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65-99 Burban Associates, LLC v. New Antioch Church of God
65-99 BURBAN ASSOCIATES, LLC v. NEW
ANTIOCH CHURCH OF GOD ET AL.
(AC 48394)
Suarez, Clark and Seeley, Js.
Syllabus
The self-represented defendant, G, a pastor at the defendant church, appealed from the trial court’s judgment of possession for the plaintiff in its summary process action. G claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly refused to permit him to appear in a self-represented capacity at trial. Held:
This court declined to review G’s claim that he was denied the right to selfrepresentation at trial, as G failed to properly preserve his claim for appellate review and the claim was inadequately briefed.
This court declined to review G’s unpreserved claims that the trial court improperly rendered judgment for the plaintiff for nonpayment of rent with respect to certain leased property, which G claimed was not legally habitable, and when the plaintiff’s summary process action was retaliatory in nature, as G raised these claims for the first time on appeal.
This court declined to review G’s unpreserved claim that the trial court erred by issuing an order in the summary process action while the court in a separate breach of contract action between the parties had already issued an order of administrative consolidation, as G never requested a stay or continuance of the summary process action pending the resolution of the breach of contract action and, therefore, this claim was neither raised in nor decided by the trial court.
Argued February 2—officially released July 21, 2026
Procedural History
Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Haven, Housing
Session, where the named defendant filed a counterclaim;
thereafter, the court, Stone, J., denied the motion to
dismiss filed by the defendant Esau A. Greene, Jr., and
granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike the counterclaim;
subsequently, the case was tried to the court; judgment
of possession for the plaintiff, from which the defendant
Esau A. Greene, Jr., appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Esau A. Greene, Jr., self-represented, the appellant
(defendant).
65-99 Burban Associates, LLC v. New Antioch Church of God
Robert L. Rispoli, with whom were John A. Farnsworth and, on the brief, Jeff Mastrianni, for the appellee
(plaintiff).
Opinion
SEELEY, J. In this summary process action, the selfrepresented defendant, Esau A. Greene, Jr.,1 appeals
from the judgment of possession rendered by the trial
court in favor of the plaintiff, 65-99 Burban Associates,
LLC. On appeal, Greene claims that the court improperly
(1) refused to permit him to appear in a self-represented
capacity during the trial, (2) rendered judgment in favor
of the plaintiff for nonpayment of rent with respect
to leased property that was not legally habitable, (3)
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in this summary process action, which he alleges was commenced
by the plaintiff in retaliation for a breach of contract
action brought against the plaintiff by the defendant
New Antioch Church of God (church),2 and (4) failed to
stay this summary process action until the civil breach
of contract action was resolved. We affirm the judgment
of the court.
The following facts, which were found by the court or
are undisputed in the record, and procedural history are
relevant to our resolution of this appeal. “[The plaintiff] own[s] commercial premises located at 65-99 Burban
Drive in Branford . . . . The plaintiff entered into a five year lease agreement with [the church and its pastor,
Greene] from March 15, 2021, through March 14, 2026,3
1
New Antioch Church of God also is a defendant in this case but has filed a separate appeal, which we have addressed in a separate decision, also released today. See 65-99 Burban Associates, LLC v. New Antioch Church of God, 240 Conn. App. 442, ___ A.3d ___ (2026). In this opinion, we refer to New Antioch Church of God and Greene collectively as the defendants and individually by name when necessary.
2
See New Antioch Church of God v. 65-99 Burban Associates, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-23-6136990-S.
3
Because the lease expired on March 14, 2026, this court, sua sponte, issued an order on April 16, 2026, requiring the parties “to file simultaneous memoranda of no more than 2000 words on or before April 30,
65-99 Burban Associates, LLC v. New Antioch Church of God
for approximately 14,000 square feet of church space,
attached parsonage, a parking lot and the grounds. The
defendants agreed to pay $5500 on the first of every
month for the first two years of the lease and $7500 on
the first of every month beginning on March 1, 2023.
“While the premises were rented in ‘as is’ condition,
article XI of the lease required the plaintiff to ensure that (1) the roof was repaired within fifteen days of the execution of the lease, (2) the windows were repaired within
thirty days of the execution of the lease, and (3) the
[heating, ventilating, and air conditioning] system was in
good working order within thirty days of execution of the
lease. Thereafter, the defendant[s] became responsible
for maintenance of all building components, repairs to
the structure of the building, including mechanicals, and
‘all repairs, maintenance and replacements to the interior
and exterior of the demised premises and the fixtures
and equipment therein and appurtenances thereto . . . .’
