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Campelli v. Mansfield
MARIO CAMPELLI ET AL. v. TOWN
OF MANSFIELD
(SC 21209)
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker,
Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.
Syllabus
Pursuant to statute (§ 12-107b (2)), “forest land” is defined in relevant part as a tract or tracts of land in a municipality or municipalities “aggregating twenty-five acres or more in area bearing tree growth that conforms to . . . [certain] standards established by the State Forester . . . .”
Pursuant further to statute (§ 12-107d (f)), a property owner who has obtained a report from a certified forester certifying that the property owner’s land conforms to the standards established by the state forester may file an application with the assessor of the town in which the land is located, along with the certified forester’s report, to have the assessor classify the land as forest land and thereby receive a reduction in the property tax assessment, and, if the assessor determines that the use of the land as forest land has not changed as of or prior to the assessment date, the assessor shall classify the land as forest land.
Pursuant further to statute (§ 12-504h), land that has been classified as forest land “shall remain so classified without the filing of any new application subsequent to such classification . . . until either . . . [t]he use of such land is changed to a use other than that described in the application for the existing classification . . . or . . . such land is sold or transferred . . . .”
The plaintiffs, who owned property located in the town of Mansfield, appealed to the Superior Court from the decision of the defendant town’s board of assessment appeals, which had upheld the decision of the town assessor to terminate the property’s classification as forest land. In 2005, the plaintiffs had submitted to the assessor an application, seeking to have their Mansfield property classified as forest land for municipal property tax purposes under § 12-107b (2) (A), along with a report by a certified forester attesting that their property met the criteria for forest land classification under that provision because it was a single 25 acre tract of land that conformed to the relevant standards. The assessor had approved the application, but, in 2021, the assessor discovered that the property was actually 22.53 acres. The assessor notified the plaintiffs that the property therefore did not qualify as forest land under § 12-107b (2) (A), but the assessor nonetheless indicated that the property continued to qualify as forest land under § 12-107b (2) (B) because the plaintiffs also owned a 14.05 acre parcel in the town of Tolland that also was classified as forest land, and, when the two properties were aggregated, they satisfied the statute’s 25 acre requirement. When the plaintiffs subsequently sold the 14.05 acre Tolland parcel, the assessor terminated the classification of the plaintiffs’ Mansfield property as forest
Campelli v. Mansfield
land, causing the property’s assessed value to increase substantially. The trial court ultimately sustained the plaintiffs’ appeal from the board’s decision, concluding that, although the Mansfield property had been erroneously designated as forest land because it was not and never had been 25 or more acres, § 12-504 did not permit the assessor to terminate the property’s forest land classification because the property had not been sold and its use had not changed. The trial court therefore ordered the town to reinstate the forest land classification of the Mansfield property and to assess property taxes on the property accordingly. On appeal, the town claimed that its assessor had the statutory authority to terminate the property’s classification as forest land because that property had never satisfied the minimum acreage requirement of § 12-107b (2). Held:
The trial court properly sustained the plaintiffs’ appeal from the board’s decision upholding the assessor’s declassification of the property as forest land and ordered the town to reinstate the forest land classification of the property, this court having concluded that municipal assessors lack the statutory authority to terminate erroneous forest land classifications and that such claims must be directed to the state forester.
The town could not prevail on its claim that its assessor had the authority to terminate the forest land classification of the Mansfield property pursuant to § 12-504h (2) on the ground that “such land [was] sold or transferred by” the plaintiffs when they sold their Tolland parcel.
The term “such land,” as used in § 12-504h (2), plainly and unambiguously referred back to the “land” previously specified in the text of that statute, that is, the “land” described in a property owner’s application for forest land classification.
The only land described in the plaintiffs’ application to the town for forest land classification was the Mansfield property, that property was classified as forest land under § 12-107b (2) (A) as a single 25 acre tract, independent of the 14.05 acre Tolland parcel, and, because the Mansfield property was not sold or transferred and its use had not changed to a use other than that described in the plaintiffs’ application to classify the Mansfield property as forest land, the sale of the Tolland parcel had no effect on the forest land classification of the Mansfield property, and the assessor was not authorized under § 12-504h (2) to declassify the Mansfield property as forest land.
The town could not prevail on its claim that its assessor had the authority to terminate the Mansfield property’s forest land classification under § 12-107d (f) insofar as that classification was erroneous from its inception on the basis that the Mansfield property never satisfied the minimum twenty-five acre requirement of § 12-107b (2).
This court previously held, under an earlier version of § 12-107d, that municipal assessors lack statutory authority to terminate forest land classifications, even if those classifications are erroneous, on the basis that the earlier version of the statute provided that an assessor “shall” approve an application for the classification of property as forest land if the property has been so
Campelli v. Mansfield
designated by the state forester and that there was no statutory provision that gave an assessor discretionary authority to deny such an application under those circumstances.
Moreover, subsequent legislation (P.A. 04-115, §§ 2 and 3) concerning forestry management did not vest a municipal assessor with the discretionary authority to deny, change, or terminate forest land classifications if the assessor disputes a certified forester’s findings that a property satisfies the statutory definition of forest land under § 12-107b (2), even if those findings were erroneous at the time of the initial application.
