J-S44005-25 2026 PA Super 156
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MICHAEL ALLEN STARK :
:
Appellant : No. 1648 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 9, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-09-CR-0003952-2023
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
OPINION BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED JULY 22, 2026
Michael Allen Stark appeals, nunc pro tunc,1 from the judgment of
sentence, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, following
his convictions of one count each of first-degree murder, 2 second-degree
murder,3 robbery—inflict serious bodily injury,4 robbery—threaten serious
1 Prior to the instant appeal, Stark had filed an appeal to this Court, which was
quashed as untimely. See Order, 4/25/25. On May 5, 2025, Stark filed a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, seeking reinstatement of his right to file a direct appeal, nunc pro tunc. The PCRA court appointed counsel and, ultimately, the Commonwealth agreed that Stark’s appellate rights should be reinstated. On June 9, 2025, the PCRA court granted Stark’s PCRA petition and reinstated his appellate rights nunc pro tunc. This appeal follows.
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
3 Id. at § 2502(b).
4 Id. at § 3701(a)(1)(i).
J-S44005-25
bodily injury,5 kidnapping,6 flight to avoid apprehension,7 criminal use of a
communication facility,8 tamper with/fabricate physical evidence,9 and abuse
of a corpse,10 and three counts of theft by unlawful taking. 11 After careful
review, we vacate Stark’s judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial.
The facts of this case, while complex, are largely uncontested. Stark
and Matthew Branning worked together at Enchlor, Inc. (Enchlor), a parts
manufacturing business located in Silverdale Borough, Bucks County. Thane
Tagg is the owner and operator of Enchlor. Stark worked at Enchlor beginning
in May 2021 and worked part-time evening shifts, from 4:00 p.m. to 12:00
a.m., on weekends.12 Branning was an employee at Enchlor for approximately
nine years and worked the day shift from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. every
weekday. It is uncontested that Stark and Branning had no personal
5 Id. at § 3701(a)(1)(ii).
6 Id. at § 2901(a)(2).
7 Id. at § 5126(a).
8 Id. at § 7512(a).
9 Id. at § 4910(1).
10 Id. at § 5510.
11 Id. at § 3921(a).
12 We note that Stark also worked part-time at Fetterolf Corporation but had
been failing to appear for work since September 2021.
-2-J-S44005-25
relationship, rarely saw each other at work due to their separate shifts, and
spoke only sparingly about work.
In October 2021, Stark was having difficulty showing up to work. In
particular, October 5, 2021 was the last day Stark had appeared for a
scheduled shift. Additionally, on October 7, 2021, Stark was having car
issues, and Branning, at Tagg’s behest, picked up Stark and brought him to
work. However, shortly after arriving at Enchlor, Branning took Stark home.
Later, Stark informed Tagg that he would also be able to work on October 15,
2021 and wished to discuss the possibility of increasing his hours and
transitioning to full-time employment.
On October 15, 2021, Branning and Tagg arrived at work at
approximately 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., respectively. At approximately 2:00
p.m., Tagg left Enchlor and asked Branning to notify him when Stark arrived.
Tagg received no update from Branning and, at 4:30 p.m., returned to Enchlor
to find the business empty. Tagg, believing Branning had left for the day and
that Stark’s failure to appear was an indication that Stark had voluntarily
chosen to end his employment, locked the building and went home.
On October 16, 2021, Branning’s family reported him missing to the
Bucks County police. Specifically, they explained that Branning had not come
home from work after his shift on October 15 and had missed several
scheduled family events on the evening of October 15 and the morning of
October 16. On October 19, 2021, Stark’s family reported Stark missing
because they had not heard from him in several days.
-3-J-S44005-25
On October 17, 2021, Detective Travis Schoonover of the Perkasie
Borough Police Department was assigned to investigate Branning’s
disappearance. Through the course of his investigation, he acquired the help
of Detective David Hanks of the Bucks County Detectives Bureau, 13 who
specialized in cell tower data. Police were able to create a timeline of both
men’s movements using records gathered from Uber, license plate readers on
toll booths provided by the New Jersey Turnpike Commission, cell tower data,
and Branning’s bank transactions.
Based upon their investigation, police discovered that, on October 15,
2021, Stark took an Uber from his residence, located at 314 Walnut Street
Royersford, Bucks County, to Enchlor. Approximately three miles before he
arrived at Enchlor, Stark shut off his cell phone. Stark’s Uber arrived at
Enchlor at 3:38 p.m. Stark’s arrival was confirmed by Uber records, the Uber
driver, and a Ring Doorbell camera from a house across the street from
Enchlor that depicted the Uber vehicle arriving at Enchlor. At 4:07 p.m.,
Branning was shown in drive-thru ATM security camera footage at a BB&T
Bank (BB&T), located in Sellersville, Bucks County, where he withdrew
$500.00. Branning was shown driving his 2002 Silver Lexus SUV at the time
of the transaction, wearing a black colored t-shirt and white colored shorts. A
second figure can be seen moving in the backseat of the Lexus, but it is ____________________________________________
13 Detective Hanks retired prior to the jury trial in this case but was admitted
as an expert in cell tower data. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 3), 9/5/24, 138-41 (Detective Hanks admitted as expert in field of historical cell site analysis).
-4-J-S44005-25
impossible to discern any features of the person due to the window tinting and
glare.14
After the ATM withdrawal, cell tower data located Branning’s phone at
approximately 4:47 p.m., traveling northbound over the Scudder Falls Bridge
from Pennsylvania into New Jersey. Shortly after crossing into New Jersey,
Branning’s phone ceased communicating with cell towers. Later that evening,
at 7:05 p.m., a debit card transaction was recorded on Branning’s BB&T bank
account at a gas station in Somers Point, New Jersey.15 This was the final
transaction recorded on Branning’s BB&T bank account.
At 8:36 p.m., Branning’s Lexus was seen on toll booth license plate
readers traveling southbound on the Garden State Parkway in New Jersey.
The Lexus entered the parkway from the Somers Point exit. At 9:04 p.m.,
both Stark’s and Branning’s cell phones began transmitting again in Cape May,
New Jersey. Both phones pinged a cell tower near a Wawa store in Cape May
(Cape May Wawa). Surveillance footage from the Cape May Wawa depicted
an individual, later identified as Stark, entering the store wearing glasses and ____________________________________________
14 See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 1), 9/3/24, at 21-25 (Detective Schoonover summarizing BB&T video); see also Commonwealth Exhibit C-10 (BB&T
video); Commonwealth Exhibit C-11 (BB&T video zoomed in); Commonwealth Exhibit C-12 (alternate angle BB&T surveillance video); Commonwealth Exhibit C-13 (alternate angle BB&T surveillance video zoomed in).
15 We note that, in New Jersey, gas station attendants pump gas for the driver
and drivers are prohibited by law from pumping their own gas. Additionally, by the time the police discovered that Branning’s vehicle had stopped there, the gas station had already overwritten its security camera backups and there was no recoverable video footage. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 2), 9/4/24, at 26-28.
