IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2024-CA-00385-COA
IN THE INTEREST OF T.L., A MINOR, T.L., A APPELLANT MINOR, T.L., A MINOR, T.L., A MINOR:
JESSICA L.
v.
FORREST COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF THE APPELLEES MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CHILD
PROTECTION SERVICES, BY ANDREA A.
SANDERS AND T.L., T.L., T.L., AND T.L.,
MINORS, BY AND THROUGH THEIR NEXT
FRIEND, ANDREA A. SANDERS AND
MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CHILD
PROTECTION SERVICES
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/13/2024
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. CAROL JONES RUSSELL
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: FORREST COUNTY YOUTH COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JENNA DARLENE HOLMES
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: KRISTI DUNCAN KENNEDY
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 07/21/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE BARNES, C.J., LAWRENCE AND EMFINGER, JJ.
BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Jessica L. appeals the Forrest County Youth Court’s judgment terminating her
parental rights to four of her seven children. Jessica claims that the youth court erred in
finding the Forrest County Department of Child Protection Services (CPS) made reasonable
efforts to reunify the four children with her. Additionally, she argues her counsel was
ineffective at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. We find no merit to these arguments and affirm.
¶2. Jessica’s four children at issue in this appeal are, in chronological order: TL2,1 a
female child born in July 2017; TL1 and TL3, twin male children born in August 2018; and
TL4, a female child born in March 2020.2 Jordan is the putative father of TL1, TL3 and
TL4. Taylor is the putative father of TL2.3
Procedural History
¶3. In May 2019, Forrest County CPS received a report of suspected abuse of TL1 after
a hospital visit. Upon investigation, CPS also became concerned about dangerous sleeping
conditions for TL2 and TL3. On November 26, 2019, the Forrest County Youth Court
removed TL1, TL2, and TL34 from Jessica’s custody and placed them in the custody of
Forrest County CPS. The youth court removed TL1 from Jessica’s home due to physical
neglect with unexplained, non-accidental physical injuries. TL2 and TL3 were removed
because the children’s home environment posed an immediate danger to the children. At
the time, the twins (TL1 and TL3) were approximately eighteen months old, and TL2 was
1
We shall use the same initials as in the Appellees’ brief and transcript of the termination of parental rights hearing to prevent confusion and protect the minors’ identities.
2
Jessica has a total of seven children, three of whom are not a part of this appeal. TK5 and TK6 were Jessica’s first children: a female child born in June 2013 and a male child born in August 2015, respectively. Those two children also had a history of custody with CPS but were released back to Jessica’s custody in April 2022. TK7 is Jessica’s youngest child, a female born in September 2021. TK7 has never been in CPS custody.
3
We use fictitious names of the putative fathers and foster parents to protect the children’s privacy. There is also an “unknown putative father” listed for the four children.
4
TL4 was not yet born.
2
approximately two years old. At this time, Jessica entered into a family service plan with
CPS, which required her to complete several goals and tasks to improve her abilities as a
parent, with the ultimate goal being reunification with her children. In March 2020, TL4
was born in Jones County, where Jessica had recently moved.
¶4. On April 14, 2020, after a hearing, the Forrest County Youth Court entered an
adjudication order finding TL1, TL2, and TL3 were neglected children.5 The parties did not
dispute the veracity of the allegations in the petition. The youth court ordered a permanency
plan of “Reunification with a Parent or Primary Caretaker” and a concurrent plan of
“Durable Legal Custody or Legal Guardianship.” The youth court entered a disposition
order the same day, placing each of the three children in the custody of CPS.
¶5. In September 2020, the Jones County Youth Court held a shelter hearing for TL4
after CPS received allegations of neglect. The youth court removed her from Jessica’s
custody, placing her in the custody of the Jones County CPS. TL4 was approximately five
months old. In October 2020, a disposition hearing was held for TL4, after which the youth
court ordered a permanency plan of “Reunification with a Parent or Primary Caretaker” and
a concurrent plan of “Custody with a Relative.” The Jones County Youth Court transferred
TL4’s case to the Forrest County Youth Court and custody of TL4 to the Forrest County
CPS because Forrest County had jurisdiction over her siblings.
¶6. Through 2020 and 2021, review and permanency hearings occurred on a regular
basis, and orders were entered for each child, noting Jessica’s progress towards the
5
TL1’s status was changed from abused to neglected.
3
permanency plan of reunification, with the concurrent plan being durable legal custody or
guardianship. However, on March 1, 2022, the Forrest County Youth Court issued a
“Review Hearing Order,” finding the permanency plan for reunification was “no longer
appropriate” and not in the children’s best interest. The court changed that plan to
“adoption,” with the concurrent plan becoming “Reunification with a Parent or Primary
Caretaker.” Numerous review hearing orders continued to be issued after hearings, giving
status updates on CPS and Jessica’s progress. On July 26, 2023, Forrest County CPS
petitioned the youth court to terminate Jessica’s parental rights to the four children. In
August 2023, Shronda Carter was appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) for the children.
¶7. On November 17, 2023, the Forrest County Youth Court held a termination of
parental rights hearing, a transcription of which is included in our record.6 Witnesses
testifying at the hearing were Shawnesty Mays, a social worker with CPS; Anna, the foster
mother of the twins (TL1 and TL3); and Jessica. On February 12, 2024, the youth court
issued a judgment terminating Jessica’s parental rights.7 Jessica timely appealed.
