Appellate Case: 25-1078 Document: 83-1 Date Filed: 07/20/2026 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 20, 2026
Christopher M. Wolpert
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
ROBBIN WARD,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 25-1078
NATIONAL CREDIT SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendant - Appellant.
--------------------------------------------------ACA INTERNATIONAL, LLC;
NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW
CENTER,
Amici Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 1:21-CV-02597-NYW-JPO)
John W. Bowdich, Bowdich & Associates, PLLC, Dallas, Texas, for DefendantAppellant.
Matthew R. Osborne, Ramos Law, Northglenn, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Sarah J. Auchterlonie and Courtney E. Bartkus, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Denver, Colorado, and Leah C. Dempsey, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Washington, D.C., filed an Amicus Curiae Brief on behalf of Defendant-Appellant ACA International, LLC.
Caroline Cohn, National Consumer Law Center, Boston, Massachusetts, filed an Amicus Curiae Brief on behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee Robbin Ward.
Appellate Case: 25-1078 Document: 83-1 Date Filed: 07/20/2026 Page: 2
Before TYMKOVICH, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.
Robbin Ward’s daughter used his personal information to secure a residential
lease for herself in his name. Ward claims she did so without his knowledge or
permission. After Ward’s daughter failed to timely pay rent, the landlord evicted her
and transferred collection of the outstanding debt to National Credit Systems, Inc.
(NCS). As part of its collection process, NCS reported the delinquent debt—under
Ward’s name—to various credit reporting agencies (CRAs) that in turn documented
the debt on his credit report.
When he learned of this, Ward disputed the debt and claimed he was a victim
of identity fraud by an unknown perpetrator. But after investigating Ward’s dispute,
NCS determined it could not confirm his protestations, so it concluded the
information was accurate and declined to correct its reporting. Ward then sued NCS
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) alleging NCS failed to conduct a
reasonable investigation of his dispute. The district court permitted Ward’s claim to
proceed to trial, after which a jury found NCS liable and awarded Ward $500,000 for
his emotional distress. NCS appeals from the district court’s denial of its post-trial
motion challenging the judgment.
This appeal requires us to determine whether a consumer must prove the
disputed information was in fact inaccurate to succeed on an unreasonable
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investigation claim under the FCRA, and if so, what qualifies as an actionable
inaccuracy.
We conclude that inaccuracy is a prima facie element of such a claim. And to
establish that element, a consumer must demonstrate the disputed information was
objectively and readily verifiable by the furnisher of the information, here NCS, as
containing a mistake or error. Ward’s claim did not meet that standard because
whether the information NCS furnished was in fact inaccurate depended on the
veracity of Ward’s assertion of identity theft, which was not objectively verifiable,
while the objective evidence that was readily available to NCS suggested that he was
indeed connected to the debt.
As a result, we REVERSE and VACATE the district court’s judgment against
NCS and remand with direction to enter judgment for NCS on Ward’s unreasonableinvestigation claim.
I. Background
A. The Fair Credit Reporting Act
The FCRA “seeks to promote ‘fair and accurate credit reporting’ and to protect
consumer privacy.” Trans Union LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 418 (2021) (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)). “To achieve those goals, the Act regulates the [CRAs] that
compile and disseminate personal information about consumers.” Id. The FCRA
also regulates the entities that report consumer data to CRAs. The Act terms those
entities as furnishers of information. In furtherance of the FCRA’s goal of fair and
accurate reporting, the Act imposes two primary duties on furnishers.
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First, furnishers must “accurately report information” to CRAs. Sanders v.
Mountain Am. Fed. Credit Union, 689 F.3d 1138, 1147 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)). If a consumer directly notifies a furnisher “that specific
information is inaccurate[,] and the information is, in fact, inaccurate,” then the
furnisher “shall not furnish [such] information” to a CRA. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s2(a)(1)(B). And “[i]f a consumer submits an identity theft report to a” furnisher
stating the information the furnisher sent to a CRA “resulted from identity theft,” the
furnisher “may not furnish such information . . . unless [it] subsequently knows . . .
that the information is correct.” Id. § 1681s-2(a)(6)(B). But while the FCRA allows
federal agencies and state officials to enforce § 1681s-2(a) against furnishers, the Act
does not provide consumers a private right of action to do so. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s2(c)(1); Sanders, 689 F.3d at 1147.
Second, if a furnisher receives notice of an indirect dispute, where it “receives
notice of a [consumer’s] dispute from the [CRA], it must perform the verification and
correction duties described in 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(b).” Sanders, 689 F.3d at 1147.
If the furnisher subsequently finds “an item of information disputed by a consumer
. . . to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be verified after any reinvestigation,”
then the furnisher must either “modify,” “delete,” or “permanently block the
reporting of that item of information.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E). But unlike
§ 1681s-2(a), consumers may bring a civil action against a furnisher for its willful or
negligent failure to conduct a reasonable investigation under § 1681s-2(b). See id.
§ 1681n (willful violations); id § 1681o (negligent violations).
