2026 IL App (3d) 240722
Opinion filed July 20, 2026
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2026
WARREN S. WINKLER, LLC, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 18th Judicial Circuit,
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Du Page County, Illinois,
)
v. ) Appeal No. 3-24-0722
) Circuit No. 24-SC-732
WELD ALL, INC., )
) Honorable
Defendant-Appellant. ) Thomas A. Else,
) Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Peterson and Anderson concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiff, Warren S. Winkler, LLC, obtained a $10,000 default judgment against defendant,
Weld All, Inc. Within 30 days, defendant moved to vacate the judgment (735 ILCS 5/2-1301 (West
2024)). The circuit court denied the motion. Within 30 days of that denial, defendant moved to
reconsider and then filed this appeal. While the appeal was pending, the circuit court granted
defendant’s motion to reconsider, vacated the default judgment, and set the matter for trial.
¶2 We conclude the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion to
reconsider. We also conclude the circuit court abused its discretion when it entered the default and
denied defendant’s motion to vacate. We therefore vacate as void the order granting the motion to
reconsider, reverse the default judgment and the order denying defendant’s motion to vacate, and
remand this matter for a trial on the merits.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Plaintiff sued defendant in January 2024. Plaintiff alleged a breach of contract and sought
$10,000. The complaint was not verified by a representative of plaintiff; it was signed by counsel
under penalty of perjury (id. § 1-109). A summons was issued with a return date of April 22, 2024.
On the return date, plaintiff appeared with counsel. Defendant’s president, Dennis Spal, appeared
without counsel. 1 Spal acknowledged service. Because plaintiff had not filed proof of service,
however, the court continued the matter to July 24, 2024, for status. At the hearing’s conclusion,
Spal asked the court whether the case could be tried that day. The court responded, “No.”
¶5 On July 24, 2024, plaintiff appeared with counsel. Spal appeared for defendant, again
without counsel. The court set a bench trial for October 30, 2024, and stated it would prepare the
order. The court addressed Spal personally. It told him he had seven days to file an appearance if
he had not done so already. The court also told Spal that he could obtain a copy of the order—
which would contain important information for trial—online or from the circuit clerk’s office
within two days. The court warned Spal it was his responsibility to obtain and read the order; the
order would not be mailed to him. Finally, the court cautioned that “[p]eople lose cases every day
because they don’t read the order.” Spal told the court he understood. The following exchange
occurred at the hearing’s end:
“[SPAL]: Why can’t we take care of it today?
1
A corporation is permitted to defend a small claim without counsel, through a corporate
representative. Ill. S. Ct. R. 282(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018).
2
THE COURT: Go in the hall and take care of it. Other than that, I’m setting it for
trial. Other than that, have a nice day.
[SPAL]: Can I ask you a question?
THE COURT: Sure.
[SPAL]: What was the reason for today’s—and the first—I thought we were going
to settle it. I thought this was—
THE COURT: You can settle it any time you want to. There’s the lawyer. Go settle
it.
[SPAL]: Okay.
THE COURT: Okay. If you settle it—Counsel, if it’s settled, just give me an order
of dismissal. Okay?
[SPAL]: I just thought that—
THE COURT: Have a nice day.”
¶6 The court’s written order reiterated the directive that defendant file an appearance within
seven days. It warned the failure to do so “could lead to default judgment.” The order also required
the parties to exchange trial exhibits by October 23, 2024. It warned the failure to do so could lead
to the exhibits being barred. Finally, the order warned the “[f]ailure to follow this order could lead
to sanctions” and stated the “[p]arties were directed to read this order.”
¶7 Spal did not obtain a copy of the July 2024 order. Nor did he file an appearance on
defendant’s behalf. The record contains no indication either party exchanged their trial exhibits.
¶8 On October 30, 2024, plaintiff appeared with counsel. Spal appeared on defendant’s behalf,
again without counsel. Immediately after the participants identified themselves for the record, the
court entered a default judgment in plaintiff’s favor:
3
“THE COURT: Okay. On July 24, 2024, there was an order entered by this Court
which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Defendant to file appearance within seven days. Failure to file appearance could
lead to default judgment. Failure to follow this order could lead to sanctions. Parties were
directed to read this order.
Asking for a default judgment?
[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Granted.
Have a nice day.
***
[SPAL]: I don’t understand—
THE COURT: That means you’re done.”
The court awarded plaintiff $10,000 and directed plaintiff to prepare the written judgment. The
following exchange occurred at the hearing’s end:
“THE COURT: Were you going to say something?
[SPAL]: I—I don’t understand. I mean—
THE COURT: Well, you understood when you were standing here before.