Termination of Parental Rights Hearing
Shawnesty Mays’s Testimony
¶8. At the termination of parental rights hearing, Mays testified about the neglect of the
children, the abuse of TL1, and CPS’s efforts towards reunification of the family and its
6
None of the other numerous review or permanency hearings were transcribed for the record.
7
The court continued entering review hearing orders after the termination of parental rights judgment as well, giving updates on CPS, Jessica, and the children.
4
barriers. Both putative fathers knew the children were in CPS custody, but as of the time
of the hearing, they had not had any recent contact with the agency or the children. Mays
testified that CPS became involved after reports of physical abuse. In May 2019, CPS
received a report of suspected abuse of TL1, who sustained multiple fractures and an eye
injury. Mays testified that upon investigation, the agency determined that TL1 was likely
abused. The agency also had concerns regarding “safe sleep” for TL2 and TL3 (who were
approximately two years old and nine months old, respectively) because they were sleeping
in bunk beds. Therefore, in November 2019, TL1, TL2, and TL3 were removed from
Jessica’s custody and later adjudicated neglected children.
¶9. Mays testified that in November 2019, Jessica entered into a family service plan with
CPS as part of the reasonable efforts at reunification ordered by the youth court. The agency
met with Jessica to create tasks and goals to be included in the agreement.8 Mays testified:
“The overall goal was to ensure safety and well-being of the children. Jessica was to
complete parenting classes, maintain contact with the agency, maintain visitation, obtain and
maintain employment, and maintain stable housing.” Mays testified that Jessica completed
parenting classes but failed to maintain stable housing and employment.
¶10. In September 2020, Mays testified that CPS received a report of neglect of TL4.
Jones County CPS investigated and found Jessica’s home unsafe for TL4. The five-monthold child had no safe place to sleep, and the house contained animal feces and urine. CPS
took TL4 into custody and adjudicated her a neglected child.
8
Jordan was included in these discussions but never entered into an agreement with CPS and failed to remain in contact with it.
5
¶11. Mays testified about another report of possible physical abuse when TL1, TL2, and
TL3 had a visit with Jessica on the weekend of May 19, 2023. TL1 returned with a bump
on his forehead and an injury to his scalp as if his hair had been pulled. Due to these
injuries, on May 31, 2023, forensic interviews of TL1 and TL3 were conducted at a local
children’s advocacy center to investigate. Recordings of these interviews, as well as an
“interview summary” document, were admitted into evidence without objection. TL3
admitted that Jessica “whoops” him and that it hurts; but he was unsure if the whippings left
marks or bruises. TL3 stated that Jessica whips TL1 on his “booty with a flashlighter,”
which leaves marks and bruises. He also stated that Jessica whips TL1 a lot and is mean to
both of them. At the time, the youth court suspended Jessica’s visitations with the children
after this weekend visit.
¶12. Mays testified that CPS made referrals to support Jessica by providing in-home
services. The children do not receive any monetary support, such as child support, disability,
or Social Security income. The children have no relationship with the putative fathers, who
have not been in contact with the children since they were taken into CPS custody. CPS
attempted placement with the maternal grandmother, but this placement proved unavailing
because the grandmother had a history with CPS. Accordingly, Mays testified that TL2 and
TL4 were placed with a foster parent in September 2020 and August 2021, respectively; they
call her “Nana.” TL1 and TL3 were placed with Anna in August 2021; they call her
“Mom.” Mays testified that the children are “doing well, thriving”—they are healthy, happy,
and have a good relationship with the foster families. At the time of the hearing, all the
6
children were in an adoptive placement except TL2, for whom the agency was exploring
options.
¶13. At the time of the hearing, Jessica had three other children (TK5, TK6, and TK7) in
her custody. Mays testified that multiple reports regarding these children had been made to
CPS. While CPS had found Jessica’s home a safe environment for these children, Mays
testified that adding four more children would create instability.
¶14. Mays testified that there had been “a substantial erosion between the children” and
Jessica. Mays stated this erosion was seen in the forensic interviews in May 2023. Further,
while Jessica demonstrated a willingness “at times” to support and care for her children, her
“lack of protective capacities and . . . stability” showed she could not care for them. Jessica
also had “an excessive history with CPS and multiple reports against her.” Jessica had held
numerous jobs during this time and lived in many places. Jessica was also inconsistent with
her mental health treatment. She had failed to comply with her family service plan and had
been given ample time to reunite with her children. In Mays’s opinion, Jessica lacked “a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood,” and adoption was in the children’s best
interests. She recommended that parental rights should be terminated.
Jessica’s Testimony
¶15. Jessica testified in opposition to the petition to terminate her parental rights. She
admitted that by the end of 2019, five of her children at the time (TL1, TL2, TL3, TK5, and
TK6) were in CPS custody.
¶16. Jessica testified about the two injuries TL1 sustained in 2019. The first one was an
7
eye injury sustained during a visit with his father in April 2019. When TL1 returned home,
Jessica noticed his eye was bleeding; so she took him to the hospital, where she was told “he
had pulled a blood vessel or something.” Jessica was not sure how the injury happened
because she was not there; Jordan “was watching him.” A report stated that the injury
occurred when TL1 was “on an elevated surface in a car chair” that fell over. CPS
investigated, but Jessica claimed “nothing came back.” In November 2019, TL1 sustained
another injury while in the father’s care. Once home, Jessica noticed that TL1 was dragging
his right leg while crawling. TL1 was taken to Merit Hospital in Hattiesburg, where he was
diagnosed with a broken femur.