Rather, P.A. 04-115 created a system of certified foresters, and, pursuant to § 12-107d, as amended by P.A. 04-115, it is a certified forester, rather than the state forester, who evaluates land to determine whether it should be designated as forest land, and, if the municipality or the property owner disagrees with the findings in the certified forester, the municipality or property owner must appeal to the state forester.
Accordingly, the state forester is vested with the exclusive statutory authority to correct errors in the certified forester’s findings regarding whether a property satisfies the statutory acreage requirements, and, in the present case, the assessor lacked authority under § 12-107d (f) to terminate the forest land classification of the Mansfield property.
The town could not prevail on its claim that its assessor had the authority to terminate the forest land classification of the Mansfield property pursuant to the statute (§ 12-55 (b)) that requires municipal assessors to “equalize the assessments of the property in the town . . . and [to] make any assessment omitted by mistake or required by law.”
The town’s claim was foreclosed by this court’s decision in Griswold Airport, Inc. v. Madison (289 Conn. 723), in which this court held that § 12-55 (b) does not vest municipal assessors with statutory authority to terminate land classifications for property tax purposes.
Specifically, although § 12-55 assigns municipal assessors a watchtower role to correct inequalities, it does not authorize assessors to revoke a land classification preliminarily to exercising that role, and, because the specific statutes governing the classification and declassification of forest land, namely, §§ 12-107d and 12-504h, do not permit assessors to correct forest land classifications on the ground that the certified forester had erroneously calculated the number of conforming forest land acres, § 12-55 (b) was inapplicable.
Argued April 16—officially released July 21, 2026
Procedural History
Appeal from the decision of the defendant’s board of
assessment appeals changing the classification of certain
of the plaintiffs’ real property, brought to the Superior
Campelli v. Mansfield
Court in the judicial district of Tolland and transferred
to the judicial district of New Britain, Tax Session, where
the court, Cordani, J., denied the parties’ motions for
summary judgment; thereafter, the case was tried to the
court, Budzik, J.; judgment sustaining the plaintiffs’
appeal, from which the defendant appealed. Affirmed.
Lloyd L. Langhammer, for the appellant (defendant).
Mario Campelli, self-represented, and Christine
Campelli, self-represented, the appellees (plaintiffs).
William Tong, attorney general, Matthew I. Levine,
deputy associate attorney general, and Michael P. Holler, special assistant attorney general, filed a brief for
the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection
as amicus curiae.
Opinion
ECKER, J. The issue in this tax appeal is whether
a municipal assessor has the authority under General
Statutes § 12-107d, General Statutes § 12-504h, or General Statutes § 12-55 to terminate the classification of
property as “forest land” on the ground that the property
does not now, and never did, meet the minimum acreage
required to qualify as forest land under General Statutes
§ 12-107b (2) (A). Consistent with this court’s holding
in Carmel Hollow Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem, 269 Conn. 120, 848 A.2d 451 (2004) (Carmel
Hollow), we conclude that municipal assessors lack the
statutory authority to terminate erroneous forest land
classifications and that such claims “must be directed to
the state forester . . . .” (Footnote omitted.) Id., 145. We
therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court, which
determined that the municipal assessor for the defendant, the town of Mansfield, had improperly terminated
the forest land classification of the property owned by
the plaintiffs, Mario Campelli and Christine Campelli.
I
BACKGROUND
In June 2005, the plaintiffs purchased property located
on Hickory Lane in the town of Mansfield (Hickory Lane
Campelli v. Mansfield
property). Two months later, the plaintiffs submitted
an application to the defendant’s assessor, seeking to
classify the property as forest land for municipal tax
purposes under § 12-107b (2) (A), which defines “forest
land,” in relevant part, as “one tract of land of twentyfive or more contiguous acres” that “bear[s] tree growth
that conforms to the forest stocking, distribution and
condition standards established by the State Forester
pursuant to subsection (a) of section 12-107d . . . .”
Consistent with the requirements of § 12-107d (g), the
plaintiffs submitted the signed and sworn report of a
certified forester describing the Hickory Lane property
and attesting that it meets the statutory criteria for forest land classification because it is a single twenty-five
acre tract of land that “conforms to the standards of
forest stocking, distribution and condition established
by the State Forester.” General Statutes § 12-107d (g).
In September 2005, the defendant’s assessor granted
the plaintiffs’ application to classify the Hickory Lane
property as forest land.1
In 2021, the defendant’s assessor conducted a review
of the town’s property records and discovered “that the
acreage, heretofore, listed on the property record card
for the [Hickory Lane property], at 25 acres, is incorrect.”
(Emphasis in original.) A 1992 survey map filed in the
town’s land records listed the acreage of the property
as 22.53 acres. Because the acreage of the property was
less than 25 acres, the defendant’s assessor determined
that it did not qualify as forest land under subdivision
(2) (A) of § 12-107b.
The defendant’s assessor nonetheless concluded that
the Hickory Lane property qualified as forest land under
a different statutory subdivision, § 12-107b (2) (B), which
defines forest land to also include “two or more tracts of
land aggregating twenty-five acres or more in which no
single component tract shall consist of less than ten acres
. . . .” This definition applied to the Hickory Lane property at the time because, according to the land records, the
1
Prior to its purchase by the plaintiffs in 2005, the Hickory Lane property had been classified as a single twenty-five acre tract of forest land since 1994.