Remember, I told you I’m going to prepare the order, it’s your responsibility to get a copy
of the order, you’ll have seven days to file your appearance. I did it back in July.
Look at the order. Did you read the order?
[SPAL]: I—obviously, I don’t—I didn’t—I don’t know what order there is that I
was to look at.
4
THE COURT: That order.
[SPAL]: Okay. What you handed me?
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
[SPAL]: Okay. And what was I to do?
THE COURT: Line 1, what does it say? Defendant is to—defendant—
[SPAL]: File appearance within seven days.
THE COURT: Okay. You’re the defendant. You didn’t file an appearance.
[SPAL]: I was to file an appearance here?
THE COURT: Yes. You didn’t file an appearance.
[SPAL]: What is the purpose of that?
THE COURT: What’s the purpose of filing an appearance?
[SPAL]: Yeah.
THE COURT: Okay, sir. We’re not going to go into, like Law Number 1, you
know. Defendants are required—everyone, in order to have—for the court to have
jurisdiction over them, they must file an appearance; okay? You, in order to appear in court
and have your case heard, were required to file an appearance.
Back in July, I gave you seven days. It says right in the order if you don’t file your
appearance, an order of default can be granted. It says I told you to read the order, I told
you there’s going to be sanctions if you don’t, and you didn’t. They win.
Have a nice day.
[SPAL]: Can I ask you one more?
THE COURT: One more.
5
[SPAL]: What was the—what was the reason for today’s date then?
THE COURT: It was for trial. I assumed—well, I didn’t assume, but—because this
happened. I checked to see whether or not you’d filed—you had filed an appearance. You
have not filed an appearance. That’s the order requiring you to do that. You didn’t do it;
okay? All right.”
¶9 Defendant retained counsel. On November 22, 2024, defendant filed a verified motion to
vacate the default under section 2-1301(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (id. § 2-1301(e)).
We will refer to this motion as the first postjudgment motion. Defendant noted Spal did not
understand how to file an appearance and did not fully grasp the “grav[e] *** consequences” that
could result from noncompliance with the July 2024 order. Defendant contended (without
elaboration) it had a meritorious defense to the action. It further contended that vacating the
judgment would not cause plaintiff undue hardship.
¶ 10 On December 3, 2024, the court held a hearing on the first postjudgment motion. Counsel
identified himself and the motion that he was presenting. The court interjected, “Well, no, it’s not
quite that easy, is it?” The court noted the procedural history of the case and defendant’s failure to
file an appearance and exchange documents as required by the July 2024 order. The following
exchange then occurred:
“THE COURT: ***. What [Spal] should have done, and you are a good lawyer,
you know, if he had hired you then instead of now, the first thing you would have done
was file your appearance and you wouldn’t be standing here right now asking me to vacate
a default judgment.
[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: The orders that are on this call are there for a reason.
6
[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: I understand, Judge.
And I talked to *** Spal. He is a nice guy, but he doesn’t understand—he didn’t
understand what he was doing. I know your Honor told him at length, and he admitted to
me at length that is what you had told him. He didn’t realize he would be placing himself
in this kind of a position.
He doesn’t know how to—he is not very tech savvy, he doesn’t know how to e-file.
And that is no excuse because I know, as well as your Honor knows, he can go downstairs
and e-file with help.
THE COURT: It says parties were directed to read this order.
[DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL]: I know, Judge.
THE COURT: So if I do this, the wheels will fall off this entire call. Okay.
So I understand the position you are in. I know that you want me to vacate that
judgment, but I am not vacating that judgment.
Your motion is, respectfully, denied.”
¶ 11 On December 23, 2024, defendant filed a verified motion to reconsider the denial of its
motion to vacate. We will refer to this motion as the successive motion or the successive
postjudgment motion. 2
¶ 12 On December 26, 2024, defendant presented the successive motion. The court entered a
briefing schedule and set it for hearing in March 2025. Less than two hours after presenting its
2
As noted below, a successive postjudgment motion is one that asks the court to reconsider its
decision on a first postjudgment motion. Owens v. Berkshire Nursing & Rehab Center, LLC, 2026 IL App
(1st) 241662, ¶ 25.
7
motion, defendant filed a notice of appeal. On December 31, 2024, the court stayed enforcement
of the judgment conditioned on a $10,000 bond, which defendant posted later that day.