¶17. In 2019, Jessica was living in a two-bedroom apartment in Forrest County. After
TL1’s second injury, CPS advised Jessica to move to another apartment so the boys and girls
would have separate rooms. Jessica moved to a three-bedroom house in Jones County,
where she lived with Jordan, TK4, TK5, and TK6—the latter two children having been
returned to her custody in the summer of 2020. From April to September 2020, Jessica
worked sixteen-hour shifts on the weekends at a nursing home. In August 2020, Jordan
moved out, leaving Jessica with childcare and financial problems. Jessica testified that she
could no longer work because she could not find a babysitter, and she could not pay her bills
because she no longer worked. Jessica admitted that at this point, her home instability
began. In September 2020, a CPS home inspection occurred when Jessica was packing to
move to Pike County. The social worker found the home unsafe due to moving boxes and
uncleanliness. Jessica admitted that the social worker found animal feces and urine on the
8
floor. At this time, TL4, TK5, and TK6 were removed from the house due to child
endangerment.
¶18. In September 2020, Jessica moved to Pike County, where she lived with her aunt.
Without custody of any children, Jessica was able to work the day shift at McDonald’s and
the night shift at a nursing home, trying to afford her own place to live. In October 2020,
Jessica moved into a three-bedroom house, but she had to move out because her landlord did
not accept government assistance. She moved to another three-bedroom house but had to
move out because the landlord sold the unit.
¶19. Jessica testified that in October 2020, she quit her job at McDonald’s because her
social worker was concerned about her mental stability from lack of rest due to working long
hours at two jobs, as well as Jessica’s ability to care for her children when working the night
shift at the nursing home. Therefore, in December 2020, Jessica left her job at the nursing
home. In January 2021, she began employment as a personal care assistant with better hours
at another nursing home, but the pay was lower. In April 2021, TK5 and TK6 were returned
to her custody. In May 2021, Jessica quit her job at this nursing home as well. Jessica
testified that she did not work from May through August 2021. She gave birth to TK7 in
September 2021 and began working from home “for Medicaid.” This job gave her
flexibility to care for the children in her custody; however, she became bored with the job
and quit after one month. In November 2021, Jessica began work as a delivery driver for
FedEx and maintained this job for two years. Jessica testified that in July 2023, she quit the
FedEx job because it made her tired and depressed. In September 2023, Jessica started
9
working at a mobile dental service. At the time of the termination of parental rights hearing
in November 2023, Jessica worked at the same job and was living in a three-bedroom
apartment with TK5, TK6, and TK7. She testified that there was room in the apartment for
her other four children if she regained custody of them.
¶20. Jessica testified about her May 2023 weekend visit with TL1 and TL3 when TL1 was
injured. On May 15, 2023, Anna contacted her when TL1 returned to his foster home with
a bruise on his forehead. Jessica denied knowledge of any injury over the weekend. Anna
also found an area on the top of TL1’s head, where it appeared “somebody had pulled his
hair.” Jessica again denied knowledge of TL1’s injuries and claimed that none of the other
children injured him.
¶21. CPS assisted Jessica in receiving mental health treatment for depression through Pine
Belt in Jones County at the beginning of her case. However, she did not complete treatment
because she did not find it beneficial. Jessica admitted that CPS had not given her
permission to stop treatment.
¶22. Jessica also admitted that she provided CPS with fraudulent employment verification
by presenting a fake check stub around the end of 2021. Additionally, Jessica did not
disclose to CPS her pregnancy with TK7. Financially, Jessica testified that she has $140 left
at the end of the month after her bills are paid. She receives food stamps and housing
assistance. She acknowledged that from 2019 until 2023, life has been an “up and down
roller coaster” for her children.
Anna’s Testimony
10
¶23. Anna, the foster mother of TL1 and TL3, was the last witness. She works as a social
worker. Anna testified about TL1’s injuries after the May 2023 weekend visit with Jessica.
He had a “little mark” at his hairline and told Anna he did not know how he became injured.
However, TL3 told Anna that TL1 “hit his head on the wall.” Later, TL1 started
complaining that his head hurt. Anna found the spot on his scalp. Anna took TL1 to the
doctor. TL1 told the doctor he was injured by a car door. Anna testified that TL1 was not
injured at her house.9
GAL Report
¶24. In January 2024, the GAL filed her report with the youth court. She explained that
TL1was taken into CPS custody in November 2019 due to “unexplained physical injuries”;
TL2 and TL3 were taken into custody due to “sibling risk.” TL4 came into CPS custody in
September 2020 due to neglect.
¶25. The case file indicated TL1 was taken to the emergency room between April 28,
2019, and May 19, 2019 for “further evaluation of a fall.” Jessica had reported that TL1 was
in his car seat, arched his back, and tumbled over the side, hitting his face. She was not in
the room when it occurred but heard it.10 Jessica noticed bruising on the side of his face and
bleeding from one eye. TL1 was admitted to the hospital for further monitoring and testing.
9
Towards the end of the hearing, Taylor appeared, wanting to oppose the termination of his parental rights to TL2. Since CPS had already presented its case to terminate his rights, the youth court bifurcated the proceedings as to Taylor. His hearing was scheduled for December 19, 2023; however, he did not appear, and no further evidence was presented.
10
This account contradicts Jessica’s own testimony at the hearing that she was not present at all.
