Opinion issued July 14, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-24-00870-CV
LILLIAN GONZALEZ, Appellant
V.
HOUSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellee
On Appeal from the 215th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2023-47538
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lillian Gonzalez appeals the trial court’s order granting the Houston Housing
Authority’s plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity and dismissing
her claims for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.
Background
Gonzalez’s claims arise from her tenancy at the Southlawn Palms Apartments,
where she lived with her minor children in a subsidized unit under a Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) program and received housing assistance
through a contract administered by the Houston Housing Authority (HHA) in
coordination with the property owner and manager.
According to Gonzalez, the apartment complex was unsanitary and unsafe. It
was unsanitary because of rodent and bug infestations, mold, sewage, and trash. And
it was unsafe because it lacked adequate security despite several violent incidents
having occurred there or nearby. Gonzalez alleged that three deadly shootings had
happened at the apartment complex, that her car was struck by bullets on another
occasion, and that her daughter was abducted from a convenience store next to the
apartment complex and sexually assaulted. Because Gonzalez reported her
daughter’s assault to police, Gonzalez feared the assailants would learn which
apartment she and her daughter lived in and retaliate. She alleged that she asked the
apartment’s front office about protections under the federal Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA),1 including relocation, but her request was either ignored or
denied, leading her to file a complaint with HUD.
1
Relevant here, VAWA ensures that federally subsidized tenants cannot be evicted
or denied housing assistance because they are or have been “a victim of domestic
violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking, if the applicant or tenant
2
Gonzalez sued HHA and several other defendants connected with the
management and ownership of the apartment complex. With respect to HHA, she
alleged negligence and gross negligence, claiming HHA was obligated to inspect the
complex and enforce fair housing standards but had “knowingly ignored” the
conditions that made her apartment uninhabitable. Gonzalez also alleged that HHA
did not give her the statutorily required notice of occupancy rights under VAWA or
respond to her inquiries about those rights, thus preventing her from exercising any
right to relocate under VAWA after her daughter was assaulted.2 Gonzalez
characterized HHA’s alleged VAWA-related failures as a “breach of [HHA’s] duty
to provide reasonable and general care.” And she further characterized some of
HHA’s refusal to assist her in curing the poor living conditions or relocating as
retaliatory after she complained to HUD. These failures, Gonzalez claimed, caused
her physical injury, pain and suffering, and emotional distress that warranted
economic and noneconomic damages.
HHA filed a plea to the jurisdiction and argued that Gonzalez’s claims must
be dismissed because HHA retained governmental immunity. HHA argued that, to
the extent Gonzalez had alleged HHA breached a lease or rental agreement, no such
otherwise qualifies for admission, assistance, participation, or occupancy.” 34
U.S.C. § 12491(b)(1).
2
Gonzalez claims she did not receive the HUD-5380 Notification of Occupancy
Rights under VAWA and the HUD-5382 Certification of Domestic Violence,
Dating Violence, Sexual Assault, or Stalking and Alternate Documents.
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contract existed between them. Further, HHA argued, it was immune from any tort
claims because Gonzalez had not pled facts falling within the limited waiver of
immunity in the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) for personal injury caused by a
“condition or use of tangible personal or real property.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 101.021(2).
Gonzalez responded that HHA’s immunity was waived by Section 392.006 of
the Local Government Code, which provides that a “housing authority shall be
subject to all landlord obligations and tenant remedies, other than a suit for personal
injuries, as set forth in any lease or rental agreement . . . .” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE
§ 392.006. But she clarified that her contract-related allegations concerned HHA’s
obligation through its agreement with HUD to comply with federal law, including
VAWA, without identifying any individual contract between her and HHA. She
further argued the HHA had not properly “train[ed], supervise[d], or discipline[d]
their employees who act[ed] in a way that violate[d] federal law” and failed to refer
her to “the appropriate department, staff, or policymaker,” and that the jurisdictional
plea did not address these VAWA-related failures.
The trial court ultimately granted the plea and dismissed Gonzalez’s claims
against HHA without giving her an opportunity to amend her pleading.
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Governmental Immunity
In her sole issue on appeal, Gonzalez contends the trial court should not have
dismissed her claim alleging HHA violated VAWA because HHA’s plea to the
jurisdiction did not address that claim.
A. Standard of review
Governmental immunity protects the State’s political subdivisions, including
housing authorities, from suit and liability. See Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643
S.W.3d 387, 392 (Tex. 2022); Harris Cnty. Hous. Auth. v. Rankin, 414 S.W.3d 198,
201 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied); see also TEX. LOC. GOV’T
CODE § 392.006.
Because governmental immunity defeats a trial court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction, it may be raised in a plea to the jurisdiction. Pepper Lawson Horizon
Int’l Grp., LLC v. Tex. S. Univ., 669 S.W.3d 205, 211 (Tex. 2023). When, as here,
a plea challenges the plaintiff’s pleadings, “the government does not dispute the
plaintiff’s factual allegations, and evidence is irrelevant.” City of Austin v. Powell,
704 S.W.3d 437, 447 (Tex. 2024). The question we must answer in evaluating a
pleadings challenge is “whether the alleged facts ‘affirmatively demonstrate a trial
court’s subject matter jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v.
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004)).
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Whether a plaintiff has carried this burden is a question of law we review de
novo, construing the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. See Heckman v.
Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). And when the trial court grants
a plea to the jurisdiction without stating the basis for its ruling, we may affirm on
any basis properly before us. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Stern, 355 S.W.3d
129, 134 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).
B. Analysis
We begin by noting that Gonzalez does not challenge the trial court’s
dismissal of any negligence or contract claim based on HHA’s alleged failures to
maintain sanitary conditions at the apartment complex or keep the premises safe.
