FILED
JULY 21, 2026
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
DAVID SHANE FEEKES and MEGAN ) No. 41176-1-III L. KRIETE-FEEKES, husband and wife, )
)
Appellants, )
)
v. ) PUBLISHED OPINION
)
TRIPLE M CONSTRUCTION, LLC, a )
Washington limited liability company, )
)
Respondent. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — David Feekes and Megan Kriete-Feekes entered into
two contracts with Triple M Construction LLC for construction work on their residential
property. The Feekes terminated the contracts after partial performance. Triple M
recorded a claim of lien for unpaid work.
The Feekes then brought a motion under RCW 60.04.081 for Triple M to show
cause why its claim of lien should not be released as frivolous or reduced as clearly
excessive. The trial court denied the Feekes’ motion and awarded Triple M its No. 41176-1-III
Feekes v. Triple M. Constr.
reasonable attorney fees and costs for prevailing. We affirm but deny Triple M its
reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal.
FACTS1
The Feekes sought to have a pole building constructed on their property to serve as
their personal residence. Toward that goal, the Feekes entered into two contracts with
Triple M. “Contract #1055” was for Triple M to perform excavation work for
$27,405.98. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 123-38. “Contract #1056” was for Triple M to
perform concrete work for $32,257.99. CP at 139-57.
The Feekes paid one-half of each contract as a down payment before Triple M
began work. The parties later agreed to a change order for Contract #1056, increasing the
contract price to $35,509.99.
After Triple M performed most excavation and some concrete work, Mr. Feekes
cancelled the contracts by sending Triple M a text message:
1
The parties dispute material facts, and the trial court’s order did not include findings on those disputed facts. Consistent with the notion that a claim of lien should not be dismissed unless it is clearly frivolous, we present the facts favorably for the party resisting dismissal of its lien, Triple M.
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Good day, at your convenience start working on an invoice for me to close
the excavation portion of your bid please. I don’t know how to complete
the concrete as I would be interested in your guys finish as far as they have
gotten but I need to work with them directly if and however that is possible.
I’m getting my plumbing and electrical needs planned now so I will be
interested in a frame bid broken down starting on exterior with a start and
finish date.
CP at 25.
Triple M sent the Feekes invoices for the remaining balances—$12,321.27 for the
excavation work and $328.23 for the concrete work. Because the Feekes refused to pay
either invoice, Triple M recorded a claim of lien for the total invoiced balances.
The Feekes filed a motion for Triple M to show cause why its claim of lien should
not be dismissed as frivolous or reduced as clearly excessive. The Feekes argued that
Triple M’s failure to provide them with the statutory “Notice to Customer”2 rendered its
claim of lien frivolous. The Feekes also argued that Triple M’s lien should be reduced
because (1) Triple M performed less than one-half of the contract work, (2) Triple M’s
work was deficient (in that it failed to place rebar in the footings and because the concrete
was cracking), and (3) they had paid Triple M far more than the value they received.
Triple M disputed these allegations, and the parties submitted dueling arguments
2
See RCW 18.27.114(1).
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regarding whether the Feekes acted as their own general contractor on the project, which
would render Triple M exempt from providing the statutory notice.
The trial court considered the parties’ arguments and determined (1) there were
debatable issues regarding whether Triple M’s claim of lien was frivolous, and (2) Triple
M’s claim of lien was not clearly excessive. In its oral ruling, the court observed:
Feekes hired Triple M to provide at least some of the work on the structure
that they wished to build on their personal property. But at the time they
did the initial contract, there was no contract for them to complete all of the
work. That was talked about as a possibility, but it was not contracted at
the beginning.
Rep. of Proc. at 49.
Based on the two above determinations, the trial court denied the Feekes’ motion
and awarded Triple M its reasonable attorney fees and costs.
The Feekes appeal to this court.