11
¶26. The GAL report noted that in November 2019, TL1 was examined by Dr. Scott
Benton, a child-abuse pediatrician. Dr. Benton documented:
TL1 was seen on 5/20/2019 by NP Wendi Nopper. I reviewed the case and
wrote then, ‘History from mother of fall out of car seat. Trauma evaluation
with several fractures, facial bruising that is inconsistent with history in both
timing and mechanism. Fractures are 6-8 weeks old. Given late healing
stages it is not possible to reconstruct fracture mechanisms. I agree with the
findings and recommendations.’ Finding was physical abuse. Today, presents
with history of hurting leg in a crib a week ago. X-ray with subacute
transverse right femur fracture. By history, this represents medical neglect at
a minimum. There is no evidence of bone disease. There is no identifiable
accidental event to explain fracture. Given multiple past fractures and this
incident, I reaffirm my grave concern that this is an abused child and he and
his siblings should be protected.
TL1, TL2, and TL3 were then placed in CPS custody.
¶27. Regarding Jessica’s employment history, the GAL report stated “[t]hroughout the life
of the case, [Jessica] has shown great instability in employment. She has had over six
different employers since the case has been opened.” Additionally, “[d]ishonesty was
prevalent in the case.” Jessica provided a “fake check stub” to CPS to verify employment
at a personal care home. The report stated Jessica’s income fluctuated due to her frequent
job changes. While Jessica received support in budgeting, “her finances never would
increase to a salary that would support four (4) additional children.” Her numerous “abrupt
moves” across three counties (Jones, Forrest, and Pike Counties) further led to “instability
in the home environment and protective capacities.” The report noted that in 2023, Jessica
had moved twice.
¶28. The report also noted that “[a]s the case progressed, the agency attempted to
implement weekend visitation.” However, TL1’s injuries “gave grave concerns for
12
[Jessica’s] protective capacity to keep the children safe from harm.” The report referred to
TL1’s forehead and scalp injuries, as well as the forensic interview in May 2023, when TL3
disclosed that Jessica had “whoop[ed]” him with a “flash lighter” that left marks on him.
Jessica was also inconsistent with her mental health treatment for depression.
¶29. The GAL reported that she had been highly involved in family team meetings, youth
court hearings, visits with the children, and visits to Jessica’s home. She found the “parentchild bond between [Jessica] and the four children has been [severely] eroded due to the
sporadic periods where [Jessica] would do well and visit” and the times when she would not
visit. Overnight visits often “spark[ed] allegations of maltreatment when the children
arrived back to placement.” Additionally, she noted that TL1 and TL3 “have now identified
[Jessica] as the person who has physically harmed” TL1. The GAL stated “reintroduc[ing]
the children back to [Jessica] as a custodial parent would be detrimental to the[ir] emotional
stability.”
¶30. The GAL observed that each time she visited Jessica’s home, trash was “both inside
and outside” the home. “The properties appeared to be unkept.” The GAL stated the length
of time the case has been open is “significant.” There were allegations of fighting with
family members who were once identified as family support. The GAL found Jessica’s
“transient lifestyle” was not in the best interest of the children under the totality of the
circumstances. The four children should be “legally freed for adoption” and all biological
parental rights terminated, according to the GAL.
Judgment Terminating Parental Rights
13
¶31. The February 12, 2024 judgment found that CPS had “made reasonable efforts over
a reasonable period of time to diligently assist Respondents[11] in complying with the service
plan, but that Respondents [had] failed to substantially comply with the terms and conditions
of the plan, and that reunification [was] not in the best interests” of the four children.12
“[T]ermination of Respondents’ parental rights is appropriate because reunification between
Respondents . . . and Minor Petitioners . . . is not desirable toward obtaining a satisfactory
permanency outcome based on one or more of the grounds set forth in Sections 93-15-119
or 93-15-121.”13 The youth court found the following grounds for terminating parental
11
The Respondents were Jessica, Jordan, Taylor, and the unknown putative father.
12
TL1, TL2, TL3, and TL4 were the minor petitioners.
13
Section 93-15-119(1) provides the grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights and the standard of proof:
(1) A court hearing a petition under this chapter may terminate the parental
rights of a parent when, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence:
(a)(i) That the parent has engaged in conduct constituting abandonment
or desertion of the child, as defined in Section 93-15-103, or is
mentally, morally, or otherwise unfit to raise the child, which shall be
established by showing past or present conduct of the parent that
demonstrates a substantial risk of compromising or endangering the
child’s safety and welfare; and
(ii) That termination of the parent’s parental rights is appropriate
because reunification between the parent and child is not desirable
toward obtaining a satisfactory permanency outcome . . . .
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-119(1)(a) (Rev. 2021). Section 93-15-121 lists numerous grounds for termination of parental rights, to be established by clear and convincing evidence. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-121 (Supp. 2024).
14
rights under the statutes: Respondents (1) “engaged in conduct constituting abandonment
or desertion” of the children and were “mentally, morally, or otherwise unfit to raise” the
children; (2) were “unwilling to provide reasonably necessary food, clothing, shelter, or
medical care” for the children; (3) “failed to exercise reasonable visitation or
communication” with the children; (4) “neglectful conduct [had] caused, at least in part, an
extreme and deep-seated antipathy by [the children] toward the parents”; (5) “neglectful
conduct” had caused, in part, “a substantial erosion of the relationship between the parents
and [children]”; and (6) had “committed an abusive act for which reasonable efforts to
maintain the children in the home would not be required . . . , or a series of physically,
mentally or emotionally abusive incidents, against the children . . . making future contact .
