COURT OF CHANCERY
OF THE
STATE OF DELAWARE
LORI W. WILL LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
VICE CHANCELLOR 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734
July 21, 2026
Sean J. Bellew, Esquire Scott B. Czerwonka, Esquire
Bellew LLC Wilks Law, LLC
2961 Centerville Road, Suite 302 4250 Lancaster Pike, Suite 200
Wilmington, Delaware 19808 Wilmington, Delaware 19805
RE: Quentin Bichon v. Sharding Capital Management, LLC et al.,
C.A. No. 2025-1310-LWW
Dear Counsel:
This letter opinion addresses the defendants’ motion to dismiss in favor of
arbitration. Intervening events mooted the plaintiff’s primary claims, leaving only
a request for attorneys’ fees under a contractual fee-shifting provision. Because the
operative contract reflects the parties’ clear and unmistakable intent to delegate
substantive arbitrability to an arbitrator, I decline to exercise jurisdiction over the
remaining fee dispute. The motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the Complaint for Breach of Contract (the
“Complaint”) and documents incorporated by reference. 1
1
Compl. for Breach of Contract (Dkt. 1) (“Compl.”); see Freedman v. Adams, 2012 WL 1345638, at *5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2012) (“When a plaintiff expressly refers to C.A. No. 2025-1310-LWW
July 21, 2026
Page 2 of 9
A. The Sale
On September 3, 2025, plaintiff Quentin Bichon and defendants Sharding
Capital Management, LLC and Sharding Capital I (together, “Sharding”) entered
into an Amended and Restated Purchase Agreement (the “Purchase Agreement”). 2
Under the Purchase Agreement, Bichon agreed to purchase 22,115 shares of
Securitize, Inc. Series A preferred stock from Sharding. 3
Section 7 of the Purchase Agreement mandates that “[a]ll controversies
arising [t]hereunder shall be resolved by binding arbitration” conducted by JAMS,
where available.4 This provision includes a carveout for the parties to “seek
injunctive relief in any other court of law of competent jurisdiction.” 5 Section 8.10
entitles the “prevailing party” in any legal proceeding to recover reasonable
attorneys’ fees.6
and heavily relies upon documents in her complaint, these documents are considered to be incorporated by reference into the complaint.”), aff’d, 58 A.3d 414 (Del. 2013). 2
Compl. ¶ 7; see Compl. Ex. A (“Purchase Agreement”).
3
Compl. ¶ 8. The aggregate purchase price was $331,725. Id.
4
Purchase Agreement § 7.
5
Id.
6
Id. § 8.10.
C.A. No. 2025-1310-LWW
July 21, 2026
Page 3 of 9
A dispute later arose over the transfer of the Securitize shares, which Bichon
asserts Sharding improperly canceled. 7
B. This Litigation
Bichon filed this lawsuit on November 12, 2025, advancing claims for breach
of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 8 He
sought specific performance of Sharding’s obligations under the Purchase
Agreement and attorneys’ fees.9
On December 4, 2025, Sharding moved to dismiss the Complaint under Court
of Chancery Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 10 Briefing
ensued.11 In his answering brief, Bichon explained that Sharding had “provided the
equitable relief that [he] was seeking” by transferring the disputed Securitize
shares.12 He acknowledged that this development “moot[ed] much of the
7
Compl. ¶¶ 11-14.
8
Id. ¶¶ 20-31.
9
Id. at 8.
10
Dkt. 4.
11
Defs.’ Opening Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. 5) (“Defs.’ Opening Br.”); Pl.’s Answering Br. in Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. 10) (“Pl.’s Answering Br.”); Defs.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. 11) (“Defs.’ Reply Br.”).
12
Pl.’s Answering Br. 1.