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B. Factual Background
Ward’s daughter, LaQuencilla Green, used Ward’s social security number and
driver’s license to apply for a Texas rental property in Ward’s name. Green listed
Ward’s Colorado address on the rental application but used her own phone number
and put herself as Ward’s emergency contact. Green included in the application:
color copies of Ward’s driver’s license and social security card, an altered version of
her Texas-based Nieman Marcus pay stubs listing Ward’s name, and a fake social
security income letter also attributed to Ward. Green lived on the property for
several months but failed to fully pay rent. The landlord evicted Green and obtained
a default judgment for the debt against Ward in a Texas court. 1 The landlord then
assigned collection of the debt to NCS.
NCS reported the delinquent debt to various CRAs that in turn reported the
collection account on Ward’s credit report. Ward claims he first learned of the
delinquent debt when he tried to refinance the mortgage on his Colorado home. He
1
The state court default judgment states that Ward was “duly served with process” but “did not answer to deny [the landlord’s] claim.” App., Vol. V at 172. Ward, however, argues that because the default judgment is against “Robin” Ward, rather than Robbin Ward, the judgment might “relate[] to a different person and case altogether.” Aple. Br. at 36. But other record documents related to that case list the defendant as “Robbin Ward” and the address on the default judgment is the rental property at issue. See App., Vol. V at 169–71. In any event, because NCS did not know about the default judgment at the time of the dispute, we do not consider it in our analysis of the inaccuracy issue. Along with the Texas default judgment, NCS also did not know at the time of its investigation that the IP address used for the online rental application was from Green’s Nieman Marcus workplace in Texas and that Green posted videos online showing she was the person living in the rental property.
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filed several disputes with the CRAs and NCS claiming he was a victim of identity
theft and was thus not responsible for the debt. With his dispute, Ward included an
FTC Identity Theft Report and ID Theft Affidavit, a copy of his driver’s license and
social security card, and various other documents showing he lived and worked in
Colorado. His ID Theft Affidavit stated that he did not authorize anyone to use his
personal information for the rental application and that he did not know who
completed it. He did, however, admit in the affidavit that his daughter worked at
Nieman Marcus in Dallas and that the associated pay stubs were hers, though with his
name on them. See App., Vol. III at 215–16. Ward also stated that although his
driver’s license had not been stolen, he had given it to his daughter in the past for
other purposes. But despite the above evidence that suggested Green submitted the
rental application, Ward maintained that an unknown thief must have stolen his and
his daughter’s information to incur the rental debt. Ward now contends he was
unaware of Green’s fraud until he saw videos showing her living on the property.
NCS investigated Ward’s claim over several months. It discovered that
Ward’s driver’s license matched the one on the rental application and that Ward’s
daughter worked at Nieman Marcus in Texas. After verifying that the debt “balance”
and “identifying documents” were “correct,” NCS concluded the information it
furnished was accurate, so it continued to report the debt to the CRAs. App., Vol. III
at 208.
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C. Procedural Background
Ward sued NCS and the CRAs alleging they violated the FCRA. Among other
claims, Ward alleged NCS negligently failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of
his dispute under § 1681s-2(b)(1). The CRAs settled with Ward before trial.
NCS moved for summary judgment. It argued Ward’s negligence claim failed
because he could not show NCS reported an inaccurate debt or that it conducted an
unreasonable investigation. On the inaccuracy issue, NCS argued Ward’s claim of
identity theft raised a legal dispute that was not cognizable under the FCRA.
The district court denied NCS’s motion on those issues, allowing Ward’s
negligence claim to advance. 2 It concluded that whether Ward established the
disputed information was inaccurate was a question of fact for the jury. The district
court also found there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude NCS’s
investigation was not reasonable. Throughout pretrial proceedings, NCS continued to
ask the district court to reconsider its ruling on the inaccuracy issue, arguing Ward
failed to make a prima facie showing that NCS furnished inaccurate information. But
the district court stood by its decision, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.
The jury returned a verdict for Ward, finding NCS negligently failed to
conduct a reasonable investigation of the disputed debt. It awarded Ward $500,000
for his claimed emotional distress.
2
Ward also alleged NCS willfully violated the FCRA, but the district court granted summary judgment to NCS on those counts. The district court also granted summary judgment to NCS against Ward’s claim for economic damages, leaving only Ward’s negligence claim for emotional distress.
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NCS subsequently moved for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 50(b), again arguing Ward’s dispute was not cognizable under the
FCRA because it raised a legal dispute. NCS also argued Ward’s claim was not
actionable because the information in dispute was not objectively and readily
verifiable as inaccurate—a standard other circuits have adopted under the FCRA.
The district court denied the motion and NCS appealed.
II. Discussion
NCS raises one central issue: whether the district court applied the correct
legal standard for Ward’s unreasonable-investigation claim. NCS argues the district
court erred in denying its Rule 50(b) motion because Ward failed to establish that the
information NCS furnished to the CRAs was inaccurate. 3
We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 50(b) motion de novo. See
Wagner v. Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc., 586 F.3d 1237, 1243–44 (10th Cir. 2009).