ANALYSIS
The Feekes argue the trial court erred by not dismissing Triple M’s claim of lien
as frivolous. Alternatively, they argue the trial court erred by not reducing it as clearly
excessive. We address each argument separately. But first, we discuss the appropriate
standard of review and the summary procedure for dismissing a claim of lien.
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Standard of review
When reviewing a trial court’s order granting or denying a release or reduction of
a claim of lien under RCW 60.04.081, we review its findings for substantial evidence and
its legal conclusions de novo. Intermountain Elec., Inc. v. G-A-T Bros. Constr., Inc.,
115 Wn. App. 384, 390-91, 62 P.3d 548 (2003). Here, the trial court did not enter any
findings on disputed factual issues. Thus, our review of the trial court’s order is de novo.
Summary procedure for dismissal of a claim of lien
RCW 60.04.021 authorizes a lien in the contract amount for those who furnish
labor, professional services, materials, or equipment for the improvement of real property
at the owner’s request. To perfect such a lien, a claimant must properly record a claim of
lien in accordance with RCW 60.04.091.
RCW 60.04.081 authorizes a narrow and limited summary proceeding to
determine if a claim of lien is frivolous and made without reasonable cause, or reduce it if
it is clearly excessive. Woodley v. Style Corp., 7 Wn. App. 2d 543, 551, 453 P.3d 739
(2019). A court must release the claim of lien if it is frivolous and made without
reasonable cause or reduce it if it is clearly excessive. Id.
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A. THE VIABILITY OF TRIPLE M’S CLAIM OF LIEN
Having described the standard of our review and the summary procedure, we now
address each of the Feekes’ two arguments.
1. Whether Triple M’s claim of lien was frivolous
“A lien is frivolous if it is ‘improperly filed beyond legitimate dispute’ and ‘so
devoid of merit that it has no possibility of succeeding.’” Id. at 551-52 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Williams v. Athletic Field, Inc., 172 Wn.2d 683, 699,
261 P.3d 109 (2011)). This high standard exists to ensure that those claiming
construction liens are not deprived of their right to a trial on a legitimate lien claim. Id. at
552. “Thus, a lien is not frivolous if it presents debatable issues of law and fact.” Id.
The Feekes argue that Triple M’s claim of lien meets the above frivolous standard
because Triple M failed to provide them with the Notice to Customer as required by
RCW 18.27.114(1). As explained below, we conclude that Triple M was not required to
provide the statutory notice to the Feekes.
a. Triple M did not agree to build a residential unit
RCW 18.27.114(1) requires a contractor, in certain situations, to provide its
customer a statutory notice prior to starting work. The notice generally advises the
customer how to protect themselves and their property from lien claims. Id. If the
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situation requires the contractor to provide the notice and the notice is not given, the
contractor is precluded from enforcing its lien. RCW 18.27.114(4).
RCW 18.27.114(1) requires a contractor to give a residential customer the
statutory notice only if the contractor agrees to repair, alter, or construct “four or fewer
residential units or accessory structures.” Here, Triple M did not agree to construct even
one residential unit for the Feekes.3 We conclude that Triple M was not required to
provide the statutory notice; therefore, its claim of lien was not frivolous.
b. Debatably, the Feekes acted as their own general contractor
Another situation where a contractor need not provide its customer with
the statutory notice is when the contractor contracts with another contractor.
RCW 18.27.114(5). At the trial court level and on appeal, both parties argued
whether this exception applies.
RCW 18.27.010(1)(a) defines “contractor” to include “any person . . . who . . .
upon his or her property, employs members of more than one trade upon a single job or
project.” Because RCW 18.27.114(1) requires the Notice to Customer to be provided
3
The Feekes accidently conceded this point when, in his declaration, Mr. Feekes complained: “Triple M . . . tried to pressure me into signing more contracts for [its] company to complete more work.” CP at 117.
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before work begins, our inquiry is not whether the Feekes ultimately hired more than one
trade, but whether that was their initial plan.
