Opinion issued July 16, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-23-00941-CV
JENNIFER KOTT-LOONEY, Appellant
V.
SUSAN MICHELLE AIELLO, Appellee
On Appeal from the 234th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2023-52729
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this interlocutory appeal,1 appellant, Jennifer Kott-Looney, challenges the
trial court’s order denying her motion to dismiss2 the claims of appellee, Susan
1
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.008, 51.014(a)(12).
2
See id. § 27.003(a); see also id. § 27.005.
Michelle Aiello, pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act (“TCPA”), 3 in
Aiello’s suit against her for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. In two issues, Kott-Looney contends that the trial court erred in denying
her motion to dismiss.
We affirm.
Background
In her original petition, Aiello alleged that in 2018 and again on November
15, 2022, David B. Looney (“David”), Kott-Looney’s husband, filed for divorce
from Kott-Looney. “Upon [David] deciding to file for divorce,” David and Aiello
“began a dating relationship.”
Aiello further alleged that in mid-November 2022, Kott-Looney found
Aiello’s cellular telephone number and posted Aiello’s telephone number on social
media, with the caption: “please feel free to tell her what you think for dating a
married man and wrecking a home.” (Internal quotations omitted.) According to
Aiello, one of Kott-Looney’s friends then texted her, stating: “A married man?
You’re a dirty homewrecking whore. I would be so ashamed of myself. He’s a
husband and a father!!! Sluts like you need to disappear...PERMANENTLY
DIE...Go deep throat a chainsaw.” (Internal quotations omitted.)
3
See id. §§ 27.001–.011.
2
Additionally, in late November or early December 2022, Aiello’s roommate
called her to say that when he walked out the front door of their shared home, “he
saw a female walking around the front yard while a young child was in the front seat
of a [car] parked in Aiello’s driveway.” The female “demanded to know who the
roommate was, and he asked her the same.” The female then “asserted she was
David[’s] . . . wife and wanted to speak to him.” Before driving away from Aiello’s
home, Kott-Looney left a note on David’s car window.
Subsequently, according to Aiello, in January 2023, while she was teaching
at the middle school where she worked, the school receptionist called her and stated
that Kott-Looney was on the telephone and wanted to know if Aiello was at school
because she wanted to speak to her. Upon learning that information, Aiello
immediately panicked, “as Kott[-Looney] had already stalked her home” and
because Kott-Looney was not forthcoming with her name on the telephone with the
receptionist. The principal of the school “deemed [the situation] a possible threat to
Aiello and possibly her students,” so he ordered an evacuation of Aiello’s class to a
different location. The incident caused Aiello’s “blood pressure to spike, as she was
on high alert with anxiety and fear for her personal safety.” Aiello filed a report with
the school district’s police department, and shortly thereafter, Aiello “filed for a civil
protective order in an effort to protect herself.”
3
Aiello further alleged that in March 2023, Kott-Looney told David that she
“had performed a background check on Aiello and . . . located and spoke with people
Aiello knew.” Kott-Looney also “reach[ed] out to third parties to find what
information she could about Aiello to try to use against her.”
According to Aiello, on April 14, 2023, Kott-Looney contacted a supervisor
at the school where Aiello taught, with the following message: “. . . Aiello has been
actively having an affair with my husband now for 6 months. She has stated she is
in encouragement of affairs despite the pain to my family and my son. She also was
text messaging my husband 450 times per day during class hours which made me
question how she does any teaching. Just wanted to make you aware of her. She
has shown no remorse for her actions at all.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Aiello
alleged that Kott-Looney’s message was intended to “get [her] reprimanded at work,
or worse, terminated from her job entirely.”
Additionally, Aiello alleged that in late April 2023, Kott-Looney began
sending David “images of Aiello’s [previous] divorce decree,” which was “a
personal matter” that Kott-Looney was using “for purposes of harassment and
stalking.” In response, Aiello filed another report with law enforcement. When law
enforcement officers spoke with Aiello, they asked her “if she was able to protect
herself[] because it was likely Kott[-Looney] would continue to escalate and
possibly try to hurt Aiello physically.” Based on her conversation with officers,
4
Aiello believed that Kott-Looney “would ultimately try to physically harm or kill
[her] and the only way to stop her would be deadly force.”
Further, according to Aiello, in late April 2023 or early May 2023,
Kott-Looney began sending text messages to David’s parents “with disparaging,
malicious, and utterly false remarks [about Aiello] with the intent to embarrass,
torment, and abuse Aiello.” For instance, Kott-Looney sent a text message stating:
“Just FYI your son’s new girlfriend has a criminal record, used to be a stripper and
now sells her own pornography online. She also apparently smokes weed and does
ecstasy daily.” (Internal quotations omitted.)