And because this issue presents a question of statutory interpretation, we review the
3
Ward contends NCS did not preserve this argument for appeal because it raised the issue for the first time “in a post-trial motion” without “mov[ing] for [a] directed verdict on the same grounds.” Aple. Br. at 6. But NCS did move for a “directed verdict” under Rule 50(a) (i.e., a judgment as a matter of law) at the close of evidence arguing Ward’s claim was “not actionable under the FCRA.” App., Vol. X at 256–58. NCS also preserved this issue because it moved for summary judgment arguing Ward “cannot demonstrate any actual inaccuracies in NCS’s reporting . . . .” App., Vol. I at 107. See Wolfgang v. Mid-Am. Motorsports, Inc., 111 F.3d 1515, 1521 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen the material facts are not in dispute and the denial of summary judgment is based on the interpretation of a purely legal question, such a decision is appealable after final judgment.”).
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district court’s application of the FCRA de novo. See Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. EPA,
887 F.3d 986, 990 (10th Cir. 2017).
A. Legal Framework
Ward’s claim arises under § 1681o of the FCRA, which entitles consumers to
“actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of” a furnisher’s negligent
failure to comply with § 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(1).
Section 1681s-2(b) requires “a furnisher of information who has received notice of a
dispute from a CRA” to:
(1) investigate the disputed information; (2) review all
relevant information provided by the CRA; (3) report the
results of the investigation to the CRA; (4) report the results
of the investigation to all other CRAs if the investigation
reveals that the information is incomplete or inaccurate; and
(5) modify, delete, or permanently block the reporting of the
disputed information if it is determined to be inaccurate,
incomplete, or unverifiable.
Llewellyn v. Allstate Home Loans, Inc., 711 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
We have yet to authoritatively state whether an unreasonable-investigation
claim under § 1681s-2(b) requires a consumer to prove the disputed information was
in fact inaccurate.
To determine the statutory requirements of a § 1681s-2(b) claim, we start with
the text. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). And the
provision’s text makes clear that the entire focus of the FCRA’s obligations on
furnishers is to prevent inaccurate reporting. For instance, although a furnisher’s
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duty to investigate is triggered upon notice from a CRA that the consumer disputes
the “completeness or accuracy” of the furnished information, the furnisher only
incurs an obligation to fix the information if it finds “the information is incomplete or
inaccurate . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(D) (emphasis added). And if a furnisher
is directly “notified by [a] consumer . . . that specific information is inaccurate,” it
must only stop furnishing the information if it “is, in fact, inaccurate.” Id. § 1681s2(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The text thus shows that a furnisher’s obligation at the
start is to correct its reporting only when the information is inaccurate or
incomplete. 4
And because a furnisher only incurs such an obligation when the disputed
information is in fact inaccurate or incomplete, the consumer must prove inaccuracy
(or incompleteness) as a necessary predicate to establishing actual but-for causation,
which is another statutory requirement of a negligence claim under the FCRA. 5 For
4
“[T]he FCRA’s requirement that furnishers of information correct
‘incomplete or inaccurate’ information, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(D), extends not only to false information, which is clearly inaccurate, but to information provided in such a manner as to create a materially misleading impression as well.” Llewellyn, 711 F.3d at 1186 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, as an alternative to proving inaccuracy, a consumer can also sustain a § 1681s-2(b) unreasonable-investigation claim by making a prima facie showing that the furnisher’s report was so incomplete as to render the disputed information materially misleading. But because Ward did not allege NCS’s report was incomplete, we do not address such a claim.
5
Section 1681o states, “Any person who is negligent in failing to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of—(1) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of that failure . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a)(1) (emphasis added). This provision’s statement that a plaintiff can only recover damages that are
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example, if the information the furnisher reported was in fact accurate, then whether
the furnisher conducted a reasonable investigation would be irrelevant: no matter
how unreasonable it was, the allegedly deficient investigation could not have caused
the consumer’s claimed injury because the FCRA does not require a furnisher to alter
accurate information. Thus, as a prerequisite to proving actual causation, a consumer
must establish that the disputed information was in fact inaccurate or incomplete.
Our case law also supports this conclusion. We have said in unpublished
opinions that to maintain a § 1681s-2(b) claim, a consumer “bears the burden of
showing that the information [the furnisher] furnished was inaccurate or incomplete,”
Schueller v. Wells Fargo & Co., 559 F. App’x 733, 737 (10th Cir. 2014), and that the
consumer’s “dispute must be bona fide, i.e., one that could materially alter how the
reported debt is understood,” Sartori v. Susan C. Little & Assocs., P.A., 571 F. App’x
677, 682 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
And we have held that a furnisher’s investigation under § 1681s–2(b) need
only be “one that a reasonably prudent person would undertake under the
circumstances.” Maiteki v. Marten Transp. Ltd., 828 F.3d 1272, 1275 (10th Cir.
a “result” of a furnisher’s negligence “imposes a requirement of but-for causation.” Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 214 (2014); see also id. at 212 (“Where there is no textual or contextual indication to the contrary, courts regularly read phrases like ‘results from’ to require but-for causality.”). The requirement for actual cause “requires proof ‘that the harm would not have occurred’ in the absence of—that is, but for—the defendant’s conduct.” Id. at 211 (citation modified) (quoting Restatement (First) of Torts § 431 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 1934)). “This but-for requirement is part of the common understanding of cause.” Id. “This is so because it is natural to say that one event is the outcome or consequence of another when the former would not have occurred but for the latter.” Id. at 212.
