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State v. Bey
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HENNY JORDAN BEY
(AC 48215)
Elgo, Clark and Westbrook, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff in error, A Co., a bail bonds company, filed a writ of error challenging the trial court’s denial of its motion for order requesting that the court either order the defendant in error, the state of Connecticut, to enter the rearrest warrant for the criminal defendant, B, who had been located in Arizona, into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database or release A Co. from its obligations on surety bail bonds that it had executed to obtain B’s release from custody. A Co. claimed, inter alia, that the court erred in concluding that the state’s refusal to enter B’s rearrest warrant into the NCIC database did not constitute good cause to release A Co. from its surety bond obligations pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 38-23) and statute (§ 54-65c). Held:
The trial court properly determined that A Co. failed to establish good cause to release it from its surety bond obligations pursuant to Practice Book § 38-23 because the state’s refusal to enter B’s rearrest warrant into the NCIC database did not constitute an act of law for purposes of the rule set forth in Taylor v. Taintor (83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366), as the state did not remove B from Connecticut or prevent him from appearing in court.
The trial court properly determined that A Co. failed to establish good cause to release it from its surety bond obligations pursuant to § 54-65c, as A Co. did not allege or prove that B had been detained or incarcerated in another state as required under the statute, and this court declined A Co.’s invitation to read into § 54-65c an additional, alternative ground that would entitle a bail bondsman to release from its surety bond obligations upon a showing that the state has declined to enter a defendant’s rearrest warrant into the NCIC database, as such an interpretation would be contrary to well settled tenets of statutory construction requiring this court to interpret a statute according to its plain language and to avoid reading into a clearly expressed statute provisions or requirements not expressed in the language of the statute.
The trial court properly determined that it lacked the authority to order the state to enter B’s rearrest warrant into the NCIC database pursuant to statute (§ 29-164f), as that statute contains no language authorizing a court to do so, and, if the legislature had intended to vest such authority in the trial court, it easily could have done so expressly.
Argued November 20, 2025—officially released July 21, 2026
Procudural History
Writ of error from the decision of the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, geographical
State v. Bey
area number one, Hon. Gary J. White, judge trial referee,
denying the plaintiff in error’s motion for order seeking,
inter alia, release from its obligations on certain surety
bonds. Writ of error denied.
William B. Westcott, for the plaintiff in error.
Timothy F. Costello, supervisory assistant state’s
attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Paul J. Ferencek,
state’s attorney, and Sydelle Exantus, assistant state’s
attorney, for the defendant in error.
Opinion
CLARK, J. In this writ of error, the plaintiff in error,
Aces Bail Bonds (Aces), claims that the trial court
improperly denied its motion for order requesting that
the court either order the defendant in error, the state
of Connecticut (state), to enter the rearrest warrant
for the criminal defendant, Henny Jordan Bey (defendant), into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC)
database1 or release Aces from its obligations on certain
surety bail bonds. Specifically, Aces claims that the trial court erred in concluding that (1) the state’s refusal to
enter the defendant’s rearrest warrant into the NCIC
database did not constitute good cause to release Aces
from its surety bond obligations pursuant to Practice
Book § 38-23 and General Statutes § 54-65c,2 and (2)
it lacked the authority to order the state to enter the
defendant’s rearrest warrant into the NCIC database
pursuant to General Statutes § 29-164f and the court’s
1
“The NCIC database is maintained by the [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and aggregates criminal justice information from a variety of sources. Some files in the database contain information about individual persons and are known as person files. Other files contain records regarding stolen property. Law enforcement agencies routinely check NCIC records to obtain information concerning persons in custody or under investigation.” Commissioner of Correction v. Freedom of Information Commission, 307 Conn. 53, 58 n.4, 52 A.3d 636 (2012).
2
Although § 54-65c has been amended since the events at issue; see Public Acts 2025, No. 25-25, § 2; that amendment has no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
State v. Bey
inherent bail authority. We reject Aces’ claims and deny
the writ of error.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts. On
January 13, 2023, the police arrested the defendant and
charged him with interfering with an officer in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-167a, failure to move over and
reduce speed when approaching an emergency vehicle in
violation of General Statutes § 14-283b (b), operating a
motor vehicle without a license in violation of General
Statutes § 14-36 (a), failure to carry a registration certificate and insurance card in violation of General Statutes
§ 14-13, and failure to wear a safety belt in violation
of General Statutes § 14-100a (c) (1). Aces executed a
surety bail bond in the amount of $10,000 to obtain the
defendant’s release from custody.