Campelli v. Mansfield
plaintiffs also owned “land classified as [f]orest [l]and in
the [t]own of Tolland,” which “include[d] a 14.05 acre
parcel, a 1.26 acre parcel and a 6.54 acre parcel . . . .”
Neither the 1.26 acre parcel nor the 6.54 acre parcel met
the 10 acre minimum requirement for aggregation, but,
by aggregating the 14.05 acre parcel with the Hickory
Lane property, the assessor determined that the plaintiffs had satisfied the statutory minimum of 25 acres
of forest land.
There was one complication—the plaintiffs were in
the process of selling the 14.05 acre Tolland parcel. The
defendant’s assessor advised the plaintiffs that, “according to . . . § 12-504h, the [forest land] classification [of
the Hickory Lane property] ‘shall cease as of the date
of sale or transfer’ ” of the 14.05 acre Tolland parcel,
and, as a result, the assessor notified the plaintiffs that
the assessed value of the Hickory Lane property would
increase from $3800 on the 2020 grand list to $38,640
on the 2021 grand list. (Emphasis omitted.) In December
2021, the plaintiffs sold the 14.05 acre Tolland parcel,
and the assessor terminated the forest land classification
of the Hickory Lane property.
Following an unsuccessful appeal to the defendant’s
board of assessment appeals, the plaintiffs filed a tax
appeal in the Superior Court. See General Statutes
§§ 12-107d (j) and 12-117a (a) (1). After denying both
parties’ motions for summary judgment, the trial court
conducted a trial de novo, at which the plaintiff Mario
Campelli and the defendant’s assessor, Rochelle Lambert,
testified. On the basis of the evidence adduced at trial,
the trial court found that “the Hickory Lane property
is not now and never has been twenty-five acres in size
. . . [and] ought never have been designated as forest
land in the first instance.” The trial court, however, also
determined that the assessor was legally precluded from
terminating the existing forest land classification on the
ground that the property did not meet the minimum acreage requirement. This conclusion was based on the language of § 12-504h, which provides in relevant part that
land classified as forest land “shall remain so classified
Campelli v. Mansfield
without the filing of any new application subsequent to
such classification . . . until either of the following shall occur: (1) The use of such land is changed to a use other
than that described in the application for the existing
classification by said record owner, or (2) such land is
sold or transferred by said record owner. . . .”
The trial court concluded that “§ 12-504h’s express
terms are clear. A forest land classification shall remain
on the land unless that land is sold or its use changes.
Section 12-504h includes no additional provision that a
forest land classification must have been correct in the
first instance, or that the classification may be revoked
because it was originally obtained by mistake.” Because
the Hickory Lane property has been classified as forest
land since 2005 and neither the use nor the ownership
of the property has changed since that time, the trial
court held that “it was improper for the [defendant] to
terminate the Hickory Lane property’s forest land classification for the 2021 grand list year and for each subsequent year . . . .” The trial court therefore ordered the
defendant to “reinstate the forest land classification [of]
the Hickory Lane property and [to] assess real property
taxes on the same commensurate with that designation.”
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial
court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the
appeal to this court. See General Statutes § 51-199 (c);
Practice Book § 65-1.
On appeal, the defendant contends that the judgment
of the trial court should be reversed because the sale of
the 14.05 acre Tolland parcel resulted in the plaintiffs
owning less than the minimum twenty-five acres of qualified forest land required by § 12-107b (2) (B), thus necessitating the termination of the forest land classification
of the Hickory Lane property pursuant to §§ 12-107d
and 12-504h. The defendant further contends that the
assessor’s declassification of the Hickory Lane property
is consistent with § 12-55, which requires assessors to
“equalize the assessments of property in the town, if necessary, and [to] make any assessment omitted by mistake
Campelli v. Mansfield
or required by law.”2 (Emphasis added.) General Statutes
§ 12-55 (b). The plaintiffs respond that the defendant’s
assessor lacked the statutory authority to terminate the
forest land classification of the Hickory Lane property
pursuant to Timber Trails Associates v. New Fairfield,
226 Conn. 407, 627 A.2d 932 (1993), and Carmel Hollow Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem, supra,
269 Conn. 120.
II
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING
FOREST LAND CLASSIFICATIONS
It is important at the outset to understand the statutory and regulatory framework governing forest land
classifications. To encourage land preservation and natural resource conservation, General Statutes §§ 12-107a
through 12-107g grant preferential tax treatment to
property classified as farm land, forest land, open space
land, and maritime heritage land. See, e.g., Rustici v.
Stonington, 174 Conn. 10, 13, 381 A.2d 532 (1977).
Section 12-107a “declare[s] (1) that it is in the public
interest to encourage the preservation of farm land,
forest land, open space land and maritime heritage land
in order to maintain a readily available source of food
and farm products close to the metropolitan areas of the
state, to conserve the state’s natural resources and to
provide for the welfare and happiness of the inhabitants
of the state, (2) that it is in the public interest to prevent the forced conversion of farm land, forest land, open
space land and maritime heritage land to more intensive
uses as the result of economic pressures caused by the
2
The defendant also claims, for the first time in its reply brief, that the plaintiffs’ appeal to the trial court was improperly filed pursuant to § 12-117a instead of General Statutes § 12-119. “It is a well established principle that arguments cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief. . . . Arguments must be raised in an appellant’s original brief . . . so that the issue as framed . . . can be fully responded to by the appellee in its brief, and so that [an appellate court] can have the full benefit of that written argument.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Benjamin v. Corasaniti, 341 Conn. 463, 476–77 n.8, 267 A.3d 108 (2021). We decline to address the defendant’s belated claim.