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2016) (quotation marks omitted). “In this respect, a furnisher’s duties resemble those
of a [CRA], which can also be liable for failing to ‘follow reasonable procedures to
assure maximum possible accuracy’ of information on a credit report.” Gross v.
CitiMortgage, Inc., 33 F.4th 1246, 1251 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681e(b)). And for a consumer to prevail on an unreasonable-procedures
(§ 1681e(b)) or unreasonable-investigation (§ 1681i(a)) claim against a CRA, he
“must establish that: (1) the CRA failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure the
accuracy of its reports; (2) the report in question was, in fact, inaccurate; (3) [he]
suffered injury; and (4) the CRA’s failure caused his injury.” Wright v. Experian
Info. Sols., Inc., 805 F.3d 1232, 1239 (10th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added) (citation
modified); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (A CRA must “conduct a reasonable
reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate” upon
notification of a consumer dispute.). “This order of proof makes sense: if there is no
inaccuracy, then the reasonableness of the investigation is not in play.” Gross, 33
F.4th at 1251.
We join the circuits that have extended this logic to FCRA claims against
furnishers and conclude that a consumer must make a prima facie showing that the
disputed information was in fact inaccurate or incomplete to prevail on a § 1681s2(b) unreasonable-investigation claim. See, e.g., id. (“[T]o prevail on a FCRA claim
against a furnisher, a consumer must make a prima facie showing that the furnisher’s
report was inaccurate.”); Roberts v. Carter-Young, Inc., 131 F.4th 241, 249 (4th Cir.
2025) (A consumer must allege “inaccuracy (or incompleteness) . . . to satisfy the
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first element of a failure to investigate claim” under § 1681s-2(b).); Chiang v.
Verizon New Eng. Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 37 (1st Cir. 2010) (“Section 1681s-2(b) . . .
requir[es] a showing of actual inaccuracy in suits against furnishers.” (emphasis
added)); Felts v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 893 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2018) (A
consumer must “demonstrat[e] that had the furnisher conducted a reasonable
investigation, . . . [it] would have discovered that the information it reported was
inaccurate or incomplete . . . .”). And as an element of a § 1681s-2(b) claim, when
there are no underlying material factual disputes and a furnisher challenges the
consumer’s showing of inaccuracy or incompleteness, the court must resolve the
issue and cannot leave it as a fact question for the jury. See Gross, 33 F.4th at 1251
(“[B]efore a court considers the reasonableness of [a furnisher’s] procedures, the
consumer must make a prima facie showing of inaccuracy in the [furnisher’s]
reporting.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Chiang, 595 F.3d at 37 (“[A]bsent a
showing of actual inaccuracy on a reinvestigation, a plaintiff’s claim against [a
furnisher] fails as a matter of law.” (emphasis added)). The judge “is better
positioned” than the jury to make this determination because “the relevant legal
principle can be given meaning only through its application to the particular
circumstances of a case” and “assessments of credibility and demeanor are not
crucial to the proper resolution of the ultimate issue . . . .” See Miller v. Fenton, 474
U.S. 104, 114, 116–17 (1985).
Ward, however, argues the FCRA does not require “proof of actual inaccuracy
as a threshold matter.” Aple. Br. at 7 (internal citation omitted). Rather, he contends
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a furnisher’s duty to investigate is triggered upon mere notice of a dispute and the
furnisher must also, for example, correct its report if the accuracy of the information
“cannot be verified . . . .” Id. at 8 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E)). But Ward
is mistaken. Even though a furnisher must investigate upon notice of an indirect
dispute, the reasonableness of that investigation only comes into play when the
information is in fact inaccurate or incomplete, as we explained above. And the
provision’s requirement that a furnisher either modify, delete, or block reporting
information it finds “cannot be verified after any reinvestigation” does not alter that
conclusion. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E). Subsection 1681s-2(b)(1)(E) merely
lists various actions a furnisher must take when triggered by the results of its
investigation; it does not bear on whether a consumer has an actionable claim against
the reasonableness of that investigation. The “cannot be verified after any
reinvestigation” language deals with the scenario where a furnisher determines from
its investigation that further investigation into the accuracy of the disputed
information would be futile. See Hinkle v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 827 F.3d
1295, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 2016) (“When a furnisher reports that disputed information
‘cannot be verified,’ the question of whether the furnisher complied with § 1681s2(b) will likely turn on whether the furnisher reasonably determined that further
investigation would be fruitless or unduly burdensome.”). But that was not the
situation here where NCS determined the disputed information was accurate; the
“cannot be verified” provision is thus not at issue. See Reyes v. Equifax Info. Servs.,
LLC, 140 F.4th 279, 287–89 (5th Cir. 2025) (“[R]eading § 1681i(a)(5)(A) to require
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the deletion of debt information because of inaccuracies which ‘cannot be verified’
until all legal disputes are fully adjudicated would frustrate the FCRA’s goal of
ensuring fair and accurate credit reporting.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We recognize that § 1681s-2(a)(6) imposes certain duties on a furnisher “upon
notice of identity theft-related information.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(6). For
instance, when “a consumer submits an identity theft report to” a furnisher alleging
information that the furnisher maintains “resulted from identity theft,” the furnisher
“may not furnish such information . . . to any [CRA], unless the [furnisher]
subsequently knows . . . that the information is correct.” Id. § 1681s-2(a)(6)(B)
(emphasis added).
