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N. G. v. D. S.
N. G. v. D. S.*
(AC 47892)
Elgo, Suarez and Norcott, Js.
Syllabus
The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff and granting certain other relief. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion in awarding alimony to the plaintiff for a period of four years. Held:
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony to the plaintiff for a period of four years, as a review of the record led this court to the conclusion that the trial court was mindful of the factors in the statute (§ 46b-82 (a)) governing alimony in determining the alimony to be awarded to the plaintiff and applied those factors to the credible evidence before it.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the defendant to transfer a certain percentage of his 401 (k) plan to the plaintiff, as the court specified in its memorandum of decision that it had considered the criteria set forth in the statute (§ 46b-81) governing the assignment of property and transfer of title, the credible evidence before it, and the closing arguments of counsel, and, contrary to the defendant’s assertion, the court was not prohibited from distributing assets accrued after separation but before dissolution.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to reargue and reconsider its decision in regard to the marital home, as the defendant failed to assert that there was a controlling principle of law that the court had overlooked or that the court misapplied the law, and the defendant’s argument for an opportunity to retain the marital home was inconsistent with the arguments that he presented at trial, in which he insisted that the marital home be sold because the home was undervalued.
Argued January 20—officially released July 21, 2026
*
In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of family violence, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2024); we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
N. G. v. D. S.
Procedural History
Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Ansonia-Milford and tried to the court, Tindill, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting
certain other relief, from which the defendant appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Richard W. Callahan, for the appellant (defendant).
Opinion
SUAREZ, J. The defendant, D. S., appeals from the
judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the
plaintiff, N. G.1 On appeal, the defendant claims that the
court abused its discretion in (1) awarding alimony for a
period of four years, (2) fashioning its property distribution orders, and (3) denying his motion to reconsider.2
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following procedural history and facts, as found
by the court, are relevant to this appeal. The parties
were married on May 12, 2018, in Milford. There were
no children issue of the marriage. On September 3, 2021,
1
Alexander J. Trembicki represented the plaintiff before the trial court. On September 13, 2024, Trembicki filed a motion before this court for permission to withdraw his appearance, which this court granted on September 27, 2024. The plaintiff did not file a brief or otherwise participate in this appeal. We, therefore, have considered this appeal on the basis of the defendant’s brief, the defendant’s oral argument and the record only.
2
We note that, in his statement of issues, the defendant characterized the claims raised on appeal as follows: “(1) Based upon the uncommon procedural circumstances of this case, and the statutory factors, did the trial court abuse its equitable discretion by ordering spousal support for four years after justice was delayed?
“(2) Based upon the uncommon procedural circumstances of this case, and the statutory factors, did the trial court abuse its equitable discretion by dividing retirement assets acquired after justice was delayed?
“(3) Did the trial court err by denying the defendant’s motion to reconsider its order [regarding] the disposition of the marital real property?” We have reframed the claims in this appeal for clarity and to more accurately reflect the arguments set forth in the body of the defendant’s brief. See Doe v. Quinnipiac University, 218 Conn. App. 170, 173 n.4, 291 A.3d 153 (2023).
N. G. v. D. S.
the plaintiff commenced this dissolution action. In her
complaint, the plaintiff sought, inter alia, a dissolution
of marriage, alimony, an equitable distribution of assets,
and attorney’s fees.
A trial for the dissolution of marriage was scheduled to
begin on March 13, 2023. The court, however, rescheduled the trial for April 13, 2023. On April 13, 2023,
the court commenced the trial in the judicial district of
Ansonia-Milford. The trial, however, was interrupted by
other court obligations and was continued to November
13, 2023. On September 5, 2023, the court declared a
mistrial because the judge had been reassigned from
the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford to the Regional
Family Trial Docket in the judicial district of Middlesex.
A new trial was scheduled to begin on February 13, 2024,
in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford but the trial
did not proceed due to a snowstorm. Thereafter, the
case was referred to the Regional Family Trial Docket.