-5-J-S44005-25
a dark-colored sweatshirt with the hood pulled over his head. Stark purchased
two USB adapter car charger cables, one compatible with his phone and the
other compatible with Branning’s phone. Branning is not seen on the Cape
May Wawa footage.
At 10:14 p.m., Branning’s vehicle was depicted traveling northbound on
the Garden State Parkway through the Cape May Toll Plaza. At 10:28 p.m.,
Branning’s phone communicated with a cell tower north of the Great Egg Toll
Plaza and traveled north towards the Atlantic City Expressway. This was the
last transmission from Branning’s phone as it did not turn back on and was
never located.
At 10:42 p.m., the Lexus is depicted traveling westbound on the Atlantic
City Expressway towards Philadelphia. On October 16, 2021, from 12:09 a.m.
until 1:52 a.m., Stark’s phone pinged off cell towers in McPherson Square in
the Kensington section of Philadelphia. This is the last recorded activity from
Stark’s cell phone, which, like Branning’s, was never located. Ultimately, the
investigation revealed16 that Stark moved to Detroit, Michigan and was listed
as being employed by a temporary employment agency, People Ready, as of
October 27, 2021.
16 Investigators became aware of Stark’s location in November of 2021, when
Stark pawned a bicycle at Garden City Pawn, a pawn shop in Garden City, Michigan. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 2), 9/4/24, at 48-49; see also Commonwealth Exhibit C-26 (Garden City Pawn pawn slip). Police secured receipts and surveillance footage, which depicted Stark entering Garden City Pawn with a bicycle. See Commonwealth Exhibits C-27, C-28 (photographs of Stark entering Garden City Pawn); Commonwealth Exhibits C-29, C-30 (surveillance videos of Stark entering Garden City Pawn).
-6-J-S44005-25
On November 2, 2021, 17 days after Stark and Branning disappeared,
a couple walking their dog in Reisterstown, Maryland found a deceased
individual (John Doe)17 in a drainage ditch off the side of a service road on the
13000 block of Old Hanover Road.18 The drainage ditch had seen at least
some rainfall during the preceding weeks and, as a result, the body had
sustained water damage. Maryland police and EMS responded and determined
that John Doe was deceased. John Doe was wearing a black colored t-shirt
and white shorts.
John Doe was transported to the Maryland Office of the Chief Medical
Examiner (OCME) in Baltimore, Maryland. On November 3, 2021, Jiemin
Zhou, M.D., an associate pathologist (Dr. Zhou), Stephanie Dean, M.D., a
forensic pathologist and the Chief Medical Examiner of OCME (Dr. Dean), and
William Ceasor Rodriguez, III, Ph.D., a consulting forensic anthropologist (Dr.
Rodriguez), conducted the autopsy.19 As discussed infra, Dr. Rodriguez
assisted the OCME in determining time of death.
17 This John Doe would later be identified as Branning. However, the body would not be identified as Branning until April 2022, and this lapse in time is particularly relevant to the facts of this case. Thus, we refer to the body as “John Doe” until he is identified as Branning during the police investigation.
18 Maryland authorities were not able to identify the John Doe due to the facial
deterioration and water damaged hands, which, respectively, prevented facial recognition and fingerprinting. Thus, they did not contact Pennsylvania or Bucks County authorities.
19 Doctors Dean and Rodriguez were accepted as experts in their respective
fields and testified at trial as to their opinions and conclusions. See N.T. Jury (Footnote Continued Next Page)
-7-J-S44005-25
Doctor Dean concluded, in relevant part, that John Doe’s body was in
the early stages of decomposition. Doctor Dean concluded that the body had
not sustained any gunshot wounds, puncture wounds, or fractured bones, did
not exhibit any evidence of blunt-force trauma or car-related injuries, and that
John Doe’s neck was largely intact and exhibited no visible injuries from
ligature. As a result of these conclusions, Dr. Dean also performed radiology,
microscopic autopsy, dissection, and toxicology tests. 20 These tests revealed
only that one of John Doe’s coronary arteries was 50% occluded; however,
Dr. Dean concluded that this was not likely a cause of death but could
contribute to an arrythmia, which would not have been detectable by the tests
she performed. Additionally, the toxicology test revealed a small amount of
ethanol was present, which Dr. Dean concluded was due to the stage of
decomposition.
Doctor Dean further opined that an autopsy, at this stage of
decomposition, would not be able to rule out death by seizure, cardiac
arrythmia, asphyxia, exposure to elements, drowning, or rare drugs or
poisons. Ultimately, Dr. Dean concluded that the cause of death and manner
of death were undetermined.
Trial (Day 3), 9/5/24, at 14-15 (Doctor Dean admitted as expert in forensic pathology); id. at 43 (Doctor Rodriguez admitted as expert in forensic anthropology). Doctor Zhou did not testify at trial.
20 The toxicology report was prepared and authored by Rebecca Phipps, who
did not testify at trial. See Commonwealth Exhibit C-70 (OCME post-mortem examination report).
-8-J-S44005-25
Doctor Rodriguez, who was also present at the autopsy, assisted Dr.
Dean and, together, they collected various maggots from John Doe. Doctor
Rodriguez opined that maggots can help determine time of death through a
process called “time of colonization.” Time of colonization refers to the time
at which flies have inhabited a corpse and laid eggs. It does not necessarily
coincide with the time of death. Based upon the recovered maggot corpses, 21
the environmental conditions of the drainage ditch, and the early
decomposition stage of the body, Dr. Rodriguez concluded that John Doe had
died within the last five days, or as early as October 29, 2021.
In December 2021,22 Branning’s vehicle was found abandoned in Falls
Church, Virginia, without a license plate and with a flat rear left tire.
Branning’s family was alerted to its location when a towing company in Virginia
sent a letter to them. Branning’s family alerted Detectives Schoonover and
Hanks, who communicated with the Fairfax County, Virginia police
department.
21 As was noted several times throughout trial, Dr. Rodriguez is not a forensic
entomologist. See id. at 47, 50, 57, 65, 72. Nevertheless, Dr. Rodriguez still opined that the maggots recovered were of the first or second instar and, thus, could not have been present in the body for more than five days. The term “instar” refers to “the stage of development of the blow fly. After they hatch they . . . go through three instars or stages of development[, during which] their morphology [] changes . . . and that’s how one can determine whether [the larvae is a first, second, or third] instar.” N.T. Jury Trial (Day 3), 9/5/24, at 63 (Doctor Rodriguez defining instar).
22 The record does not reflect the exact date that Branning’s vehicle was found.
-9-J-S44005-25
The Fairfax County police confirmed that Branning’s vehicle was locked,
they had not seen anyone with the vehicle, and no one had entered the vehicle
as part of the towing process. Fairfax County police also secured the vehicle
in its impound lot and had not entered the vehicle.