¶ 13 After the parties filed their briefs on appeal, we determined there was a potential
jurisdictional bar to our review. At the time defendant filed its notice of appeal, the court had yet
to rule on the successive postjudgment motion. Generally, a pending postjudgment motion renders
a notice of appeal ineffective until the motion is ruled upon. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(2) (eff. July
1, 2017) (a notice of appeal becomes effective when the court rules on the last pending
postjudgment motion); Salah v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 2025 IL App (1st)
240641-U, ¶¶ 13-16 (dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction where there remained pending
in the circuit court a timely postjudgment motion, and neither the record nor the clerk’s online
docket showed resolution or withdrawal of the motion); see also Chand v. Schlimme, 138 Ill. 2d
469, 477-78 (1990) (holding that the filing of a notice of appeal, alone, does not “abandon an
otherwise effective post-trial motion or *** deprive the trial court of jurisdiction”). Thus, we
ordered defendant to supplement the common law record and later granted defendant leave to
supplement the report of proceedings.
¶ 14 On March 28, 2025, the circuit court held a hearing on defendant’s successive
postjudgment motion. Immediately after the parties’ attorneys identified themselves, the court
granted the motion and set the matter for trial. 3 The parties—before and after the court granted the
successive motion—objected to the court’s jurisdiction to do so. They argued defendant’s notice
of appeal had divested the circuit court of jurisdiction to make any further orders in the case. The
We are quite perplexed by the parties’ failure to notify us that the circuit court had granted the
3
motion. That order was entered three days before defendant filed its brief in this court and, as discussed
below, had significant implications for this appeal.
8
court rejected the parties’ arguments. In any event, the court stayed the proceedings in June 2025
pending this appeal.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 Defendant contends the circuit court abused its discretion when it awarded default
judgment to plaintiff and when it denied defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment.
Defendant asks us to reverse the circuit court’s default judgment and remand for further
proceedings.
¶ 17 A. Mootness and Jurisdiction
¶ 18 In March 2025, the circuit court granted defendant the very same relief defendant seeks
from this court when it granted defendant’s successive postjudgment motion. This raises the
threshold question of mootness. See Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 522-23 (2001)
(“An appeal is moot when *** the reviewing court cannot grant the complaining party effectual
relief.”); Old Second National Bank, N.A. v. Karolewicz, 2022 IL App (1st) 192091, ¶ 26
(mootness is a threshold question). We believe the answer to that question rests in the answer to a
different question—whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to grant the successive postjudgment
motion.
¶ 19 If the circuit court had jurisdiction to grant the motion, then defendant’s appeal would be
moot, as we would be unable to grant defendant any relief that it would not have already obtained.
If this is the case, we would simply dismiss the appeal, as the question presented does not fall
within an exception to the mootness doctrine. See In re Marriage of Peters-Farrell, 216 Ill. 2d
287, 293 (2005). If the court lacked jurisdiction, however, then its order granting the successive
motion would be a nullity (Nunez v. C&C Investments of Chicago, LLC, 2022 IL App (1st) 211423,
¶¶ 21-22), and this appeal would not be moot. If that is the case, we would vacate as void the order
9
granting the successive motion (Schak v. Blom, 334 Ill. App. 3d 129, 134 (2002)) and proceed to
the merits of defendant’s appeal.
¶ 20 Accordingly, after oral argument, we directed the parties to some relevant authorities and
asked them to brief the following question: “Did the circuit court have jurisdiction to rule on the
successive postjudgment motion?”
¶ 21 1. Standard of Review
¶ 22 This jurisdictional question is one of law, so our review is de novo. McCormick v.
Robertson, 2015 IL 118230, ¶ 18.
¶ 23 2. Final Judgments
¶ 24 We begin with the basic rule that a final judgment is one “that fixes the rights of the parties
absolutely and finally in the litigation and terminates the litigation on the merits so that if the
judgment is affirmed, the only thing left to do is to proceed with the execution of the judgment.”
In re Application of the County Collector, 395 Ill. App. 3d 155, 159 (2009). In this case, the default
judgment awarding plaintiff $10,000 on the sole count of its complaint terminated the litigation on
the merits. As such, the order was final and appealable. Id.; see Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).