On February 20, 2024, the court commenced a trial,
which continued over the course of three nonconsecutive dates. The court heard testimony from the plaintiff
and the defendant, and various exhibits were admitted
into evidence.
On May 29, 2024, the court issued a memorandum of
decision dissolving the parties’ marriage and issuing
various financial orders. In its memorandum of decision,
the court found that the plaintiff was sixty-three years
old and had earned an associate degree and a bachelor’s
degree in marketing from the Fashion Institute of Technology in New York. In 2001 or 2002, the plaintiff became
a licensed realtor. In October 2010, the plaintiff was
diagnosed with breast cancer and her illness, surgeries,
and treatment through 2012 severely limited her ability to work full-time. The court further found that the
plaintiff had been cancer free since 2012, appeared to be
in fair health and had been working sporadically since
then. The court noted that the plaintiff was eligible to
receive $1086 monthly from Social Security retirement
N. G. v. D. S.
benefits as of the date of trial and would be eligible to
receive $1127 monthly beginning in September 2024.
The court found that the defendant was fifty-five years
old and had earned a bachelor’s degree in mathematics
from Loyola University, a master’s degree in economics
from George Mason University, and a master’s degree in
business administration from Wake Forest University.
At the time of trial, he was employed at Barclays Bank in
New York as the Director of Loss Forecasting. According
to the court, he appeared to be in good health.
With respect to the parties’ income, the court found
that the defendant earned more than the plaintiff during
the course of the marriage and had a greater future earning capacity. The court further found that the defendant
contributed more to the parties’ household expenses
than the plaintiff and that the defendant was content
with the plaintiff’s nominal financial contributions to
the household expenses, given her limited employment
earnings. The court credited the defendant’s testimony
that he paid approximately $4000 monthly for the parties’ expenses. The court also found that both parties
had significant pension and retirement accounts.3 The
court found that, as of the date of the parties’ marriage,
the defendant’s Barclays 401 (k) plan had a value of
$32,689.46 and, as of December 31, 2023, that value
had increased to $340,925.26.
With respect to the marriage, the court found that
the parties met in 2011, when the defendant was getting divorced from his previous wife and was looking
for a short-term apartment or condominium rental.
The plaintiff assisted the defendant with two rental
properties and the sale of his former marital home. They
began a personal relationship in July 2012 and moved in
3
Although the court did not make a specific finding as to the total net value of each party’s retirement plans, the plaintiff’s financial affidavit dated February 12, 2024, listed five separate plans with a total net value of $216,065.57, and the defendant’s March 25, 2024 financial affidavit listed five separate plans with a total net value of $1,215,054.20.
N. G. v. D. S.
together in the summer of 2013 at the plaintiff’s Milford
residence (marital residence).
The court found that the parties fought about the
defendant’s infidelity and his lying about his infidelity.
These arguments sometimes evolved into physical altercations during which the plaintiff sometimes sustained
injuries. These altercations also created periods of separation between the parties, either due to the issuance of
a criminal protective order, or by the parties’ voluntary
decisions to physically separate. The court noted that, in
November 2018, both parties were arrested for disorderly
conduct arising from an incident in which the defendant
slammed the plaintiff against a vanity and the plaintiff
hit the defendant with a hairbrush. As a result of this
incident, the plaintiff sustained injuries to her ribs which required medical attention. The court also noted another
altercation in April 2019, in which the plaintiff sustained injuries and briefly lost consciousness. In late June or
early July 2019, the defendant was arrested for a physical altercation with the plaintiff that led to the issuance of a criminal protective order. In July or August 2020,
the parties moved into a rental home in Delray Beach,
Florida, and rented out the marital residence. The court
noted that the parties’ arguments and physical altercations continued in Florida and, in May 2021, the plaintiff
obtained a restraining order against the defendant. The
court specifically found that the defendant minimized
the violence between the parties and blamed the plaintiff
for the physical altercations that resulted in her injuries. The parties have not resided together since May 2021,
when the plaintiff left the rental home in Florida and
returned to the marital residence in Connecticut.