Shortly thereafter, Detectives Schoonover and Hanks secured a search
warrant for the vehicle and traveled to Falls Church, Virginia. During this
search, the detectives obtained DNA swabs of the steering wheel, which
revealed positive matches for Stark’s DNA, but no match for Branning’s DNA. 23
The detectives also located two packs of Newport cigarettes, empty crack
cocaine containers, Branning’s BB&T debit card, and a loose battery and back
cover for Stark’s cellphone. The Newport cigarettes were affixed with a New
Jersey tax stamp, indicating that they were purchased in New Jersey. Stark
was a known smoker whose brand of choice was Newport. Additionally,
investigators noted that the driver’s seat was adjusted almost entirely
forward, nearly touching the steering wheel. Investigators believed that this
seat position indicated that a person of smaller stature was the last to operate
the vehicle. Notably, police believed Stark, who is 5’2”, was the last operator
of the vehicle.24 Additionally, police recovered a USB drive, which was later ____________________________________________
23 The detectives also swabbed various door handles, a cigarette, one of the
empty Newport packs, and several vehicle surfaces.
24Shortly after discovering Branning’s vehicle, the Commonwealth initiated Grand Jury proceedings against Stark. Stark was ultimately arrested and extradited to Pennsylvania, where he testified before the Twentieth Bucks (Footnote Continued Next Page)
- 10 -J-S44005-25
identified as Branning’s, which contained music and “thousands” of images
and videos of women asphyxiating men with their thighs. See N.T. Jury Trial
(Day 2), 9/4/24, at 63-64; see also Pre-Trial Motions Hearing, 1/12/24, at
25-26 (describing contents of USB drive).
In February 2022, investigators intercepted phone calls between Stark
and his family. The phone calls were centered around Stark’s family’s
frustrations with being interviewed by the police about where Stark went, or
what happened to Branning, and Stark responded, “I don’t know, you
shouldn’t be talking about it, I have no idea.” Commonwealth Exhibit C-44,
at 2:49.
On April 4, 2023, the Doe Network, a non-profit organization that
identifies missing persons and John Doe bodies,25 performed dental record
checks on the John Doe discovered in Maryland on November 2, 2021, and
determined that John Doe’s teeth matched Branning’s dental records.
Subsequent DNA testing confirmed that John Doe was Branning. As a result,
the OCME transported Branning’s body to Pennsylvania.
On August 8, 2023, the Bucks County District Attorney’s Office
contacted Dennis Cornelis Dirkmaat, Ph.D., a forensic anthropologist (Dr.
Dirkmaat), and requested that he determine Branning’s cause, manner,
County Investigating Grand Jury on January 13, 2022. On March 2, 2023, the Grand Jury concluded that there was sufficient evidence to charge Stark with the above-mentioned offenses.
25 See https://www.doenetwork.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2026).
- 11 -J-S44005-25
and/or time of death. The Bucks County District Attorney’s Office sent
Branning’s body to Dr. Dirkmaat, who conducted a “comprehensive forensic
anthropological analysis” that included forensic osteological analysis,
inventory of the remains, biological profile analysis, antemortem skeletal
trauma analysis, perimortem skeletal trauma analysis, forensic taphonomic
analysis, and postmortem interval. See Commonwealth Exhibit C-73 (Doctor
Dirkmaat’s expert report). Doctor Dirkmaat, after reviewing Drs. Dean and
Rodriguez’s autopsy notes and conclusions, similarly concluded that the cause
and manner of death were undetermined. However, Dr. Dirkmaat disagreed
with Dr. Rodriguez’s 5-day time-of-death window and, instead, opined that
Branning had died within 21 days prior to the discovery of his body on
November 2, 2021.26
On January 10, 2024, the Commonwealth sought a third opinion, from
John Robert Wallace, Ph.D., a forensic entomologist (Dr. Wallace). In
particular, the Commonwealth requested that Dr. Wallace assist in
determining the postmortem interval, if possible, using the maggots that Drs.
Dean and Rodriguez had recovered from Branning’s body. See
Commonwealth Exhibit C-74 (Doctor Wallace’s expert report). The
Commonwealth sent Dr. Wallace a flash drive that included: the homicide
report, expert and autopsy reports from Drs. Dean and Rodriguez, and
26 Notably, this time-of-death window places Branning’s earliest time of death
on October 11, 2021, four days before he disappeared.
- 12 -J-S44005-25
autopsy photographs. See id. Doctor Wallace explained that, typically, he
does not estimate time of death but rather time of colonization. See id.
Doctor Wallace opined that, while time of colonization is not time of
death, it can be used to help determine time of death. See N.T. Jury Trial
(Day 4), 9/9/24, at 10. Doctor Wallace opined that time of colonization is
impacted by various factors including, but not limited to, temperature ranges,
amounts of rainfall,27 and the position of the body. See id. (Doctor Wallace
explaining fly wings cannot operate below 50 degrees Fahrenheit and, thus,
struggle to colonize bodies at low temperatures); see id. at 11 (Doctor
Wallace testifying flies cannot swim and, thus, rainfall data is important where
body is recovered from ditch or body of water as flies would be unable to
colonize submerged body); see id. (Doctor Wallace explaining colonization
can be reset if sufficient rainfall submerges body orifices as it could drown or
kill any flies or larvae).
Through the provided photos, Doctor Wallace identified maggots of first,
second, and third instar. See Commonwealth Exhibit C-74 (Doctor Wallace’s
expert report); see also N.T. Jury Trial (Day 4), 9/9/24, at 18-19 (Doctor
27 Doctor Wallace testified that, based upon data from the BaltimoreWashington Airport (BWI), there was approximately 1.96 inches of rainfall on October 25, 2021, and 3.91 inches of rainfall on October 29, 2021. See id. at 20. Doctor Wallace explained that amount of rainfall could impact, or reset, time of colonization. See id. However, Dr. Wallace also testified that the Commonwealth did not provide him with rainfall data for the specific region where Branning’s body was recovered and, thus, he could not sufficiently opine as to whether that rainfall had a significant impact on the time of colonization in this case. See id. at 21-22.
- 13 -J-S44005-25
Wallace explaining there were not “very many” third instars). Doctor Wallace
explained that, if Branning’s body contained only first and second instars, then
the time of colonization was between 8:54 a.m. on October 27, 2021, and
5:54 p.m. on October 29, 2021. See Commonwealth Exhibit C-74 (Doctor
Wallace’s expert report); see also N.T. Jury Trial (Day 4), 9/9/24, at 18-19.
However, Dr. Wallace stated that the presence of third instar maggots was
significant because it expands the time of colonization to between 9:54 a.m.
on October 23, 2021, and 5:54 p.m. on October 29, 2021. See N.T. Jury Trial
(Day 4), 9/9/24, at 18-19. In reaching his conclusions, Dr. Wallace explained
that he was unable to accurately discern the type of blowfly 28 present because
none of the maggot specimens were properly preserved and he only had
access to photographs; thus, he was only able to give a “conservative” time
of colonization estimate. See id. at 22-27. Ultimately, Dr. Wallace did not
opine as to cause or manner of death.