Here, the record is less clear on this point. On one hand, both contracts state they
are “General Contractor Agreement[s]” and fairly imply that Triple M is the general
contractor. CP at 123, 140. On the other hand, there is evidence that the Feekes always
intended to hire more than one trade to work on their property. First, the building permit
identifies the Feekes as the general contractor. Second, Mr. Feekes text messaged Triple
M that he had arranged the plumbing and electrical work, and this arrangement occurred
before the Feekes ever asserted that Triple M had breached the contracts. We conclude
that it is debatable whether Triple M was required to provide the statutory notice, and so
its claim of lien was not frivolous.
2. Whether Triple M’s claim of lien was clearly excessive
A claim of lien is clearly excessive if it is unquestionably above the usual or
agreed amount. Woodley, 7 Wn. App. 2d at 560. On this issue, there is a significant
factual disagreement.
The parties disagreed on the extent to which Triple M had completed both
contracts, whether Triple M had breached the concrete contract and, if so, how much
might be owed to whom. These questions are best answered at trial through questioning
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and cross-examination, not in a summary process by affidavit. We conclude that the trial
court did not err in declining to reduce Triple M’s claim of lien.
B. REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Triple M requests an award of reasonable attorney fees on appeal and cites
RAP 18.1(a) and RCW 60.04.081(4). We deny its request.
RAP 18.1(a) provides: “If applicable law grants to a party the right to recover
reasonable attorney fees or expenses on review before either the Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court, the party must request the fees or expenses as provided in this rule,
unless a statute specifies that the request is to be directed to the trial court.” (Emphasis
added.) The rule, itself, does not authorize recovery of attorney fees on appeal. Rather,
the rule permits recovery of attorney fees on appeal only if applicable law grants that
right and the party requests fees as prescribed by RAP 18.1. Wachovia SBA Lending, Inc.
v. Kraft, 165 Wn.2d 481, 493, 200 P.3d 683 (2009). The question then is whether
RCW 60.04.081(4) grants the right to recover attorney fees on appeal.
RCW 60.04.081(4) provides in relevant part:
If, following a hearing on the matter, . . . the court determines that the lien is
not frivolous and was made with reasonable cause, and is not clearly
excessive, the court shall issue an order so stating and awarding costs and
reasonable attorneys’ fees to the lien claimant to be paid by the applicant.
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The general rules of statutory construction are well summarized in Pacific
Northwest Shooting Park Association v. City of Sequim:
In interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to determine and give
effect to the legislature’s intent and purpose in creating the statute. We
generally begin our analysis with the text of the statute. If the statute is
clear and unambiguous on its face, we determine its meaning only from the
language of the statute and do not resort to statutory construction principles.
A statute is ambiguous only if it can be reasonably interpreted in more than
one way, not merely because other possible interpretations exist.
158 Wn.2d 342, 354, 144 P.3d 276 (2006) (citations omitted).
A careful reading of RCW 60.04.081(4) shows that the statute’s text does not
support recovery of attorney fees on appeal. RCW 60.04.081(4) uses phrases such as
“following a hearing” and “issue an order.” First, the hearing referred to is the hearing at
the trial court level. Many appellate cases, such as this, are decided without a hearing.
Second, the order referred to is the order issued after the trial court hearing. Appellate
courts generally issue opinions, not orders. We conclude that the statute can only be
reasonably interpreted as permitting attorney fees at the trial court level.
Triple M cites W.R.P. Lake Union Limited Partnership v. Exterior Services, Inc.,
85 Wn. App. 744, 934 P.2d 722 (1997), in support of its request for reasonable attorney
fees on appeal. There, Division One of this court stated, “Attorney fees are mandatory
for the prevailing party under RCW 60.04.081(4).” Id. at 753. The Lake Union court
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neither quoted nor analyzed the statute, yet awarded the prevailing party attorney
fees “both below and on appeal.” Id. To the extent Lake Union concluded that
RCW 60.04.081(4) authorizes attorney fees on appeal, we decline to follow it.
Affirmed.
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________ _________________________________ Cooney, A.C.J. Murphy, J.
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