C.A. No. 2025-1310-LWW
July 21, 2026
Page 4 of 9
Complaint,” leaving only his request for attorneys’ fees. 13 I took the fee request
under advisement on the papers.14
II. ANALYSIS
Sharding moved to dismiss the Complaint under Court of Chancery
Rule 12(b)(1) in favor of arbitration.15 Although the analysis proceeds under
Rule 12(b)(1), the court is not necessarily divested of subject matter jurisdiction
where an enforceable arbitration exists.16 Instead, the court abstains from exercising
its jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ contract. 17 A motion to dismiss under
13
Id.
14
Dkt. 14.
15
Ct. Ch. R. 12(b)(1).
16
Gandhi-Kapoor v. Hone Cap. LLC, 307 A.3d 328, 340-44 (Del. Ch. 2023), aff’d sub nom. CSC Upshot Ventures I, L.P. v. Gandhi-Kapoor, 326 A.3d 369 (Del. 2024) (TABLE). See id. at 344 (stating that the court “decline[s] to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction 17
when parties have agreed to an otherwise enforceable arbitration provision”). C.A. No. 2025-1310-LWW
July 21, 2026
Page 5 of 9
Rule 12(b)(1) will be granted where “the dispute is one that, on its face, falls within
the arbitration clause of [a] contract.”18
The parties agree that intervening events mooted the primary claims in the
Complaint.19 Only Bichon’s request for attorneys’ fees remains to be resolved.20
Before assessing the merits of the fee request, I must first consider who has the
authority to decide its arbitrability: this court, or an arbitrator. I conclude that the
arbitration clause in the Purchase Agreement clearly and unmistakably delegates this
gating question to the arbitrator.
A. Substantive Arbitrability
“[T]he question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, commonly referred
to as ‘substantive arbitrability,’ is generally one for the court” to decide. 21 “There is
an exception, however, when there is ‘clear and unmistakable evidence’ that the
18
NAMA Hldgs., LLC v. Related World Mkt. Ctr., LLC, 922 A.2d 417, 429 (Del. Ch. 2007) (citation omitted).
19
Pl.’s Answering Br. 1, 8 (explaining that Sharding’s “agree[ment] to sell 22,115 shares of Series A preferred stock in Securitize . . . moots much of the Complaint,” including the plaintiff’s “claim for specific performance”); Defs.’ Reply Br. 1 (stating that, due to “recent actions by a non-party to th[e] action, . . . the relief sought by the Complaint . . . has been mooted”).
20
Pl.’s Answering Br. 5-10 (“[T]he only remaining issue is [the] [p]laintiff’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses under the express language of the Purchase Agreement.”).
21
SBC Interactive, Inc. v. Corp. Media P’rs, 714 A.2d 758, 761 (Del. 1998). C.A. No. 2025-1310-LWW
July 21, 2026
Page 6 of 9
parties intended otherwise.”22 Such evidence exists where an arbitration provision
“(1) generally refers all disputes to arbitration and (2) references a set of arbitral
rules that empowers arbitrators to decide arbitrability.” 23
Although the prongs of the Willie Gary test are recited in this order, the
mechanics of the test require the court to analyze the arbitral rules first. 24 The
incorporation of rules empowering an arbitrator to decide jurisdiction creates a
“heavy presumption that the parties intended to delegate substantive arbitrability.” 25
Once that presumption is established, the court must determine whether the
agreement’s carveouts and exceptions, if any, are “so obviously broad and
substantial” as to overcome it.26
Section 7 of the Purchase Agreement states, in relevant part, that “[a]ll
controversies arising hereunder shall be resolved by binding arbitration in the City
and County of San Francisco, California, conducted by JAMS if available, or by an
22
James & Jackson, LLC v. Willie Gary, LLC, 906 A.2d 76, 78 (Del. 2006) (citation omitted).
23
Lefkowitz v. HWF Hldgs., LLC, 2009 WL 3806299, at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2009); see Willie Gary, 906 A.2d at 80.
24
See BuzzFeed Media Enters., Inc. v. Anderson, 2024 WL 2187054, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 15, 2024).
25
Id.
26
McLaughlin v. McCann, 942 A.2d 616, 625 (Del. Ch. 2008).