Campelli v. Mansfield
assessment thereof for purposes of property taxation
at values incompatible with their preservation as such
farm land, forest land, open space land and maritime
heritage land, and (3) that the necessity in the public
interest of the enactment of the provisions of sections
12-107b to 12-107e, inclusive, 12-107g and 12-504f is
a matter of legislative determination.” Consistent with
these provisions, farm land, forest land, open space land,
and maritime heritage land are taxed on the basis of their
“current use without regard to neighborhood land use
of a more intensive nature,” rather than at their fair
market value. General Statutes § 12-63 (a).
Forest land is defined as “any tract or tracts of land
aggregating twenty-five acres or more in area bearing
tree growth that conforms to the forest stocking, distribution and condition standards established by the State
Forester pursuant to subsection (a) of section 12-107d,
and consisting of (A) one tract of land of twenty-five or
more contiguous acres, which acres may be in contiguous
municipalities, (B) two or more tracts of land aggregating
twenty-five acres or more in which no single component
tract shall consist of less than ten acres, or (C) any tract
of land which is contiguous to a tract owned by the same
owner and has been classified as forest land pursuant to
this section . . . .” General Statutes § 12-107b (2).
To classify property as forest land, a property owner
“shall employ a certified forester to examine the land to
determine if it conforms to forest stocking, distribution
and condition standards established by the State Forester
. . . .” General Statutes § 12-107d (c). The certified forester must issue a report that includes “a description of
the land, a description of the forest growth upon the land,
a description of forest management activities recommended to be undertaken to maintain the land in a state
of proper forest condition and such other information as
the State Forester may require . . . .” General Statutes
§ 12-107d (g). According to regulations promulgated by
the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection
(department), the certified forester’s report also must
Campelli v. Mansfield
include “the total acreage for each . . . component lot” proposed for forest land classification and “the total number
of acres that the qualified forester determines conform[s]
to the standards for forest land classification . . . .”
Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 12-107d-4 (a) (3) and (4).3
After obtaining a report from a certified forester, the
property owner “may apply for its classification as forest land on any grand list of a municipality by filing a
written application for such classification accompanied
by a copy of the certified forester’s report . . . with the
assessor thereof not earlier than thirty days before or
later than thirty days after the assessment date and,
if the assessor determines that the use of such land as
forest land has not changed as of a date at or prior to the
assessment date such assessor shall classify such land as
forest land and include it as such on the grand list . . . .” General Statutes § 12-107d (f).
The municipality within which the proposed forest land
is located or the owner of the proposed forest land “may
appeal to the State Forester for a review of the findings of
the certified forester as issued in the certified forester’s
report.” General Statutes § 12-107d (i). In particular,
the municipality “may appeal . . . (i) the total number of
acres . . . determined to satisfy the standards for forest
land classification . . . or (ii) the qualified forester’s delineation of the land determined to satisfy the standards
for forest land classification . . . or any changes in land
previously classified as forest land.” Regs., Conn. State
Agencies § 12-107d-4 (f) (2). The appeal “shall be filed
with the State Forester not later than thirty business
days after the issuance of the report and shall be brought
by petition in writing. The State Forester shall review
the report of the certified forester and any information
the certified forester relied upon in developing his or
her findings and may gather additional information at
his or her discretion. The State Forester shall render
3
The department oversees the state forester and promulgates regulations governing forest land classifications. See General Statutes §§ 12-107a through 12-107g; General Statutes §§ 23-65f through 23-65q; see also Regs., Conn. State Agencies §12-107d-1 through 12-107d-5.
Campelli v. Mansfield
the results of his or her review of the certified forester’s
report not later than sixty calendar days after the appeal
was filed.” General Statutes § 12-107d (i).
The statutory scheme does not provide either the
municipality or the property owner with a right of appeal
from the ultimate decision of the state forester, although
a property owner “aggrieved by the denial of any application to the assessor of a municipality for classification of
land as forest land [has] the same rights and remedies for
appeal and relief as are provided in the general statutes
for taxpayers claiming to be aggrieved by the doings of
assessors or boards of assessment appeals.” General Statutes § 12-107d (j). These remedies include a tax appeal to
the Superior Court. See General Statutes § 12-117a (a) (1)
(“[a]ny person . . . claiming to be aggrieved by the action
of the board of tax review or the board of assessment
appeals, as the case may be, in any town or city may make
application, not later than two months after the date of
the mailing of notice of such action, in the nature of an
appeal therefrom to the superior court for the judicial
district in which such town or city is situated”).
Once granted, forest land classifications “shall be
deemed personal to the particular owner who requests
and receives such classification and shall not run with
the land. Any such land which has been classified by a
record owner shall remain so classified without the filing
of any new application subsequent to such classification
. . . until either of the following shall occur: (1) The use
of such land is changed to a use other than that described
in the application for the existing classification by said
record owner, or (2) such land is sold or transferred by
said record owner.” General Statutes § 12-504h. If land
classified as forest land is sold or transferred, the classification “shall cease as of the date of sale or transfer.”