“The windows that had been broken due to the premises being vacant were repaired within the allotted time
period. Although the roof repairs were not completed
within fifteen days, the plaintiff did have a company
make the repairs and the defendant[s] did not incur
any costs for them. The plaintiff also had a heating and
cooling company make repairs at the beginning of the
defendants’ tenancy and has, [at] various points, provided a credit to the defendants for maintenance work
that [the defendants had] paid for, including $26,690
in March 2022 to replace the furnace, $1500 for the air
2026, addressing whether the defendants are still in possession of the property and, if not, whether the appeal has become moot as a result of the defendants vacating the property and the expiration of the lease. See Bridgeport v. Grace Building, LLC, 181 Conn. App. 280, 293–98, 186 A.3d 754 (2018).” (Footnote omitted.) In response, the parties indicated to this court that the defendants remain in possession of the premises, as they continue to operate a crisis center for vulnerable women in one of the buildings on the premises, even though the church building is under abatement by order of the fire marshal of the town of Branford and has been vacated. We conclude, therefore, that the appeal is not moot. See id., 295 (summary process appeal becomes moot when, at time of appeal, appellant no longer is in possession of premises).
65-99 Burban Associates, LLC v. New Antioch Church of God
conditioners in June 2022, and $2400 for service of the
rooftop units in December 2022.
“After the initial payment for the security deposit
[and] prorated [rental payments made in] March . . .
and April 2021 . . . the defendants either did not make
their monthly payments, paid late, or paid less than the
rental amount. At the end of 2021, the defendants owed
$24,940 in rent and late fees. At the end of 2022, the
defendants owed $16,550. Despite the lease providing
for a rent increase on March 1, 2023, the plaintiff did not begin charging $7500 until September 1, 2023. After one
partial payment in September, the defendants stopped
making any payments for rent. From September 2023
until October 2024, the defendants accrued $109,300 .
. . in unpaid rent, use and occupancy, and late fees.
“In October 2021, [Greene] emailed Michael Massimino,
an agent of the plaintiff, seeking to begin discussions to
purchase the premises. In July 2022, Massimino made
an offer to the defendants [whereby] the plaintiff would
sell the church and four acres of land for $1.8 million
dollars, $[1.5] million dollars4 would be due at closing,
and $300,000 would be financed by a mortgage held by
the plaintiff. The parties would negotiate credits as
reimbursement for work that the defendant[s] had done.
After the defendants had undertaken steps to obtain
financing, Massimino told Greene that [the plaintiff] no
longer wanted to sell the property.” (Footnote added.)
The plaintiff filed a notice to quit possession of the
premises for nonpayment of rent, which was served on
the defendants on May 28, 2024. The defendants did
not vacate the premises by the June 4, 2024 date set
in the notice, and the plaintiff thereafter commenced
this summary process action5 for nonpayment of rent.
4
We note that the court’s memorandum of decision includes a scrivener’s error in that it states that $1.3 million would be due at closing. The transcript from the trial shows that the correct number is $1.5 million to be paid at the time of closing.
5
“Summary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy. . . . It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to
65-99 Burban Associates, LLC v. New Antioch Church of God
In an amended complaint,6 the plaintiff alleged that
it had entered into a written lease agreement with the
defendants, who took possession of the premises but
failed to pay monthly rent, and that it had served on the
defendants a notice to quit possession of the premises
on or before June 4, 2024, but that, despite that notice,
the defendants continued to remain in possession of the
premises. At the outset of the action, Greene filed an
appearance as a self-represented party, and the church
was represented by Attorney Jerald Scott Barber. On
July 17, 2024, Greene filed a motion to dismiss the action. On August 20, 2024, on behalf of the church, Attorney
Barber filed an answer and ten special defenses7 and
sought a “right of recoupment,” which sought money
damages and which the court and the parties treated as
a counterclaim.8 Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion
to strike the counterclaim.
A trial in this matter was held on October 10, 2024. At
the commencement of the proceeding, the court asked
which, under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their terms.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) TOV Realty, LLC v. Suarez, 354 Conn. 745, 752, A.3d ___ (2026). “Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination. . . . Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau, 236 Conn. App. 861, 864 n.3, 349 A.3d 1096 (2025), cert. denied, 354 Conn. 918, 351 A.3d 411 (2026).
6
The trial court file shows that the amended complaint was served on the church and Greene on July 16, 2024.