In May 2023, Kott-Looney began “stalking” Aiello’s social media pages. On
May 4, 2023, Aiello “received an alert from iLock360 stating her email address and
password had been accessed by a suspicious website, InstantCheckMate.com.”
According to Aiello, Kott-Looney “had an account with th[at] website” and had
“used [it] to search public records[] for years.” Kott-Looney also “created a
Snapchat[4] profile with [David’s] name and old [tele]phone number and tried to add
4
“Snapchat is a messaging application that allows users to share pictures, videos, and
messages that are only available for a short time before they become inaccessible.
‘Snaps’ can be directed privately to selected contacts or to a semi-public ‘story.’”
Igboji v. State, No. 14-17-00838-CR, 2025 WL 556460, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 20, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
5
Aiello as a friend.” And Kott-Looney went through “Aiello’s Pinterest posts[5] for
any alleged ‘dirt’ on Aiello.”
Aiello also alleged that, on July 31, 2023, she received an email from Belinda
Colby, in the human resources department for Aiello’s school district, to “make [her]
aware of information received form [sic] a community member.” In response to the
email, Aiello had “a visceral and physical reaction.” “Her heart began to beat
rapidly, she felt nauseous, and she was overwhelmed with fear and anxiety” because
“[s]he knew that Kott[-Looney] was the community member that contacted her
school district’s human resources department.”
When Aiello spoke to Colby, Colby confirmed that Kott-Looney had
“attempted to contact the Assistant Superintendent of [the school district] but was
transferred to the human resources department.” Kott-Looney told Colby that she
was “the soon-to-be-ex-wife of the person Aiello was currently in a relationship
with,” i.e., David, and Kott-Looney accused Aiello of harassing her by text message,
threatening her through Aiello’s Pinterest posts, and posting scandalous pictures on
Pinterest. Kott-Looney also told Colby that Aiello used narcotics, had “a sexual
5
“Pinterest is a social media website where users can share photos, articles, and other
information about their interests on personalized web-based Pinboards which are,
by default, viewable by all of Pinterest’s 80 million monthly users.” Pinterest, Inc.
v. Pintrips, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
6
relationship with a 17-year-old female,” and had a “pornographic website.” (Internal
quotations omitted.)
While speaking to Kott-Looney, Colby asked her if she had ever seen Aiello
use narcotics or alcohol, and Kott-Looney said that she had not. Colby also asked
Kott-Looney “how she came by th[e] information” about the seventeen-year-old,
and Kott-Looney said that she had “heard [it] from a third-party.” When Colby
asked about the purported “pornographic website,” Kott-Looney told Colby that she
had never visited the website, and she did not know the web address.
In discussing Kott-Looney’s allegations with Aiello, Colby explained to
Aiello that “what Kott[-Looney] was describing did not qualify as harassment.” And
after Colby visited Aiello’s Pinterest page, she determined that “nothing warranted
an employee investigation.”
Aiello further alleged that from August 4, 2023 until August 10, 2023, the day
before Aiello filed her original petition, Kott-Looney had personally messaged “at
least 20 members of the [school district’s private] Parent Facebook page [6] with
Aiello’s full name paired with malicious, disparaging, defaming, and untrue
remarks.” Kott-Looney also posted on social media that the school district had
“hire[d] individuals who harass the parents in the district, have criminal records,
6
See Jeansonne v. State, 624 S.W.3d 78, 90 n. 13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2021, no pet.) (“Facebook, Inc. is an online social media and social networking
service company.” (internal quotations omitted)).
7
were previously strippers, online porn artists, and other wonderful things.” (Internal
quotations omitted.) She “told one parent that Aiello had an affair with a 17-year-old
girl.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Kott-Looney included Aiello’s personal
information in some of her messages.
Aiello brought claims against Kott-Looney for defamation and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. As to her defamation claim, Aiello alleged that
Kott-Looney had been “actively making false statements of fact relating to Aiello to
third parties via her defamatory posts and personal messages over the [school
district’s private] Facebook . . . Parent[] group,” to which Aiello also belonged.
According to Aiello, Kott-Looney had sent personal messages to at least thirty
individuals within the Facebook group containing defamatory remarks about Aiello,
including, but not limited to, that “Aiello was a stripper,” “Aiello use[d] drugs like
ecstasy and marijuana daily as she t[aught] children,” “Aiello ha[d] a dangerous
criminal history,” and Aiello “had a sexual relationship with a minor female child.”