¶ 25 3. Direct Challenges to Final Judgments
¶ 26 Final judgments are subject to direct challenge, both in the circuit court by filing a motion
under sections 2-1202, 2-1203, or 2-1301(e) of the Code, and in the appellate court by filing a
notice of appeal. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1202 (West 2024) (governing postjudgment motions in jury
cases); id. § 2-1203 (governing postjudgment motions in nonjury cases); id. § 2-1301(e)
(governing postjudgment motions in cases where judgment is entered by default); Ill. S. Ct. R. 301
(eff. Feb. 1, 1994) (providing that every final judgment is appealable as of right and is initiated by
filing a notice of appeal). The statutes and supreme court rules set forth strict 30-day time
10
limitations for challenging a final judgment. A postjudgment motion in the circuit court, whether
in a jury, nonjury, or default case, must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the final judgment
or within any extension of time allowed within that 30-day window. 735 ILCS 5/2-1202(c), 2-1203(a), 2-1301(e) (West 2024); Ill. S. Ct. R. 274 (eff. July 1, 2019). Likewise, a notice of appeal
must be filed within 30 days of the final judgment or within 30 days of the denial of the last
pending, timely postjudgment motion. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 27 These 30-day deadlines have “immemorially been termed ‘jurisdictional.’ ” In re Marriage
of Singel, 373 Ill. App. 3d 554, 558 (2007) (O’Malley, J., specially concurring); see Secura
Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (2009) (explaining a timely
notice of appeal “is both jurisdictional and mandatory”); Peraino v. County of Winnebago, 2018
IL App (2d) 170368, ¶ 24 (describing the 30-day deadline to file a postjudgment motion to
reconsider as “jurisdictional” and holding the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider an
untimely postjudgment motion). This is because a circuit court’s jurisdiction or the appellate
court’s potential jurisdiction to modify or vacate a final judgment is understood to terminate on
the thirty-first day after a judgment. Peraino, 2018 IL App (2d) 170368, ¶ 15; People ex rel.
Alvarez v. Skryd, 241 Ill. 2d 34, 40 (2011). After the thirtieth day, the parties must either accept
the judgment or seek relief in collateral proceedings. See, e.g., 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2024).
However, a timely postjudgment motion filed under one of the above-referenced sections of the
Code (id. §§ 2-1202, 2-1203, 2-1301(e)) “extends [both] the circuit court’s jurisdiction, [and] the
appellate court’s potential jurisdiction *** until 30 days after the motion is denied.” Sears v. Sears,
85 Ill. 2d 253, 258 (1981).
¶ 28 4. Successive Postjudgment Motions
11
¶ 29 Successive postjudgment motions are plainly prohibited by supreme court rule—each party
“may make only one postjudgment motion directed at a judgment order that is otherwise final and
appealable.” 4 Ill. S. Ct. R. 274 (eff. July 1, 2019). A successive postjudgment motion is one that
requests reconsideration after the first postjudgment motion is denied. Owens v. Berkshire Nursing
& Rehab Center, LLC, 2026 IL App (1st) 241662, ¶ 25. The motion at issue here is a textbook
example of a successive postjudgment motion. Defendant titled its motion a “motion to
reconsider,” styled its motion as such, and in its prayer for relief asked the court to “reconsider the
denial of [defendant’s] Motion for Relief from Default Judgment.”
¶ 30 It is beyond dispute that successive postjudgment motions are procedurally improper; they
are unauthorized by statute and forbidden by supreme court rule. Sears, 85 Ill. 2d at 259; Ill. S. Ct.
R. 274 (eff. July 1, 2019). According to our supreme court, a circuit court must not grant a
successive postjudgment motion. See Sears, 85 Ill. 2d at 259.
¶ 31 The circuit court thus never should have granted defendant’s successive postjudgment
motion. This does not end the discussion, however, because an erroneous order is not void; it is
voidable. LVNV Funding, LLC v. Trice, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 27. If the order is voidable, then it is
beyond our reach at this time because our jurisdiction extends only to the judgments specified in
the notice of appeal and any orders which were steps in the procedural progression leading to the
specified judgment. See In re Marriage of Arjmand, 2024 IL 129155, ¶ 29. The order granting
defendant’s successive postjudgment motion cannot be said to have been an order “leading” to the
judgment that defendant challenges on appeal (the default judgment). And in addition, an order
vacating a default is not a final order and is not immediately appealable. Federal National
4
This restriction is relaxed when the circuit court modifies the final order, pursuant to a timely
postjudgment motion or otherwise. Ill. S. Ct. R. 274 (eff. July 1, 2019). In such cases, affected parties have
30 days to file a postjudgment motion directed at the new, or “superseding,” judgment. Id.
12
Mortgage Ass’n v. Tomei, 2014 IL App (2d) 130652, ¶ 15. If the order is voidable, it would be
beyond our reach until the court entered judgment on the complaint a second time. Arjmand, 2024
IL 129155, ¶ 29.
¶ 32 If the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion, then the order granting the motion
is void. Trice, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 39. A void judgment “may be attacked at any time or in any
court, either directly or collaterally.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.)
R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 304, 309 (1986). Stated differently, a
void judgment “may be challenged in perpetuity.” Trice, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 38. Further, we have
a duty to vacate void judgments and orders of which we have knowledge, even if the judgment or
order is not technically before us for review. Wierzbicki v. Gleason, 388 Ill. App. 3d 921, 931
(2009).