7
The ten special defenses alleged that the plaintiff’s action was barred (1) due to the plaintiff’s failure to perform its obligations under the lease, (2) due to the plaintiff’s breach of the lease, (3) by the doctrines of equitable and/or promissory estoppel, (4) by virtue of the doctrine of waiver, (5) by the doctrine of laches, (6) by virtue of the plaintiff’s unclean hands, (7) by the plaintiff’s contributory and/or comparative negligence, (8) by the plaintiff’s failure to mitigate its damages, (9) by the plaintiff’s fraudulent, negligent or innocent misrepresentations “as to the terms of the subject transactions,” which induced the church to enter into those transactions and on which the church reasonably relied to its detriment, and (10) by virtue of accord and satisfaction.
8
We note that the trial court file in this case does not include an answer or any special defenses filed by Greene when he appeared in the case in a self-represented capacity. In its memorandum of decision, however,
65-99 Burban Associates, LLC v. New Antioch Church of God
Greene: “Do you know if your attorney is in mediation
right now?” Greene replied: “Yes, he is with another client.” The court initially stated to Greene that it would
pass on the matter “until your attorney comes out of
mediation,” and Greene responded, “[o]h, okay.” Thereafter, a judicial marshal informed the court that Attorney
Barber was in the hallway and would be in the courtroom
momentarily. When Attorney Barber entered the courtroom, the court asked if he needed more time to finish
his mediation, and Attorney Barber replied that he could
take up the summary process matter at that time and
return to his mediation afterward. He also stated to the
court that he had filed an appearance on behalf of both
the church and Greene.9
The court then addressed the motion to dismiss and
the motion to strike the counterclaim. The court denied
the motion to dismiss and, following brief arguments
from counsel regarding the motion to strike, granted the
motion to strike. After those issues were resolved, the
court asked if the parties were ready for trial, to which
Attorney Barber responded that he was not prepared for
trial because he had to subpoena witnesses. A colloquy
between the court and Attorney Barber ensued, during
which Attorney Barber stated: “Well, Your Honor, I
filed my appearance on behalf of [Greene] this morning.
I was on—previously I was on the file for the church
only. The church is only—the church’s interests are distinct and different than [Greene’s] interest in this case.” After Attorney Barber acknowledged that he had filed
an appearance on behalf of the church two months prior,
the court responded: “So, you’ve been aware that this
action is pending for two months, and you’re not ready
for trial today?” Attorney Barber then stated that he
was ready for trial, and the trial proceeded. At no point
during that colloquy or the discussions that took place did Greene interject and indicate to the court that he wanted
the court treated the special defenses filed by the church alone as having been raised by “the defendants.”
9
The record shows that Attorney Barber filed an appearance on behalf of Greene on October 10, 2024, the day of the trial.
65-99 Burban Associates, LLC v. New Antioch Church of God
to represent himself during the trial. Subsequently, the
court heard testimony from Lisa Amato, the plaintiff’s
property manager, and Greene and admitted various
exhibits into evidence.
On December 30, 2024, the court rendered judgment of
possession in favor of the plaintiff. In its memorandum
of decision, the court found that the plaintiff had proven
by a fair preponderance of the evidence that there had
been a nonpayment of rent in violation of the terms of
the lease. With respect to the special defenses, the court
stated: “ ‘[E]quitable defenses and counterclaims implicating the right to possession are available in a summary
process proceeding.’ Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Dairy
Mart, Inc., 225 Conn. 771, 777, 627 A.2d 386 (1993).
As a preliminary matter, the court notes that the special
defenses did not provide any factual allegations to determine whether the special defenses were equitable and,
thus, implicated the right to possession. Nevertheless,
the court treated all of the special defenses as equitable in nature. As the defendants did not produce any evidence
that this action is barred by waiver, laches, contributory
and/or comparative negligence, failure to mitigate damages, or accord and satisfaction, those special defenses
fail.” Further, the court rejected the two special defenses for breach of contract and concluded that the defendants
did not produce any evidence that the plaintiff should
be estopped from pursuing this summary process action
for purposes of their special defense of equitable and/or
promissory estoppel.10 The court also determined that
the defendants did not establish their special defense of
10
In reaching this conclusion, the court stated: “Even though the plaintiff did not timely complete all the required repairs, the defendants were not prejudiced, as they received a credit for the repairs that should have been made by the [plaintiff]. The defendants have been in possession of the premises for nearly four years without paying rent for much of that time. The plaintiff continues to make maintenance repairs itself and [to] credit the defendants for maintenance work that the [defendants] [undertook] despite the lease agreement requiring the defendants to be responsible for that work.”