On January 25, 2023, the defendant was arrested
again and charged with interfering with an officer in
violation of § 53a-167a, refusal to show a license or registration certificate in violation of General Statutes
§ 14-217, operating a motor vehicle without a license in
violation of § 14-36 (a), and parking within ten feet of
a fire hydrant in violation of General Statutes § 14-251
(a). Aces executed a surety bail bond in the amount of
$20,000 to obtain the defendant’s release from custody.
In April 2024, after the defendant failed to appear
in court, the trial court issued a rearrest warrant and
ordered the surety bonds totaling $30,000 forfeited.
On September 13, 2024, Aces filed a motion for order
pursuant to Practice Book § 38-23 and General Statutes
§§ 29-164f, 54-65a, and 54-65c, requesting that the court
either order the state to enter the defendant’s rearrest
warrant into the NCIC database or release Aces from its
obligations under the surety bonds. In its motion, Aces
represented that it had located the defendant and that the
defendant was residing in Arizona. It argued that placing the rearrest warrant into the NCIC database would
“enable local authorities to detain the defendant . . .
[and allow Aces] to take custody and fulfill its civil obligation to return the defendant to Connecticut . . . .”
State v. Bey
The trial court heard oral argument on Aces’ motion on
October 8, 2024. The state objected to the motion. After
hearing from the parties, the court denied the motion
from the bench, stating: “I’m not too sure that I do have
the authority to order the state to do anything when it
comes to extraditing somebody or making it easier for
the bondsmen to carry out an obligation the bondsmen
incurred. So, I’m going to sustain the state’s objection.”
This writ of error followed.
I
Aces first claims that the trial court erred in denying
its motion for order because it established good cause
pursuant to § 54-65c and Practice Book § 38-23 to release
it from its surety bond obligations. Specifically, it argues that the state’s refusal to enter the defendant’s rearrest warrant into the NCIC database established good
cause to release it from its bond obligations because (1)
the state’s refusal made the defendant unavailable by
virtue of an act of law, which is sufficient to establish
good cause pursuant to Practice Book § 38-23, and (2)
the state would not “furnish the conditions precedent
to ever allow [Aces] to establish the circumstances that
would lead to relief [under] § 54-65c.” We conclude that
the trial court properly determined that Aces failed to
establish good cause under § 54-65c and Practice Book
§ 38-23.
A
We first address Aces’ claim that the trial court erred
in concluding that the state’s refusal to place the defendant’s rearrest warrant in the NCIC database did not
constitute an “act of law” for purposes of establishing
good cause pursuant to Practice Book § 38-23.
Practice Book § 38-23 provides: “Where bail has been
posted by a bondsman or other surety, such bondsman
or surety shall not be relieved of any obligation upon the
bond except with the permission of the judicial authority and for good cause shown.” “Although [§ 38-23] does
State v. Bey
not specify the exact legal test to be used by a court in
determining good cause, this state has followed the common-law rule set forth in Taylor v. Taintor, [83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 366, 366, 21 L. Ed. 287 (1872)], which affirmed
the decision of our Supreme Court in Taintor v. Taylor,
36 Conn. 242, 255 (1869), that a surety will be relieved of its obligation on a bail bond only when the performance
of the condition [of the bond] is rendered impossible by
the act of God, the act of the obligee, or the act of the
law (Taylor rule).”3 (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Garcia, 178 Conn. App. 557, 565–66, 176 A.3d
575 (2017). “Because the release of a bail surety pursuant to Practice Book § 38-23 is not discretionary but,
rather, requires the trial court’s application of the rule
in Taylor to the facts as found by the court, our review of the trial court’s application of the law is plenary.” State v. Sheriff, 301 Conn. 617, 627 n.6, 21 A.3d 808 (2011).