. . undesirable.” Miss. Code Ann. §§ 93-15-119, -121. Finally, the youth court found by
clear and convincing evidence that it was in the best interest of the children for parental
rights to be terminated for them to be eligible for adoption.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶32. The standard of review for termination of parental rights is limited. “The judge’s
findings of fact are viewed under the manifest error/substantial credible evidence test.” S.F.
v. Lamar Cnty. Dep’t of Child Prot. Servs., 373 So. 3d 985, 987 (¶8) (Miss. 2023). The
reviewing court “asks not how it ‘would have decided the case ab initio but whether . . .
credible proof’ exists to support the judge’s findings of fact ‘by clear and convincing
evidence.’” Id. (quoting Ethredge v. Yawn, 605 So. 2d 761, 764 (Miss. 1992)). The
appellate court “gives deference to the youth court’s findings of fact.” Id. (quoting G.Q.A.
15
v. Harrison Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 771 So. 2d 331, 335 (¶14) (Miss. 2000)). An
appellate court will not overturn a judge’s “findings of fact when supported by substantial
evidence unless an erroneous legal standard is applied or is manifestly wrong.” Denham v.
Lafayette Cnty. Dep’t of Child Prot. Servs., 356 So. 3d 173, 181 (¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023)
(quoting Smith v. Doe, 314 So. 3d 154, 162 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021)).
DISCUSSION
I. Reasonable-Efforts-at-Reunification Requirement
¶33. Jessica argues that the youth court erred in finding CPS exercised “reasonable efforts”
in attempting to reunify her with the four children at issue. She claims it was error for the
youth court to modify her permanency plan from reunification to termination of parental
rights/adoption because she complied with all the terms of her family service plan. She also
contends the youth court’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Forrest
County CPS counters that this Court does not have jurisdiction to review the youth court’s
findings because Jessica failed to appeal the proper orders, thus contending this issue is
procedurally barred.
¶34. On March 1, 2022, the youth court entered review hearing orders for each child after
a hearing the same day, changing the permanency plan from reunification to adoption. The
orders indicate Jessica was represented by counsel at this March 1 hearing, as she had been
since the disposition hearing in April 2020.14 The orders noted the “reasonable efforts”
14
Jessica’s court-appointed attorney, however, moved to withdraw in May 2022 because Jessica had no contact with her except at the hearings and family meetings. For a period of time, no attorney was listed for Jessica on the review and permanency orders, but by at least July 2023 until the November 2023 hearing, the record shows Jessica was
16
made by Forrest County CPS for the prior permanency and concurrent plans. For
reunification, CPS had “maintained contact with Jessica and encouraged compliance with
tasks and goals on her service agreements,” as well as “facilitated a family team meeting.”
For TL4, the youth court noted CPS “gained extensive knowledge of the mother’s financial
situation.” Regarding the prior concurrent plan of “durable legal custody or legal
guardianship,” the youth court found CPS had made “reasonable efforts” to seek “relative
placement and explored possible durable legal custody with the foster placement.”
However, the court now found “reunification with a parent or primary caretaker” was “no
longer appropriate and not in the best interest” of each child. Also, the concurrent plan for
each child changed to “reunification with a parent or primary caretaker.” No mention was
made in these March 2022 orders that they were in any way final orders or adjudications of
the cases.
¶35. In fact, approximately every six months thereafter, from March 2022 until May 2023,
the youth court held review hearings and entered subsequent review hearing orders in
accordance with the Uniform Rules of Youth Court Practice, tracking Jessica’s progress and
CPS’s assistance. The permanency plan remained adoption, but the concurrent plan
remained reunification. A September 2022 review hearing order noted CPS was working
on obtaining “the last necessary documents” for the termination of parental rights petition.
During this time, the youth court conducted two permanency hearings and entered orders on
October 11, 2022, and July 25, 2023.
represented by counsel.
17
¶36. On July 26, 2023, Forrest County CPS filed a petition to terminate parental rights.
After a hearing on November 17, 2023, the youth court entered a judgment terminating
Jessica’s parental rights on February 13, 2024, and Jessica timely appealed from this
judgment.
A. Jurisdiction
¶37. Forrest County CPS argues that Jessica should have appealed the March 1, 2022
review hearing orders that changed the permanency plan to adoption, or alternatively, she
should have appealed any one of the many subsequent review-hearing or permanency
orders.15 Because she did not appeal but, instead, waited until after the termination of
parental rights hearing and judgment in February 2024, CPS contends that this Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear her first issue. We disagree.
¶38. Section 43-21-651(1) (Rev. 2021) of the Mississippi Code provides that “appeals may
be taken from final orders or decrees of the youth court” to the Mississippi Supreme Court.
This statute was amended during the 2024 Regular Session of the Mississippi Legislature
to “clarify the right of appeal from youth court.” 2024 Miss. Laws ch. 531, § 11 (S.B. 2792)
(effective July 1, 2024). While passed by the Legislature but not yet in effect at the time this
appeal was filed, the amended statute gives some guidance as to what constitutes a “final
order” for appeals from youth court:
15
Forrest County CPS claims Jessica should have appealed from any of the following youth court orders that discussed CPS’s “reasonable efforts” after the permanency plan changed to adoption: (1) the March 1, 2022 Review Hearing Orders; (2) the subsequent Review Hearing Orders entered on April 19, 2022; September 6, 2022; January 3, 2023; February 28, 2023; April 18, 2023; and October 17, 2023; or (3) the permanency orders of October 11, 2022, and July 25, 2023.