Section 1681s-2(a)(6), however, does not extinguish the requirement for a
consumer to establish inaccuracy just because he submits an identity theft report.
Initially, as we explained, consumers cannot bring private actions under any
provision of § 1681s-2(a), including this one. The provision thus does not control a
consumer’s claim under § 1681s-2(b). Second, this identity-theft provision does not
bar a furnisher from reporting the disputed information when the furnisher knows the
information is correct. Therefore, when a furnisher concludes the information is
correct (as NCS did here), the provision’s potential application turns on whether the
furnisher was wrong to make that conclusion because the information was in fact
incorrect (i.e., inaccurate). And a consumer’s submission of an identity theft report
supported solely by his own allegations cannot establish the disputed information was
inaccurate. See id. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(D) (A furnisher will have “reasonable cause to
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believe that the information is inaccurate” when it has “specific knowledge, other
than solely allegations by the consumer, that would cause a reasonable person to
have substantial doubts about the accuracy of the information.” (emphasis added)).
As a result, § 1681s-2(a)(6) does not change our conclusion.
In sum, we conclude that for a consumer to establish a prima facie case under
§ 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA, the consumer must at least establish that: (1) he disputed
the information through a CRA, see Sanders, 689 F.3d at 1147; (2) the information
was in fact inaccurate or incomplete; (3) the furnisher’s investigation of his dispute
was unreasonable, see Maiteki, 828 F.3d at 1275; (4) he suffered an injury; and (5)
the furnisher’s unreasonable investigation was the actual cause of his injury.
B. Inaccuracy Under the FCRA
The district court correctly identified inaccuracy as one of the elements Ward
had to prove for his negligent investigation claim. See, e.g., App., Vol. II at 85
(instructing the jury that Ward “must show that the information furnished by NCS
was inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading”). It then relied on our decision in Wright
to conclude the standard for inaccuracy depended on whether Ward’s dispute was a
legal or factual one. See Wright, 805 F.3d at 1242. Applying this legal-factual
distinction, the district court denied NCS’s motion for summary judgment on the
inaccuracy element because it found Ward raised a factual dispute, the accuracy of
which NCS could have uncovered through a reasonable investigation.
NCS requests that we reject the legal-factual distinction to assess inaccuracy
and instead adopt the standard that other circuits have recently used. Under that
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standard, to determine “whether a claimed inaccuracy is potentially actionable under
§ 1681s-2, a court must determine, among other things, whether the information in
dispute is ‘objectively and readily verifiable.’” Holden v. Holiday Inn Club
Vacations Inc., 98 F.4th 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 2024) (citation modified).
We have not yet articulated the standard for inaccuracy under the FCRA. We
acknowledge that some district courts in our circuit, like the district court here, have
read Wright to “indicate[] that the FCRA does not require resolution of ‘legal
disputes about the validity of the underlying debt[]’” and subsequently relied on a
purported legal-factual distinction. See, e.g., Plater v. Phoenix Fin. Servs., 762 F.
Supp. 3d 1098, 1108 (W.D. Okla. 2024) (second alteration in original) (quoting
Wright, 805 F.3d at 1242). But in Wright we were not addressing what was an
actionable inaccuracy under the FCRA. Rather, we were analyzing what the term
“reasonable reinvestigation” required within the context of an unreasonable
investigation claim against a CRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a). Under § 1681i(a), “[a]
reasonable reinvestigation . . . does not require CRAs to resolve legal disputes about
the validity of the underlying debts they report.” Wright, 805 F.3d at 1242. And
while Wright’s legal-factual distinction might be relevant to the reasonableness of a
furnisher’s investigation, it does not control our interpretation of the inaccuracy
element of a § 1681s-2(b) claim.