¶ 33 5. The Circuit Court’s Order Granting the Successive Postjudgment Motion
is Void for Lack of Jurisdiction and This Appeal is Not Moot
¶ 34 We conclude the order granting defendant’s successive postjudgment motion was void for
lack of jurisdiction. The parties argue on appeal, as they did in the circuit court, that defendant’s
notice of appeal divested the circuit court of jurisdiction to substantively modify the judgment on
appeal. We agree with the parties in the main but believe this point requires a little more
explanation.
¶ 35 Generally, a timely notice of appeal strips the circuit court’s jurisdiction to make orders
that substantively alter the issues on appeal. General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 173
(2011); see R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153, 162 (1998) (“[O]rders
entered after the filing of the notice of appeal are valid if the substantive issues on appeal are not
altered so as to present a new case to the reviewing court.”). Indeed, upon the timely filing of a
13
notice of appeal, the appellate court’s jurisdiction attaches at once and the matter is placed beyond
the circuit court’s jurisdictional reach. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d at 173.
¶ 36 However, a timely postjudgment motion prevents application of this rule until after the
timely motion has been disposed of. See John G. Phillips & Associates v. Brown, 197 Ill. 2d 337,
343 (2001). Indeed, Rule 303(a)(2) provides that when “any party” files a “timely postjudgment
motion,” “a notice of appeal filed before the entry of the order disposing of the last pending
postjudgment motion, *** becomes effective when the order disposing of said motion *** is
entered.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017). This rule holds true when the postjudgment
motion is filed after the notice of appeal. Brown, 197 Ill. 2d at 343. It even holds true when the
same party who filed the timely postjudgment motion filed the notice of appeal before the motion
is ruled upon: the filing of a notice of appeal does not “act[ ] as an abandonment by operation of
law.” Chand, 138 Ill. 2d at 477-78.
¶ 37 We had some pause in applying the rule of Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d at 173, because the parties’
position failed to reconcile that principle with those discussed in Brown, 197 Ill. 2d at 343.
However, we find there is no inconsistency in finding the notice of appeal divested the circuit court
of jurisdiction notwithstanding the pending successive postjudgment motion.
¶ 38 Rule 303(a)(2) plainly states that only a timely postjudgment motion renders a notice of
appeal ineffective until the court disposes of the motion. The successive motion here was not
timely. The default judgment was entered on October 30, 2024. This meant any postjudgment
motions had to be filed within 30 days, no later than December 2, 2024. 5 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a),
2-1301(e) (West 2024). Defendant filed its successive motion on December 23, 2024, well outside
5
The thirtieth day, November 29, 2024, was a court holiday, meaning any postjudgment motions
were due on the next court business day, December 2, 2024. 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2024).
14
the 30-day deadline. As such, it was “a nullity.” Village of Island Lake v. Parkway Bank & Trust
Co., 212 Ill. App. 3d 115, 123 (1991). And because it was a nullity, the successive postjudgment
motion could not render defendant’s December 26, 2024, notice of appeal ineffective.
¶ 39 Thus, the rule of Pappas applies: the notice of appeal divested the circuit court of
jurisdiction to make any orders that substantially altered the issues on appeal. Because the circuit
court’s order granting the successive postjudgment motion did exactly that, it lacked jurisdiction
to grant the motion. Its order is void and must be vacated. Schak, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 134.
¶ 40 The fact that defendant’s successive motion was filed within 30 days of the court’s denial
of defendant’s first postjudgment motion does not change this conclusion. That denial was not a
new final judgment (In re Marriage of Harris, 2015 IL App (2d) 140616, ¶ 13) and did not open
a new 30-day window in which to file additional postjudgment motions. Rather, the final judgment
for purposes of the 30-day window to file postjudgment motions remained the default judgment.
The successive motion—not having been filed within 30 days of the final judgment—was
untimely.
¶ 41 Finally, we note the circuit court rejected the parties’ jurisdictional objections to the
successive postjudgment motion, finding it had jurisdiction to consider the motion. We do not fault
the circuit court for its determination that it had jurisdiction, as the case law on this issue is not
exactly clear. Indeed, the circuit court’s determination at one time had some footing in case law—
some panels of the Second District of this court sustained that view for nearly three decades. See
In re Marriage of Agustsson, 223 Ill. App. 3d 510, 514-17 (1992); Gibson v. Belvidere National
Bank & Trust Co., 326 Ill. App. 3d 45, 48-49 (2001); People v. Serio, 357 Ill. App. 3d 806, 818
(2005); People v. Walker, 395 Ill. App. 3d 860, 869 (2009). As the court in Serio put it,
15
“The trial court has jurisdiction to rule on a successive postjudgment motion where the
successive motion is filed within 30 days of the final disposition of the preceding
postjudgment motion. Jurisdiction vests in the appellate court when the trial court disposes
of the successive motion and a notice of appeal is filed within 30 days of the denial of the
first motion attacking the judgment.” (Emphases in original.) Serio, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 818.