28 Doctor Wallace testified that different species of blowfly have different rates
at which they progress to third instar. See id. at 15-16. Doctor Wallace explained that, due to improper preservation of the maggots and the generally incomplete data, he was unable to discern the exact genus of blowfly. See id. at 14-17; see also Commonwealth Exhibit C-74 (Doctor Wallace’s expert report). Thus, Dr. Wallace evaluated the maggots as though they were of the Calliphora or Phormia generas, as both of those genera of blowflies would have been active in that region of Maryland during October. See Commonwealth Exhibit C-74 (Doctor Wallace’s expert report).
- 14 -J-S44005-25
On March 12, 2024, Sarah Waldrip, a DNA analyst at Bode Technology
(Analyst Waldrip),29 testified as to the DNA samples collected from Branning’s
vehicle. See Commonwealth Exhibit, C-66 (Analyst Waldrip’s expert report).
Analyst Waldrip testified that the DNA samples from Branning’s steering wheel
matched Stark’s DNA and specifically excluded Branning’s DNA. See id.; see
also N.T. Jury Trial (Day 2), 9/4/24, at 177-80. Analyst Waldrip stated that
the DNA samples taken from the driver’s side interior rear door handle,
passenger rear, and empty Newport cigarette packs were all “below the limit
of detection,” which means they “did[ not] meet the threshold for Bode
Technolog[y] to give a conclusion.” N.T. Jury Trial (Day 2), 9/4/24, at 181-82. Further, the DNA sample taken from the driver’s side front panel was
consistent with Branning’s DNA and excluded Stark’s DNA. See id. at 182-83. Lastly, the DNA swab taken from the cigarette specifically excluded both
Stark and Branning and, instead, comprised a DNA profile of an unknown
male. See id. at 183.
As indicated above, Stark was arrested, extradited, and charged with
the above-mentioned offenses. On December 21, 2023, the Commonwealth
filed an omnibus pre-trial motion requesting, inter alia,30 that it be permitted
29 Analyst Waldrip was admitted as an expert in DNA analysis. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 2), 9/4/24, at 167.
30 The Commonwealth also requested reciprocal discovery and that the defense be prohibited from admitting evidence from Branning’s USB drive at trial. See Commonwealth’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 12/21/23, at 1-7.
- 15 -J-S44005-25
to present evidence of Stark’s prior convictions of robbery under Pa.R.E.
404(b)(2) for the purposes of demonstrating motive, intent, plan, and/or
opportunity consistent with those convictions. See id. at 1-2. On December
27, 2023, Stark filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, which included, inter alia,31
requests to preclude admission of Stark’s prior convictions for robbery as prior
bad acts. See id. at 4-5.
On January 12, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on the parties’
pre-trial motions. Relevant to the claims on appeal, the Commonwealth
sought to introduce evidence under Rule 404(b)(2) of Stark’s three prior
convictions for robbery for the following events: 32 (1) On December 13, 1994,
Stark was convicted of robbery for a March 15, 1993, robbery of a Taco Bell
located in Allentown, Lehigh County, where Stark utilized a stolen .25 caliber
automatic handgun, threatened an employee, and took the contents of the
Taco Bell safe. Upon arrest, Stark was found to be in possession of cocaine;
(2) On January 9, 1995, Stark was convicted of robbery for a February 25,
1993, robbery of a Domino’s Pizza located in Lower Nazareth Township,
Northampton County, where he brandished a chrome-plated pistol, put the
handgun against the jaw of an employee, and took the contents of the
31Stark’s omnibus pre-trial motion included requests for discovery, habeas corpus relief, expert reports, sequestration of Commonwealth witnesses, suppression, and production of transcripts. See Stark’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 12/27/23, at 1-7 (unpaginated).
32 For ease of reference, we refer to Stark’s prior convictions, collectively, as
Stark’s 1990s robbery convictions.
- 16 -J-S44005-25
Domino’s safe. During this robbery, Stark and a co-defendant ordered three
Domino’s employees into a walk-in freezer; and, (3) On January 29, 1996,
Stark was convicted of robbery for a March 11, 1993, robbery of a Pizza Hut
located in Montgomery Township, Montgomery County, where Stark utilized a
chrome handgun to threaten a Pizza Hut employee, took the money from the
safe, and ordered the employee into the walk-in freezer. See N.T. Pre-Trial
Hearing, 1/12/24, at 8-9 (Commonwealth summarizing Stark’s 1990s robbery
convictions); see also Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/25, at 14-15 (summarizing
Stark’s 1990s robbery convictions).33
On February 1, 2024, the trial court entered an order granting in part
and denying in part pre-trial motions. Relevant to the issues on appeal, the
trial court granted the Commonwealth’s request to admit evidence of Stark’s
1990s robbery convictions as prior bad acts under Rule 404(b) for the limited
purposes of demonstrating motive, intent, plan, and/or opportunity and,
consequently, denied Stark’s motion to preclude them. See Omnibus PreTrial Order, 2/1/24, at 1-3.
Ultimately, on September 3, 2024, Stark proceeded to a four-day jury
trial. Immediately prior to closing arguments, the Commonwealth presented
Stark’s 1990s robbery convictions, via Detective Schoonover’s testimony, to
the jury. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 4), 9/9/24, at 37-48; see also id. at 37 ____________________________________________
33 We observe that the trial court’s opinion, authored on July 18, 2025, incorporates its prior opinion, dated February 26, 2025, as an attachment. We cite to the trial court opinion as dated July 18, 2025 throughout this opinion.
- 17 -J-S44005-25
(Stark renewing objection to admission of his 1990s robbery convictions); id.
49-52 (Stark renewing Rule 404(b) objection to admission of his 1990s
robbery convictions after Detective Schoonover’s direct testimony); id. at 37,
52-53 (trial court overruling Stark’s Rule 404(b) objections). On September
9, 2024, Stark was convicted of the above-mentioned offenses. Stark
proceeded immediately to sentencing and the trial court imposed an
aggregate sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Stark filed a timely
post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied.
Stark filed a notice of appeal, nunc pro tunc, and a court-ordered
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Stark
now raises the following claims for our review:
1. Did the trial court err by incorrectly permitting impermissible
[Rule] 404(b) evidence during trial, specifically[ the 1990s
robbery convictions.]
2. Did the trial court commit an error of law by denying [Stark]’s
motion for a mistrial, in response to the Commonwealth
presenting evidence that was prohibited by the trial court’s pretrial order?
Brief for Appellant, at 10 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Stark first argues that the trial court erred in admitting his 1990s
robbery convictions as prior bad acts under Rule 404(b)(2) for purposes of
demonstrating plan, motive, intent, and/or knowledge. See id. at 14-22.