As a result of Kott-Looney’s false statements, Aiello suffered stress, anxiety, mental
anguish, and emotional distress that “she w[ould] lose her job and/or that
Kott[-Looney] w[ould] continue to escalate to physical violence.” According to
Aiello, her emotional distress caused “physical ailments to appear, causing [her] to
seek medical treatment and accrue actual damages.”
8
As to her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Aiello alleged
that Kott-Looney had acted intentionally or recklessly “with regards to her
defamation (not to mention her criminal harassment and stalking) of [Aiello] at her
home, at her job, and online.” According to Aiello, Kott-Looney’s conduct was
extreme and outrageous and had caused Aiello emotional distress, mental anguish,
and physical pain because Aiello was concerned that she would lose her job and
Kott-Looney would “escalate into physical violence.”
Aiello sought damages for emotional distress, mental anguish, physical pain
and suffering, and medical expenses.
Kott-Looney answered, generally denying the allegations in Aiello’s petition
and asserting various affirmative defenses. Kott-Looney then moved to dismiss
Aiello’s claims against her under the TCPA, arguing that the trial court should
dismiss Aiello’s claims because they were “based on, and . . . in direct response
to . . . Kott-Looney’s constitutional rights to petition, to exercise free speech, and to
associate.” According to Kott-Looney, Aiello’s claims against her were based on
the official grievance she filed with Aiello’s school district, her report to law
enforcement about Aiello’s harassing behavior, and communications to parents in
the school district—matters which involved Kott-Looney’s right to free speech, right
to petition, and right of association. Kott-Looney also argued, as to Aiello’s claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, that she was entitled to dismissal
9
under the TCPA because Aiello’s claim was “based solely on alleged defamatory
statements” and Aiello’s only remedy was to “file a defamation claim against”
Kott-Looney, which Aiello had done.
In her response to Kott-Looney’s motion to dismiss, Aiello argued that
Kott-Looney had not met her burden establishing she was entitled to dismissal under
the TCPA because she had not demonstrated that Aiello’s claims were based on or
in response to Kott-Looney’s exercise of the right of free speech, to petition, or of
association. Specifically, Kott-Looney had not shown that this was “a matter of
public concern subject to [the] TCPA.” (Emphasis omitted.) Additionally, Aiello
asserted that she had made a prima facie showing of defamation.
After a hearing, the trial court denied Kott-Looney’s motion to dismiss.
Standard of Review
The Texas Legislature enacted the TCPA “to encourage and safeguard the
constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and
otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and,
at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for
demonstrable injury.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.002. To that end,
the TCPA provides for early dismissal of a legal action that is “based on or is in
response to a party’s exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of
association.” Id. § 27.003(a).
10
We review de novo the denial of a TCPA motion to dismiss. Dall. Morning
News, Inc. v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Tex. 2019); Better Bus. Bureau of Metro.
Houston, Inc. v. John Moore Servs., Inc., 441 S.W.3d 345, 352–53 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). In deciding if a legal action should be
dismissed under the TCPA, we consider “the pleadings, evidence a court could
consider under [Texas] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 166a, . . . and supporting and
opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or defense is based.” TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.006(a). The plaintiff’s allegations, and not the
defendant’s admissions or denials, constitute the basis of a legal action. Hersh v.
Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017). We review the pleadings and evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-movant. Schimmel v. McGregor, 438 S.W.3d
847, 855–56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). Whether the
TCPA applies is an issue of statutory interpretation that we also review de novo.
Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018).
Dismissal under TCPA
In her first issue, Kott-Looney argues that the trial court erred in denying her
motion to dismiss Aiello’s defamation claim against her because the claim was based
on Kott-Looney’s exercise of the rights protected by the TCPA, Aiello failed to
prove a prima facia case of defamation, and Aiello’s defamation claim was barred
by a defense. In her second issue, Kott-Looney argues that the trial court erred in
11
denying her motion to dismiss Aiello’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress
claim against her because the claim was based on or in response to Kott-Looney’s
words or protected activity, Aiello failed to prove a prima facia case of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and Aiello’s
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim was legally unavailable.