“In Taylor, the criminal defendant and principal on the
bond, Edward McGuire, was released after posting bond
in a Connecticut criminal court. . . . He later voluntarily left Connecticut for New York and failed to appear in
court as ordered. . . . Meanwhile, Maine issued a governor’s requisition to New York to take custody of McGuire
so he could be prosecuted on a pending burglary charge
in Maine, and New York delivered him to proper officers
of the state of Maine. . . . Neither of the two sureties on the bond knew, when they entered into the recognizance,
that McGuire had a burglary charge pending in Maine. . .
. After McGuire was sent to Maine, he was convicted and
sentenced to a term of incarceration of fifteen years. . . . During his confinement, the Connecticut court forfeited
3
To the extent that Aces invites us to expand the legal test for good cause under Practice Book § 38-23 beyond the considerations enunciated in the Taylor rule, we reject that invitation on the basis of binding precedent. See State v. Sheriff, 301 Conn. 617, 621–22, 626–27, 21 A.3d 808 (2011) (declining to expand the Taylor rule to determine good cause under § 38-23); State v. Garcia, 178 Conn. App. 557, 570, 176 A.3d 575 (2017) (declining to add prong to Taylor rule).
State v. Bey
the bond.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Garcia, supra,
178 Conn. App. 566–67.
Thereafter, “the Connecticut state treasurer, brought
an action against McGuire and the sureties on his bond
to collect the debt on the recognizance. . . . The sureties claimed they were excused by acts of both the law and
the obligee.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 567. Our Supreme
Court concluded that the sureties were not entitled to
be relieved from their obligations on the bond, and the
sureties appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Taylor v. Taintor, supra, 83 U.S. 369.
In affirming our Supreme Court’s judgment, “[t]he
United States Supreme Court provided examples of what
would satisfy each of the common-law conditions of
the Taylor rule. An act of God occurs when the bonded
defendant ‘dies before the day’ on which he must appear.
. . . An act of the obligee, or the party protected by the
bond, which is the state, occurs when the state does
something that makes it impossible for the defendant
to appear in its courts, such as abolishing the court in
question without qualification. . . . The third condition,
an act of law, arises when the state protected by the bond
takes custody of the defendant and then surrenders his
custody to another state, thereby exercising control of the defendant in such a way as to make compliance with the
bond impossible.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Garcia,
supra, 178 Conn. App. 567. “Because Connecticut had
not abolished the court in which McGuire was required
to appear, the court in Taylor focused on the third condition and stated that good cause cannot exist as an act
of law when McGuire voluntarily removed himself from
Connecticut by crossing the border into New York. . . .
There is a distinction between an act of the law proper
and the act of the [criminal defendant], which exposes
him to the control and action of the law. While the former exonerates, the latter gives no immunity.” (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 567–68.
State v. Bey
The court then rejected the sureties’ argument “that
the case fell into the act of law condition because even
though McGuire left Connecticut of his own volition, an
act of law rendered his appearance impossible due to the
lawful arrest and transfer of McGuire to Maine as a result
of the cooperation between authorities in New York and
Maine. . . . In rejecting this argument, the court stated
that it considered New York and Maine ‘strangers’ to the
bond agreement and held that an act of law that makes
it impossible for the criminal defendant to appear must
derive from the protected state’s action, in other words,
Connecticut’s action, which did not occur in Taylor.”
(Citation omitted.) Id., 568.
In State v. Sheriff, supra, 301 Conn. 622, our Supreme
Court made clear that the Taylor rule remains the proper
legal test for determining good cause under Practice
Book § 38-23. In Sheriff, the plaintiff in error claimed
that the trial court improperly denied its petition to
release it from its obligations on surety bail bonds, which had been “ordered forfeited after the principal on the
bonds, David Sheriff, the criminal defendant, failed to
appear for trial.” Id., 618. Specifically, the plaintiff in error argued that there was good cause to release it of
its obligations pursuant to § 38-23 because, inter alia,
it made substantial efforts to locate Sheriff in Jamaica
and the state declined to initiate extradition proceedings. Id., 627.
