at 687-888.
{¶21} Assuming arguendo counsel’s performance could be construed as
deficient, Weddle certainly cannot show that he would not have otherwise pleaded guilty
as the trial court informed Weddle of the consequences at least twice prior to accepting
his guilty plea—once at the final pretrial hearing, and again immediately before accepting
his plea. Additionally, a warning that the prison term was mandatory was contained in the
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plea form signed by Weddle. Prior to accepting his guilty plea, the following exchange
occurred during the plea colloquy:
THE COURT: There is a mandatory prison term that must be
imposed upon you by law, so you cannot be sentenced to
community control. Mandatory prison also means there can
be no judicial release during the time of your mandatory
incarceration. Do you understand that?
MR. WEDDLE: Yes.
{¶22} Thus, Weddle was informed by the trial court that any prison term imposed
would be mandatory prior to pleading guilty. We therefore find it “unconvincing for
[Weddle] to maintain that if he had only been warned about the full potential . . .
consequences of his plea, [he] would not have pled guilty, when he was in fact duly
informed of such consequences by the trial court itself.” State v. Adames, 2017-Ohio4058, ¶ 29 (5th Dist.).
{¶23} Accordingly, Weddle’s first assignment of error is without merit.
Restitution
{¶24} In his second assignment of error, Weddle complains that there “was no
evidentiary hearing and no evidence taken on the record regarding an award of
restitution” rendering this portion of his sentence contrary to law. We disagree.
{¶25} Where a trial court grants restitution “the amount of the restitution must be
supported by competent, credible evidence in the record from which the court can discern
the amount of the restitution to a reasonable degree of certainty.” State v. Laudermilk,
2022-Ohio-659, ¶ 51 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Johnson, 2004-Ohio-2236, ¶ 10 (4th
Dist.).
{¶26} We first note that the only reason no evidentiary hearing occurred on the
issue of restitution was because Weddle failed to request one. R.C. 2929.18(A)(1)
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provides a mechanism for which a party may challenge the amount of restitution.
Specifically, the statute provides:
Restitution by the offender to the victim of the offender's
criminal offense or the victim's estate, in an amount based on
the victim's economic loss. In open court, the court shall order
that full restitution be made to the victim, to the adult probation
department that serves the county on behalf of the victim, to
the clerk of courts, or to another agency designated by the
court. At sentencing, the court shall determine the amount of
restitution to be made by the offender . . . The court shall hold
a hearing on restitution if the offender, victim, victim's
representative, or victim's estate disputes the amount.
R.C. 2929.18(A)(1).
{¶27} As Weddle failed to exercise his statutory right to challenge the restitution
amount, the trial court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the
trial court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing was not erroneous.
{¶28} Second, contrary to Weddle’s claim, the trial court’s order was not “based
on an arbitrary figure devoid of evidentiary support.” The victim impact statement, which
the trial court read and considered in sentencing, shows that B.S. sustained $290 in
medical bills not reimbursed by her insurance. Notably, this was not a mere guess,
estimate, or an unsubstantiated self-reported number. B.S. submitted her medical billing
statements as accompanying evidence which reflected that her insurance paid a
substantial portion of the costs. The $290 award reflects B.S.’s out-of-pocket costs.
Accordingly, we find the award supported by competent, credible evidence.
{¶29} Weddle argues in the alternative that his counsel was ineffective for failing
to challenge the restitution order. We do not find counsel’s performance deficient. As
explained above, the $290 was calculated based on the victim impact statement and
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contained verifying documents. “Issuing an objection lacking in merit would not have
produced a different outcome.” State v. Wright, 2018-Ohio-2599, ¶ 27 (6th Dist.).
{¶30} Accordingly, Weddle’s second assignment of error is without merit.
David Bowie
{¶31} In his third assignment of error, Weddle asserts that the judge failed to pay
attention to his mitigation witness as the judge briefly commented on a poster of David
Bowie visible in the background of the witness’s camera. Weddle also points to a brief
technological error in support of this assignment. In other words, Weddle asks this court
to infer both that the trial judge was inattentive from a one-off comment regarding the
visible wall decor, and that the trial court prevented Weddle from presenting mitigation
evidence because the witness’s audio temporarily cut out.
{¶32} The record completely belies both propositions. While there was a brief
technical difficulty at the sentencing hearing where the mitigation witness was rendered
inaudible, Weddle was not deprived of an opportunity to present the evidence, nor did
David Bowie consume the judge’s attention in any way.
{¶33} Prior to going inaudible, the witness was saying:
THE WITNESS: . . . And all of a sudden [Weddle] started
really connecting to himself, taking ownership, and being
accountable, and then that energy with people attracted to
him, went to him and asked if he could help, help them as a
sponsor, work through the steps with them.
Since then, [Weddle] has developed a role within our
foundation, which is an international group. We’re based here
in Florida. We’re all over the world, though.
THE COURT: Whoop, you froze up.
{¶34} When the witness became audible again, the judge immediately interrupted
to inform the witness that a portion of his testimony was missed:
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Case No. 2025-L-085
THE COURT: [C]an I stop you for a second?
THE WITNESS: Yeah, please ask me any questions you
would like.
THE COURT: Well, the one question I was going to wait till
the end. Is that David Bowie behind you?
THE WITNESS: That may never be the end if you don’t stop
me, so I’m thankful that you did.
THE COURT: All right. There was an issue on our end as far
as seeing you and hearing you that came up about two, twoand-a-half minutes ago, so I hate to tell you, we missed a
chunk of what you had to say. The [l]ast thing I really recall is
that people were attracted to what Mr. Weddle had to offer
and were seeking advice from him. You started to talk about
the fact that you were based in Florida and then we missed
everything after that, so I apologize, but if you can kind of
remember where you were at.
{¶35} Notably, the trial court correctly identified the exact sentence where the
witness’s testimony had been cut off, evidencing that the judge was attentive. The David
Bowie poster did not derail the sentencing hearing in any way. The witness did not even
respond to that question, and instead, resumed his testimony exactly where he had left
off. Weddle was not denied the right to present his mitigation.
{¶36} Accordingly, Weddle’s third assignment of error is without merit.
Conclusion
{¶37} For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the Lake County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed.
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,
concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignments of error
are without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Lake
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND,
concurs
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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