¶ 42 This view of the circuit court’s jurisdiction was a departure from other decisions of this
court that held the circuit court has no jurisdiction to consider successive postjudgment motions.
See B-G Associates, Inc. v. Giron, 194 Ill. App. 3d 52, 58-59 (1st Dist. 1990) (holding the circuit
court “was without jurisdiction to enter subsequent orders *** relating to the merits of the
underlying cause of action” after the defendants’ first postjudgment motion was stricken with
prejudice (which was akin to a denial)); Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Gary-Wheaton
Bank, 203 Ill. App. 3d 672, 676-77 (2d Dist. 1990) (deciding appellate jurisdiction but noting that
a trial court “has no jurisdiction” to consider successive postjudgment motions); Village of Island
Lake, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 121 (Second District concluding “the trial court lost jurisdiction” after it
denied the defendants’ “one, authorized post-judgment motion”); see also Benet Realty Corp. v.
Lisle Savings & Loan Ass’n, 175 Ill. App. 3d 227, 234 (2d Dist. 1988) (concluding that once a
party’s only authorized postjudgment motion is denied, “the party has no other recourse but to
accept the trial court’s judgment or file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the denial”).
¶ 43 In 2019, however, the Second District—with the authoring justice of Agustsson, Gibson,
and Walker dissenting—declined to follow those cases, instead concluding the circuit court lacks
jurisdiction to consider a successive postjudgment motion. People v. Orahim, 2019 IL App (2d)
170257, ¶¶ 5-6. The weight of authority now takes this position. See Old Second National Bank,
16
2022 IL App (1st) 192091, ¶ 21; Royal Oak Condominium Ass’n v. Stevenson, 2025 IL App (1st)
242317, ¶ 39; People v. Stewart, 2026 IL App (2d) 240641-U, ¶ 29.
¶ 44 After Orahim, we have doubts about the continued validity of Agustsson, Serio, and
Walker. We decline any further comment, however, because we have resolved the jurisdictional
question on a different basis—defendant’s notice of appeal divested the circuit court of jurisdiction
to make any further substantive orders. We vacate as void the circuit court’s order granting
defendant’s successive postjudgment motion. Wierzbicki, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 931.
¶ 45 Because the court’s order granting defendant the same relief it seeks in this court has been
vacated, this appeal is not moot. See Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 522-23.
¶ 46 B. The Default Judgment and Defendant’s First Postjudgment Motion
¶ 47 Turning to the merits, defendant contends the circuit court abused its discretion when it
(1) awarded a default judgment to plaintiff and (2) denied defendant’s first postjudgment motion.
¶ 48 1. Appellate Jurisdiction
¶ 49 Preliminarily, we have jurisdiction to review the default judgment and the order denying
defendant’s first postjudgment motion. The circuit court denied defendant’s timely first
postjudgment motion on December 3, 2024. And although defendant moved to reconsider that
ruling, it also filed a notice of appeal from the denial within 30 days, on December 26, 2024. As
such, we have jurisdiction over this appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 50 2. Default Judgments
¶ 51 Public policy prefers that legal disputes be resolved on their merits. Dupree v. Hardy, 2011
IL App (4th) 100351, ¶ 59; 735 ILCS 5/1-106 (West 2024). Nevertheless, the circuit court has
discretion, under section 2-1301(d) of the Code, to enter judgment by default against a defendant
who fails to appear. 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(d) (West 2024). Further, in such cases, the court has
17
discretion to enter judgment without receiving proof of the complaint’s material allegations. Id.;
American Service Insurance Co. v. City of Chicago, 404 Ill. App. 3d 769, 779 (2010). This is so,
at least in part, because the failure to appear serves as an admission of the complaint’s factual
allegations. See American Service, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 779.
¶ 52 A default judgment, however, is a drastic remedy; it should be used only as a last resort.
Dupree, 2011 IL App (4th) 100351, ¶ 57. Indeed, our supreme court has recognized that “[a]
default [is] *** an action taken to punish for disobeying the court’s command and should only be
condoned when, as a last resort, it is necessary to give the plaintiff his just demand.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McCluskey, 2013 IL 115469, ¶ 16.