General Statutes § 12-504h. If the use of land classified
as forest land changes, the classification “shall cease”;
General Statutes § 12-504h; as of “the date on which the
use of such property is changed, or the date on which
the assessor becomes aware of a change in use of such
Campelli v. Mansfield
property, whichever occurs first.” General Statutes
§ 12-504e (2). “Upon termination of classification as
forest land, the assessor of the municipality in which
the land is located shall issue a notice of cancellation and
provide a copy of such notice to the owner of the land and
to the office of the assessor of any other municipality
in which the owner’s land is classified as forest land.”
General Statutes § 12-107d (e).
III
DISCUSSION
Whether the defendant’s assessor had the statutory
authority to terminate the forest land classification of the
Hickory Lane property is an issue of statutory construction subject to plenary review. See, e.g., Carmel Hollow
Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem, supra, 269
Conn. 129. To ascertain the meaning of the statutes at
issue, we apply the principles set forth in General Statutes § 1-2z. Our analysis also is informed by the tools of
statutory construction applicable to tax appeals. As we
previously have explained, “[w]hen a taxing statute is
being considered, ambiguities are resolved in favor of
the taxpayer.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Torrington Water Co. v. Board of Tax Review, 168 Conn.
319, 324, 362 A.2d 866 (1975). The statutes governing
forest land classifications are taxing statutes, and any
ambiguity found therein must be resolved in favor of the
taxpayer. See id.; see also Rolling Hills Country Club,
Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, 168 Conn. 466, 473, 363
A.2d 61 (1975).
A
General Statutes § 12-504h
We first address whether the defendant’s assessor had
the authority to terminate the forest land classification
of the Hickory Lane property under § 12-504h on the
ground that, in light of the sale of the 14.05 acre Tolland
parcel, “such land [was] sold or transferred by said record
owner.” General Statutes § 12-504h (2). The issue is easily
resolved on this record because the defendant does not
Campelli v. Mansfield
dispute that the Hickory Lane property was classified
as forest land under § 12-107b (2) (A) as a single twentyfive acre tract that conformed to the relevant standards,
independent of the 14.05 acre Tolland parcel. It necessarily follows that the sale of the Tolland parcel had no
effect on the forest land classification of the Hickory
Lane property.
Section 12-504h4 provides in relevant part that land
classified as “forest land pursuant to section 12-107d . . .
shall remain so classified without the filing of any new
application subsequent to such classification . . . until
either of the following shall occur: (1) The use of such
land is changed to a use other than that described in the
application for the existing classification by said record
owner, or (2) such land is sold or transferred by said
record owner. . . .” (Emphasis added.) The term “such
land” is not defined in § 12-504h, and, therefore, we
must consult its commonly approved usage. See General
Statutes § 1-1 (a). “The word such has been construed as
an adjective referring back to and identifying something
previously spoken of; the word naturally, by grammatical usage, refers to the last antecedent. . . . The accepted
dictionary definitions of such include having a quality already or just specified, previously characterized
or specified, and aforementioned.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Lackman v. McAnulty, 324 Conn. 277,
4
Section 12-504h “is contained in chapter 223 of the General Statutes, entitled ‘Real Estate Conveyance Tax’ ”; Carmel Hollow Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem, supra, 269 Conn. 140; which “pertain[s] to the imposition of an additional real estate conveyance tax on property classified as farm land, forest land . . . open space land [or maritime heritage land] that has been sold or changes in use within a period of ten years from the acquisition of title to such property.” Id., 140 n.24. In Carmel Hollow, we noted that, “although § 12-504h is part of the real estate conveyance tax scheme, there is nothing in its language to suggest that it does not apply to the termination of a classification for the purpose of property tax assessments . . . .” Id., 140–41. “Moreover, it would make no sense to construe § 12-504h as requiring the termination of a classification for the purpose of imposing a real estate conveyance tax, but not for the purpose of revaluing property on the grand list of a municipality.” Id., 141. Accordingly, § 12-504h applies to the termination of forest land classifications for municipal property tax purposes.
Campelli v. Mansfield
287, 151 A.3d 1271 (2016); see also L. H.-S. v. N. B., 341
Conn. 483, 493, 267 A.3d 178 (2021) (“the phrase ‘such
person’ . . . [typically] modifies or refers to the phrase
immediately preceding it in the statute”); LaProvidenza
v. State Employees’ Retirement Commission, 178 Conn.
23, 27–28, 420 A.2d 905 (1979) (“the phrase ‘such allowance’ ” meant prior statutory reference to “a retirement
allowance based [on] a ‘permanent and total disability’ ”).
The term “such land” in § 12-504h (2) plainly and unambiguously refers back to the land previously specified
in the statute, i.e., the land described in the property
owner’s application for forest land classification.