Instead, she limits her complaints on appeal to the dismissal of her claims alleging
that HHA (1) was negligent in failing to properly train, supervise, and discipline its
employees to ensure compliance with federal law and (2) violated VAWA by not
providing her the statutorily required occupancy notice or issuing proper
documentation when she reported the sexual assault and asked to relocate.
In her operative pleading, Gonzalez points to Section 392.006 of the Local
Government Code as waiving HHA’s governmental immunity. It provides:
For all purposes, including the application of the Texas Tort Claims Act
(Chapter 101, Civil Practice and Remedies Code), a housing authority
is a unit of government and the functions of a housing authority are
essential government functions and not proprietary functions.
Provided, however, a housing authority shall be subject to all landlord
obligations and tenant remedies, other than a suit for personal injuries,
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as set forth in any leasing or rental agreement and in Chapters 24, 54,
91, 92, and 301 of the Property Code.
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 392.006. Essentially, through this provision, the
Legislature has instructed that in a suit against a housing authority other than for
personal injuries, the housing authority, despite its status as a governmental unit, is
subject to the obligations and tenant remedies under the lease agreement and certain
provisions of the Property Code. See id. In other words, the fact that the housing
authority is a unit of government exercising governmental functions does not protect
the housing authority from those obligations, designated in Section 392.006, it has
as a landlord. Id. Section 392.006 makes clear, however, that in a suit against a
housing authority for personal injuries, the provisions of the TTCA control. Id.
As we have already noted, Gonzalez is not alleging on appeal that she and
HHA had a landlord-tenant relationship, so our analysis does not concern that part
of Section 392.006. We turn instead to the TTCA, which is the only avenue for
Gonzalez’s negligence claim against HHA. See Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex. 2008) (recognizing TTCA is “the only, albeit
limited, avenue for common-law recovery against the government”).
To support a waiver of immunity under the TTCA, as relevant here, a
negligence cause of action asserted against a governmental unit must arise from a
personal injury “caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property.”
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(2) (emphasis added). Gonzalez’s
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allegations that HHA negligently trained, supervised, and disciplined its employees
and representatives with respect to VAWA compliance are not actionable under the
TTCA because they involve failures in conduct and not the condition or use of
tangible personal or real property. See, e.g., Tex. A&M Univ. v. Bishop, 156 S.W.3d
580, 583 (Tex. 2005); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 580–81
(Tex. 2001); Harris v. Galveston Cnty., 799 S.W.2d 766, 767–68 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied). Consequently, the trial court did not err in
dismissing Gonzalez’s claim alleging negligent training, supervision, and discipline
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The same is true for Gonzalez’s claim alleging that HHA did not provide the
VAWA occupancy notice or respond appropriately to her request to transfer to a
safer unit after her daughter’s sexual assault. Nothing in Section 392.006 can be
read as a waiver of HHA’s governmental immunity as to these allegations. See TEX.
LOC. GOV’T CODE § 392.006; see also Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid
Transit, 369 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2012) (“[A] waiver of governmental immunity
must be clear and unambiguous.”). And Gonzalez does not identify any other
source, nor can we find one either internal or external to VAWA, that waives HHA’s
governmental immunity.
To the contrary, while VAWA’s housing protections prohibit discrimination
against victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking in
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federally assisted housing programs, they do not create a private right of action, let
alone one against a governmental unit for which immunity is waived. See Gonzalez
v. 2009 Hous. Scott Street, LP, No. 4:24-cv-05143, 2025 WL 2598190, at *4 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 18, 2025), adopted by 2025 WL 2597697 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2025); see
also U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (invalidating VAWA’s civil remedy
provision). Instead, VAWA contemplates that its housing-related requirements will
be policed by a federal agency, like HUD, by conducting compliance reviews. See
34 U.S.C. § 12492(a)(1). We thus conclude Gonzalez has not shown a waiver of
governmental immunity for her VAWA claim.
A pleading amendment cannot overcome this deficiency. Gonzalez argues we
should remand the case so she can amend her pleadings to allege a claim for
discrimination under the federal Fair Housing Act based on sex. See generally 42
U.S.C. § 3604(b) (making it unlawful “to discriminate against any person in the
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of
services or facilities” on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin”).3 That remedy is not appropriate here.
3
Unlike VAWA, the Fair Housing Act permits private parties to bring actions
challenging discriminatory housing practices. See Williams v. Harris Cnty. Hous.
Auth., No. 14-3570, 2016 WL 8730315, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2016) (citing 45
U.S.C. § 3613 and Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283, 289 (5th Cir. 2003)), adopted by
2016 WL 5661705 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2016).
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“[T]he right to amend typically arises when the pleadings fail to allege enough
jurisdictional facts to demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction.” Clint Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538, 559 (Tex. 2016) (emphasis added). Here, the
jurisdictional bar arises not from a lack of factual allegations but from the nature of
Gonzalez’s claim. That is, she does not propose to add more jurisdictional facts;
instead, she proposes to “cure” the jurisdictional defect by changing the claim she
brought to allege HHA’s conduct was motivated by sex under a discrimination
theory. But “remand is a mechanism for parties, over whose claims the trial court
may have jurisdiction, to plead facts tending to establish that jurisdiction, not for
parties, over whose claims the trial court does not have jurisdiction, to plead new
claims over which the trial court does have jurisdiction.” Id. With these principles
in mind, we conclude Gonzalez is not entitled to a remand to allege a new cause of
action under the FHA.
We overrule Gonzalez’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s order granting HHA’s plea to the jurisdiction.
Andrew Johnson
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.
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