Our Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff in error’s
invitation to revisit and expand the Taylor rule’s criteria for good cause. See id., 622 and n.4. Instead, the court
applied the Taylor rule to the plaintiff in error’s claim
and held that “the trial court properly concluded that
[the plaintiff in error] was not entitled to relief because none of the facts on which [the plaintiff in error] relies
prevented Sheriff from appearing for trial; nor do they
prevent Sheriff from returning to this jurisdiction. First, none of these facts implicates an act of God. Second,
Sheriff’s failure to appear at trial and his continued
absence from the jurisdiction did not result from any
State v. Bey
act of the state. The record demonstrates that Sheriff
wilfully fled to Jamaica two days prior to his trial date
and has not since returned. No act of the state compelled
Sheriff to flee, and no act of the state is preventing Sheriff from returning to this state to stand trial. There is
absolutely no evidence to demonstrate that Sheriff’s
failure to appear or his continued absence from this state
is the result of anything but his own will. Moreover,
even if we assume that the chief state’s attorney could
have extradited Sheriff from Jamaica, in the absence of
any promise by the chief state’s attorney that he would
seek extradition of Sheriff in the event that he fled, the
chief state’s attorney had no obligation to [the plaintiff
in error] to extradite Sheriff from Jamaica in order to
fulfill the obligations that [the plaintiff in error] willingly undertook. As one court has observed, [t]he state
is not the surety’s surety. . . . Finally, no law has prevented Sheriff from appearing for trial. Although it is
true that the law prevents [the plaintiff in error] from
apprehending Sheriff in Jamaica in the absence of an
extradition order, nothing in the operation of the law has
prevented Sheriff from appearing at trial or returning
to this jurisdiction. The fact that [the plaintiff in error] cannot compel Sheriff to return to this state so that [the
plaintiff in error] can fulfill its obligation is primarily the result of Sheriff’s decision to flee to Jamaica, and
[the plaintiff in error] must accept the consequences of
that decision.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 627–28; see also State v. Garcia,
supra, 178 Conn. App. 572 (concluding that “[a criminal
defendant] voluntarily leaving the United States for
Peru . . . does not meet the act of law condition under
the Taylor rule because Connecticut, the protected state,
was not responsible for making his compliance with the
bond impossible”).
It is clear, therefore, that the Taylor rule remains
the appropriate test for determining good cause under
Practice Book § 38-23. Applying the Taylor rule to the
present case, we conclude that the trial court properly
determined that Aces failed to establish good cause for
State v. Bey
releasing it from its surety obligations because the state’s refusal to enter the defendant’s rearrest warrant into
the NCIC database does not constitute an act of law for
purposes of that rule. As our Supreme Court explained in
Sheriff, an act of law occurs “[i]f the principal is arrested in the [s]tate where the obligation is given and sent out
of the [s]tate by the governor, upon the requisition of
the governor of another [s]tate . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sheriff, supra, 301 Conn. 624.
In the present case, the defendant’s presence in Arizona
resulted not from an act of the state but, rather, from
his own volition. Aces has offered no evidence to indicate
that the defendant was arrested in Connecticut and sent
out of this state by the governor. When an “accused’s
own actions cause his absence at trial . . . sureties . . . [are] not entitled to release from their obligation.” Id.
Moreover, there is no law preventing the defendant from
voluntarily returning to this state.
Because the state has neither removed the defendant
from the state nor prevented him from appearing in
court, Aces has not established that the defendant’s
failure to appear is the result of an act of law for purposes of the Taylor rule. Accordingly, we conclude that the
trial court did not err in concluding that Aces failed to
establish good cause under the Taylor rule.4
B
Next, we turn to Aces’ claim that it established
good cause because the state would not “furnish the
4
Although the law governing bail bonds and their forfeiture differs from state to state, we note that other jurisdictions similarly have rejected the claim that a state’s failure to place an arrest warrant into the NCIC database constitutes grounds to release a surety from its bond obligation. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 862 P.2d 1031, 1032 (Colo. App. 1993) (“there is no merit in sureties’ claim that the lack of an entry on the national crime computer system made it impossible for them to perform their obligations on the bond”); State v. Flores, 88 Haw. 126, 132, 962 P.2d 1008 (App. 1998) (concluding that state’s failure to enter bench warrant information into NCIC database did not constitute act or omission of obligee to release bail bond company on its surety bond obligation); State v. Locklear, Docket No. COA23-1044, 2024 WL
State v. Bey
conditions precedent to ever allow [it] to establish the
circumstances that would lead to relief [under] § 54-65c.”