Stark contends that, despite the Commonwealth’s statements to the contrary,
the Commonwealth sought to admit his 1990s robbery convictions for the sole
purpose of demonstrating that he is a dangerous person who commits armed
- 18 -J-S44005-25
robberies. See id. at 14. Stark asserts that the prejudicial effect of this
evidence outweighed any probative value because the lapse in time between
his 1990s robbery convictions and the instant case is approximately 30 years,
there are no factual commonalities between his 1990s robbery convictions and
the instant case, and the trial court’s jury instructions could not, and did not,
remedy such prejudice. See id. at 15-22. We agree.
“Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court
and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused
its discretion.” Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 808 A.2d 893, 904 (Pa.
2002). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is
rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment
that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will[,] or
partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Commonwealth v. Harris,
884 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. 2005). “It is not sufficient to persuade the
appellate court that it might have reached a different conclusion[; rather,] it
is necessary to show an actual abuse of the [trial court’s] discretionary power.”
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 67 A.3d 716, 726 (Pa. 2013) (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
Relevance is the threshold for admissibility of evidence.
Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d 594, 612 (Pa. 2008). Pursuant to Pa.R.E.
401, evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence[] and [] the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401. “Evidence is relevant
- 19 -J-S44005-25
if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a
fact at issue more or less probable[,] or supports a reasonable inference or
presumption regarding a material fact.” Drumheller, 808 A.2d at 904. “All
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by law.
Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402. “The court may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of
one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403.
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides as follows:
Rule 404. Character Evidence; Other Crimes, Wrongs, or
Acts
***
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or
act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order
to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for
another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case[,] this
evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the
evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.
Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(2).
Recently, our Supreme Court analyzed Rule 404(b)(2)’s “modus
operandi” exception. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 350 A.3d 54, 73 (Pa.
- 20 -J-S44005-25
2026) (explaining “common plan, scheme, or design . . . [are not] distinct
exceptions[, but are used] interchangeably”). The Supreme Court explained
that modus operandi is akin to a “virtual signature,” and a mere “logical
connection” between the crimes is insufficient to satisfy Rule 404(b)(2). 34 See
id.
“[E]vidence of prior crimes is not admissible for the sole purpose
of demonstrating a criminal defendant’s propensity to commit
crimes.” Commonwealth v. Melendez-Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278, 1283
(Pa. Super. 2004) (emphasis added). Further, “[m]ere similarities between a
defendant’s prior bad acts and the crimes for which he is being tried will not
qualify for a Rule 404(b)(2) exception.” Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216
A.3d 307, 316 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, “[e]vidence
may be admissible in certain circumstances where it is relevant for some other
legitimate purpose and not utilized solely to blacken the defendant’s
character.” Melendez-Rodriguez, 856 A.2d at 1283. Specifically, other
crimes evidence is admissible if offered for a non-propensity purpose, such as
proof of an actor’s knowledge, plan, motive, or identity, or absence of mistake
34 Notably, in Walker, our Supreme Court analyzed this exception as it pertains to consolidation of trials but made clear that there was no distinction between case consolidation and application of Rule 404(b)(2) when
determining the admissibility of prior convictions. See id. at 61-62 (explaining Pa.R.Crim.P. 582, governing consolidation, necessarily requires Rule 404(b) analysis to determine admissibility of other crimes in separate trials).
- 21 -J-S44005-25
or accident. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 534 (Pa. 2005).
When offered for a legitimate purpose, evidence of prior crimes is admissible
if its probative value outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.
Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 664-65 (Pa. 2014).
Unfair prejudice “means a tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis or to divert the [fact-finder]’s attention away from its duty of weighing
the evidence impartially.” Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 141 (Pa.
2007).
Evidence will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to the
defendant. This Court has stated that it is not required to sanitize
the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the [fact-finder]’s
consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at
hand and form part of the history and natural development of the
events and offenses for which the defendant is charged.
Moreover, we have upheld the admission of other crimes
evidence, when relevant, even where the details of the other
crime[s] were extremely grotesque and highly prejudicial.
Id. (emphasis added; internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
“Additionally, when examining the potential for undue prejudice, a cautionary
jury instruction may ameliorate the prejudicial effect of the proffered
evidence. . . . Jurors are presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions.”
Hairston, 84 A.3d at 666. Thus, where a cautionary instruction is provided
to the jury, the likelihood of undue prejudice is minimized. See id.
Instantly, the trial court explained its ruling as follows:
Stark was convicted [for his 1990s robbery convictions],
respectively, [27], [26], and [25] years prior to the current
charges. As a result of those crimes, Stark remained on parole
and under the supervision of the [Commonwealth] until 2015, six
- 22 -J-S44005-25
years prior to the murder of Branning. Although the lapse of time
at issue in this case was lengthy, the [c]ourt maintains that
evidence of Stark’s prior criminal convictions is admissible and
offered for a legitimate purpose.
The underlying facts of Stark’s December 13, 1994 conviction are
that on March 15, 1993, Stark entered a Taco Bell in Allentown,
Lehigh County[,] brandishing a stolen firearm and directed an
employee to open the safe and place money into a duffle bag.
Stark was arrested and found to have stolen $637.79 in cash. He
was also found to be in possession of cocaine.
Next, the underlying facts of Stark’s January 9, 1995, conviction
are that on February 25, 1993, Stark entered a Domino’s Pizza in
Northampton County, Pennsylvania, brandishing a firearm and
demanded the employees open the safe and place the money into
a bag[, a]fter which Stark placed the employees inside of a walkin freezer before fleeing the premises. Stark was found to have
stolen $885[.00] in cash.
Finally, the underlying facts of Stark’s January 29, 1996,
conviction are that on March 11, 1993, Stark entered a Pizza Hut
in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. Stark, at gunpoint,
demanded that the employee open the safe and surrender the
cash. Following this, Stark forced the employee into the walk-in
freezer before fleeing the premises. Stark was found to have
stolen $1,416[.00].
The evidence of prior bad acts was introduced in a very limited
sense and was elicited through the testimony of Detective
Schoonover. The Commonwealth recalled Detective Schoonover
as a witness, prior to ending [its] case in chief, in which he read
the corresponding affidavits of probable cause for each prior
conviction. No further examination or discussion regarding these
past convictions occurred.
First, we address the obvious gap in time between the prior acts
and the current case . . . [and] conclude[] that the remoteness
factor does not outweigh the other considerations at hand. Here,
the prior convictions share striking similarities with the alleged
crime, in terms of opportunity, method, intent, and motive. The
pattern of conduct strongly suggests that Stark’s actions were not
accidental or the result of mistake, but instead an intentional and
deliberate course of behavior. As a result, we found the evidence
- 23 -J-S44005-25
to be highly probative and [that its probative value] outweighs
any prejudicial impact resulting from the lapse of time.
In each of the three prior bad acts, Stark [] demonstrated a
consistent pattern of behavior towards the victims. In all cases,
Stark place[d] himself in a position of authority, using a forceful
demeanor while remaining meticulous in his efforts to avoid
drawing public attention. Stark’s actions are clearly calculated
and focus on obtaining small amounts of cash. In this case, while
no evidence of a weapon was introduced, it was established that
Stark was in the backseat of Branning’s vehicle[,] likely coercing
and directing Branning to withdraw money from the [BB&T ATM].