In its memorandum of decision, the court noted that
it had “carefully considered the testimony, assessed the
credibility of the parties, reviewed each exhibit submitted into evidence, and taken into consideration the parties’
closing arguments.” It also noted that it “considered
the applicable statutory provisions, including [General
N. G. v. D. S.
Statutes] §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82, and relevant case law,
including Krafick v. Krafick, 234 Conn. 783, [663 A.2d
365] (1995), and Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, 180 Conn.
533, 544, [429 A.2d 801] (1980), to make its orders and
findings.”
The court concluded that, “[b]ased on the credible
evidence before [it] and in consideration of the factors
enumerated in § 46b-82 an award of alimony to the plaintiff [was] warranted.” The court ordered the defendant
to pay monthly alimony in the amount of $4000 beginning in June 2024 and continuing until June 2028. The
alimony was modifiable as to term only.
With respect to the marital residence, the court ordered
that the defendant quitclaim all his rights, title, and
interest to the plaintiff. The court further ordered that
the plaintiff was to have exclusive use and possession of
the property and was to be solely responsible for all of
the costs associated with ownership of the property. The
court ordered the plaintiff to refinance the mortgage
and remove the defendant’s name from the deed and
mortgage no later than June 1, 2025. In the event the
plaintiff was unable to refinance and remove the defendant’s name from the deed and mortgage by June 1, 2025,
the court ordered the home to be listed for sale by June
22, 2025. The court further ordered the plaintiff to pay
the defendant $150,000 within thirty days of the closing
date of either the refinance or the sale of the property.4
Additionally, the court ordered that each party was
to retain the funds in the bank accounts listed on their
respective financial affidavits and any funds in joint
accounts to be split equally. The court ordered that both
parties were to be responsible for the debts and liabilities listed on their respective financial affidavits. As to the
parties’ retirement assets, the court ordered the defendant to transfer to the plaintiff 60 percent of the value
4
The court awarded to the defendant a property located in Maryland, free and clear of any claim or interest by the plaintiff. The defendant was to be responsible for the costs associated with ownership of this property.
N. G. v. D. S.
accrued in his Barclays 401 (k) plan from May 12, 2018,
to May 29, 2024.
On June 18, 2024, the defendant filed a motion to
reargue and reconsider.5 In this motion, the defendant
argued, inter alia, that the court should reconsider its
alimony award, its property distribution orders regarding the sale of the marital home, and its distribution of
the defendant’s Barclays 401 (k) account. Regarding the
alimony award, the defendant argued that the facts of
the present case did not support a permanent periodic
alimony award, as the parties were married late in life
and were married for only thirty-six months before the
plaintiff commenced the present action. He argued that
the alimony award, if any, should be fixed for a short term to rehabilitate the plaintiff. Moreover, he argued that
the term of the award should be less than four years, “as
the defendant should not shoulder the prejudice caused
by the delays in trial.” Lastly, he argued that the four
year term in alimony, in addition to the three years of the pendente lite period that he paid toward the plaintiff’s
expenses, resulting in a seven year term, should be fixed.
The defendant also sought to reargue the court’s order
that, if the plaintiff was unable to refinance the mortgage on the marital residence, the marital residence was
ordered to be listed for sale and the plaintiff was to pay
the defendant $150,000 within thirty days of the closing
date of the sale. Specifically, the defendant asserted that he was seeking “the same rights that the court afforded to
the plaintiff. That is, if the plaintiff [was] unable to pay the defendant $150,000 and refinance the real property
within the [one] year required by the court order . . . [he
5
The plaintiff filed a motion titled “[m]otion to reargue/reconsider/ clarify,” also on June 18, 2024. In this motion, the plaintiff sought clarification on various dates and corrections for scrivener’s errors in the court’s memorandum of decision. The plaintiff also argued that the court should reconsider various orders on the basis of allegedly outdated or incorrect information from the parties’ financial affidavits. The court granted the motion in part, and, in its corrected memorandum of decision dated July 23, 2024, clarified the relevant dates in various orders and corrected scrivener’s errors. These clerical revisions are not relevant to our disposition of this appeal.