In the present case, the defendant acknowledges that
the only land described in the plaintiffs’ application for
classification of the Hickory Lane property as forest land
was the Hickory Lane property itself.5 Thus, it is undisputed that the plaintiffs sought and obtained the forest
land classification of the Hickory Lane property under
§ 12-107b (2) (A) as “one tract of land of twenty-five or
more contiguous acres,” independent of the 14.05 acre
5
The application form for forest land classification submitted to the defendant’s assessor asks whether the property owner has “land classified as forest land in any other Connecticut town” and, if so, provides a space for the “name of [the] other town(s) . . . .” The plaintiffs responded “[y]es” and listed the name of the town as “Tolland.” It is unclear from the record whether the Tolland parcel referenced in the plaintiffs’ application is the same 14.05 acre Tolland parcel that the plaintiffs sold in December 2021. The defendant’s appellate counsel informed this court during oral argument, however, that the 14.05 acre Tolland parcel was purchased after the plaintiffs sought and obtained the forest land classification of the Hickory lane property in 2005. Likewise, the plaintiffs represented in their posttrial brief in the trial court that the 14.05 acre Tolland parcel “had no bearing whatsoever [on their] acquiring and securing the forest land classification” of the Hickory Lane property and that it was the Hickory Lane property that subsequently was used “to acquire the forest land classification for the Tolland parcel.” Thus, it is undisputed that approval of the plaintiffs’ application by the defendant’s assessor was not dependent on the Tolland parcel, and the record supports the parties’ position: the application lists the “[t]otal acreage” of the Hickory Lane property as “25.0” acres, the “[p]ortion qualified as forest land by [the] [c]ertified [f]orester” as “25.0” acres, and the “[a]creage [c]lassified” as forest land by the defendant’s assessor as “25.”
Campelli v. Mansfield
Tolland parcel. (Emphasis added.) Because the classification of the Hickory Lane property as forest land was
not dependent on the 14.05 acre Tolland parcel, and the
Hickory Lane property was not sold or transferred, and
its use has not changed to a use other than that described
in the plaintiffs’ application for forest land classification, the sale of the 14.05 acre Tolland parcel did not authorize
the declassification of the Hickory Lane property under
§ 12-504h.
B
General Statutes § 12-107d
We next address whether the defendant’s assessor
had the authority to terminate the Hickory Lane property’s forest land classification under § 12-107d (f), which
provides in relevant part that “[a]n owner of land may
apply for its classification as forest land on any grand
list of a municipality by filing a written application for
such classification accompanied by a copy of the certified forester’s report described in subsection (g) of this
section with the assessor thereof . . . and, if the assessor
determines that the use of such land as forest land has
not changed as of a date at or prior to the assessment date
such assessor shall classify such land as forest land and
include it as such on the grand list . . . .” Although the
defendant’s argument is not entirely clear, the defendant appears to contend that § 12-107d (f) granted its
assessor the authority to terminate the Hickory Lane
property’s forest land classification on the ground that
the classification was erroneous from inception because
the Hickory Lane property was less than twenty-five
acres. In ascertaining whether § 12-107d (f) granted the
defendant’s assessor such authority, “we do not write
on a clean slate, but are bound by our previous judicial
interpretations of this language and the purpose of the
statute.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 312 Conn. 513, 527, 93 A.3d 1142 (2014).
In Carmel Hollow, we addressed the authority of municipal assessors to terminate forest land classifications
Campelli v. Mansfield
under a prior version of § 12-107d. See Carmel Hollow
Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem, supra, 269
Conn. 122–23 and n.2; see also General Statutes (Rev. to
2003) § 12-107d. In light of the text and declared purpose
of the statutory scheme “to encourage the preservation
of property designated as . . . forest land . . . by ensuring against the conversion of such land to more intensive uses
as the result of higher property tax assessments”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Carmel Hollow Associates
Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem, supra, 131; this court
concluded that municipal assessors lack the statutory
authority to declassify property previously designated as
forest land.6 See id., 130, 134–35. Of critical importance
to our analysis was subsection (c) of General Statutes
(Rev. to 2003) § 12-107d, now codified at subsection (f),
providing that a municipal assessor “ ‘shall classify such
land as forest land’ ” if it has been designated as forest
land by the state forester. (Emphasis in original.) Id.,
132, quoting General Statutes (Rev. to 2003) § 12-107d
(c). We reasoned that, because the statute “provides
that an assessor ‘shall’ approve an application for the
classification of property as forest land if the property
has been so designated, and because there is no other
provision that gives an assessor discretionary authority
to deny such an application, the only reasonable construction of the statutory scheme is that an assessor
who believes that the use of the land has changed must
6
In Carmel Hollow, we noted that “[t]he terms ‘designation’ and ‘classification,’ as used in the [former] statutory scheme, refer to specific actions of the state forester and town assessors, respectively. The ‘designation’ of property as forest land requires the property owner to file a written application seeking the designation and a determination by the state forester that the property is so qualified. The ‘classification’ of designated property as forest land on the grand list of a municipality requires the property owner to file an application with the town assessor to obtain the preferential tax treatment afforded to such classified property.” Carmel Hollow Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Bethlehem, supra, 269 Conn. 131–32 n.17. The distinction between the “designation” and “classification” of property as forest land was eliminated by No. 04-115, § 3, of the 2004 Public Acts, and the current version of § 12-107d now refers only to forest land classifications. See generally General Statutes § 12-107d.
Campelli v. Mansfield
request a reexamination of the forest land designation”
by the state forester. (Emphasis in original.) Id., 134.
This court further reasoned that “it would defy common
sense to grant discretionary authority to assessors to
deny such applications because assessors may be motivated by local financial considerations that are at odds
with the underlying purpose of the statutory scheme to
conserve the state’s natural resources.” Id., 134–35.
The court therefore held that municipal assessors lack
the statutory authority to terminate forest land classifications. See id., 137.
In arriving at this conclusion, the court in Carmel
Hollow specifically rejected the claim that municipal
assessors may terminate forest land classifications if “the
state forester had no legal authority to designate the . .