To determine what constitutes an actionable inaccuracy, we again look at the
text of the statute. Section 1681s-2(b)(1) states that after receiving notice of an
indirect dispute about the “accuracy of any information” it furnished to a CRA, the
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furnisher must investigate to determine whether the information is “inaccurate,” and
if so, take appropriate action. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A), (D), (E). The FCRA
defines neither accuracy or inaccurate, but a dictionary from around the time the Act
became law defines “accuracy” “as ‘freedom from mistake or error’ or ‘conformity to
truth or to some standard or model.’” Mader v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 56 F.4th
264, 269 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 13–
14 (1971)). The definition’s reference to “truth” or “some standard or model” makes
clear that determining accuracy is an objective inquiry. We accordingly agree with
the other circuits that to determine whether something is accurate “requires a focus
on objectively and readily verifiable information.” 6 Id.
The text of other subsections of § 1681s-2 support our conclusion that a
consumer must demonstrate the disputed information is objectively inaccurate to
prevail on a § 1681s-2(b) unreasonable-investigation claim. For example, the FCRA
bars a furnisher from reporting information to a CRA that a consumer disputes as
inaccurate only if “the information is, in fact, inaccurate.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681s2(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Similarly, the FCRA bars furnishers from reporting
information to a CRA when it “knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the
information is inaccurate.” Id. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A). Section 1681s-2 defines “the
term ‘reasonable cause to believe that the information is inaccurate’” to mean
6
Ward’s trial counsel even agreed during the discussion of NCS’s Rule 50(a) motion that the relevant legal determination “hinge[d] on a matter of objectively verifiable facts.” App., Vol. X at 261.
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“having specific knowledge, other than solely allegations by the consumer, that
would cause a reasonable person to have substantial doubts about the accuracy of the
information.” Id. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(D) (emphasis added). And although subsection (a)
is not enforceable by a consumer against a furnisher, it nonetheless reveals that the
FCRA is concerned with objectively inaccurate information—not inaccuracies based
only on subjective allegations from a consumer.
We thus follow the Fourth, Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits and conclude
that under the FCRA “reported information is actionably ‘inaccurate’ only if that
information is objectively and readily verifiable” by the furnisher as containing a
mistake or error. Roberts, 131 F.4th at 251 (quotation marks omitted); see also Sessa
v. Trans Union, LLC, 74 F.4th 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2023); Reyes, 140 F.4th at 288;
Holden, 98 F.4th at 1369. Cf. Gross, 33 F.4th at 1252 (the Ninth Circuit “defining
inaccuracy under FCRA as information that is ‘patently incorrect’ or materially
misleading”). And as explained, courts must make a threshold legal determination
under this standard if the furnisher challenges the sufficiency of the consumer’s claim
because inaccuracy is a prima facie element of a § 1681s-2(b) claim. See Holden, 98
F.4th at 1369 (“[I]n determining whether a claimed inaccuracy is potentially
actionable under § 1681s-2, a court must determine . . . whether the information in
dispute is ‘objectively and readily verifiable.’” (emphasis added) (quotation marks
omitted)).
That brings us to the final, important point: What does it mean for information
to be objectively and readily verifiable as inaccurate? “[A] dispute that involves
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complex fact-gathering and in-depth legal analysis of the sort that courts would
typically perform is not objectively and readily verifiable. A dispute that implicates
unsettled questions of law and requires credibility determinations and quasidiscovery isn’t either.” Roberts, 131 F.4th at 251. Put another way, “purely factual
or transcription errors or a straightforward application of law to facts constitute
‘objectively and readily verifiable’ information.” Rozov v. Bank of Am., N.A., No.
24-13034, 2025 WL 1620921, at *2 (11th Cir. June 9, 2025) (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Conversely, allegedly inaccurate information that stems
from a dispute without a straightforward answer does not.” Id. (citation modified).
And because Wright’s purported legal-factual distinction does not control our
interpretation of the inaccuracy element, we “decline to impose a bright-line rule that
only purely factual or transcription errors are actionable under the FCRA.” Holden,
98 F.4th at 1369 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Roberts, 131 F.4th at
252 (“[B]oth legal and factual disputes can form the basis of a § 1681s-2(b) claim, so
long as they are objectively and readily verifiable.”); Sessa, 74 F.4th at 43 (“[T]here
is no bright-line rule providing . . . that only purely factual or transcription errors are
actionable under the FCRA.”).
C. Ward’s Identity Theft Dispute
Ward asks that if we adopt the objectively-and-readily-verifiable standard, we
remand to the district court for it to determine whether he demonstrated the disputed
information was inaccurate. While our standard “practice on issues raised below but
not ruled on by the district court is to leave the matter to the district court in the first
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instance,” Greystone Const., Inc. v. Nat’l Fire & Marine Ins., 661 F.3d 1272, 1290
(10th Cir. 2011) (citation modified), the district court did address the objectivelyand-readily-verifiable standard in its post-trial order. NCS argued in its Rule 50(a)
and 50(b) motions that the district court should apply that test for inaccuracy. See
App., Vol. X at 256–58. The district court concluded that even if it were to apply the
objectively-and-readily-verifiable standard, Ward had met it. See App., Vol. III at
163 (“Whether Mr. Ward filled out the lease application or not—or whether his
daughter filled out the lease application with his permission—are objectively
verifiable facts. Indeed, these facts were implicitly decided by the jury when it
returned a verdict in Mr. Ward’s favor.”). Remanding to the district court for it to
make that same finding would be a “needless waste of party and judicial
resources,” Kan. Nat. Res. Coal. v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 971 F.3d 1222, 1234
(10th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted), so we review its denial of NCS’s Rule
50(b) motion on this issue de novo. See Wagner, 586 F.3d at 1244.