N. G. v. D. S.
should have] the opportunity to refinance the mortgage
within [six] months and to pay the plaintiff $150,000.”
As to the Barclays 401 (k) account, the defendant
argued that the court’s order dividing the gains in the
account from the date of marriage to the date of dissolution rewards the plaintiff for the delay in commencing
trial and punishes him. He argued that the more appropriate period to divide the asset was from the date of
marriage to one year from the date that the action was
commenced.6
On July 23, 2024, the court granted the defendant’s
motion to reargue and reconsider in part and issued a
corrected memorandum of decision. With respect to
the award of alimony, the court denied the request. The
court, however, indicated that “[i]t was the court’s intention to limit the defendant’s alimony obligation and
it agrees that the award should be time limited. The
corrected memorandum of decision . . . [reflects] that
the award is modifiable as to amount only. The maximum term of alimony is from June 3, 2024, to June 3,
2028.” The court also denied “[t]he defendant’s request
to reargue the real estate provisions of its decision . . . .” Both parties subsequently filed new motions to reargue
and reconsider the corrected memorandum of decision,
which the court denied on August 16, 2024.7 Thereafter,
on February 14, 2025, the defendant filed a motion for
articulation and rectification, which the court denied.8
This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural
history will be set forth as necessary.
6
Although the defendant does not cite to any authority, he argues in his brief before this court that “[i]t is known in the family bar, that in furtherance of its role to dispense and provide justice, the policy makers within the Connecticut judiciary want all family cases completed via separation agreement or trial within one year of filing absent complicating circumstances.”
7
The defendant does not appeal the court’s August 16, 2024 order denying the motion to reargue.
8
The defendant filed a motion in this court for review of the trial court’s decision denying his February 14, 2025 motion for articulation and rectification. On June 10, 2025, this court granted the motion to review, but denied the relief requested.
N. G. v. D. S.
We begin by setting forth the well settled standard of
review in dissolution matters. “An appellate court will
not disturb a trial court’s orders in domestic relations
cases unless the court has abused its discretion or it is
found that it could not reasonably conclude as it did,
based on the facts presented. . . . The trial court’s findings are binding upon this court unless they are clearly
erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in
the record as a whole. . . . [T]o conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion, we must find that the court
either incorrectly applied the law or could not reasonably conclude as it did. . . . In determining whether a
trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic
relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Pencheva-Hasse v. Hasse,
221 Conn. App. 113, 121–22, 300 A.3d 1175 (2023).
I
The defendant first claims that the court abused its
discretion in awarding alimony for a period of four years.
Specifically, the defendant argues that, “based upon the
uncommon procedural facts of this case, and the statutory factors, the trial court abused its equitable discretion by awarding four years of alimony.” He maintains
that the trial was delayed due to circumstances “not
caused by the defendant” and that, “after three years of
pendente lite support, the plaintiff was afforded more
than enough time to ‘rehabilitate’ herself.”9 We are not
persuaded.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to this claim. In her proposed orders to the
court, the plaintiff requested alimony in the amount of
40 percent of the defendant’s gross income per month for
four years. At trial, the plaintiff testified that she was
“basically retired” and that the defendant had indicated
9
In his brief before this court, the defendant claims that the matter was delayed by the plaintiff changing counsel and the court’s own scheduling conflicts. The defendant does not claim, however, that the court abused its discretion in granting the various continuances.
N. G. v. D. S.
to her around the time they were married that he did not
want her to work anymore. She further testified that her
full retirement age was sixty-seven, and that she was
“hoping [the defendant would] help [her] with [supporting herself until her full retirement age].” The plaintiff
also testified that she planned on supporting herself after the dissolution of her marriage to the defendant by starting a new business and that she wanted to foster a child.
The defendant testified that he “[felt] like [he] [had]
paid approximately $4000 a month towards [the plaintiff’s] expenses for the past three years. That should be
considered time served against any alimony.” The defendant further testified that it had been six years since he
married the plaintiff and that they had been divorcing
and living apart for three of those years. During closing arguments, counsel for the defendant argued that
“[t]hese folks have been . . . in the divorcing process just shy of the amount of time they lived together. And as my
client so elegantly put it, he has supported this woman,
and he’s entitled to time served. . . . [T]hat should be
factored in in the court’s financial decisions.” Counsel
for the defendant further argued that the plaintiff’s
claim for 40 percent of the defendant’s income as alimony
would equate to “$3038 per week . . . that is simply not
equitable at all.”