18
The court to which appeals may be taken from final orders or decrees of the
youth court shall be the Supreme Court of Mississippi pursuant to the Rules
of Appellate Procedure. Final Orders in youth court include orders that grant
durable legal custody or durable legal relative guardianship, transfer
jurisdiction over the minor child to another court, such as for an adoption, or
otherwise terminate the jurisdiction of the youth court over the minor child.
All factual findings, legal determinations, and adjudication of issues by the
youth court prior to the time the final order is entered are preserved for
appellate review and any common law to the contrary is expressly abrogated.
Any matters adjudicated by the youth court through interim orders such as
adjudication/disposition orders, or permanency review orders, may be only
appealed through the interlocutory appeal process provided by the Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-651(1)(a) (Supp. 2024) (emphasis added). Under the above
statute, “permanency review orders” are interlocutory in nature and not final. Further, all
the issues, including CPS’s reasonable efforts at reunifying the family, were preserved for
appellate review. Finally, “any common law to the contrary” of this statute is “expressly
abrogated.”
¶39. In support of its argument that the March 1, 2022 review hearing and other orders
were final and appealable, Forrest County CPS cites In re L.C., 394 So. 3d 517, 528 (¶29)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2024). After adjudicating the children neglected and placing them in CPS
custody, the youth court found the permanency plan of reunification with the biological
mother was best and ordered CPS to make reasonable efforts to that effect. Id. at 520 (¶6).
However, like here, over a year later, “[t]he course of the case changed dramatically.” Id.
at 522 (¶12). A final permanency hearing was held where CPS and the GAL recommended
that the permanency plan be changed from reunification to adoption for one child. Id. at
19
522-23 (¶12).16 Upon the mother’s motion, the youth court entered detailed findings of fact
and conclusions of law. Id. at 525 (¶19). A week later, the court entered an amended
permanency plan order, changing the plan from reunification to adoption and specifically
ordering CPS to begin the termination of parental rights process. Id. at 527 (¶27). The
mother appealed from this order. Id. Nothing further in the opinion addressed the
termination of parental rights hearing or judgment.
¶40. While neither party challenged jurisdiction in In re L.C., the dissent argued that the
youth court’s amended permanency order was not a final, appealable order. Id. at (¶28); id.
at 534 (¶53) (Westbrooks, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the youth court’s “Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law” indicated that it would take further action once the
[termination of parental rights] petition was filed and the requisite evidence was presented.”
Id. at 536 (¶58). Because the youth court would take “further action” after the permanency
order, the dissent found the amended permanency order was not a final, appealable judgment
under common law. Id. at 535-36 (¶¶56-58). While the dissent cited section 43-21-651, it
correctly noted that the statute’s amendment did not apply in that case because the appeal
occurred two years before the statute’s effective date. Id. at 535 n.22. In contrast, the
majority, citing common law, concluded that the amended permanency order was final
“because it disposed of all issues before the court, ordered [CPS] to commence a
[termination of parental rights] proceeding against [the mother], and left no issue unsettled.”
Id. at 527 (¶28).
16
The opinion indicates the permanency hearings were transcribed for the record, unlike here.
20
¶41. In light of the amended section 43-21-651(1)(a) “clarifying” what constitutes a
“final” order in youth court, even though the amendment did not go into effect until four
months after this appeal was filed, the amendment supports this Court’s having jurisdiction.
In In re L.C., this Court concluded it had jurisdiction, heard the case on the merits, and
reversed in favor of the parent who appealed the youth court decision prior to a final
termination of parental rights. Id. at 530, 534 (¶¶37, 51). Here, we find, to the extent our
holding conflicts with In re L.C., it is better to hear the merits of this termination-ofparental-rights case, rather than dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, as the amended
(or “clarified”) statute would allow the appeal. The clarification indicates that the
Legislature did not agree with the common law procedure that this Court previously
advanced. We conclude that the review and permanency orders cited by Forrest County CPS
are not final, appealable orders, and Jessica properly appealed the termination of parental
rights judgment.
B. CPS’s “Reasonable Efforts”
¶42. The youth court must find CPS made “reasonable efforts” to achieve the original
permanency plan of reunification before modifying the plan to adoption and termination of
parental rights. In re L.C., 394 So. 3d at 531 (¶40) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-613(3)(a)(ii) (Rev. 2021)). Additionally, section 93-15-115(c) of the Mississippi Code
provides that the youth court must conduct a “permanency hearing, or a permanency review
hearing,” and find CPS “has made reasonable efforts over a reasonable period to diligently
assist the parent in complying with the service plan.” The Mississippi Code defined
21
“reasonable efforts” in the context of youth court law as
the exercise of reasonable care and due diligence by the Department of Human
Services, the Department of Child Protection Services, or any other
appropriate entity or person to use appropriate and available services to
prevent the unnecessary removal of the child from the home or provide other
services related to meeting the needs of the child and the parents.
Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-105(gg) (Supp. 2019).
¶43. Jessica contends that she complied with her family service plan, yet her parental rights
were still terminated. She claims CPS failed to exercise reasonable efforts to reunify the
children with her, and the youth court erred in changing her permanency plan to termination
of parental rights/adoption.
¶44. The family service plan, which Jessica entered into in November 2019, was admitted
as an exhibit during the termination of parental rights hearing. CPS monitored her progress
throughout the case. Jessica contends that she maintained stable employment and housing
under the plan. We disagree. The plan stated Jessica was to maintain verifiable employment
with an income that would sustain her family’s needs. Jessica failed to achieve that goal.
The record shows Jessica changed jobs frequently over the duration of the case, and she
ultimately never obtained a job that would support her and her seven children.