65-99 Burban Associates, LLC v. New Antioch Church of God
unclean hands. Greene, thereafter, filed this appeal in a
self-represented capacity.11
On appeal, Greene claims that the court improperly
(1) refused to permit him to appear in a self-represented
capacity during the trial, (2) rendered judgment in favor
of the plaintiff for nonpayment of rent with respect
to leased property that was not legally habitable, (3)
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in this summary process action, which he alleges was commenced
by the plaintiff in retaliation for a breach of contract
action brought against the plaintiff by the church, and
(4) failed to stay this summary process action until the
civil breach of contract action was resolved. Having
thoroughly reviewed the record and Greene’s brief, we
conclude that we cannot review the claims raised on
appeal because they either were not properly preserved
for appellate review or were inadequately briefed. See
C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630, 273 A.3d 271
(2022).
“We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required
to review issues that have been improperly presented
to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in
order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief
the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory
attention in the brief without substantive discussion or
citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . .
. For a reviewing court to judiciously and efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their
briefs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cokic v.
Fiore Powersports, LLC, 237 Conn. App. 558, 560–61,
351 A.3d 434 (2026); see also State v. Sidiropoulos,
237 Conn. App. 262, 341 n.44, 351 A.3d 871 (“[c]laims
are . . . inadequately briefed when they . . . consist of
conclusory assertions . . . with no mention of relevant
11
As we have indicated, the church has filed a separate appeal from the judgment of possession rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
65-99 Burban Associates, LLC v. New Antioch Church of God
authority and minimal or no citations from the record”
(internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 354
Conn. 923, 353 A.3d 842 (2026).
Moreover, “[i]t is well established that an appellate
court is under no obligation to consider a claim that is
not distinctly raised at the trial level. . . . The requirement that [a] claim be raised distinctly means that it
must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the court the precise matter on which its decision is being asked
. . . . The reason for the rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not been raised at
trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial
by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and
the opposing party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Karaoke Heroes NH, LLC v. RVRM Enterprises, LLC,
237 Conn. App. 762, 777 n.18, 354 A.3d 250 (2026); see
also Practice Book § 60-5 (appellate court is generally
not bound to consider claim not distinctly raised at trial
or arising subsequent to trial); Dept. of Public Health
v. Estrada, 211 Conn. App. 223, 239 n.10, 271 A.3d
1042 (2022) (“[w]e have repeatedly held that this court
will not consider claimed errors on the part of the trial
court unless it appears on the record that the question
was distinctly raised at trial and was ruled upon and
decided by the court adversely to the appellant’s claim”
(emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)),
aff’d, 349 Conn. 223, 315 A.3d 1081 (2024).
With respect to Greene’s first claim that he was denied
the right to self-representation, we first point out that
Greene did not properly preserve his claim for appellate
review. Our thorough review of the October 10, 2024
transcript shows that Greene never indicated to the
court during the proceeding that he wanted to represent
himself. In fact, when the court directly asked Greene
about the whereabouts of his counsel, Greene never stated
to the court that Attorney Barber was not representing
him at the proceeding or that he had changed his mind
and wanted to represent himself. Moreover, even when
65-99 Burban Associates, LLC v. New Antioch Church of God
Attorney Barber stated to the court that he was representing both the church and Greene and had filed an
appearance that day on behalf of Greene, which was in
addition to the appearance already filed on behalf of the
church, Greene never alerted the court that he wanted
to represent himself.
We also conclude that Greene did not adequately brief
this claim. In his appellate brief,12 Greene cites to the
fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution and
article first, § 10, of the state constitution and asserts
that “[p]eople have a state and federal constitutional
right to appear in court and be heard on matters affecting
them . . . .” He also refers to Practice Book § 3-8 (a), which governs the filing of an appearance for a represented
party, and contends that “[f]iling an appearance is the
way the person alerts the court as well as the other parties that he is representing himself.” Then, after making
a number of factual assertions about the record in this
case, he maintains, in a conclusory fashion, that he was
denied the right to represent himself. Aside from those
few general references to the state and federal constitutions, and the rule of practice, Greene provided no other
legal authority or analysis in support of his claim that he “was denied the right to represent himself . . . .”