NCS argues the district court “erred when it refused to grant NCS judgment as
a matter of law [because] Ward’s dispute necessarily required NCS to make a
subjective determination [of] Ward’s veracity in the absence of objectively and
readily verifiable information.” 7 Aplt. Br. at 12. It contends Ward’s claim that he
7
NCS also argues that the district court “erred when it refused to grant NCS judgment as a matter of law [because] the Texas state court judgment against Ward for the debt conclusively establishes that the information NCS reported to the [CRAs] was accurate.” Aplt. Br. at 11. But we need not address this argument because we conclude Ward failed to prove inaccuracy even without considering the effect of the state court judgment.
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was the victim of identity theft was not objectively and readily verifiable because it
required a credibility determination and resolution of an unsettled legal question:
Was Ward an unknowing victim of his daughter’s fraud? Or was he complicit in her
scheme because he either knew about it from the beginning or he later found out
about it but protected her after the fact?
The Eleventh Circuit confronted a similar situation in Rozov v. Bank of
America, No. 24-13034, 2025 WL 1620921 (11th Cir. June 9, 2025). In that case, a
consumer deposited a fraudulent check into his bank account. When the bank noticed
the fraud, it closed the account and reported it to a CRA. The consumer disputed the
account with the CRA and the bank, but after conducting their investigations, the
bank and the CRA confirmed the accuracy of their reporting. The consumer sued the
CRA under the FCRA, alleging that he was the victim of fraud, not the perpetrator.
Because he submitted an FBI victim report with his dispute, the consumer argued the
information was “objectively and readily verifiable because there is a clear
delineation between a perpetrator of a fraud and a victim of that same fraud.” Rozov,
2025 WL 1620921, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Eleventh Circuit,
however, held the dispute was not objectively and readily verifiable.
[The CRA] would still need to confirm the veracity of the
allegations Plaintiffs provided to the FBI. . . . [W]ithout
simply taking Martino at his word, his protestations of
innocence do not demonstrate that his innocence is
objectively and readily verifiable. . . . [F]raud schemes are
often complex and sifting perpetrator from victim is no easy
process. While we must take Plaintiffs’ version of events as
true at the pleadings stage, [the CRA] had no such
obligation. And confirming Martino’s purported innocence
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was not the type of straightforward application of law to
facts that [the CRA] could objectively and readily verify.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Likewise, Ward’s claim of identity theft is not the type of straightforward
application of law to facts that NCS could objectively and readily verify. Like the
CRA in Rozov, NCS would have had to take Ward at his word that he was not
involved in his daughter’s fraud because her scheme was clever—so much so that
Ward claims he did not even discover his daughter was the perpetrator until after he
filed this lawsuit. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(D) (A furnisher has “reasonable
cause to believe that [disputed] information is inaccurate” when it has “specific
knowledge, other than solely allegations by the consumer, that would cause a
reasonable person to have substantial doubts about the accuracy of the information.”
(emphasis added)). Accordingly, Ward cannot satisfy his prima facie requirement to
show that the information was in fact inaccurate.
Decisions from other circuits applying the objectively-and-readily-verifiable
standard also support our conclusion that Ward’s claim of identity theft was
insufficient to prove inaccuracy. See, e.g., Reyes, 140 F.4th at 287 (rejecting a
consumer’s argument that “the reported Citibank account information was inaccurate
[since] whether she ‘owed the debt’ (i.e., the outstanding balance) was contested and
unresolved” because “her alleged inaccuracy was based on a not-yet-adjudicated
position that the debt is not legally valid” (citation modified)); Mader, 56 F.4th at
269–70 (finding an “unresolved legal question” about the “validity of [the
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consumer’s] debt means that its status is not sufficiently objectively verifiable to
render [his] credit report ‘inaccurate’ under the FCRA”); Holden, 98 F.4th at 1368
(“[T]he alleged inaccurate information is not objectively and readily verifiable
because it stems from a contractual dispute without a straightforward answer. . . .
And [while] we agree that furnishers are qualified and obligated to assess issues such
as whether debts are actually due and/or are collectible, . . . that is what [the furnisher
here] did.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
The district court, however, relied on a case from the Southern District of
Florida to conclude Ward’s claimed inaccuracy was objectively verifiable. See App.,
Vol. III at 162 (citing Paulino v. W. Funding II Inc., 737 F. Supp. 3d 1338 (S.D. Fla.