As previously mentioned in this opinion, the court
noted in its corrected memorandum of decision that it
had “carefully considered the testimony, assessed the
credibility of the parties, reviewed each exhibit submitted into evidence, and taken into consideration the
parties’ closing argument. The court has also considered
applicable statutory provisions, including . . . §§ 46b-81
and 46b-82, and relevant case law, including Krafick
v. Krafick, [supra, 234 Conn. 783], and Ridgeway v.
Ridgeway, [supra, 180 Conn. 544], to make its orders
and findings.” On the basis of those considerations, the
court found that an award of alimony was warranted and
N. G. v. D. S.
ordered the defendant to pay $4000 monthly in alimony
to the plaintiff for four years.
“In reviewing the alimony award at issue, we note that
the scope of our review of a trial court’s exercise of its
broad discretion in marital dissolution cases is limited to whether the court correctly applied the law and reasonably could have concluded as it did. . . . We make every
reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of the
trial court’s action. . . . It is, however, well established that, in awarding alimony, the trial court must take into
account all of the statutory factors enumerated in . . .
§ 46b-82 (a) and that its failure to do so constitutes an
abuse of discretion. See Greco v. Greco, [275 Conn. 348,
360, 880 A.2d 872 (2005)] (trial courts must ‘consider
all of the criteria enumerated in . . . § 46b-82’). The trial court does not need to give each factor equal weight or
make express findings as to each factor, but it must
consider each factor. Id., 355; see also Burns v. Burns,
41 Conn. App. 716, 726, 677 A.2d 971 (‘“Although a
specific finding . . . is not required, the record must
indicate the basis for the trial court’s award.” . . . Sufficient evidence must exist to support the award, and
the award may not stand if it is logically inconsistent
with the facts found or the evidence.’ . . .), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 906, 682 A.2d 997 (1996); cf. Simmons v.
Simmons, 244 Conn. 158, 180–81, 708 A.2d 949 (1998)
(trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider
defendant’s age, which was ‘significant’ omission in
court’s failure to award defendant any alimony). In addition, it is a ‘long settled principle that the defendant’s
ability to pay is a material consideration in formulating
financial awards.’ . . . Finally, the trial court’s financial orders must be consistent with the purpose of alimony:
to provide continuing support for the nonpaying spouse,
who is entitled to maintain the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage as closely as possible. Hornung v.
Hornung, 323 Conn. 144, 162, 146 A.3d 912 (2016); id.,
163 (plaintiff’s efforts as homemaker, primary caretaker
of parties’ children increased defendant’s earning capacity at expense of her own earning capacity, thus entitling
N. G. v. D. S.
her, postdissolution, to maintain standard of living
parties enjoyed during marriage to extent possible);
see Blake v. Blake, 211 Conn. 485, 498, 560 A.2d 396
(1989) (‘periodic . . . alimony is based primarily upon a
continuing duty to support’). When exercising its broad,
equitable, remedial powers in domestic relations cases,
a court ‘must examine both the public policy implicated
and the basic elements of fairness.’ ” (Citations omitted;
footnote omitted.) Oudheusden v. Oudheusden, 338
Conn. 761, 768–69, 259 A.3d 598 (2021).
On appeal, the defendant argues that “[t]he alimony
award itself was an abuse of discretion” because the
plaintiff “was afforded more than enough time to ‘rehabilitate’ herself.” The defendant argues that, but for
“the uncommon circumstances of the delay in this case
that was not caused by the defendant . . . the alimony
term would have concluded in September 2026 . . . .”