“We are mindful that [i]t is the established policy of the
Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented]
litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights
of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party. . . . Nonetheless, [a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants some
latitude, the right of self-representation provides no
attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) D. K. v. D. F., 235 Conn. App. 59, 77, 344 A.3d
564 (2025). This court previously has declined to review
an inadequately briefed claim of a self-represented party
under similar circumstances. See, e.g., id., 78 (“In his
appellate brief, the [self-represented] defendant merely
12
Greene did not file an appellate reply brief.
65-99 Burban Associates, LLC v. New Antioch Church of God
recite[d] the language of [General Statutes] § 46b-56 (g)
and assert[ed], in a single conclusory statement, that the
court failed to apply that statutory provision. He [did]
not provide any legal authority, facts, or analysis to support his claim that the court failed to apply § 46b-56 (g)
or how such failure rendered improper the court’s denial
of his motion for modification.”); Speer v. Brown Jacobson P.C., 233 Conn. App. 833, 838–39, 342 A.3d 1118
(2025) (even though self-represented plaintiff aptly set
forth in her brief principles of law governing appellate
consideration of legal claim raised on appeal, she failed
to provide any analysis applying those principles to facts
of case, and, thus, court declined to review claim as inadequately briefed); see also Stanley v. Commissioner of
Correction, 233 Conn. App. 759, 761, 340 A.3d 538 (“The
plaintiff’s status as a self-represented litigant does not
permit us to overlook the fatal deficiencies in his briefs. ‘Although we recognize and adhere to the well-founded
policy to accord leeway to self-represented parties in the
appeal process, our deference is not unlimited; nor is a
litigant on appeal relieved of the obligation to sufficiently articulate a claim so that it is recognizable to a reviewing court.’ Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pollard,
182 Conn. App. 483, 487, 189 A.3d 1232 (2018).”), cert.
denied, 353 Conn. 920, 345 A.3d 809 (2025).
In the present case, although the portion of Greene’s
brief addressing this issue spans several pages, it is
devoid of any citation to relevant legal authority governing his claimed right to self-representation in this
proceeding or substantive legal analysis. See Moore v.
Bryant-Mitchell, 234 Conn. App. 378, 394–97, 344 A.3d
222 (2025) (declining to review claim raised on appeal
when appellate briefing on issue was “completely devoid
of any citation to legal authority or substantive legal
analysis” and “completely bereft of any legal analysis
discussing similar precedent or applying pertinent legal
principles to the facts of [the] case”). It was incumbent
on Greene “to provide a meaningful analysis of his claim
. . . and to include citations to relevant legal authority
and an application of that law to the facts in the present
65-99 Burban Associates, LLC v. New Antioch Church of God
case. . . . Stated differently, [i]t is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way,
leaving the court to do . . . [the] work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.” (Citations
omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Matusz v. Wellmore Behavioral Health, Inc.,
234 Conn. App. 581, 593–94, 344 A.3d 208, cert. denied,
353 Conn. 926, 345 A.3d 811 (2025).
Accordingly, we consider Greene’s first claim to be
inadequately briefed and, thus, decline to review it.
With respect to Greene’s second and third claims—that
the court improperly rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff for nonpayment of rent with respect to leased
property that was not legally habitable and when this
summary process action was retaliatory in nature—we
conclude that Greene has raised these claims for the first
time on appeal and, thus, did not properly preserve them
for appellate review.
On the issue of uninhabitability, Greene makes a number of assertions in his appellate brief about the state
of disrepair of the property and references documents
that he had submitted in support of his motion to dismiss demonstrating that the plaintiff “was subject to
an abatement action [concerning the subject] property,
which settled with an agreement indicating that the
[plaintiff] would leave the property vacant until proper
repairs were made.” Thereafter, he states: “One can infer
then that the property was uninhabitable and unsafe.”
Greene further contends that he asserted a claim regarding the uninhabitability of the property in his answer
and special defenses.13 With respect to his retaliation
claim, Greene maintains that he “asserted [an] affirmative defense of retaliation.” He also relies on the retaliatory eviction statute, General Statutes § 47a-20, which
precludes a landlord from maintaining an action against
a tenant to recover possession of a dwelling unit within
13
The answer and special defenses that Greene attached to his appellate brief is the one filed by the church on August 20, 2024. See footnote 7 of this opinion.
65-99 Burban Associates, LLC v. New Antioch Church of God
six months after a tenant does certain acts, including,
inter alia, reporting housing code violations to appropriate authorities.