¶45. The GAL report stated that over the life of the case, Jessica showed “great instability”
in employment. We agree. She has had numerous employers since 2019. In August 2020,
when Jordan moved out, Jessica admitted her instability began because she could not keep
up with her bills and lacked childcare. By September 2020, with no children in her custody,
she worked at two jobs, day and night, at McDonald’s and a nursing home, but she was
22
unable to maintain this schedule. By the end of 2020, Jessica had quit both jobs. In early
2021, she began working at another nursing home with better hours but lower pay. By May
2021, she was pregnant with TK7 and had quit her current job. After giving birth, in
September 2021, Jessica obtained a job working from home “with Medicaid,” which helped
greatly with childcare, but she found it boring and quit soon after starting.
¶46. Jessica points to sustaining her employment with FedEx as a delivery driver for two
years starting in November 2021; however, her hours were not always conducive to
childcare, and by July 2023, Jessica quit the job. In September 2023, Jessica started working
at a mobile dental clinic with better hours.
¶47. Importantly, the GAL report and CPS progress notes show “dishonesty was
prevalent” in this case, especially about employment.17 Jessica provided CPS with a
fraudulent check stub for one of her nursing home jobs. Because Jessica changed jobs
frequently, her income fluctuated, and her salary never increased to a level that would
support the four additional children, who received no other monetary support besides
Jessica’s income.
¶48. Regarding housing, the service plan stated Jessica was to maintain stable housing and
have “proper sleeping arrangements for the children. The home must be free of outside and
inside debris and construction materials” as well as “clutter.” On appeal, Jessica minimizes
her frequent moves, but the record shows Jessica’s housing was far from stable. When the
case began, Jessica was living in a two-bedroom apartment in Forrest County; however, CPS
17
Jessica was also dishonest about her pregnancy and birth of TK7.
23
advised Jessica to find a three-bedroom apartment so the boys and girls would have separate
rooms. In November 2019, Jessica moved to a three-bedroom house in Jones County. In
August 2020, Jessica’s home was found unsafe due to packing boxes, inadequate sleeping
arrangements, and pet excrement. At this point, TL4 was removed from her home due to
neglect, and Jessica moved in with her aunt, without her children. In October 2020, Jessica
moved several times trying to stay in three-bedroom apartments. The GAL report described
her lifestyle as “transient.”
¶49. Initially, one of the reasons Jessica’s children were removed from her custody was
lack of proper sleeping arrangements. Later, TL4 was removed from her home because the
infant had nowhere to sleep, and the house was deemed a dangerous environment for
children. Moreover, on visits, the GAL witnessed trash inside and outside Jessica’s
properties, which she described as “unkept.” At the time of the hearing on the termination
of parental rights, although Jessica’s home was deemed safe (with three children in her
custody), May testified that adding four more children would create instability.
¶50. In support of Jessica’s position that she complied with the family service plan, she
points to passing drug tests, completing parenting classes, and complying with visitations
with her children until CPS “abruptly stopped” them in May 2023. Visitation stopped,
however, because of the injuries TL1 sustained during the weekend visit in Jessica’s care.
These injuries then precipitated the forensic interviews with TL1 and TL2, where they
complained of maltreatment by Jessica.
¶51. CPS had worked with Jessica since November 2019, exercising “reasonable efforts”
24
in an attempt to reunify her with her children. For the first two years, the CPS progress
notes indicated Jessica was trying to comply with the plans and moving toward reunification.
CPS was diligently assisting Jessica by arranging numerous services: mental health treatment
for her depression, parenting classes, visitations, and in-home services. However, in
September 2021, CPS noted that Jessica had become “chronically dishonest to the agency
which is causing major issues in her case.” Then, in March 2022, CPS noted, “Jessica
continues to be apathetic and have little motivation to do what she needs to do to get her
children back,” and “Jessica is her own barrier to reunification due to her continuing to be
dishonest with the agency and being unstable with her housing and finances.” Further, the
GAL stated that the relationship between Jessica and her children had eroded due to her
sporadic visits.
¶52. We conclude that the youth court properly found CPS exercised reasonable efforts
over time to assist Jessica in reunifying with her four children. Even so, Jessica failed to
meet the terms of her family service plan. Accordingly, the youth court did not err in
changing the permanency plan from reunification to termination of parental rights/adoption.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶53. Next, Jessica, through new counsel on appeal, claims her appointed counsel at the
termination of parental rights hearing on December 19, 2023, was ineffective because he did
not allow Jessica in the courtroom. However, she acknowledges that claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel in civil cases are usually remedied by legal malpractice claims or bar
complaints. Further, Jessica contends that she “was not allowed to testify nor present any
25
evidence” at the termination of parental rights hearing, which is untrue. This issue lacks
legal authority and is based on factual inaccuracies.
¶54. The Mississippi Supreme Court has expressly held that the Sixth Amendment, by its
express terms, “limits its own application to ‘criminal prosecution,’ [and] does not apply to
civil proceedings.” Miller v. Smith, 229 So. 3d 100, 105 (¶22) (Miss. 2017). Mississippi
courts have not specifically “addressed whether the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective
assistance of counsel extends to proceedings involving the termination of parental rights.”
Denham v. Lafayette Cnty. Dep’t of Child Prot. Servs., 356 So. 3d 173, 183 (¶39) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2023). Further, our supreme court has held that “the constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel does not apply to a civil proceeding.” DeMyers v. DeMyers, 742 So.