In 2011, after the issuance of the decision in Sheriff,
the legislature enacted § 54-65c, which “expanded the
common-law definition of good cause.”5 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Garcia, supra, 178 Conn.
App. 566. We are not persuaded.
We begin with the appropriate standard of review. “The
interpretation of a statute, as well as its applicability to a given set of facts and circumstances, involves a question
of law and our review, therefore, is plenary.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn.
App. 619, 629, 882 A.2d 98, cert. denied, 276 Conn.
924, 888 A.2d 92 (2005), and cert. denied, 276 Conn.
925, 888 A.2d 92 (2005); see also State v. Agron, 323
Conn. 629, 633–40, 148 A.3d 1052 (2016) (interpreting § 54-65c and concluding, after employing plenary
standard of review, that plaintiff in error did not meet
statute’s requirements).
Section 54-65c provides in relevant part: “A court shall
vacate an order forfeiting a bail bond and release the
professional bondsman, as defined in section 29-144, or
the surety bail bond agent and the insurer, as both terms
are defined in section 38a-660, if (1) (A) the principal on the bail bond (i) is detained or incarcerated (I) in another state, territory or country, or (II) by a federal agency, or (ii) has been removed by United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, and (B) the professional bondsman, the surety bail bond agent or the insurer provides
satisfactory proof of such detention, incarceration or
removal to the court and the state’s attorney prosecuting
3267172, *5 (N.C. App. July 2, 2024) (decision without published opinion 902 S.E.2d 746) (concluding that trial court exceeded its authority to set aside forfeiture as outlined by statute when it vacated forfeiture on ground that state had not placed defendant’s arrest warrant into NCIC database).
5
Section 54-65c provides additional conditions that would vacate a forfeiture order. This court has emphasized, however, that, “[f]or cases not within the statute, the three common-law conditions of the Taylor rule, reaffirmed in Sheriff, remain binding precedent.” State v. Garcia, supra, 178 Conn. App. 566 n.14.
State v. Bey
the case, and (C) the state’s attorney prosecuting the
case declines to seek extradition of the principal . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Because the three conditions set forth
in § 54-65c are phrased in the conjunctive, it is clear
that a court may vacate an order forfeiting a bail bond
and release a professional bail bondsman pursuant to
§ 54-65c only if all three of the conditions are satisfied. See Afkari-Ahmadi v. Fotovat-Ahmadi, 294 Conn. 384,
393–94, 985 A.2d 319 (2009) (reaffirming “ ‘significance
in the use of the word “and” between . . . two stated conditions’ ” to show that both conditions must be met); Penn
v. Irizarry, 220 Conn. 682, 687, 600 A.2d 1024 (1991)
(“[t]he use of the conjunctive, ‘and,’ indicates that both
conditions must be fulfilled”).
In the present case, Aces failed to establish good cause
under § 54-65c because it neither alleged nor proved
that the defendant had been detained or incarcerated
in another state. On the contrary, the entire premise of
Aces’ claim is that the state’s refusal to enter the defendant’s rearrest warrant into the NCIC database is the
very thing that is preventing the defendant from being
detained and incarcerated in Arizona for the pending
charges here in Connecticut. For purposes of § 54-65c,
the terms “detained or incarcerated” mean that a defendant is in the custody of a governmental entity. State v.
Agron, supra, 323 Conn. 639–40.
Our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Agron, supra,
323 Conn. 629, is instructive. In Agron, the plaintiff in
error brought a writ of error claiming that the trial court improperly denied its motion to release it of its obligation on a surety bail bond pursuant to § 54-65c after the
criminal defendant, Angel Agron, failed to appear in
court and fled to Puerto Rico. Id., 630–31. In support of
its motion to release it of its bond obligation, the plaintiff in error submitted evidence that the state had declined
to initiate extradition proceedings against Agron even
though he had been located by bail enforcement agents
in Puerto Rico and made aware of his warrant for failure
to appear in Connecticut. Id., 632. Our Supreme Court
State v. Bey
rejected the plaintiff in error’s claim, concluding that
“the word ‘detained’ as used in [§ 54-65c] . . . require[s] custody by a governmental entity.” Id., 639. The court
reasoned that, because “[i]t [was] undisputed that Agron
was not incarcerated or detained by any governmental
entity . . . the [plaintiff in error] did not meet the requirements of § 54-65c.” Id., 640.