Our examination of the record in this case leads us to
conclude that Greene’s claims of uninhabitability and
retaliation were not raised before the trial court. Contrary to Greene’s assertion, he never asserted an affirmative defense of retaliation, and the special defenses
filed by the church, even if attributable to Greene, do
not include allegations of uninhabitability or retaliation
under § 47a-20. See footnotes 7 and 8 of this opinion.
Additionally, although Greene testified at the trial that
the repairs the plaintiff was required to perform were
not completed in a timely manner, that the roof of the
building leaked, and that there was no air conditioning,
the focus of his testimony was on the plaintiff’s failure
to complete the required repairs under the lease, not the
uninhabitability of the premises.14
“As we previously have noted, we will not review a claim
unless it was distinctly raised at trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eubanks v. Commissioner of Correction, 329 Conn. 584, 597, 188 A.3d 702 (2018). Also, this
court has recognized that, “[b]ecause our review is limited to matters in the record, we [also] will not address issues not decided by the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Cohen & Wolf, P.C. v. Netter, 236 Conn. App.
693, 700, 350 A.3d 609 (2025), cert. denied, 354 Conn.
919, 353 A.3d 840 (2026). Accordingly, because Greene
did not raise his claims of uninhabitability and retaliation with the trial court, which, thus, did not decide the
claims, we decline to review them. See McLaughlin v.
14
When asked about his discussion with the landlord about the property, Greene testified that, “from the onset of looking at the property, I was told that the property had been vacant. And, as we toured the . . . rectory, the home, I was told by [Massimino] that we should not worry because the insurance [was] going to take care of all of the repairs that needed to be done. And, also, there [were] questions if the house or building was habitable, and I was told yes, they were.”
65-99 Burban Associates, LLC v. New Antioch Church of God
McLaughlin, 237 Conn. App. 429, 439, 351 A.3d 956,
cert. denied, 354 Conn. 927, 353 A.3d 848 (2026).
Finally, we also decline to review Greene’s last claim—
that the “court erred by issuing an order in the housing
session while the civil court had already issued an order
of administrative consolidation.” In asserting this claim,
Greene argues that “the housing court should have issued
a stay in this [summary process] action until the [breach
of contract] matter in civil court was resolved.” Specifically, in his appellate brief, Greene contends that, during the trial in this case, “counsel for the tenant requested to be heard on his motion for consolidation; however, [the
court] refused. Subsequently, the civil court granted
the requested consolidation. Although the civil court
consolidation was granted after the eviction proceedings, it was ordered before the [judgment in this case was
rendered]. Therefore, the housing session [court] should
have entered a stay of [the] proceedings until matters in
the civil court were resolved.”
The record in this case demonstrates that the defendants never requested a stay or continuation of the summary process action pending the resolution of the breach
of contract action. As we previously indicated in this
opinion, prior to the commencement of the trial of the
summary process action, the court briefly addressed a
motion to strike filed by the plaintiff, which asserted
that the defendants’ counterclaim for money damages
could not properly be raised in a summary process action.
Attorney Barber argued in response to the motion to
strike “that the matter more properly should just be
transferred to the earlier [breach of contract] action,
which [was] pending . . . .” The court, which treated
Attorney Barber’s statement as a motion to transfer or
consolidate, granted the motion to strike, stating: “I’m
going to grant the motion to strike, and the reason is
because summary process actions are about possession,
not money damages. . . . With respect to the motion to
transfer or consolidate, I did review [the] docket, and it
appears that the relief that you’re seeking in that other
65-99 Burban Associates, LLC v. New Antioch Church of God
case is separate and distinct from the relief that would
be sought in this case, and I . . . don’t think it would
be appropriate to consolidate these matters . . . or [to]
transfer the case at this time.” At no point during the
proceedings did the defendants request a stay or continuance of the summary process proceeding, and the trial
court file does not contain any such filing. Therefore,
this claim was neither raised in nor decided by the trial
court and is being raised for the first time on appeal. For the reasons previously discussed, we decline to review
this claim.15
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
15
Even if we were to review this claim, we find no merit to Greene’s contention that the trial court in this case “failed or refused to acknowledge the fact that the civil court had consolidated the matters in November of 2024, prior to the housing court issuing an order.” As Greene acknowledges, the consolidation order in the breach of contract action was issued after the completion of the trial in this case, and Greene has not directed this court to anything in the record demonstrating that the trial court in this case was made aware of a consolidation order issued in the separate breach of contract action. Moreover, the court in the breach of contract action consolidated the matters “for administrative purposes only,” the effect of which is unclear.