Ultimately, such evidence is probative of Stark’s motive and intent
to threaten Branning and restrict his freedom of movement as he
did in the prior armed robberies when he forced employees of the
establishments he robbed into the walk-in freezer before fleeing.
The absence of a weapon does not diminish the significance of
Stark’s actions, which are critical to understanding the nature of
his involvement in this incident. Furthermore, the prior acts
illustrate that Stark was not mistaken, and his intentions were to
rob Branning of money when he entered the vehicle, the same as
his intentions were upon entering the three prior establishments.
[T]he [c]ourt did not err in determining that the probative value .
. . outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice. . . . The [c]ourt
emphasiz[ed] that Stark’s prior armed robberies were not so
dissimilar from the current charges of robbery and kidnapping that
they would lead the jury to convict based solely on [Stark]’s bad
character. Here, as previously established, Stark and Branning
left Enchlor together that day. The prior convictions are directly
relevant to critical issues regarding intent, motive[,] and plan. In
addition to the similarity of Stark’s conduct, such evidence is
pivotal in helping the jury understand the context of the conduct
charged.
Moreover, in evaluating the potential prejudicial impact of the
evidence, the [c]ourt [found] that the prior bad acts in question
are not particularly inflammatory or emotionally charged. The risk
of undue prejudice is therefore de minimis. While the evidence
may provide context and assist the jury in understanding Stark’s
actions, it does not, in this instance, pose a substantial risk of
unfairly influencing the jury or overshadowing the primary issues
in this case.
- 24 -J-S44005-25
***
Additionally, . . . to mitigate any potential for undue prejudice,
directly after the affidavits of probable cause were introduced, the
[c]ourt instructed the jury as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, you have just heard evidence
tending to prove the defendant was involved in prior
robberies for which he is not on trial here. This evidence is
before you for a limited purpose. That is for the purpose of
tending to show common motive, intent, plan[,] and/or
opportunity. This evidence must not be considered by you
in any other way than for the purpose I just stated.
You must not regard this evidence as showing that the
defendant is a person of bad character or criminal
tendencies from which you might be inclined to infer guilt.
N.T. [Jury Trial (Day 4),] 9/9/24, at [] 48. The [c]ourt again
instructed the jury . . . at the conclusion of trial:
You have heard evidence tending to prove that the
defendant was involved in prior robberies for which he is not
on trial. I speak to the testimony of Detective Schoonover
to the effect that [] Stark was previously convicted of
robbery in Montgomery County, . . . Lehigh County, . . . and
Northampton County[.] This evidence is before you for a
limited purpose; that is, for the purpose of tending to show
common motive, intent, plan[,] and/or opportunity.
This evidence must not be considered by you in any way
other than for the purpose I just stated. You must not
regard this evidence as showing that the defendant is a
person of bad character or criminal tendencies from which
you might be inclined to infer guilt.
Id. at 135.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/25, at 14-18.
Our review of the record does not support the trial court’s determination
that Stark’s prior convictions are admissible to show modus operandi, intent,
- 25 -J-S44005-25
motive, and/or opportunity. Rather, our review reveals that Stark’s prior
convictions are clearly distinguishable from, and have absolutely zero
similarities to, the instant case. Simply put, there is no relevancy.
Stark’s prior robbery convictions introduced as evidence by the
Commonwealth can be summarized as follows: (1) Stark utilized a firearm to
steal money from a Taco Bell; (2) Stark utilized a firearm to steal money from
a Domino’s Pizza; and (3) Stark utilized a firearm to steal money from a Pizza
Hut. See id. at 14-15. In the Domino’s Pizza and Pizza Hut robberies, Stark
and a co-defendant forced the employees into walk-in freezers. See id.;
see also N.T. Jury Trial (Day 4), 9/9/24, at 37-49 (Detective Schoonover
testifying that in Domino’s Pizza and Pizza Hut robberies, Stark had an
accomplice and co-defendant). Simply put, Stark’s prior robbery convictions
all involved threatening, but not physically harming, restaurant employees
with a firearm and demanding small sums of money from their safes. See
Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/25, at 14-15; see also N.T. Jury Trial (Day 4),
9/9/24, at 37-49.
In the matter sub judice, there is no firearm, no evidence of robbery,
no forcing of anyone into a walk-in freezer, no evidence of co-defendants, and
Branning died. Stark did not kidnap anyone in his prior convictions and did
not kill anyone. Furthermore, in Stark’s 1990s robbery convictions he
neither threatened employees nor crossed any state lines. Suffice it to the
say there are absolutely no commonalities between Stark’s 1990s
robbery convictions and the instant events.
- 26 -J-S44005-25
More specifically, we disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that
Stark’s prior convictions fall within the ambit of the Rule 404(b)(2) exception.
See id. at 14-18. We emphasize that these prior convictions are so devoid of
similarities to the instant case that they simply cannot demonstrate plan,
motive, opportunity, or intent.
As they are related to each other, Stark’s 1990s robbery convictions
reveal his modus operandi as utilizing a firearm and threats to rob a chain
restaurant’s safe for small amounts of cash. See Walker, supra at 73
(modus operandi is “virtual signature” and mere “logical connection” between
crimes is insufficient to satisfy Rule 404(b)(2) exception). However, as noted
above, the instant case is over 25 years removed from those prior cases, has
no similarities to them, and, consequently, cannot be utilized to demonstrate
Stark had a common plan, scheme, or design. See id. (explaining that
“common plan, scheme, or design . . . [are not] distinct exceptions[, but are
used] interchangeably”). Therefore, Stark’s prior convictions do not satisfy
the modus operandi exception set forth in Rule 404(b)(2). See MelendezRodriguez, supra; Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1).
Further, Stark’s 1990s robbery convictions cannot satisfy the Rule
404(b)(2) exception demonstrating motive, opportunity, or intent. There are
no commonalties between Stark’s 1990s robbery convictions and the instant
case. More importantly, there is nothing in the record that even tends to
suggest that the instant offenses grew out of, or were in any way caused by,
his 1990s robbery convictions. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 387 A.2d
- 27 -J-S44005-25
835, 838 (Pa. 1978) (Rule 404(b)(2) “motive” exception requires
Commonwealth demonstrate crime currently on trial “grew out of or was in
any way caused by [] prior set of facts and circumstances”). 35 It is clear from
the record that Branning’s disappearance and death in no way grew out of or
were caused by Stark’s robberies of chain restaurants in the 1990s. See
Commonwealth v. Ross, 57 A.3d 85, 104 (Pa. Super. 2012) (reversing
murder conviction because trial court had improperly admitted evidence of
defendant’s past violent abuse of women as proof of common scheme to rape
and murder victim); see also Commonwealth v. Green, 271 A.3d 393, 404-05 (Pa. Super. 2021) (concluding prior shooting not sufficiently similar to
establish identity despite similar locations of crimes where crimes occurred 14
months apart and utilized different firearms). How these cases could be
considered at all related to the instant matter is beyond the understanding of
this Court, and the trial court made no effort to address Rule 404(b)(2)’s
35 The Commonwealth claims, in its brief, “Stark [] killed Branning to hide his
involvement in the [robbery of Branning] because [Stark] was the only actor with the opportunity or motive to do so.” Commonwealth’s Brief, at 18. The Commonwealth’s argument is misplaced and not in line with Martin.