2d 1157, 1162 (¶20) (Miss. 1999); see also Adams v. Rice, 249 So. 3d 463, 472 (¶35) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2018) (“The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is triggered
in criminal proceedings, not family-law matters.”). Jessica cites no authority in support of
her argument.
¶55. Under Mississippi caselaw, there is no Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel in civil cases, including termination of parental rights cases. Such cases are civil
in nature, despite the separate opinion’s suggestion that they are not. Jessica was entitled
to appointed counsel, which she received. Nothing in the record indicates that he was not
competent.
¶56. Jessica’s argument is based on factual inaccuracies. Both she and her appointed
counsel were present at her termination of parental rights hearing, which was held on
26
November 17, 2023. Jessica testified at length, and her counsel effectively cross-examined
CPS’s witnesses. The hearing of December 19, 2023, where Jessica claims her counsel was
ineffective for not allowing her in the courtroom, was not Jessica’s hearing, but Taylor’s
bifurcated termination of parental rights hearing. However, Taylor failed to appear, and no
further testimony was taken. There is no other information in the record about Taylor’s
hearing.18
¶57. Even if the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applied to
termination of parental rights hearings, Jessica’s argument is without merit. In order to
establish a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “the defendant must show
that counsel’s performance was deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Jessica fails to show,
nor do we find, any deficient performance by her counsel that prejudiced her termination of
parental rights hearing.
CONCLUSION
¶58. The youth court’s judgment terminating Jessica’s parental rights was based on
substantial evidence. The youth court properly found that CPS made reasonable efforts to
reunify the four children with Jessica. There is no merit to Jessica’s argument regarding her
counsel’s performance at the termination of parental rights hearing. Accordingly, we affirm
the youth court’s judgment.
18
The separate opinion states that Jessica “was entitled to appointed counsel.” To be clear, we agree. Jessica had appointed counsel at her termination of parental rights hearing. However, Jessica’s appellate argument is mistakenly based on Taylor’s December 2023 hearing where Taylor failed to appear, and no hearing took place.
27
¶59. AFFIRMED.
LAWRENCE, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.,
CONCUR. CARLTON, P.J., AND McDONALD, J., CONCUR IN PART AND IN
THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. WILSON, P.J.,
CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
WESTBROOKS, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITHOUT
SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. McCARTY, J., CONCURS IN PART AND
DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY
WESTBROOKS, J.; McDONALD, J., JOINS IN PART.
McCARTY, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:
¶60. Over a century before the U.S. Supreme Court recognized it, Mississippi determined
that “[n]o higher evidence could be afforded of the sanctity with which our law invests the
parental right of custody, or rather recognizes and protects the right given by nature and by
God.” Moore v. Christian, 56 Miss. 408, 411 (1879). In more recent years, we have called
“[t]he natural parent presumption[] a bedrock principle of Mississippi family law.” K.D.F.
v. J.L.H., 933 So. 2d 971, 980 (¶35) (Miss. 2006); see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65
(2000) (likewise agreeing that parents have a fundamental liberty interest “in the care,
custody, and control of their children”).
¶61. This liberty interest in the preservation of the family unit is “so crucial” that the
Mississippi Legislature decided “that before termination of parental rights, a mother or
father could be appointed a lawyer if they were indigent.” Denham v. Lafayette Cnty. Dep’t
of Child Prot. Servs., 356 So. 3d 173, 186 (¶55) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (McCarty, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-113 (Rev. 2021)).
¶62. As a part of the termination of parental rights law, our Legislature codified that “[a]ll
parents have the right to be appointed counsel in termination of parental rights hearings, and
28
[that] the court shall appoint counsel if the court makes a finding that the parent is indigent
and counsel is requested by the parent.” Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-201(2)(a) (Supp. 2025);
see also Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-113(b) (Rev. 2021) (directing that in termination
proceedings “the court shall determine whether the [indigent] parent is entitled to appointed
counsel”).
¶63. The law further sets out the duties of appointed counsel. Namely, that “[a]ttorneys
for all parties, . . . shall owe the duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality and competent
representation to the party client pursuant to the Mississippi Rules of Professional
Conduct.” Miss Code Ann. § 43-21-201(4) (emphasis added); see also MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4.
¶64. While the majority asserts that the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance
of counsel is limited to criminal prosecutions and does not apply to civil proceedings, we
cannot pretend that termination proceedings are merely civil in nature. Termination
proceedings occur in an adversarial setting and involve the potential loss of a protected
liberty interest in one’s family. And as in all proceedings brought by the State, they can be
very lopsided, as the State generally has greater resources at its disposal, including
investigators, caseworkers, lawyers, and experience.
¶65. Because Jessica was facing the loss of her fundamental liberty right to her family, she
was entitled to appointed counsel, and that lawyer must be reasonably effective in that duty.
As expounded more fully in the separate opinion in Denham, “[t]his mother should not be
owed less of a duty than if a lawyer had been appointed to her in a criminal case.” 356 So.
3d at 188 (¶67) (McCarty, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29
¶66. I agree with the majority that credible proof exists in the record to support the core
findings by the trial court below, but I cannot agree that there is no duty of effective counsel
in cases where a parent faces the termination of rights to their child. Nearly 150 years ago,
our Supreme Court reckoned that “the parental right of custody” was a “right given by
nature and by God.” We must honor that right by ensuring parents have effective counsel.
WESTBROOKS, J., JOINS THIS OPINION. McDONALD, J., JOINS THIS
OPINION IN PART.
30