The TCPA provides a procedure for the expedited dismissal of retaliatory
lawsuits that seek to intimidate or silence citizens on matters of public concern. In
re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 584 (Tex. 2015); Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Houston,
Inc. v. John Moore Servs., Inc., 500 S.W.3d 26, 37 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2016, pet. denied). “The TCPA’s purpose is to identify and summarily dispose of
lawsuits designed only to chill First Amendment rights, not to dismiss meritorious
lawsuits.” In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 589; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 27.002 (“The purpose of [the TCPA] is to encourage and safeguard the
constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and
otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by law and,
at the same time, protect the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits for
demonstrable injury.”). Under the TCPA, a party may move to dismiss a “legal
action” that is “based on or is in response to” the party’s “exercise of the right of
free speech, right to petition, or right of association.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 27.003(a); see also Creative Oil & Gas, LLC v. Lona Hills Ranch, LLC, 591
12
S.W.3d 127, 131 (Tex. 2019). A “[l]egal action” is “a lawsuit, cause of action,
petition, complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim or any other judicial pleading or
filing that requests legal, declaratory, or equitable relief.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 27.001(6) (internal quotations omitted).
To be entitled to dismissal under the TCPA, the movant has the initial burden
to “demonstrate[] that [a] legal action is based on or is in response to” the movant’s
exercise of the right to petition, association, or free speech. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 27.005(b); see also Lowry v. Fox Television Stations, LLC, No.
01-20-00627-CV, 2022 WL 2720509, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July
14, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). If the movant meets her initial burden, then the burden
shifts to the non-movant. Diogu Law Firm PLLC v. Experience Infusion Ctrs. LLC,
No. 01-19-00494-CV, 2020 WL 1681182, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Apr. 7, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Whether the movant has met her initial burden to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the non-movant has asserted a legal
action based on or in response to the movant’s right to petition, association, or free
speech is reviewed de novo. See Hall, 579 S.W.3d at 377.
13
Kott-Looney asserts that Aiello’s defamation and
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims were “based on” or filed “in
response to” the exercise of her right of free speech and association.7
The “[e]xercise of the right of free speech means a communication made in
connection with a matter of public concern.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 27.001(3) (internal quotations omitted). The “[e]xercise of the right of association
means to join together to collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend common
interests relating to a . . . matter of public concern.” Id. § 27.001(2) (internal
quotations omitted). A “[m]atter of public concern” means “a statement or activity
regarding . . . a matter of political, social, or other interest to the community[] or a
subject of concern to the public.” Id. § 27.001(7) (internal quotations omitted).
Aiello disputes that her claims against Kott-Looney involve a matter of public
concern because Kott-Looney’s false statements and behavior, on which Aiello’s
7
In her appellant’s brief, Kott-Looney also mentions that Aiello’s claims against her
were “based on” or “in response to” her “right to petition.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 27.005(b). However, she provides no substantive analysis for
any argument that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss because
Aiello’s defamation and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims were
“based on” or “in response to” her right to petition. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i)
(appellant’s brief “must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions
made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record”). As such, we
conclude that any argument that the trial court erred in denying her motion to
dismiss because Aiello’s claim involved Kott-Looney’s right to petition is waived
due to inadequate briefing. See Hooks v. Brenham Hous. Auth., No.
01-17-00602-CV, 2018 WL 6061307, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov.
20, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A failure to provide substantive analysis of an issue
or cite appropriate authority waives a complaint on appeal.”).
14
claims were based, only related to Aiello, only damaged Aiello’s reputation, and
only harmed Aiello’s health.
The applicable definition of “[m]atter of public concern” is narrower now than
at the TCPA’s inception. See Hayman v. Khan, 693 S.W.3d 444, 449 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.); Vaughn-Riley v. Patterson, No.
05-20-00236-CV, 2020 WL 7053651, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 2, 2020, no
pet.) (mem. op.). Specifically, the Legislature substantively amended the definition
of “[m]atter of public concern” in 2019, deleting the “good, product, or service in
the marketplace” and “environmental, economic, or community well-being”
language from the definition. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.001(7);
Hayman, 693 S.W.3d at 449–50; see also Vaughn-Riley, 2020 WL 7053651, at *3
(noting legislative history of definition of “[m]atter of public concern” reflected
Legislature’s intent to narrow TCPA’s scope in 2019 amendments).