Here, in order for the Commonwealth to satisfy the motive exception, Stark’s robbery and murder of Branning would have had to arise out of Stark’s robberies from the 1990s. See Martin, supra. There is no evidence to support such a contention and the Commonwealth presents no argument that it does. Rather, the Commonwealth contends that Stark was the only actor with the opportunity or motive to kill Branning. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 18. Yet, that claim falls short of Rule 404(b)(2)’s motive exception and, even if true, has no bearing on whether or not Stark’s 1990s robbery convictions are admissible.
- 28 -J-S44005-25
motive exception. As a result, we conclude that the trial court unequivocally
abused its discretion and erred in allowing the Commonwealth to introduce
Stark’s prior convictions as evidence in the instant trial. See MelendezRodriguez, supra; Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). For the same reasons, we conclude
that Stark’s 1990s robbery convictions were not admitted for a legitimate
purpose, but, rather, to paint Stark as a violent person who uses guns to
commit robberies. See Hairston, supra.
We likewise conclude that the trial court’s jury instructions did not cure
the undue prejudice. The jury instructions, quoted above, make clear that the
jury was only to consider those convictions for the limited purposes of showing
intent, motive, opportunity, or plan. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/25, at 18
(quoting jury instructions); see also Jury Trial (Day 4), 9/9/24, at 48 (first
jury instruction); see id. at 148 (second jury instruction). However, as we
have concluded that Stark’s 1990s robbery convictions, by law, were not
admissible for those purposes, it was inappropriate for the trial court, via
its ruling and jury instructions, to permit the jury to consider Stark’s 1990s
robbery convictions at all. Consequently, we conclude that the jury
instructions failed to ameliorate the undue prejudice caused by the admission
of Stark’s 1990s convictions.
In summation of our foregoing analysis, we conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion when it improperly admitted evidence of Stark’s robbery
convictions from 1994, 1995, and 1996, respectively. See Harris, supra.
Such evidence had no commonalities with the instant offenses and, as such,
- 29 -J-S44005-25
failed to satisfy any of the exceptions set forth in Rule 404(b)(2). Further,
the jury instructions failed to ameliorate the prejudice Stark suffered because
the jury could not have considered the evidence for the limited purposes
described by the trial court, constituting an error of law. We, therefore, are
constrained to conclude that the evidence was offered for no legitimate
purpose and, in any event, was more prejudicial than probative, and was
offered for propensity purposes, rather than to demonstrate modus operandi,
intent, motive, or opportunity. See Dillon, supra; Melendez-Rodriguez,
supra.
The trial court’s abuse of discretion, however, only justifies reversal if
the error was not harmless. See Commonwealth v. Hamlett, 234 A.3d 486,
492 (Pa. 2020) (appellate courts may raise harmless error sua sponte).
Our Supreme Court has defined harmless error as follows:
Although it is [] evident that error occurred, [an a]ppellant is not
entitled to a new trial if the error was harmless. An error will be
deemed harmless if: (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant
or the prejudice was de minimis; (2) the erroneously admitted
evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence
which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted
evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted
evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect
of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could
not have contributed to the verdict.
Commonwealth v. Markman, 916 A.2d 586, 603 (Pa. 2007) (citations and
quotations omitted).
“The harmless error doctrine, as adopted in Pennsylvania, reflects the
reality that the accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial.”
- 30 -J-S44005-25
Commonwealth v. Drummond, 775 A.2d 849, 853 (Pa. Super. 2001). “[A]n
error can be harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error is harmless.” Commonwealth v. Story,
383 A.2d 155, 162 (Pa. 1978) (emphasis added).
“If honest, fair[-]minded jurors might very well have brought in not
guilty verdicts, an error cannot be harmless on the basis of overwhelming
evidence.” Commonwealth v. Rasheed, 640 A.2d 896, 898 (Pa. 1994)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Where a court determines that the
evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the court must then “decide[] if the error
was so insignificant by comparison that it could not have contributed to the
verdict.” Id. Our Supreme Court has cautioned that “a conclusion that the
properly admitted evidence is so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of
the . . . error is so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error is harmless, is not to be arrived at lightly.”
Story, 383 A.2d at 166.
Instantly, the trial court addressed harmless error as follows:
The Commonwealth presented substantial and compelling
evidence of Stark’s guilt, including physical and forensic evidence
placing Stark in Branning’s vehicle, security footage of Stark in
Cape May, New Jersey[,] traveling in the vehicle, and[,] most
notably[,] the exact locations of Branning and Stark’s phones
through cell-site and GPS tracking. The jury’s verdict reflects their
careful consideration based on the overall weight of the evidence,
rather than any influence from the prior convictions. Thus, any
error that may have occurred in the admission of such evidence
did not affect the outcome of the trial.
- 31 -J-S44005-25
Stark’s prior conduct was not introduced to show that he ha[d] a
propensity for criminal behavior, but rather to show that the
conduct in question [wa]s consistent with Stark’s modus operandi
and to establish intent. The probative value of the evidence
outweighs any potential prejudice to Stark, especially with the
provision of a proper limiting instruction.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/18/25, at 18-19.
Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the abovedescribed error was not harmless and that Stark is entitled to a new trial. In
reaching this conclusion we rely heavily on the fact that the Commonwealth
conceded throughout this case that almost all of its evidence was
circumstantial, that there is virtually no direct evidence identifying Stark as a
kidnapper, robber, or murderer, and that there is no direct evidence that
Branning was even murdered. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 4), 9/9/24, at 103
(Commonwealth closing argument explaining most of its evidence was
circumstantial); see also Commonwealth’s Brief, at 20 (“Commonwealth’s
case-in-chief was, admittedly, mostly circumstantial”).
We conclude that evidence of Stark’s prior convictions could not be, and
was not, merely cumulative of other untainted evidence presented at trial.
See Markman, supra. Similarly, for the reasons stated above, we conclude
that the prejudice Stark incurred was not “de minimis.” The trial court’s error
in admitting Stark’s prior convictions was, without doubt, prejudicial, as it cast
Stark as someone who has repeatedly committed armed robbery. Such a
prejudicial light had virtually no probative value in the instant case where the
Commonwealth failed to present evidence that even a generically similar
armed robbery occurred. We emphasize that the admission of Stark’s 1990s
- 32 -J-S44005-25
robbery convictions effectively told the jury a story that Stark was armed with
a gun and threatened Branning. Without Stark’s 1990s robbery convictions,
the trial transcripts are entirely devoid of evidence that Stark employed any
weaponry, let alone a firearm, or threatened Branning in any way.