C.A. No. 2025-1310-LWW
July 21, 2026
Page 7 of 9
alternate arbitration service of comparable reputation.” 27 It clarifies that “nothing in
th[e] [Purchase] Agreement shall be deemed to limit the Parties’ rights to seek
injunctive relief in any other court of law of competent jurisdiction.” 28 Despite this
carveout, Section 7 provides “clear and unmistakable evidence” of an intent to
delegate for two reasons.29
First, the Purchase Agreement identifies a set of arbitral rules to be applied.
By selecting JAMS, the parties “incorporate[d] the rules of an arbitral tribunal that
empower an arbitrator to determine questions of substantive arbitrability.” 30
Proceedings before JAMS are governed by the JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration
Rules & Procedures, which grant the arbitrator “the authority to determine
jurisdiction and arbitrability issues as a preliminary matter.” 31
27
Purchase Agreement § 7.
28
Id.
29
Willie Gary, 906 A.2d at 78.
30
Fairstead Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Blodgett, 288 A.3d 729, 757-58 (Del. Ch. 2023). 31
JAMS Comprehensive Arb. Rules & Procedures, Rule 11(b) (2021). That the selection of JAMS is conditional upon its availability does not defeat the heavy presumption of delegation. Rather, the primary invocation of a specific arbitral body and its jurisdictional rules is sufficient to demonstrate the parties’ intent. Cf. Fairstead, 288 A.3d at 757-58 (explaining that the primary invocation of JAMS and its comprehensive rules sufficiently empowered the arbitrator to determine substantive arbitrability).
C.A. No. 2025-1310-LWW
July 21, 2026
Page 8 of 9
Second, Section 7 “generally provides for arbitration of all disputes.”32 The
sole exception is a request for “injunctive relief[,]” which a party may pursue in a
“court of law of competent jurisdiction.” 33 Delaware courts evaluate this delegation
broadly in favor of arbitration; they do not require an arbitration clause to “refer all
disputes to arbitration without exception.”34 This prong of the Willie Gary test is
satisfied so long as any exclusions are not “so obviously broad and substantial as to
overcome [the] heavy presumption” of delegation. 35
Thus, both prongs of the Willie Gary test are met. Section 7 of the Purchase
Agreement conveys clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to submit
questions of substantive arbitrability to the arbitrator.
B. The Remaining Dispute
Because Bichon’s substantive claims are moot, the sole remaining issue is his
request for attorneys’ fees under Section 8.10 of the Purchase Agreement.36 Bichon
invokes the cleanup doctrine, arguing that because he initially sought injunctive
32
Willie Gary, 906 A.2d at 80.
33
Purchase Agreement § 7.
34
McLaughlin, 942 A.2d at 623-24.
35
Id. at 625 (“In a case where there is any rational basis for doubt about that, the court should defer to arbitration, leaving the arbitrator to determine what is or is not before her.”). 36
See Pl.’s Answering Br. 5-10; Purchase Agreement § 8.10.
C.A. No. 2025-1310-LWW
July 21, 2026
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relief, the court should retain jurisdiction to award fees.37 As established above,
however, the parties clearly and unmistakably delegated questions of substantive
arbitrability to the arbitrator. I therefore decline to exercise jurisdiction over the fee
dispute.38 The arbitrator must resolve the threshold issue of arbitrability and, if
arbitrable, whether fee-shifting is appropriate.
III. CONCLUSION
Sharding’s motion to dismiss is granted. Because the parties clearly and
unmistakably delegated substantive arbitrability to the arbitrator, I decline to
exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Bichon’s fee request. The Complaint is
dismissed without prejudice under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(1). IT IS SO
ORDERED.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Lori W. Will
Lori W. Will
Vice Chancellor
37
See Pl.’s Answering Br. 8-10.
38
See Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. 63, 68 (2019) (“When the parties’ contract delegates the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, a court may not override the contract. In those circumstances, a court possesses no power to decide the arbitrability issue.”).