¶ 53 3. Section 2-1301 of the Code
¶ 54 Section 2-1301(e) of the Code provides the court with discretion to vacate the default
judgment “upon any terms and conditions that shall be reasonable,” provided the defaulted party
files a motion within 30 days after its entry. 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2024). The defaulted
party has the burden to establish a sufficient basis for vacating the default. Mann v. Upjohn Co.,
324 Ill. App. 3d 367, 377 (2001). Consistent with the policy of deciding disputes on their merits,
courts construe section 2-1301(e) liberally in favor of vacating defaults. McCluskey, 2013 IL
115469, ¶ 16.
¶ 55 4. Standard of Review
¶ 56 In exercising its discretion under section 2-1301, the court should consider all events
preceding the default. Mann, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 377. “The overriding consideration,” when
deciding to grant or vacate a default judgment, “is the achievement of substantial justice.” H.D.,
Ltd. v. Department of Revenue, 297 Ill. App. 3d 26, 32 (1998). To achieve substantial justice, the
court may consider the severity of the penalty resulting from the default judgment and the attendant
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hardship on plaintiff if obliged to proceed to a trial on the merits. Venzor v. Carmen’s Pizza Corp.,
235 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1057-58 (1992). When deciding whether to vacate a default under section
2-1301(e), the court may also—but is not required to—consider the existence of a meritorious
defense and the moving party’s diligence. Mann, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 377; see In re Haley D., 2011
IL 110886, ¶ 57 (noting section 2-1301 of the Code does not require a showing of a meritorious
defense and a reasonable excuse for not having timely asserted it). “What is just and proper must
be determined by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations
regardless of the outcome.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mann, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 377.
Because both are matters of discretion, we must determine if the circuit court’s decisions to award
plaintiff a default and deny defendant’s first postjudgment motion were unreasonable. In re H.B.,
2022 IL App (2d) 210404, ¶ 71.
¶ 57 5. This Case
¶ 58 We conclude the circuit court abused its discretion when it entered a default judgment
against defendant. After being served, Spal appeared on the return date. Because plaintiff had not
filed proof of service, however, the court continued the matter for three months for plaintiff to do
so. When both parties returned to court in July 2024, the court ordered defendant to file a written
appearance within seven days and set trial for October 30, 2024. It also ordered the parties to
exchange their trial exhibits by October 23, 2024. Defendant did not file an appearance.
¶ 59 When the parties appeared for trial, the court did not ask them whether they had exchanged
trial exhibits—the record contains no proof that either party had done so—or whether they were
otherwise ready for trial. Instead, the circuit court immediately noted defendant’s failure to file an
appearance and asked plaintiff if it was requesting a default judgment. Plaintiff replied that it was,
and the court granted the request, telling the parties to “[h]ave a nice day.”
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¶ 60 We acknowledge the circuit court clearly and directly admonished Spal that defendant’s
failure to file an appearance might cause defendant to “lose [the] case[ ]” and the written order
specifically warned of sanctions. We also acknowledge defendant failed to follow the court’s clear
directive notwithstanding this warning. However, the circuit court here treated default as a first
resort, not as a last resort. See Dupree, 2011 IL App (4th) 100351, ¶ 57. The record does not show
the court considered the severity of the penalty (a $10,000 judgment entered without any sworn
proof), nor does it show the court asked plaintiff to identify any hardship it would face if required
to prove its case at trial. See Venzor, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 1057-58. Instead, the court immediately
asked plaintiff if it wanted a default judgment and then promptly awarded plaintiff $10,000,
without asking either party if they were ready for trial.
¶ 61 We can certainly appreciate the circuit court’s apparent desire to avoid any further delay
in this case, which had been pending for nine months at the time it was called for trial. We
nevertheless find the court’s decision to award a default judgment unreasonable. The reasonable
course would have been to take a brief break to allow Spal (a nonattorney) to take the short trip
downstairs to the circuit clerk’s office to file a written appearance. Up to that point, none of the
delay in the case was attributable to defendant. Had the court simply allowed Spal to file
defendant’s appearance, trial could have proceeded that day (assuming plaintiff was ready, a fact
the court never confirmed).
¶ 62 On this point, plaintiff notes defendant never tendered any trial exhibits as required by the
July 2024 order. Thus, plaintiff argues, even if the court would have allowed Spal to file
defendant’s appearance on the trial date, defendant was still not in compliance with the July 2024
order and could not have tried the case that day.