2024)). In Paulino, a consumer discovered that someone had taken out an auto loan
in his name. Although the disputed loan was in the consumer’s name, it contained an
incorrect address and an incorrect social security number. The consumer filed a
dispute with the CRA reporting the debt. But “despite its knowledge that the SSN
used on the Disputed Loan did not match [the consumer’s] actual SSN,” the CRA
“determined the Disputed Loan belonged to [the consumer] and declined to change
its reporting or block the Disputed Account.” Paulino, 737 F. Supp. 3d at 1343. The
consumer sued the CRA for an unreasonable investigation under the FCRA. The
CRA moved to dismiss the suit, arguing the consumer did not adequately plead the
information was inaccurate because it was not objectively and readily verifiable. The
district court denied the motion because it found “the question of whether Plaintiff
executed the Disputed Loan is objectively and readily verifiable . . . . [W]hether
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Plaintiff executed the Disputed Loan, is a factual question that will be answered in
the affirmative or negative. Put differently, Plaintiff’s dispute with the CRA’s boils
down to whether he executed the Disputed Loan on November 8, 2022, or whether
someone else did so without his authorization.” Id. at 1346.
The district court here found Ward’s situation similar to the one in Paulino,
concluding, “[w]hether Mr. Ward filled out the lease application or not—or whether
his daughter filled out the lease application with his permission—are objectively
verifiable facts.” App., Vol. III at 163. But the disputed information in Paulino was
materially different than Ward’s dispute. The court in Paulino found it plausible that
the disputed information was objectively inaccurate because the disputed “account
was associated with a SSN and personal identifying information that differed from”
the consumer’s. 737 F. Supp. 3d at 1347. Because the inaccuracy of that “factual
information [was] easily verifiable via consultation of available records,” Rozov,
2025 WL 1620921, at *3 n.4, the Paulino court found the CRA could have easily and
objectively verified the disputed loan was not made by the consumer. But here, all
objective information about the rental debt pointed towards Ward’s involvement
through his daughter: the rental application contained true copies of his driver’s
license and social security card (neither of which Ward reported as stolen), Ward’s
correct address, and Ward’s daughter’s phone number and job information.
Ward, however, argues the objective evidence available to NCS confirmed that
the rental application was fraudulent. He claims the pay stubs and social security
letter “were obviously fake,” the phone number used to rent the apartment was not
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Ward’s, and Ward’s actual paystubs and mortgage statement he provided with his
dispute showed that he lived in Colorado and not Texas. Aple. Br. at 17–21. But
none of that evidence forecloses the possibility that Ward either allowed his daughter
to use his information to obtain the lease or that she did so without his permission
initially but that he subsequently chose to protect her and helped conceal her
deception. In either scenario, it is unclear whether Ward would bear responsibility
for the rental debt, presenting an unsettled legal question that made the disputed
information not objectively inaccurate. See Roberts, 131 F.4th at 251 (“Inaccuracies
that are objectively and readily verifiable do not include claims of tortious conduct
that require a furnisher to evaluate the subjective nature of the parties’ actions—such
as claims of fraud or retaliation.”). 8
Ward also contends that NCS could have discovered other evidence that
demonstrates he was not responsible for the debt. He points out that “the IP address
used to rent the apartment did not match” Ward’s location in Colorado and the
landlord was aware the tenant was female. Aple. Br. at 19–20. But whether NCS
8
Our decision does not mean that all consumer claims of fraud or identity theft are categorically not objectively and readily verifiable. If a consumer’s dispute of identity theft contains objective evidence showing the consumer was not tied to the debt it might meet the inaccuracy standard. And even consumers in Ward’s position, with only subjective evidence of fraud, are not without recourse. For example, Ward could have pursued his allegation of identity theft with law enforcement or a regulatory agency to gather more information that objectively proved he was the victim of fraud. Or Ward “could sue [NCS] for a declaration that [he] no longer owed a debt,” and “[w]ith that declaration in hand, [he] would have a much stronger cudgel with which to force [NCS] to stop reporting [the] debt to a reporting agency.” Holden, 98 F.4th at 1368–69 (citation modified).
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should have discovered such evidence goes towards the reasonableness of its
investigation because Ward did not include it in his dispute. For instance, NCS could
have also attempted to contact Green to inquire whether she used Ward’s personal
information without his knowledge or approval. In any event, none of that evidence
would have allowed NCS to objectively verify that Ward was not connected to the
rental application through his daughter. Even if NCS contacted Green and she
subsequently admitted to committing identity fraud and disavowed Ward’s
involvement, the inaccuracy of the disputed information would still depend on the
truth of her assertions. This would require NCS to subjectively assess her credibility,
which as we explained is something a furnisher is not qualified nor obligated to do.
Thus, Ward cannot show the information was inaccurate under the objectively-andreadily-verifiable standard.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s denial of NCS’s Rule 50(b)
motion, vacate the district court’s judgment for Ward, and remand with direction to
enter judgment for NCS on Ward’s negligence claim.
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