Communications are a matter of public concern when they can “be fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social or other concern to the
community” or when it “is a subject of general interest and of value and concern to
the public.” Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (internal quotations
omitted). “The arguably inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is
irrelevant to the question of whether it deals with a matter of public concern.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted). Deciding whether a communication is of public or
15
private concern requires us to examine the “content, form, and context” of that
communication, “as revealed by the whole record.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Notably, to fall within the “[m]atter of public concern” category, a
communication must have public relevance beyond the private or personal interests
of the parties. See Creative Oil, 591 S.W.3d at 136. Thus, a private dispute affecting
only the fortunes of the private parties involved is simply not a “[m]atter of public
concern” under any tenable understanding of those words. See id. at 134–37. When
the communication involved does not relate to a matter of public concern, the
assertion that it could result in a matter of public concern is beyond the reach of the
act. Erdner v. Highland Park Emergency Ctr., LLC, 580 S.W.3d 269, 276 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied). As the Texas Supreme Court has explained,
communications that are merely “related somehow to one of the broad categories”
set out in the statute but that otherwise have no relevance to a public audience are
not “communications made in connection with a matter of public concern.” McLane
Champions, LLC v. Houston Baseball Partners LLC, 671 S.W.3d 907, 916 (Tex.
2023) (internal quotations omitted).
To determine whether Aiello’s claims involve a “[m]atter of public concern,”
we first look to her pleadings, which are the “best and all-sufficient evidence of the
nature of the action.” Hersh, 526 S.W.3d at 467 (internal quotations omitted); see
also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.006(a) (pleadings are evidence in
16
TCPA cases). We cannot “blindly accept” attempts by the movant to characterize
the non-movant’s claims as implicating protected expression. See Sloat v. Rathbun,
513 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, pet. dism’d).
Aiello’s claims against Kott-Looney stem from Kott-Looney’s purportedly
false statements about Aiello and her alleged harassment of Aiello. The record
indicates that Kott-Looney’s statements and behavior constituted personal attacks
on Aiello’s character stemming from a private dispute related to David’s and
Kott-Looney’s marriage and affected only the parties involved. See Creative Oil,
591 S.W.3d at 136 (to be matter of public concern, claim must have public relevance
“beyond the . . . interests of the private parties”); Beard v. McGregor Bancshares,
Inc., No. 05-21-00478-CV, 2022 WL 1076176, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 11,
2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“The record is devoid of evidence that the dispute
had any relevance to the broader community . . . . Rather, [the defendant’s]
Facebook statements were personal attacks on [the plaintiff’s] character stemming
from a private dispute affecting the fortunes of only the parties involved . . . .”);
Miranda v. Byles, 390 S.W.3d 543, 554 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet.
denied) (“An issue is not a public issue simply because it is a controversy of interest
to the public.”). Private disputes, whether sounding in contract or in tort, that merely
affect the fortunes of the litigants are not matters of public concern. Morris v.
Daniel, 615 S.W.3d 571, 576 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.); see
17
also Gaskamp v. WSP USA, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 457, 477 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2020, pet. dism’d) (tort claims with no potential impact on wider community
or public audience were not matters of public concern under TCPA). Further, the
fact that third parties may be involved does not automatically transform a private
dispute into a matter of public concern. See Morris, 615 S.W.3d at 578.
Here, we have an obligation to consider Aiello’s pleadings in the light most
favorable to her and in favor of the conclusion that her claims are not reliant on
protected expression. Abundant Life Therapeutic Servs., Tex., LLC v. Headen, No.
05-20-00145-CV, 2020 WL 7296801, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 11, 2020, pet.
denied); see also Newstream Hotels & Resorts, LLC v. Abdou, No. 02-21-00343-CV,
2022 WL 1496537, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 12, 2022, pet. denied) (mem.
op.). We must read Aiello’s pleadings “in [a] manner most sympathetic to the
TCPA’s non-applicability.” White Nile Software, Inc. v. Carrington, Coleman,
Sloman & Blumenthal, LLP, No. 05-19-00780-CV, 2020 WL 5104966, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Aug. 31, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). “The TCPA’s purpose is to
identify and summarily dispose of lawsuits designed only to chill First Amendment
rights, not to dismiss meritorious lawsuits.” In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 589.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Aiello’s claims against Kott-Looney
do not involve a matter of public concern, and as such, Kott-Looney is unable to
establish by preponderance of the evidence that Aiello’s suit against her is based on
18
or in response to her rights of free speech or association. See, e.g., Yu v. Koo, 633
S.W.3d 712, 723 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (where appellant’s statements
did not involve “a matter of public concern,” appellant unable to establish that they
involved appellant’s right of free speech). Thus, we hold that the trial court did not
err in denying Kott-Looney’s motion to dismiss.
We overrule Kott-Looney’s first and second issues.
Conclusion
We affirm the order of the trial court. We dismiss any pending motions as
moot.
Kristin Guiney
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guerra and Guiney.
19