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¶ 63 We are not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument for two reasons. First, the record does not
show either party ever exchanged trial exhibits. No proofs of service were filed, and the circuit
court never asked whether the parties had exchanged them. On the record before us, we cannot
conclude either party had complied with the July 2024 order or was ready for trial. Second, even
if we assume plaintiff had tendered its trial exhibits to defendant and was ready for trial, defendant
may not necessarily have needed any documentary evidence to prevail. Plaintiff’s claim could fail
on plaintiff’s proof alone. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1110 (West 2024) (governing motions for a directed
finding); DeHeer-Liss v. Friedman, 227 Ill. App. 3d 422, 426-27 (1991) (discussing the standard
for a directed finding and noting the plaintiff has the burden of proof to establish a breach of
contract by a preponderance of the evidence).
¶ 64 Under the circumstances present here, we conclude a default judgment did not achieve
substantial justice between the parties. H.D., Ltd., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 32. Thus, the circuit court
abused its discretion when it awarded plaintiff the default judgment.
¶ 65 We likewise conclude the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied defendant’s
first postjudgment motion. About three weeks after the court entered default judgment, defendant
filed its first postjudgment motion, seeking relief from the default under section 2-1301(e) of the
Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2024). In the motion, defendant acknowledged it had not filed
its appearance as required by the July 2024 order. It nevertheless asserted it was without counsel
at the time and its representative did not know how to file an appearance or fully grasp the “grav[e]
*** consequences” that could result from noncompliance. In addition, defendant asserted it had a
meritorious defense and plaintiff would suffer no undue hardship if the default was vacated.
¶ 66 At the hearing on the motion, the court quickly chided defendant’s motion, asking
rhetorically, “it’s not quite that easy, is it?” The court then noted defendant’s failure to comply
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with the July 2024 order. The court stated default would not have entered if defendant had filed its
appearance, remarking “[t]he orders that are on this call are there for a reason.” When defendant’s
counsel began arguing the basis of defendant’s motion, the court redirected the focus to
defendant’s failure to comply with the July 2024 order, remarking this time that the “parties were
directed to read [the July 2024] order.” The court denied the motion, remarking this final time that
doing otherwise would cause “the wheels [to] fall off” its “entire call.”
¶ 67 The court’s denial of defendant’s first postjudgment motion is problematic. First, the record
contains no indication the court considered the relevant factors; it instead reflects a singular focus
on defendant’s failure to comply with the July 2024 order. A court abuses its discretion when it
fails to conduct a required balancing test. See Carlson v. Jerousek, 2016 IL App (2d) 151248, ¶ 69.
Second, the basis for denial was erroneous. “If the same failure to act that caused the default in the
first place automatically justified the failure to vacate the default, section 2-1301(e) would be
meaningless: there would never be a situation where a default judgment was vacated.” Rockford
Housing Authority v. Donahue, 337 Ill. App. 3d 571, 575 (2003). Third, the court’s final remark
makes clear it was worried about how granting the motion might affect the rest of the cases on its
call. A court’s decision on a motion to vacate must be based on the case’s specific facts and
circumstances, not on a hard-and-fast rule that applies in all circumstances. Mann, 324 Ill. App.
3d at 377. For these reasons, the court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s first
postjudgment motion.
¶ 68 To sum up, we conclude the circuit court abused its discretion both when it awarded a
default judgment to plaintiff and when it denied defendant’s first postjudgment motion. Nothing
in the record suggests defendant was contumaciously flouting the court’s authority. To the
contrary, defendant appeared on all three court dates in this case. On the first two occasions, Spal
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expressed defendant’s eagerness to participate in the case, either via settlement or trial. At the time
the court defaulted defendant, none of the delay in the case was attributable to defendant. Under
the facts and circumstances of this case, we fail to see how the drastic measure of a default
judgment, entered without any sworn proof from someone with knowledge of the claim, achieved
substantial justice. See Haley D., 2011 IL 110886, ¶ 57. Accordingly, we reverse the default
judgment and the order denying defendant’s first postjudgment motion and remand for a trial on
the merits.
¶ 69 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 70 For the reasons stated, we (1) vacate as void the circuit court’s March 2025 order granting
defendant’s successive postjudgment motion, (2) reverse the default judgment and the order
denying defendant’s first postjudgment motion, and (3) remand this matter for a trial on the merits.
¶ 71 Reversed in part and vacated in part.
¶ 72 Cause remanded.
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Warren S. Winkler, LLC v. Weld All, Inc., 2026 IL App (3d) 240722
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County, No. 24-SC732; the Hon. Thomas A. Else, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Peter M. Tumminaro, of Law Offices of Peter M. Tumminaro, for Ltd., of Roselle, for appellant.
Appellant:
Attorneys Sheila Genson, of The Winkler Group LLC, of Schaumburg, for for appellee.
Appellee:
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