. property as forest land” in the first place because “the
property did not meet the statutory criteria for designation as forest land” and because the property owner
“provided inaccurate and misleading information in its
application to designate the property as forest land.”
Id., 145. We stated that the state forester’s authority
to designate property as forest land “ha[d] no bearing
on the issue of whether the assessor had the requisite
authority” to terminate a forest land designation. Id.
“Moreover, claims regarding the erroneous designation of property as forest land must be directed to the
state forester, or to the Superior Court, pursuant to the
express provisions of [General Statutes (Rev. to 2003)]
§ 12-107d (f), which authorize the landowner or municipality to appeal to the Superior Court from the state
forester’s approval or disapproval of an application to
designate property as forest land within thirty days of
such decision.” (Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.)
Id., 145–46. In other words, municipal assessors lack
the statutory authority to terminate forest land classifications, even if the forester’s designations were, and
always have been, erroneous.
One month before the release of this court’s decision
in Carmel Hollow, the legislature enacted No. 04-115
Campelli v. Mansfield
of the 2004 Public Acts (P.A. 04-115), entitled “An
Act Concerning Forestry Management,” which made
substantial changes to § 12-107d. See P.A. 04-115, § 3.
Although the defendant in the present case does not
address the significance of these statutory amendments
(or our decision in Carmel Hollow), the department submitted an amicus brief in support of the defendant, in
which it argues that Carmel Hollow no longer is good
law in light of P.A. 04-115. The department argues that,
under the current version of § 12-107d, the defendant’s
assessor possessed the statutory authority to terminate
the forest land classification of the Hickory Lane property. We disagree.
The most significant change implemented by the 2004
amendment was the creation of a system of certified
foresters, who are private practitioners certified by the
Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection as foresters pursuant to the requirements set forth
in General Statutes § 23-65h. See P.A. 04-115, § 2; see
also General Statutes § 12-107b (7). Consistent with this
change, the legislature amended § 12-107d to provide
that a certified forester, rather than the state forester,
“may evaluate land proposed for classification as forest
land and attest to the qualifications of such land for classification as forest land, provided such certified forester
has satisfactorily completed training by and obtained
a certificate from the State Forester or his or her designee related to policies and standards for evaluating
land proposed for classification as forest land and, in
the opinion of the State Forester, the certified forester
acts in conformance with such policies and standards.”
P.A. 04-115, § 3, codified at General Statutes § 12-107d
(b). Under § 12-107d, as amended, it is now a certified
forester who evaluates land and determines whether
it meets the statutory and regulatory requirements to
qualify as forest land under General Statutes §§ 12-107b
(2) and 12-107d, and §§ 12-107d-1 through 12-107d-4 of
the regulations.
Two other statutory changes warrant mention. First,
P.A. 04-115 amended § 12-107d to provide municipal
assessors with the discretion to deny an application for
Campelli v. Mansfield
forest land classification if “the assessor determines that
the use of such land as forest land has . . . changed as of
a date at or prior to the assessment date . . . .” (Emphasis
added.) P.A. 04-115, § 3, codified at General Statutes
§ 12-107d (f). In all other circumstances, however, the
municipal assessor “shall classify such land as forest land
and include it as such on the grand list . . . .” (Emphasis
added.) P.A. 04-115, § 3, codified at General Statutes
§ 12-107d (f). Second, P.A. 04-115, § 3, deleted the statutory provision that provided the municipality and the
property owner with a right to appeal to the Superior
Court. Instead, § 12-107d (i), as amended by P.A. 04-115,
§ 3, now provides that, if the municipality or the property owner disagrees with “the findings of the certified
forester as issued in the certified forester’s report,” the
party must appeal in writing to the state forester “not
later than thirty business days after the issuance of the
report . . . .” The state forester “shall render the results
of his or her review of the certified forester’s report not
later than sixty calendar days after the appeal was filed.”
General Statutes § 12-107d (i). Neither the municipality nor the property owner has a right to appeal from
the decision of the state forester, as they did under the
prior version of the statute, but P.A. 04-115 left intact
the portion of § 12-107d providing “[a]n owner of land
aggrieved by the denial of any application to the assessor
of a municipality for classification of land as forest land
[with] . . . the same rights and remedies for appeal and
relief as are provided in the general statutes for taxpayers claiming to be aggrieved by the doings of assessors
or boards of assessment appeals.” P.A. 04-115, § 3, codified at General Statutes § 12-107d (j); see also General
Statutes § 12-117a (a) (1).
On the basis of these statutory changes, we conclude
that, unlike the former version of § 12-107d analyzed in
Carmel Hollow, the current version of the statute plainly
allows a municipal assessor to deny an application for the
classification of property as forest land “if the assessor
determines that the use of the land has changed prior
to the assessment date.” Imperial Development, LLC
v. Coventry, Superior Court, judicial district of New
Campelli v. Mansfield
Britain, Docket No. HHB-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (April 1,
2016) (62 Conn. L. Rptr. 30, 31–32); see General Statutes
§ 12-107d (f). It does not, however, vest municipal assessors with the discretionary authority to deny, change,
or terminate forest land classifications if they disagree
with the certified forester’s findings as to whether a
property’s total number of acres satisfies the statutory
definition of forest land under § 12-107b (2), even if
those findings were erroneous at the time of the initial
application. Under the plain language of the statutory
scheme, municipal assessors who dispute the certified
forester’s findings as to forest land acreage “shall classify such land as forest land and include it as such on the
grand list”; General Statutes § 12-107d (f); unless they
successfully “appeal to the State Forester for a review
of the findings of the certified forester as issued in the
certified forester’s report.” General Statutes § 12-107d
(i). No such appeal was filed by the defendant’s assessor
in the present case.