He argues that the purpose of alimony awards are “(1)
to maintain the standard of living that was established
during the marriage by the supporting spouse; or (2) to
provide some support for a time limited basis so a former
spouse can rehabilitate their earing capacity and support
themselves.” (Emphasis omitted.) The defendant asserts
that the alimony order awarded to the plaintiff failed to
promote the sound policy of providing an incentive for
the spouse receiving support to use diligence in procuring
training or skills necessary to attain self-sufficiency. The defendant, therefore, requests that this court reverse
the judgment as to the alimony order and vacate that
order or, in the alternative, to reduce the alimony term
to end in September 2026.
“[Section] 46b-82 (a) provides in relevant part that
[i]n determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and
the duration and amount of the award, the court shall
consider the evidence presented by each party and shall
consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the
. . . dissolution of the marriage . . . the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning
capacity, vocational skills, education, employability,
N. G. v. D. S.
estate and needs of each of the parties and the [division
of property made] pursuant to [§] 46b-81 . . . . We note
also that [t]he trial court may place varying degrees of
importance on each criterion according to the factual
circumstances of each case. . . . There is no additional
requirement that the court specifically state how it
weighed the statutory criteria or explain in detail the
importance assigned to each statutory factor. . . .
“Time limited alimony is often awarded. . . . The trial
court does not have to make a detailed finding justifying its award of time limited alimony. . . . Although a
specific finding for an award of time limited alimony is
not required, the record must indicate the basis for the
trial court’s award. . . . There must be sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the spouse
should receive time limited alimony for the particular
duration established. If the time period for the periodic
alimony is logically inconsistent with the facts found or
the evidence, it cannot stand. . . . In addition to being
awarded to provide an incentive for the spouse receiving
support to use diligence in procuring training or skills
necessary to attain self-sufficiency, time limited alimony
is also appropriately awarded to provide interim support
until a future event occurs that makes such support less
necessary or unnecessary.” (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Ingles v. Ingles, 216 Conn.
App. 782, 795–96, 286 A.3d 908 (2022).
“In reviewing an alimony order, we do not substitute
our judgment for that of the trial court, which is in
the best position to fashion an effective and equitable
arrangement. An award of alimony is permissive, not
mandatory, and rest[s] in the sound discretion of the trial court . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D. S. v. D. S., 351 Conn. 1, 35, 328 A.3d 111 (2025).
To the extent that the defendant argues that the court
abused its discretion in awarding alimony for a period of
four years from the date of dissolution given the length
of the parties’ marriage and the unique procedural circumstances of this case, we note that our appellate courts
N. G. v. D. S.
have declined to articulate a bright-line rule as to how
long a marriage must last before a party is entitled to
“lifetime alimony.” Instead, our appellate courts have
noted that we must simply determine whether the court
abused its discretion by granting an award of lifetime
alimony on the basis of its findings as to the statutory
factors enumerated in § 46b-82. See, e.g., McMellon v.
McMellon, 116 Conn. App. 393, 394, 396, 976 A.2d 1
(upholding lifetime alimony award of $325 weekly for six
year marriage), cert. denied, 293 Conn. 926, 980 A.2d
911 (2009); see also Keenan v. Casillo, 149 Conn. App.
642, 663–64, 663 n.7, 89 A.3d 912 (upholding lifetime
alimony award of $1200 per week to forty year old woman
after three year marriage), cert. denied, 312 Conn. 910,
93 A.3d 594 (2014); Langley v. Langley, 137 Conn. App.
588, 590–91, 595, 604, 49 A.3d 272 (2012) (upholding
rehabilitative alimony award of $175 per week for five
years from date of dissolution after three year marriage).
Our review of the record leads us to the conclusion
that the court was mindful of the statutory factors in
determining the alimony to be awarded to the plaintiff
and applied those factors to the credible evidence before
it. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse
its discretion in awarding alimony to the plaintiff.
II
The defendant next claims that the court abused its
discretion in its orders related to property distribution.
Specifically, the defendant argues that the court abused
its discretion when it ordered the defendant to transfer 60 percent of the value of his Barclays 401 (k) plan
“acquired after the uncommon and unfair procedural
delay in this case.” He maintains that it was “an abuse
of . . . discretion to divide [his] 401 (k) acquired after
2022.” We are not persuaded.