Although, in the present case, there is no dispute that
the defendant had not been detained or placed in custody
in Arizona at the time Aces moved to be relieved of its
obligations under the surety bonds, Aces nevertheless
argues that, “by refusing to place [the defendant’s rearrest warrant] in NCIC . . . [the state] was . . . already
declining to extradite him, as there would be no possibility of extradition without the precedent ability of the
state of Arizona to first apprehend [the defendant] under
the mechanism of the NCIC system.” Aces’ interpretation
ignores the clear and plain language in § 54-65c stating
that a principal must be detained or incarcerated in order
for the statute to apply. Moreover, the statute makes no
mention whatsoever of the NCIC database.
Aces’ claim on appeal amounts to an invitation to read
into § 54-65c an additional, alternative ground that would
entitle a professional bail bondsman to the relief afforded under that statute upon a showing that the state has
declined to enter a defendant’s rearrest warrant into the
NCIC database. Such an interpretation would be contrary
to well settled tenets of statutory construction requiring
us to interpret a statute according to its plain language
and to avoid reading into a clearly expressed statute
provisions or requirements not expressed in the language
of the statute. “When interpreting statutes, we afford
statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning and
refrain from reading into statutes provisions that are not
clearly stated . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Guadalupe, 66 Conn. App. 819, 827, 786 A.2d
494 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 907, 789 A.2d 996
(2002); see also Dusto v. Rogers Corp., 222 Conn. App.
71, 110, 304 A.3d 446 (2023) (“[i]n the absence of such
State v. Bey
an explicit requirement, we . . . decline to read such a
requirement into [the] statute”), cert. denied, 348 Conn.
939, 307 A.3d 274 (2024); Gamez-Reyes v. Biagi, 136
Conn. App. 258, 274, 44 A.3d 197 (“We are bound to
interpret legislative intent by referring to what the legislative text contains, not what it might have contained.
. . . We will not read into clearly expressed legislation
provisions which do not find expression in its words.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 306
Conn. 905, 52 A.3d 731 (2012).
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we conclude
that the trial court did not err in concluding that the
plaintiff failed to establish good cause under § 54-65c.
Accordingly, we reject Aces’ claim.
II
Aces next claims that the trial court improperly concluded that it lacked authority to order the state to enter the defendant’s rearrest warrant into the NCIC database.
We disagree.
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of
review. Whether the court has the legal authority to issue
an order is a question of law subject to plenary review.
See, e.g., State v. Abushaqra, 164 Conn. App. 256, 264,
137 A.3d 861 (2016). Moreover, to the extent that Aces’
claim requires us to interpret the statutes pertaining to
the NCIC database, that issue of statutory interpretation
is likewise subject to our plenary review. See, e.g., Airey v. Feliciano, 352 Conn. 639, 646, 338 A.3d 344 (2025).
Aces argues that the court had the authority to order
the state to enter the rearrest warrant into the NCIC
database pursuant to § 29-164f, which is the statute
by which our legislature entered into and enacted into
law the National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact (compact).6 Although Aces acknowledges that the
“authority of the trial court to order the state to initiate 6
“This [c]ompact organizes an electronic information sharing system among the federal government and the states to exchange criminal history records for noncriminal justice purposes authorized by federal or
State v. Bey
extradition is unspecified in § 29-164f,” it argues that “it is nonetheless clear that the trial court holds the power
to order items into [the] NCIC [database].”
Section 29-164f, however, includes no language authorizing a court to require a law enforcement agency to
enter a rearrest warrant into the NCIC database. It is
well established that, “[w]hen a court interprets [a statute], it cannot . . . supply additional terms to change the meaning of the provision at issue.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) PJM & Associates, LC v. Bridgeport,
292 Conn. 125, 138, 971 A.2d 24 (2009). “We are not in
the business of writing statutes; that is the province of
the legislature. Our role is to interpret statutes as they
are written. . . . [We] cannot, by [judicial] construction, read into statutes provisions [that] are not clearly
stated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rider v.