Because the state forester is vested with the exclusive
statutory authority to correct errors in the certified
forester’s findings regarding “the total number of acres
. . . determined to satisfy the standards for forest land
classification”; Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 12-107d-4
(f) (2) (i); we conclude that the defendant’s assessor lacked the authority under § 12-107d (f) to terminate the forest
land classification of the Hickory Lane property.
C
General Statutes § 12-55
Lastly, the defendant claims that its assessor had the
statutory authority to terminate the forest land classification of the Hickory Lane property under § 12-55
(b), which requires municipal assessors to “equalize the
assessments of property in the town, if necessary, and
[to] make any assessment omitted by mistake or required
by law.” The defendant’s claim is foreclosed by Griswold
Airport, Inc. v. Madison, 289 Conn. 723, 729 n.10, 961
A.2d 338 (2008), in which this court held that § 12-55 (b)
Campelli v. Mansfield
does not grant municipal assessors the statutory authority to terminate property tax classifications.
In Griswold Airport, Inc., the town of Madison claimed
that § 12-55 (b) granted its assessor the authority to
declassify land classified as open space land pursuant to
General Statutes (Rev. to 2003) § 12-107e, even though
the assessor lacked the authority to terminate the open
space land classification under General Statutes (Rev.
to 2003) § 12-504h. See id., 725–26, 729 and n.10. We
rejected the town’s claim on the ground that, although
Ҥ 12-55 imports a watchtower role for the assessor to
correct inequalities, whether too high or too low,” it
does not “[authorize] an assessor to remove an open space
classification preliminar[ily] to exercising this role . . . . Rather, the authority to declassify open space clearly is
conferred by § 12-504h only. It is a [well settled] principle of [statutory] construction that specific terms covering [a] given subject matter will prevail over general
language of . . . another statute which might otherwise
prove controlling.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 729 n.10.
In accordance with Griswold Airport, Inc.,7 we conclude that the defendant’s assessor lacked the statutory
authority to terminate the forest land classification of
the Hickory Lane property under § 12-55 (b). Similar to
open space land classifications, forest land classifications
7
During oral argument before this court, the defendant’s appellate counsel claimed that Griswold Airport, Inc., was distinguishable because it addressed a municipal assessor’s authority to “equalize the assessments of property in the town” under § 12-55 (b), rather than a municipal assessor’s authority to “make any assessment omitted by mistake . . . .” General Statutes § 12-55 (b). This distinction misses the point. Regardless of whether a municipal assessor seeks to equalize assessments, to correct an assessment omitted by mistake, or to impose an assessment required by law, § 12-55 (b) is a statute of general applicability that yields to the specific terms governing the termination of a forest land classification in § 12-107d or § 12-504h. Because § 12-55 (b) does not authorize a municipal assessor to terminate a forest land classification prior to exercising its watchtower role, the defendant’s reliance on § 12-55 (b) is misplaced. See Griswold Airport, Inc. v. Madison, supra, 289 Conn. 729 n.10.
Campelli v. Mansfield
specifically are governed by §§ 12-107d and 12-504h,
neither of which authorized the defendant’s assessor to
terminate the forest land classification of the Hickory
Lane property on the ground that the certified forester
erroneously calculated the number of conforming forest
land acres. See part III A and B of this opinion. Because
the specific statutes governing the classification and
declassification of forest land do not permit municipal
assessors to correct forest land classifications on this
basis, we conclude that § 12-55 (b) is inapplicable.
IV
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the defendant’s assessor lacked the
statutory authority to terminate the forest land classification of the Hickory Lane property. We arrive at
this conclusion without expressing an opinion concerning whether public policy supports granting municipal
assessors the statutory authority to terminate erroneous forest land classifications. To the extent that it is
incongruous to grant municipal assessors the statutory
authority to terminate forest land classifications if there
has been a change in the use of the classified property or
upon its sale or transfer; see General Statutes § 12-504h;
but not if the forest land classification erroneously was
granted in the first place on the basis of an accident, mistake, or omission, that is an issue that must be addressed
by the legislature. “It is not the province of this court,
under the guise of statutory interpretation, to legislate
. . . a [particular] policy, even if we were to agree . . . that it is a better policy than the one endorsed by the legislature as reflected in its statutory language.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Trinity Christian School v.
Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 329
Conn. 684, 697–98, 189 A.3d 79 (2018); see also Mozzochi v. Glastonbury, 188 Conn. 276, 279, 449 A.2d 173
(1982) (“[i]t is not the function of courts to read into
clearly expressed legislation provisions [that] do not
find expression in its words” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). “It is the legislature’s prerogative to address
Campelli v. Mansfield
and remedy any perceived inconsistency” in the statutory
scheme. PPC Realty, LLC v. Hartford, 350 Conn. 347,
361, 324 A.3d 780 (2024).
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court properly
sustained the plaintiff’s appeal from the decision of the
board of assessment appeals and ordered the defendant’s
assessor to reinstate the forest land classification of the
Hickory Lane property.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.