The defendant’s claim requires little discussion. “In
dissolution proceedings, the court must fashion its financial orders in accordance with the criteria set forth in . . . § 46b-81 (division of marital property) . . . . Pursuant to
N. G. v. D. S.
§ 46b-81 (c), the court shall consider the length of the
marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of
the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning
capacity, vocational skills, education, employability,
estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and
the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the
contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition,
preservation or appreciation in value of their respective
estates. . . .
“While the trial court must consider the delineated
statutory criteria . . . no single criterion is preferred over others, and the court is accorded wide latitude in varying the weight placed upon each item under the peculiar
circumstances of each case. . . . A trial court . . . need not give each factor equal weight . . . or recite the statutory criteria that it considered in making its decision or make
express findings as to each statutory factor. . . .
“Importantly, § 46b-81 (a) permits the farthest reaches
from an equal division as is possible, allowing the court
to assign to either the husband or wife all or any part
of the estate of the other. . . . On the basis of the plain language of § 46b-81, there is no presumption in Connecticut that marital property should be divided equally
prior to applying the statutory criteria. . . . Additionally, [i]ndividual financial orders in a dissolution action are part of the carefully crafted mosaic that comprises
the entire asset reallocation plan. . . . Under the mosaic
doctrine, financial orders should not be viewed as a collection of single disconnected occurrences, but rather
as a seamless collection of interdependent elements. . . .
As previously noted in this opinion, we will not disturb
a trial court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless
the court has abused its discretion or it is found that
it could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the
facts presented.” (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Pencheva-Hasse v.
Hasse, supra, 221 Conn. App. 129–30.
N. G. v. D. S.
“[W]hen a trial court states in its memorandum of decision that it has considered the factors listed in § 46b-81
(c) in fashioning an order distributing marital property,
the judge is presumed to have performed [his or her] duty
unless the contrary appears [from the record].” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 130–31. In the present
case, the court specified in its memorandum of decision
that it considered the criteria set forth in § 46b-81 and
the credible evidence before it and that it had considered
the closing arguments of counsel. The court also noted
in its memorandum of decision that both parties had significant pension and retirement accounts. As previously
stated in this opinion, the defendant’s counsel argued
in closing argument that the court should consider the
delay in the dissolution proceedings following the parties’ separation in crafting its financial orders. The court, in
the exercise of its broad discretion, awarded 60 percent
of the accrued value of the defendant’s Barclays 401 (k)
plan to the plaintiff. Contrary to the defendant’s claim,
the court was not prohibited from distributing assets
accrued after separation but before dissolution. See
Wendt v. Wendt, 59 Conn. App. 656, 661, 757 A.2d 1225
(“[i]n a dissolution action, marital property is valued as
of the date of dissolution, not the date of separation”
(internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 255
Conn. 918, 763 A.2d 1044 (2000).
Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant has failed
to demonstrate that the court’s orders distributing his
Barclays 401 (k) plan constituted an abuse of its discretion.
III
The defendant next claims that the court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion to reargue and
reconsider. Specifically, the defendant claims that it is
“error for a court of equity not to give joint owners the
same opportunity before the property is sold to a third
party.” We are not persuaded.
N. G. v. D. S.
We begin with the following legal principles that guide
our analysis of the defendant’s claim. “[I]n reviewing a
court’s ruling on a motion to open, reargue, vacate or
reconsider, we ask only whether the court acted unreasonably or in clear abuse of its discretion. . . . When
reviewing a decision for an abuse of discretion, every
reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its
correctness. . . . As with any discretionary action of
the trial court . . . the ultimate [question for appellate
review] is whether the trial court could have reasonably
concluded as it did. . . . [T]he purpose of a reargument is . . . to demonstrate to the court that there is some decision or some principle of law which would have a controlling
effect, and which has been overlooked, or that there has
been a misapprehension of facts. . . . It also may be used
to address . . . claims of law that the [movant] claimed
were not addressed by the court. . . . [A] motion to reargue [however] is not to be used as an opportunity to
have a second bite of the apple . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Prioleau v. Agosta, 232 Conn. App. 94,
101–102, 335 A.3d 93 (2025).