Given our conclusion that this evidence was not cumulative, not de
minimis, and, ultimately, was far more prejudicial than probative, we must
ascertain whether the other evidence was so overwhelming and that the
prejudicial effect was, thus, so insignificant by comparison that the trial court’s
error was harmless. See Markman, supra.
We conclude that the facts of this case are not so overwhelming that
the trial court’s admission of Stark’s prior convictions were harmless. We
reiterate and emphasize that, here, the Commonwealth’s direct evidence
demonstrated that Stark and Branning left Enchlor in the afternoon of October
15, 2021, and both men traveled to New Jersey, and then to the Kensington
section of Philadelphia. Throughout this trip, there is no evidence that either
of the two men communicated with anyone. That is the last shred of evidence
regarding the activities or location of Stark or Branning until October 27, 2021
and November 2, 2021, respectively. That is 12 days and 17 days,
respectively, before either of the men are seen again.
The Commonwealth presented almost no evidence that the men were
together during that period of time, with the exception of the time they
traveled together in New Jersey and Kensington. Seventeen days later,
Branning’s body was recovered in Maryland, and his vehicle was later located
- 33 -J-S44005-25
in Virginia in December of 2021. The Commonwealth further demonstrated
that, at least at some point between October 15, 2021, and October 27, 2021,
Stark operated Branning’s vehicle. See Commonwealth Exhibit C-66 (Stark’s
DNA present on steering wheel and other portions of vehicle). However, the
Commonwealth presented no direct evidence as to how or when Branning’s
body made it to Maryland, whether he was alive or dead when he arrived in
Maryland, or how or when Branning’s vehicle made it to Virginia. 36 Again, we
reiterate that the gap in time was 12 days from Stark’s disappearance on
October 15, 2021, until he was confirmed to be in Michigan on October 27,
2021. The time lapse is 17 days from Branning’s disappearance until the
recovery of his body on November 2, 2021, which was not identified until April
4, 2022. Finally, the time lapse pertaining to the discovery of Branning’s
vehicle is at least 45 days from October 15, 2021, when it was last seen on
the New Jersey turnpike, until December 2021, when it was located and
recovered in Falls Church, Virginia. Notably, there are at least 35 days
between October 27, 2021 and December 2021, when it would have been
virtually impossible for Stark to access the vehicle.
The above periods of time are wholly unaccounted for in the
Commonwealth’s evidence. Indeed, the Commonwealth presented no
36 The only possible connection of this case to Falls Church, Viginia that the
Commonwealth found was that Branning had an ex-girlfriend who lived in Virginia Beach, Virginia. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 2), 9/4/24, at 37 (Detective Schoonover testifying he interviewed Branning’s ex-girlfriend, who stated she had not spoken to Branning since 2017).
- 34 -J-S44005-25
evidence that Branning’s vehicle could not have been accessed, stolen, or
operated by someone else between October 15, 2021, and December of 2021.
The Commonwealth simply had no idea where the vehicle was during that
period or who may have operated it. In making these observations, we
emphasize that Stark and Branning were not the only DNA sources found in
the vehicle. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 2), 9/4/24, at 183 (Analyst Waldrip
testifying there was unidentified third male source of DNA on some items
tested in vehicle).
Further, after Branning’s body was discovered on November 2, 2011,
and ultimately identified on April 4, 2022, there are no fewer than four
different experts who examined the body, the maggots, and other conditions,
including but not limited to, the rainfall, temperature, and position of the body.
Two of these experts concluded that the cause of death and manner of
death are undetermined. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 3), 9/5/24, at 19-20
(Doctor Dean testifying cause and manner of death are undetermined); see
id. at 39-75 (Doctor Rodriguez testifying solely regarding time of death); see
id. at 102 (Doctor Dirkmaat testifying his examinations revealed no
perimortem injury, cause of death, or manner of death); see N.T. Jury Trial
(Day 4), 9/9/24, at 25 (Doctor Wallace testifying that he was not asked to
determine cause or manner of death). None of the experts can say how
Branning died. Not only can none of the experts explain how Branning died,
- 35 -J-S44005-25
but the investigators also never located a murder weapon or evidence of one. 37
Finally, none of the experts could even conclude that there was a homicide in
this case.
Because we cannot say with any degree of certainty that there was even
a homicide, let alone that the other offenses were committed, we conclude
that there is not overwhelming evidence to sustain Stark’s convictions. ____________________________________________
37 We note, as we did above, that three of the experts opine different times of
death. Doctor Rodriguez testified that Branning died within 5 days of November 2, 2021, which would have made it impossible for Stark to kill Branning because Stark was already in Michigan at that time. Doctor Dirkmaat testified that Branning died sometime between October 11, 2021, and November 2, 2021. Doctor Dirkmaat was not aware that his timeline
overlapped with when Branning was confirmed to still be alive by at least four days. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 3), 9/5/24, at 104 (Doctor Dirkmaat testifying that in estimating postmortem interval, he did not realize that his three-week estimate overlapped when Branning was alive by four days). Finally, Dr. Wallace, testified that he estimated time of colonization to be between 9:54 a.m. on October 23, 2021, and 5:54 p.m. on October 29, 2021. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 4), 9/9/24, at 18-19. Doctor Wallace explained that time of colonization can happen almost immediately or could be delayed, or even reset, by a number of environmental factors that he had insufficient data to account for. See id.
In any event, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must, we are unable to resolve these discrepancies. Even if we discount all expert opinion regarding a timeline that would either exonerate Stark or make the Commonwealth’s case implausible, the expert testimony still fails to illuminate how Branning died. Again, none of the experts could explain Branning’s cause or manner of death. There are no direct witnesses, there are no detectable injuries to Branning’s body, and the Commonwealth’s evidence that there was even a murder is entirely
circumstantial, even speculative. In short, even assuming, arguendo, that Branning died sometime between the evening of October 15, 2021, when he and Stark disappeared, and October 27, 2021, when Stark was confirmed to be in Michigan, there is simply not overwhelming evidence to demonstrate that Stark killed Branning.
- 36 -J-S44005-25
Accordingly, the trial court’s error cannot be and is not harmless and we are
compelled to vacate Stark’s convictions and remand for a new trial consistent
with this opinion.38
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for a new trial.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Dubow, J., Joins the Opinion.
Sullivan, J., Files a Concurring Statement.
Date: 7/22/2026
38 In light of our disposition, we need not address Stark’s remaining claim. However, we note that it is somewhat intertwined with the above-discussed Rule 404(b) prior bad acts claim. In particular, during Detective Schoonover’s testimony, wherein he presented the jury with Stark’s 1990s robbery convictions, he also referenced a prior arrest of Stark for which he had not been convicted and that the trial court had previously ruled was inadmissible. See N.T. Jury Trial (Day 4), 9/9/24, at 49-53 (Stark’s Rule 404(b) objection and discussion of trial court’s prior ruling). Nevertheless, we need not address whether this was error.
- 37 -