Rider, 210 Conn. App. 278, 288, 270 A.3d 206 (2022).
If our legislature had intended to vest in trial courts
the authority to order law enforcement agencies to enter
rearrest warrants into the NCIC database upon a defendant’s failure to appear in court, it easily could have
done so expressly.7 Indeed, there are numerous instances
state law, such as background checks for governmental licensing and employment.” General Statutes § 29-164f (a).
7
We note that other jurisdictions have enacted legislation expressly providing that a rearrest warrant shall be entered into the NCIC database. See Cal. Penal Code § 980 (b) (Deering 2023) (“The clerk shall require the appropriate agency to enter each bench warrant issued on a private surety-bonded felony case into the [NCIC]. If the appropriate agency fails to enter the bench warrant into the [NCIC], and the court finds that this failure prevented the surety or bond agent from surrendering the fugitive into custody, prevented the fugitive from being arrested or taken into custody, or resulted in the fugitive’s subsequent release from custody, the court having jurisdiction over the bail shall, upon petition, set aside the forfeiture of the bond and declare all liability on the bail bond to be exonerated.”); Cal. Penal Code § 1196 (b) (Deering 2023) (same); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2807 (a) (Cum. Supp. 2025) (“If a defendant fails to appear as directed by the court and guaranteed by an appearance bond, the court in which the bond is deposited shall declare a forfeiture of the bail and issue a warrant for the defendant’s arrest. If the defendant is charged with a felony offense, the sheriff shall enter such warrant into the national crime information center’s index within 14 days of issuance of the warrant and, upon request,
State v. Bey
in which our legislature has expressly required that
information be entered into the NCIC database or that
a person or agency take some other action with respect
to that database. See, e.g., General Statutes § 14-145 (b)
(3) (requiring identification numbers of towed vehicles be
entered into NCIC database); General Statutes § 17a-8b
(requiring Department of Children and Families to report
missing or abducted child to NCIC); General Statutes
§ 29-1i (c) (requiring entry of information relating to
missing adult person into NCIC database); General Statutes § 54-63c (e) (requiring law enforcement or probation
officers to check NCIC database before releasing arrestee
or setting bond). The absence of similar language requiring the state to enter rearrest warrants into the NCIC
database or authorizing courts to order law enforcement agencies to enter rearrest warrants into the NCIC
database following a defendant’s failure to appear for a
court appearance is strong evidence that the legislature
did not intend to vest courts with such authority. See
Rubin v. Brodie, 228 Conn. App. 617, 646, 325 A.3d 1096
(2024) (“[w]here a statute, with reference to one subject
contains a given provision, the omission of such provision
from a similar statute concerning a related subject . . .
is significant to show that a different intention existed”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).8
We conclude that the trial court properly determined
that it lacked the authority to order the state to enter
the court shall make a copy of the warrant available to a compensated surety who deposited the bond on behalf of the defendant.”); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 331 (G) (2017) (permitting surety to request rearrest warrant be entered into NCIC database when authorized); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-13-16 (b) (Cum. Supp. 2021) (bail forfeiture may not be initiated until forty-five days following entry of rearrest warrant into NCIC database); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-139 (d) (1) (2025) (requiring entry of rearrest warrant related to felony charges and class A and B misdemeanors that are violent or sexual in nature entered into NCIC database). Connecticut has not adopted similar legislation. See General Statutes § 54-65a.
8
The plaintiff further argues that the trial court’s authority to order rearrest warrants into the NCIC database is derived from its inherent bail authority. Although it is true that the trial court retains jurisdiction over the defendant to ensure compliance with conditions of release
State v. Bey
the defendant’s rearrest warrant into the NCIC database. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Aces’
motion for order.
The writ of error is denied.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
and, therefore, has authority to set and revoke bail; see State v. Ayala, 222 Conn. 331, 346–47, 610 A.2d 1162 (1992); State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859, 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also State v. Bates, 140 Conn. 326, 330, 99 A.2d 133 (1953); and to order the forfeiture of bonds and to issue rearrest warrants or capiases; see General Statutes § 54-65a; it does not follow that the relevant statutes also vest in courts the entirely separate and unrelated authority to order law enforcement agencies to enter rearrest warrants into the NCIC database.