The additional following procedural history and facts,
as gleaned from the record or found by the court, are relevant to our resolution of this claim. The plaintiff first
acquired the marital home in 2004, but she fell behind on
the mortgage and the home went into foreclosure around
2012. The plaintiff arranged a short sale in which the
defendant purchased the marital home for $345,000,
with $250,000 of the purchase price funded by the plaintiff. The defendant borrowed $95,000 from his sister to
finance the remainder of the purchase price, and he then
took out a home equity line of credit in order to repay
his sister. The defendant moved into the marital home
with the plaintiff in 2013. In April 2018, the defendant
transferred 50 percent of his ownership interest in the
marital home back to the plaintiff through a quitclaim
deed.
In her proposed orders, the plaintiff requested that the
defendant quitclaim his remaining 50 percent interest
N. G. v. D. S.
in the marital home to her and close the home equity line
of credit. The defendant, by contrast, requested that
the marital home be “immediately listed for sale until
sold with an agreed upon licensed real estate agent at
an agreed upon price. . . . At closing, after the payment
for the equity line and all usual and customary closing
costs, the net proceeds shall be divided equally between
the parties.”
At trial, the plaintiff testified that she was aware that
the defendant wanted the marital home sold immediately, but she argued that she wanted the home because
it was her house. The plaintiff stated that she wanted
the court to order that the outstanding balance on the
home equity line credit be paid and that the court order
the defendant to transfer his interest in the property to
her. The defendant testified that he wanted the house to
be sold because “I think that’s the only way to . . . fairly get the equity that’s in the house out of the house.” The
defendant further testified that the appraisals submitted as exhibits at trial “understate the true market value
of the property” because “people have made unsolicited
offers for the property. . . . [O]bviously the real estate
market has been kind of hot . . . in recent years, and [the location of the marital home] is kind of . . . an in demand area.” The defendant then testified that the property is
“a rather large lot right across the street from the beach” and that, although most of the houses in the area are on
one-tenth of an acre, the marital home sits on “about
two-thirds” of one acre. During closing arguments, the
defendant’s counsel argued that, “in this market, lots
of houses sell way more than they’re valued at. Perhaps
the simplest way to resolve what the house is worth is
you put it on the open market.”
In its memorandum of decision, the court found that
“[b]oth parties benefited from the short sale of the [marital home], the plaintiff more so than the defendant. The
plaintiff was able to get the home out of foreclosure,
have $550,000 in debt forgiven, pay off credit card debt,
and receive cash as a result of the defendant purchasing
N. G. v. D. S.
the home for $345,000.” As previously noted in this
opinion, the court ultimately awarded the marital home
to the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to quitclaim
his interest to her. The court further ordered that the
plaintiff was to refinance the mortgage and remove the
defendant from the mortgage, or list the marital home for
sale by June 22, 2025. The plaintiff was further ordered
to pay the defendant $150,000 within thirty days from
the closing date of either the sale or the refinancing of
the mortgage.
In his motion to reargue and reconsider dated June 18,
2024, the defendant, for the first time, requested that
the court give him an opportunity to retain the marital
home if the plaintiff could not refinance the home. The
court denied the defendant’s motion to reconsider as to
the real estate provisions of its decision. In that motion, the defendant did not assert that there was a controlling
principle of law which the court overlooked or that the
court misapplied the law. The defendant only argued
in his motion that he was a joint owner of the marital
property and should thus have had an opportunity to
retain the marital home after the dissolution of his marriage to the plaintiff. The defendant’s argument for an
opportunity to own the marital home is inconsistent
with the arguments that he presented at trial, in which
he insisted that the marital home be sold because the
home was undervalued. The defendant’s motion was
“effectively nothing more than an attempt to have an
impermissible second bite of the apple . . . .” (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Prioleau v.
Agosta, supra, 232 Conn. App. 104.
Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to reargue and reconsider.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.